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Abstract
As the global leader in incarceration, America locks up its own citizens at a rate that dwarfs that of any
other developed nation. Yet while racial minorities and the urban poor fill American prisons and jails for
street crimes, the state has historically struggled to consistently prosecute corporate crime. Why does the
American state lock people up for street crimes at extraordinary rates but demonstrate such a limited
capacity to prosecute corporate crime? While most scholarship analyzes these questions separately,
juxtaposing these phenomena illuminates how the carceral state’s divergent treatments of street crime
and corporate crime share common and self-reinforcing ideological and institutional origins. Analyzing
intellectual history, policy debates, and institutional change relating to the politics of street crime and
corporate crime from 1870 through today demonstrates how the class biases of contemporary crime
policy emerged and took root during multiple junctures in U.S. history, including the Gilded Age,
Progressive Era, New Deal, and post-war period. This reveals that political constructions of street
criminals as pathological deviants and corporate criminals as honorable people driven to crime by market
dynamics have consistently been rooted in common ideas about what causes and constitutes crime. By
the 1960s, these developments embedded class inequalities into the criminal justice institutions that
facilitated the carceral state’s rise while the regulatory state became the government’s primary means of
controlling corporate crime. The historical development of mass incarceration, the corporate criminal law,
and regulatory state should not be viewed as autonomous developmental threads, but as processes that
have overlapped and intersected in ways that have reinforced politically constructed understandings
about what counts as “crime” and who counts as a “criminal.”
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ABSTRACT
PUNISHMENT AND PRIVILEGE: THE POLITICS OF CLASS, CRIME, AND
CORPORATIONS IN AMERICA
Anthony Grasso
Marie Gottschalk

As the global leader in incarceration, America locks up its own citizens at a rate that
dwarfs that of any other developed nation. Yet while racial minorities and the urban poor
fill American prisons and jails for street crimes, the state has historically struggled to
consistently prosecute corporate crime. Why does the American state lock people up for
street crimes at extraordinary rates but demonstrate such a limited capacity to prosecute
corporate crime? While most scholarship analyzes these questions separately, juxtaposing
these phenomena illuminates how the carceral state’s divergent treatments of street crime
and corporate crime share common and self-reinforcing ideological and institutional
origins. Analyzing intellectual history, policy debates, and institutional change relating to
the politics of street crime and corporate crime from 1870 through today demonstrates
how the class biases of contemporary crime policy emerged and took root during multiple
junctures in U.S. history, including the Gilded Age, Progressive Era, New Deal, and postwar period. This reveals that political constructions of street criminals as pathological
deviants and corporate criminals as honorable people driven to crime by market dynamics
have consistently been rooted in common ideas about what causes and constitutes crime.
By the 1960s, these developments embedded class inequalities into the criminal justice
v

institutions that facilitated the carceral state’s rise while the regulatory state became the
government’s primary means of controlling corporate crime. The historical development
of mass incarceration, the corporate criminal law, and regulatory state should not be
viewed as autonomous developmental threads, but as processes that have overlapped and
intersected in ways that have reinforced politically constructed understandings about
what counts as “crime” and who counts as a “criminal.”
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CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICS OF CLASS, CRIME, AND CORPORATIONS IN
AMERICA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
“Laws are like cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but
let wasps and hornets break through.”
-Jonathan Swift, 17071
Nearly a decade has passed since the onset of the Great Recession. The economy
has made steady improvements in that time, but the economic collapse reshaped the lives
of millions of people who lost their homes, jobs, and savings in its wake. The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission’s 2011 report indicated that the recession was not just an
accident. The word “fraud” was used over 150 times to describe the actions of the
financial officers and agents who precipitated the crisis.2 In 2010, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to comprehensively
reform the financial industry, create a Consumer Financial Protection Board, and
mandate new regulations on high-risk financial instruments and speculative trading. At
the bill signing, President Barack Obama stated that “unless your business model depends
on cutting corners or bilking your customers, you’ve got nothing to fear from reform.”3
Obama’s statement seemed to offer a real promise that through Dodd-Frank, the
state would rein in financial fraud and never let a similar disaster unfold again. But such
bold rhetoric is not new to American politics. In the early 2000s, the energy-trading
company Enron perpetrated one of the biggest frauds in U.S. history with help from the
1

Jonathan Swift, “A Tritical Essay Upon the Faculties of the Mind (1707),” in The Works of Jonathan
Swift, vol. IX (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1814), 338.
2
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States” (Washington:
Government Printing Office, January 2011); Jed S. Rakoff, “The Financial Crisis: Why Have No
High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,” The New York Review of Books, January 9, 2014.
3
“Obama’s Remarks at the Signing Ceremony,” New York Times, July 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate-text.html?mcubz=0.
1

accounting firm Arthur Andersen. After Enron’s collapse, Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 to monitor corporate accounting, auditing, and financial disclosures.
Upon signing the bill, President George W. Bush said, “Every corporate official who has
chosen to commit a crime can expect to face the consequences.”4 Years earlier, President
George H.W. Bush made similar claims. Over 1,000 Savings & Loan Associations
(“S&Ls”) shuttered in the 1980s upon going insolvent as financiers profited through risky
speculative investments and junk bond operations. After the collapse, Bush signed the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, stating, “This legislation
will…put in place permanent reforms so these problems will never happen again.”5
It is a recurring pattern for policymakers to “discover” the problem of corporate
crime and provide a solution only to “discover” it again during the next crisis.6 In spite of
this, the state has never developed the ongoing capacity to prosecute corporate crime.
This stands in contrast to the broader development of the criminal justice system. As the
global leader in incarceration, America locks up its own citizens at a rate that dwarfs that
of any other developed nation. Yet while racial minorities and the urban poor fill prisons
and jails for property crime, drug use, and violent crime, the state has struggled to punish
those who have made millions of dollars at the cost of ruining millions of lives.
Industry leaders who cause such massive collapses routinely defend themselves as
different from and more redeemable than the street criminals penalized so harshly by the
4

George W. Bush, “Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” July 30, 2002,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73333.
5
Nathaniel Nash, “Savings Cure May Kill the Patient,” New York Times, August 3, 1990,
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/03/business/savings-cure-may-kill-the-patient.html?mcubz=0.
6
William Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds: The Failure of Corporate Criminal Liability
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 69; Robert Tillman, Henry Pontell, and William Black,
Financial Crime and Crises in the Era of False Profits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.
2

justice system. After the collapse of Enron, its CEO Jeffrey Skilling famously insisted
that, “We are the good guys…We are on the side of the angels.”7 Angelo Mozilo, the
CEO of Countrywide who drove his company deep into the sub-prime mortgage business
prior to the Great Recession, asserted that “we didn’t do anything wrong” and that the
“tides go in and out. This is just another tide.”8 Even after precipitating economic
devastation, it has been commonplace for executives to defend themselves as rational and
morally upright community leaders who should not be confused with common criminals.
Herein lies the project’s fundamental puzzle: why does the American state
excessively incarcerate the urban poor and racial minorities for street crimes while
turning a blind eye to the crimes of corporate executives which, in many ways, are far
more damaging than everyday street crimes?9 Scholars offer a variety of answers. For
one, corporate actors can defend themselves with well-financed legal teams that most
defendants cannot afford.10 Accounts of “too big to fail” politics have argued that the
state also views corporations as “too big to jail” and fears that punishing corporate crime

7

ABC News, “Enron’s Ex-CEO Skilling on Hot Seat,” ABC News, January 6, 2016,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87377&page=1.
8
Julia La Roche, “ANGELO MOZILO: ‘No, No, No, We Didn’t Do Anything Wrong,’” Business
Insider, September 2, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/mozilo-says-he-did-not-do-anythingwrong-2014-9.
9
For analyses of the extent of annual damage inflicted through corporate crime, see Michael L.
Benson, Shanna R. Van Slyke, and Francis T. Cullen, “Core Themes in the Study of White-Collar
Crime,” in The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime, ed. Shanna R. Van Slyke, Michael L.
Benson, and Francis T. Cullen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–24; Michael Levi,
“Sentencing Respectable Offenders,” in The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime, ed. Shanna R.
Van Slyke, Michael L. Benson, and Francis T. Cullen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016),
582–602; Russell Mokhiber, “20 Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime,” Harvard Law
Record, March 24, 2015, http://hlrecord.org/2015/03/20-things-you-should-know-about-corporatecrime/.
10
Matt Taibbi, The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap (New York: Spiegel and
Grau, 2014); David O. Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society
(Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 1997).
3

could hurt the economy.11 Historically oriented scholars suggest that deregulation and the
growth of the financial industry since the 1980s has glorified corporate crime as a social
good.12 And well-resourced corporations can use their political and financial clout to
capture regulatory agencies and shape legislation in their favor.13
These are all valuable explanations for why the state has struggled to prosecute
corporate crime during the late twentieth century prison boom. But while they are not
wrong, they are incomplete. These arguments are ahistorical, as the state struggled to
punish corporate crime well before the 1980s.14 And to the detriment of the literature,
scholars typically analyze corporate crime in isolation from the politics that have driven
mass incarceration.15 This has left unexplored how the political development of the
carceral state and the state’s stunted capacity to punish corporate crime are related.
Alternatively, this dissertation juxtaposes these phenomena to illustrate how the
criminal justice system’s divergent treatments of street crime and corporate crime share

11

Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (Cambridge:
Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2014).
12
Tillman, Pontell, and Black, Financial Crime and Crises; John Hagan, Who Are the Criminals? The
Politics of Crime Policy from the Age of Roosevelt to the Age of Reagan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2010); Rana Foroohar, Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of
American Business (New York: Crown Business, 2016).
13
Gregg Barak, Theft of a Nation: Wall Street Looting and Regulatory Colluding (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2012); Daniel Carpenter and David Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special
Interest Influence and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Gretchen
Morgenson, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to
Economic Armageddon (New York: Times Books, 2011); for a good review of literature
demonstrating that the costs of white-collar crime outweigh the costs of street crime by several orders
of magnitude, see Benson, Van Slyke, and Cullen, “Core Themes in the Study of White-Collar
Crime,” 13–14; see Rebecca Katz, “United States,” in Encyclopedia of White-Collar and Corporate
Crime, ed. Lawrence Salinger, vol. 2 (New York: SAGE, 2005), 838–41 for an argument that the costs
of corporate crime are uniquely high in the U.S. since it is the world’s preeminent capitalist power.
14
Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (New York:
Harper and Row, 1975); Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds.
15
Hagan, Who Are the Criminals?; Taibbi, The Divide are two notable exceptions that will be
discussed.
4

common and self-reinforcing ideological and institutional origins.16 This demonstrates
that the historical development of mass incarceration, corporate criminal law, and the
regulatory state should not be understood as autonomous developmental threads. These
processes have intersected and overlapped in ways that reinforce politically constructed
understandings about what counts as crime and who counts as a criminal. Divergent
political constructions of street criminality and corporate criminality have regularly been
rooted in common currents in American political thought and criminological discourse.
While the street criminal has been constructed as pathological, irredeemable, and
deserving of incarceration, the corporate criminal has been constructed as a rational, selfinterested individual whose behavior can be guided with mild regulatory interventions.
By examining how prevailing intellectual and ideological discourses about crime
shaped institutional development, criminal justice, and regulatory policy since 1870, this
project illustrates how the punitive character and class biases of contemporary U.S. crime
policy emerged and took root. Since the late nineteenth century, policymakers have relied
on prevailing ideologies about what causes and constitutes crime to design policy. This
facilitated the construction of a criminal justice system designed to punish the poor and a
regulatory state built to channel the wealthy away from criminal sanction.
The origins of these institutional arrangements can be found in late nineteenth
century politics, when scholars of the emergent school of criminal anthropology
articulated new ideas about crime. They posited that the criminal was a naturally

16

"Street crime" technically refers to crimes committed in public, including property crime and
vandalism, but is more commonly used to refer to crimes common among lower class citizens,
including drug use and violent crime. "Corporate crime" refers to crime committed by a corporate
entity or by employees acting on behalf of a corporation.
5

occurring phenomenon with a biological constitution predisposed to violence and
amorality. Criminal anthropologists built on evolutionary and eugenic research that
attributed poverty and inequality to individuals’ biological dispositions, and thus operated
with a preconceived notion that the likely criminal was a lower-class citizen. They
consequently focused on behaviors common among disadvantaged populations. This
imbued criminal anthropology with a series of a priori assumptions about what counted
as crime and who was a likely criminal that instilled class biases into crime discourse.
Policymakers used these ideas to justify punishments for populations viewed as
pathologically criminal, including blacks, immigrants, organized labor, and the poor.
Arguably criminal behaviors took on different substantive meanings when
committed by people who did not fit this image of the criminal type. This is visible in late
nineteenth century discourses about economic regulation and the robber barons. Debates
about regulating the new large corporations dominating the economy and the men
running them hinged less on whether executives did “bad things” and more on whether
they were judged to be “bad people.” The economically motivated businessman was seen
as an inversion of the natural criminal, a man whose virtuous disposition was not inclined
to crime. Once judged as non-criminal persons, the debatably criminal actions of
executives were rationalized as outcomes of healthy market dynamics and capitalist selfinterest rather than criminal temperaments. This framing provided for a stark contrast
from prevailing discourses of criminality that depicted lower-class offenders as inherently
defective. The regulatory state was in part designed as an alternative to the criminal
justice system for respectable offenders who did not warrant punishment and could be
monitored through carefully crafted rules intended to guide their behavior.
6

These developments established ideological and institutional precedents that
conditioned subsequent crime politics. From the Gilded Age through Progressive Era,
New Deal, and post-war period, criminal justice institutions developed to identify and
punish people deemed pathologically prone to criminality. Through the twentieth century,
crime and regulatory politics remained frontloaded with class biases inherited from late
nineteenth century politics. Interpretive understandings of the “corporate criminal” never
matched established ideas of the natural criminal guiding the development of the criminal
justice system, so the regulatory state channeled corporate actors away from the prison.
By comparing how street crime and corporate crime have been politicized, the
project provides new insights into the class disparities of American criminal justice. The
limited prosecution of corporate crime has persisted alongside a growing carceral state
because distinct conceptions of street and corporate criminality have been embedded into
state institutions. These ideas are rooted in shared ideologies about what causes and
constitutes crime that have been hardened through the development of the criminal justice
system and regulatory state. Strategies to dismantle the carceral state and enhance the
prosecution of corporate crime must recognize how political constructions of different
types of criminality guide the state’s responses to different varieties of criminal behavior.
The project makes five major contributions to extant scholarship. First, it speaks
to research about ideas and institutions in American political development (APD). Crime
policy is an important area to study the interplay of ideas and institutions. Political actors
have regularly deployed and modified intellectual and ideological constructs of crime to
advance their goals and shape who and what is considered criminal in American law.
7

Second, the project insists that scholars of the carceral state be attentive to the
Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Contemporary law-and-order rhetoric attributes crime,
especially among lower-class citizens, to individual personal faults while obscuring the
structural roots of crime.17 This mirrors nineteenth-century discourses about the
biological pathologies of criminals. This is no simple coincidence. Ideas associated with
bio-essentialist crime theory shaped the carceral state’s institutional foundation and
conditioned the evolution of crime discourse over the twentieth century. The distinction
that street criminals are pathologically irredeemable and corporate criminals are
respectable and rational took shape and was sewn into institutional frameworks in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After biological crime ideologies were
discredited in the mid-twentieth century, political actors continued to operate within an
institutional context embedded with class-skewed practices and premises informed by
biological theory. This tied policymakers to a governing class ideology of crime even
after explicitly biological ideas of criminality and human behavior declined in influence.
A third contribution is to analyses of corporate crime. Scholars acknowledge that
regulatory agencies have discretion to respond to corporate crime through administrative
controls, but rarely explore the political basis of this institutional design. This project
explores how ideational constructs of the corporate criminal have shaped regulatory
development and the state’s underdeveloped ability to prosecute corporate crime.
The project also speaks to literature about the regulatory state. Scholars often fail
to recognize how debates about regulatory policy have been intertwined with debates

17

Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Street Crime: Criminal Process and Cultural Obsession
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
8

about crime. Dating back to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s creation in 1887,
regulatory agencies have internalized a political construct of the corporate criminal that is
less “criminal” than lower-class offenders. This project’s wide historical lens highlights
how and why the regulatory state was designed to siphon off corporate crime from the
criminal justice system while investigating the effects this has had on American politics.
A fifth contribution is to literature on business-government relations in the U.S.
Corporations are uniquely powerful interests, but research often overlooks nuances in
how they exercise their power. In debates over regulation, corporate actors have secured
their favored policies by framing their policy preferences within prevailing political,
social, and economic discourses. Corporate actors who have drawn on dominant ideas
about criminality to frame their preferences in these debates have been more successful
than those who attempted to use sheer force to attain their goals. By speaking to dominant
discourses of a moment, strategic business leaders have made their policy goals appealing
to policymakers. This illustrates how political and ideational discourses can condition the
range of policies that can be pursued at a given moment, even by powerful interests.
Class and criminality have been mutually constitutive constructs in American
politics. Class hierarchy and street criminality have regularly been explained as products
of a shared set of faults among lower-class citizens. With pathological constructions of
street criminality embedded into the criminal justice system and respectable constructions
of corporate criminality embedded into the regulatory state, both institutions reflect and
reinforce a class-skewed understanding of who and what counts as “criminal.”
The relations between the carceral state, corporate criminal law, and regulatory
state are underappreciated in current scholarship. Analyzing these developmental threads
9

together reveals understudied dynamics about U.S. crime politics that have shaped public
policies and institutions traditionally not considered in broader analyses of American
criminal justice. The shared roots of the state’s divergent treatments of street crime and
corporate crime must be fully understood if they are to be transformed.
Project Overview
The project’s timeline encompasses several periods of American political
development. Beginning in 1870, policy and institutional change is traced through the
Gilded Age, Progressive Era, New Deal, post-war period, and Great Society. By relying
on an examination of intellectual history in conjunction with primary source analyses of
legislative histories, case law, agency documents, and archival sources, the project
connects shifting ideas about crime to institutional development and policy change. This
illustrates how political developments ingrained class inequalities into the criminal justice
institutions that have facilitated the carceral state’s rise since the 1960s while the
regulatory state has become the state’s primary means of controlling corporate crime.
To highlight differences and commonalities in how policymakers have
conceptualized street and corporate criminality, the empirical chapters are structured into
pairs. The first pair examines the Gilded Age, with chapter two focusing on the politics of
street crime from roughly 1870 through 1900 and chapter three studying the politics of
corporate crime during the same period. Chapters four and five are organized similarly to
examine the early twentieth century Progressive Era, and chapters six and seven study the
politics of street crime and corporate crime from the Great Depression through 1960s.
Many scholars identify the politics of the 1960s as a proximate trigger for the
prison boom, pointing to the southern strategy and conservative backlash to civil rights
10

and Johnson’s War on Poverty as ushering in a new brand of punitive politics that
facilitated the rise of the carceral state.18 Scholars of business history also emphasize the
importance of the 1960s, when the rise of consumerism promoted robust regulatory
reforms that led to a significant uptick in the political mobilization of corporations.19 This
project illustrates how common institutional and ideological roots influenced both of
these developments. The basis for contemporary punitive crime politics was laid over the
course of the previous century when ideological frameworks stigmatizing street criminals
as pathological shaped the institutional terrain on which the carceral state evolved.
During the same period, the channeling of corporate crime into regulatory arenas was
facilitated by elements of this crime discourse. In the 1960s, this institutional context
steered anti-business impulses towards regulatory rather than criminal justice reform.
This reveals how the ideological and institutional basis for a class-biased system of mass
incarceration originated out of long-standing trends in American politics.
The dissertation takes 1870 as its analytic starting point for several reasons. First,
in the late nineteenth century, large corporations emerged and developed in ways that
adapted to and reshaped the American economy.20 Business crimes were not new in the

18

Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the
1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the
Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 21, no. 2 (Fall
2007): 230–65; Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
19
David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (Washington:
Beard Books, 1989), 16–37; Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How
Washington Made the Rich Richer--and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2010), 95–115; Timothy Werner and Graham Wilson, “Business Representation in
Washington, DC,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government, ed. David Coen, Wyn
Grant, and Graham Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 261–84.
20
Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The
11

late 1800s, but the size of corporations altered the scope of corporate crime and its
character as a social and political problem. As corporations became capable of abuses on
an unprecedented scale, American business posed new challenges to American politics.
This periodization does not imply that there was no status differentiation in
punishment prior to 1870. Criminal codes entailed class biases long before the industrial
revolution, and racial biases were written into southern Black Codes after the Civil
War.21 But early nineteenth century criminal justice was localized and municipalities kept
poor records, leaving it difficult to study who was punished and why during these years.22
The few analyses that try find that states fostered a relative equality in punishment when
compared to Europe, sentencing planters and laborers to comparable rates of monetary,
carceral, and corporal sanctions in the colonial era and nineteenth century.23 However,
these analyses use unreliable data, and the emergence of large corporations in the late
nineteenth century changed the nature of inequality in American society.

Expansion of National and Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1982); Richard Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in
American Business, 1895-1904 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
21
William Chambliss, “A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy,” Social Problems 12, no. 1
(Summer 1964): 67–77; David Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of
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The project also begins in 1870 because crime politics experienced a critical shift
at this moment. Preceding 1870, American penology was largely built on the classical
school of criminology. This philosophy embodied the ideas of Cesare Beccaria, who
linked criminal sanction to deterrence and claimed that punishment should be swift,
certain, and proportional to the crime committed in order to deter criminal behavior.
Beccaria said sentences should not be too severe because he ascribed a degree of
rationality to the potential criminal and assumed that he or she could be deterred through
moderate sanctions.24 Then in 1870, the American Congress of Corrections published its
“Declaration of Principles” directing U.S. prisons to focus on rehabilitating offenders.25
The rehabilitative ideal went on to supplant deterrence-based penology and older
philosophies of punishment.26 But rehabilitative ideology’s nominal progressivism was
compromised by its reliance on the developing school of criminal anthropology.
Founded by Italian scholar Cesare Lombroso, criminal anthropology attributed
criminal behavior to the biological constitution of offenders. Lombroso claimed to
identify physiological characteristics and congenital atavistic traits that were indicative of
a primitive biological inheritance predisposed to criminal behavior. He referred to
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individuals with such traits as “born criminals.”27 Scholars of crime and human behavior
readily imported Lombrosian philosophy to America, fitting it into an intellectual context
favoring eugenics and scientific racism. Combining criminal anthropology with biodeterministic research on poverty, scholars proceeded to link socioeconomic inequality
and crime to a singular defective biology. This caused criminal anthropological scholars
to narrowly focus on crimes associated with lower class and poor populations. 28
Scholars relied on this work to design two prongs of the rehabilitative ideal—one
premised on reforming and releasing inmates and another on punishing those deemed
“incorrigibles” who proved immune to reform. The incorrigibles concept reflected
Lombroso’s idea of born criminals. Incorrigibles were viewed as driven by natural
biological impulses that left them irrational, rendering Beccarian deterrence philosophy
useless and warranting severe rather than moderate punishment. This construct of
incorrigibility was imbued with the class biases that shaped criminal anthropology. By
taking for granted what counted as crime and who was likely to commit it, rehabilitative
ideology narrowly defined who counted as a criminal by focusing on lower-class citizens
while obscuring the structural roots of crime under an emphasis on individual defects.
The influence of biological theories of behavior was not limited to studies of
crime and poverty. Similar themes appeared in the work of economists like William
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Graham Sumner who used Herbert Spencer’s concept of “social Darwinism” to
rationalize capitalist economics. The disadvantages of lower classes were attributed to
their pathologies, but capitalists’ successes were credited to their natural superiority, an
argument that was readily accepted by leaders of industry. With natural selection serving
as a biological apology for the inequalities of capitalism, these ideas synthesized the
glorification of Protestant ethic, classical economics, and evolutionary theory in a way
that justified conservative thought and opposition to proposals for economic regulation.29
Legislators and corporate interests articulated comparable ideas in debates over
the criminal provisions in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. This logic formed the
basis of a regulatory ideology deployed by lawmakers and leaders of major railroads.
According to this perspective, executives were driven by healthy self-interest and market
dynamics, not amoral dispositions. Even if their actions shared affinities with crimes like
theft, their behaviors took on new substantive meanings because they were committed by
respected members of society. The economically motivated capitalist was not a born
criminal, but a man who rose to the top by virtue of his character. Even if he engaged in
harmful or unethical behavior, he did not require penalization to change his ways.
Regulatory ideology shaped the design of the Interstate Commerce Commission
as an alternative to criminal courts for controlling railroads. Regulatory ideology does not
rule out criminal sanction for corporate actors but gives regulators the discretion to
respond to criminal behavior through civil and regulatory sanctions. These are not simply
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alternatives to incarceration the way fines or probation are, which are substitutes or
supplements to imprisonment in the wake of a conviction. In the regulatory approach,
agencies are permitted to respond to prosecutable criminal behavior through responses
like cease and desist orders, injunctions, or warning letters that do not carry the stigma of
criminality. In this way, a corporate actor can commit multiple offenses, be sanctioned
through administrative interventions each time, and never once be charged with a crime.
The regulatory approach permits regulators to ascribe alternative meanings to behaviors
legally defined as criminal by using regulatory sanctions in lieu of prosecution and
emphasizing market dynamics as the targets of reform rather than individuals.
Rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies work together to serve projects of class
sorting and ideological messaging. Rehabilitative ideology sorts lower-class offenders
into prisons for either rehabilitation or containment, while regulatory ideology sorts
corporate offenders into administrative venues under the presumption that businesspeople
are rational individuals who will be responsive to mild sanctions. Together, they send a
message that only certain types of people count as “criminal” and deserve punishment.
With the rise of rehabilitative ideology, policy debates over crime became
centered less on questions of what to punish and more on questions of who to punish.
This was different from earlier modes of crime theory, such as deterrence or retributivist
schools, which emphasized consistency in punishment for criminal acts.30 Rehabilitative
thought rested on the notion that punishment should be individualized. Two people

30

Andrew Von Hirsch and Committee for the Study of Incarceration, Doing Justice: The Choice of
Punishments: Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration (New York, Hill and Wang,
1976) on Kantian retributivism, which emphasized punishment as a means of correcting the moral
imbalance produced by a criminal act; Beccaria, On Crime and Punishment.
16

convicted of the same crime must receive different sentences if they have different
dispositions and rehabilitative potential. Alternatively, regulatory ideology was built on
the idea that corporate criminals did not fit the conventional ideational construct of the
“criminal” frontloaded with class-skewed assumptions. These ideologies have become
entrenched in the criminal justice system and regulatory state over time, embedding
premises and practices into institutional arrangements that have preserved a durable class
ideology of punishment long after Lombrosian theory was refuted.
Although they are few and far between, there have been scattered historical
examples of financiers being convicted of crimes. But juxtaposing the development of the
carceral and regulatory states highlights that harshly punishing corporate criminals would
exacerbate the problems of mass incarceration, which is overlooked by many scholars of
corporate crime. Savage sentences for those like Bernie Madoff (150 years) and Sholam
Weiss (845 years) satiate public demands for punishing white-collar criminals.31 These
cases are exceptions, not the norm, and they defuse political demands for systematic
change to the political economy and regulatory state by making examples out of a few.
Subjecting a handful of corporate criminals to brutal sentences obfuscates how
regulatory ideology has inhibited the state from developing the consistent will and
capacity to prosecute corporate crime. Instead of calling for harsh justice for corporate
offenders, this project complements the responsive regulation model of John Braithwaite
and Ian Ayres. In their model, regulators rely on a “regulatory sanctions pyramid,”
initially responding to corporate offenses through regulatory tools before escalating to
31
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criminal sanctions for repeated or dangerous behavior.32 They theorize that this would
encourage regulators to employ a mix of sanctions that would deter corporate crime, a
notion that has received empirical validation from scholars of corporate crime
deterrence.33 This indicates that the more regular prosecution of serious and repeated
behavior coupled with modest sentences would more effectively deter corporate crime
than the inconsistent use of prosecution coupled with wildly harsh sentences.34
Policy choices made in the nineteenth century established discursive parameters
and institutional arrangements that conditioned the development of crime and regulatory
policy through the twentieth century. The institutional bifurcation of street crime and
corporate crime hardened class divisions in American society by stigmatizing one class of
offenders as more “criminal” than the other. With rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies
embedded into the criminal justice system and regulatory state, policymakers remained
tied to a class ideology of punishment that made it difficult to conceptualize street and
corporate criminality in comparable terms. Assessing these developments relies on
research about ideas and institutions in American political development, the carceral
state, corporate criminal law, regulatory state, and business-government relations.
Ideas, Institutions, and American Political Development
Recent work in the APD canon has closely explored the relationship between
ideas and political development.35 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek contend that
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authoritative coalitions within political orders alter the ideas channeled through
institutions to guide development.36 Skowronek has also argued that policymakers can
recover political purchase in old ideas by modifying their purposes in pursuit of new
goals.37 Robert Lieberman has claimed that development springs from “friction” between
mismatched institutional and ideational patterns that become uncomfortably situated
within one another over time.38 While these scholars provide frameworks for assessing
how ideas can facilitate or impede change, Rogers Smith’s “spiral of politics” model
offers a general theory of how political actors, ideas, and institutions interact. According
to the theory, political development occurs within an environment of established
institutions and ideas. Political actors can use preexisting ideas to promote coalition
formation and change, which modifies the ideational and institutional universe. While
actors can exert agency by articulating new ideas, prevailing ideational and institutional
patterns can also condition development and constrain the expression of new ideas.39
The spiral model helps to explain how, why, and when political actors use ideas
by directing attention onto the varying processes through which ideas and institutions can
promote change and stability. It complements the work of scholars who have emphasized
Sheingate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 142–62 on the history of ideational and
historical institutionalist (HI) scholarship; for arguments that HI and ideational research should be
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how political actors use ideas to build coalitions, persuade opponents, and induce
institutional change.40 The theory also recognizes that while history can limit the
potential avenues for change, it is not deterministic, as path dependencies can abruptly
change at punctuated junctures or development can unfold gradually through layering or
drift.41 It also stresses timing and sequence, as major changes can be driven by seemingly
minor or contingent events that can establish rigid developmental trajectories. This
project relies on the spiral model to examine the role of ideas in American crime politics
because it captures a variety of dynamics that can shape political development.
Ideas about what causes and constitutes crime and how the state can best respond
to it have been crucial to American political development. A range of ideational forces
has shaped crime politics since the colonial era, including Puritan principles, racial
ideologies, and law-and-order politics.42 Understudied in this literature are the legacies of
biological theories of crime and rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies, which instilled
class biases into the label of criminality that have solidified over time.
These class biases have been hardened by ideational and institutional forces. For
instance, chapter four illustrates that twentieth century variants of crime theory associated
40
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with psychology and culture maintained a focus on individual defects inherited from
criminal anthropology. Chapter six shows that while some scholars of the 1930s broke
from criminology’s focus on individual faults by attributing crime to social and economic
forces, policymakers channeled these ideas into rehabilitative frameworks that reoriented
them to focus on individual defects rather than macro-economic reform. This
demonstrates how new ideas can be reshaped by existing institutional contexts. Although
untied from biological theory, policymakers in the 1930s operated in an institutional
setting infected with the class-biased premises of biological crime ideologies.
Modern penal practices continue to reflect the principles of rehabilitative
ideology. For instance, sentences remain individually tailored based on defendants’
personal traits and behavioral histories. Even strict sentencing guidelines consider an
offender’s criminal history. America’s reliance on criminal history in sentencing is highly
unusual in comparative perspective, and it is largely a legacy of the rehabilitative ideal
and its emphasis on sentencing individualization.43 Contemporary labels for recidivists
like “career criminal” mirror ideas about natural criminality and remain colored with
class-biased assumptions about who is likely to rehabilitate or recidivate.44 In contrast,
while prosecutors and judges view deterrence as paramount in white-collar cases,
favorable impressions and preconceived notions of white-collar criminals check their
impulse to punish “respectable” offenders viewed as unlikely to recidivate.45
43
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Regulatory ideology has also remained a persistent force in political development.
After shaping the Interstate Commerce Commission in the nineteenth century, regulatory
ideology has been repackaged by different coalitions over time. Those evolving coalitions
reflected shifts in the relative power of different sectors of the political economy. While
railroads were the first advocates of the regulatory model in the nineteenth century, the
financial sector adapted it in the early twentieth century. By the New Deal, Wall Street
financiers, investment bankers, and securities exchanges were leading proponents of
regulatory ideology. These ideas travelled over time due to changes in the political
economy that led different coalitions to repurpose them for historically specific
circumstances. By the 1930s, regulatory ideology was so institutionally ingrained that
even foes of corporate power in the Roosevelt administration accepted tenets of
regulatory ideology in ways that limited the state’s will to initiate corporate prosecutions.
Changes in the social sciences also altered how rehabilitative and regulatory
ideologies were politicized. Initially articulated by sociologists and anthropologists, these
ideologies were reshaped by eugenicists, cultural theorists, and economists in the
twentieth century. In the New Deal era and mid-twentieth century, new ideas articulated
by social structure and conflict theorists were stifled by rigid institutional frameworks
built upon rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies.
The project links an analysis of intellectual history to political development
through primary source analyses of legislative histories, case law, and commission and
agency documents. This tracks how various coalitions and political actors deployed ideas
Combating Corporate Crime: Local Prosecutors at Work (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
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about crime to pursue policy change and institutional development. It shows how these
ideas have promoted punitive policies for street criminals and regulatory sanctions for
corporate offenders based on shared assumptions about what it means to be a criminal.
Race, Class, and the Political Development of the Carceral State
In recent years, an interdisciplinary literature has grown examining the causes and
consequences of mass incarceration. Given this project’s core arguments, it naturally
builds on this body of work. Many scholars start by pointing to the 1960s as key to the
rise of the carceral state and suggest that a conservative backlash to civil rights and the
Great Society fueled the Republican Party’s southern strategy and a new brand of
racialized punitive politics.46 Others have challenged this narrative, highlighting how
law-and-order campaigns through U.S. history incrementally built a state capable of mass
incarceration.47 Scholars have also shown that the racial biases of American criminal
justice long predated the southern strategy, comparing the carceral state to older systems
of racial caste like Jim Crow.48 And liberals have not been innocent in this story—in the
early twentieth century, 1940s, and modern era, liberals embraced brands of harsh justice
politics that promoted racial inequality.49 This highlights the deep historical roots of the
carceral state and shows that punitive politics has long been a bipartisan persuasion.
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This project situates itself against literature emphasizing the 1960s while building
on research exploring the carceral state’s deep historical origins. While the rejection of
the rehabilitative ideal in the 1960s is often taken for granted by scholars as a catalyst for
carceral growth, this project shows how rehabilitative ideology helped construct the
institutional and ideological landscape on which the carceral state emerged.50 The ideas
associated with bio-determinism that shaped the rehabilitative ideal cannot be discarded
as antiquated ideational relics. Many rehabilitative practices, like indeterminate
sentencing, are still in use today or shaped modern penal practices. Even though biodeterminist crime theories have waxed and waned in influence over the twentieth century,
institutional practices associated with rehabilitation still infect the criminal justice system
with ideas of innate criminality. This has kept policymakers tied to a class ideology of
punishment even after biological theories of criminality fell out of favor.
Research on the long history of the carceral state commonly emphasizes links
between race and punishment. This is a warranted focus given the racialized character of
the prison population, but historical links between class and crime are often overlooked in
this research. This project focuses on how class ideologies of punishment have been
embedded into state institutions and policies. This does not mean that race will be
ignored. Rather, class-driven analyses can compensate for drawbacks to scholarship that
exclusively emphasizes racial disparities. Adolph Reed and Merlin Chowkwanyun have
argued that racial disparities studies often attribute inequality to “institutional racism”
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and individual racial animus without contextualizing these trends in social and economic
relations.51 This project explores how racial ideologies have shaped crime politics while
heeding Reed and Chowkwanyun’s warning by considering how racial ideologies have
interacted and overlapped with class dynamics in American crime politics.
This approach brings APD research on the carceral state into dialogue with
analyses of the relationship between prison systems and political economic dynamics.52 It
does so by drawing on research in critical criminology. Critical criminologists adopt
Marxist analytic frames to argue that the state politicizes crime to stigmatize the poor and
justify their exploitation.53 Loïc Wacquant’s work shows how critical criminology can be
attentive to both class and race. He contends that the carceral state hides the social
disorder produced by neoliberalism by compelling the poor to transform into workercitizens or face incarceration.54 Wacquant argues that prisons and ghettos work in tandem
to perpetuate inequality among an increasingly black subproletariat, linking the racialized
character of mass incarceration to the rise of a post-Keynesian state.55
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This project complements the work of critical criminologists by showing how
ideational constructs of crime have helped the state to define criminality with a class
slant. While speaking to literatures on race and crime, this approach emphasizes issues
related to class inequality that are sometimes downplayed in political science research by
showing how poverty and criminality have regularly been politicized as products of a
common set of individual failings.
By situating an institutionally grounded analysis within a critical criminological
framework, the project contributes to a subset of the mass incarceration literature on the
criminalization of poverty. Particularly, modern banishment laws criminalize behaviors
common among the urban poor like sleeping in public so that police can displace them
out of neighborhoods.56 Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert have shown how
policymakers frame these laws as crime prevention mechanisms by politicizing poverty
and homelessness as indicators that an individual is likely to fall into serious crime and
should thus be preemptively contained.57 This rationale is not new but was fundamental
to rehabilitative ideology and the vagrancy law reforms of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. These statutes are largely retooled vagrancy laws written to pass
constitutional muster after the Supreme Court struck down vagrancy laws in 1972.58
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By putting literatures on race, class, and crime into dialogue, the project reveals
the broad political purchase deterministic constructs of criminality have had in American
politics. The labels “incorrigible” and “born criminal” served as categories that were
populated with blacks, immigrants, organized labor, the poor, and the mentally ill in
different places at different times. The deterministic disposition of criminal anthropology
was a fertile basis out of which various prejudices could flourish.59
The project makes one final contribution to carceral state research. This literature
naturally focuses on crimes the state has penalized severely, devoting attention to the War
on Drugs, three-strikes laws, and mandatory sentencing.60 But this focus inadvertently
reinforces preexisting notions about what counts as crime by taking as a starting point the
behaviors the state chooses to punish harshly. Scholars rarely analyze the dynamics of
mass incarceration alongside the state’s inconsistent response to white-collar crime.
There are two notable exceptions to this trend, and this project complements both
while rectifying their shortcomings. One is Matt Taibbi’s The Divide. Taibbi argues that
as income inequality has grown, so have disparities in punishment, as the poor are
controlled by a system harshly punishing small offenses like welfare fraud while Wall
Street financiers freely commit frauds on much larger scales. While compelling, Taibbi’s
account lacks rigor and nuance in certain respects. He overlooks the historical persistence
of class inequality to emphasize how income disparities today produce unequal justice
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outcomes and ignores how political institutions have developed in ways that enforce class
inequalities in punishment.61
The arguments made in this project more closely mirror those made by John
Hagan in his book, Who Are the Criminals? Hagan argues that scholarly ideas of crime
have historically been linked to shifts in governing ideologies, and that structural
criminology fostered progressive crime politics during the “age of Roosevelt” (19331973) while career criminal criminology produced punitive policies for street criminals
and lenience for white-collar offenders in the “age of Reagan” (1974-2008).62 While
Hagan’s work provides noteworthy insights, it falls short in other regards. By beginning
his analysis in the 1930s, he overlooks consistencies in crime policy across the Reagan
and Roosevelt eras that are traceable to the influence of rehabilitative and regulatory
ideologies. Further, while Hagan studies white-collar crime generally, this project focuses
on corporate crime, or crimes committed by a corporate entity or individuals acting on
behalf of a corporation. This entails closer attention to specific dynamics and processes,
like the development of the regulatory state. Through a broad historical timeline and
narrowed analytic foci, the project provides new insights into the interplay between ideas
about crime and governing ideologies.
The Punishment of Corporate Crime
Research on corporate crime is concentrated in the disciplines of law and
criminology and is typically inattentive to historical trends in U.S. politics. The
ahistorical character of this research is surprising given the prominence of Edwin
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Sutherland’s 1949 book White-Collar Crime in the canon. In the book, Sutherland studied
980 legal decisions brought against seventy corporations in the early twentieth century.
He found that only 20% of charges were brought in criminal court while 80% were
handled through regulatory sanctions, civil courts, and equity proceedings despite the fact
that all of the behaviors were defined as crimes.63 Sutherland’s conclusions are typically a
starting point for corporate crime scholars today, with some suggesting that controlling
corporate crime through regulation rather than prosecution is “the American way.”64 This
uncritical acceptance of Sutherland has caused many researchers to study corporate crime
in isolation from the general dynamics of American crime politics.
Alternatively, this project situates an analysis of corporate crime within the
general currents of American crime politics. Only a few criminological scholars have
done this. One of the first was Christopher Stone, who claimed in 1975 that the criminal
law evolved to deter individuals rather than corporations and that the corporate criminal
law should be abandoned in favor of a focus on regulation.65 Recently, Gregg Barak’s
Theft of a Nation (2012) provides a criminological analysis of the social construction of
fraud and the design flaws in regulatory frameworks in relation to the 2008 financial
crisis.66 But these works do little to connect historical inquiry to politics. This project fills
this gap by assessing the political construction of corporate criminality over time.
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Positioning an analysis of corporate crime next to an analysis of the carceral state
also avoids the implications made in many studies of corporate crime. Numerous analysts
have criticized the state’s lackluster response to the behavior that caused the Great
Recession and insist on subjecting financiers to lengthy prison terms.67 While there are
problems in the way the state responds to corporate criminality, subjecting executives to
brutally long prison terms is not the solution. Extreme sentences like those given to
Madoff or Weiss quench the public’s short-term demands for punishment while
neutralizing political momentum that could be directed towards political economic
reform or structural changes to regulatory frameworks. For example, the state’s harsh
sentencing of Madoff satisfied public demands for justice but overshadowed the fact that
the SEC failed to uncover his Ponzi scheme even after initiating five inquiries over
sixteen years preceding its collapse. 68 Responses like this detract attention away from the
fact that agencies like the SEC are grossly underfunded, causing them to focus on easy
cases to bolster their statistics at the expense of ignoring serious and challenging cases.69
While there are disputes in the small literature on corporate crime deterrence, a
series of articles published in 2016 in the journal Criminology & Public Policy indicated
that deterrence can be achieved without severity.70 The main piece was a meta-analysis of
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corporate crime deterrence studies by Natalie Schell-Busey and several coauthors. They
only found evidence of deterrence when agencies used a combination of regulatory, civil,
and criminal sanctions rather than relying on one type. Qualifying that more research is
needed to verify their findings, they suggest that “a mix of agency interventions”
including regulatory and criminal sanctions is the best way to achieve deterrence.71
Responses to the study were varied. Peter Yeager argued that the glorification of
noncompliance in corporate culture and rise of "too big to fail” politics compromised the
criminal law’s deterrent power by making prosecution a rare occurrence.72 His piece
complements work studying how corporations have weakened the force of law by
capturing agencies and shaping Justice Department policy to their liking.73 It also builds
on research suggesting that economic financialization, the “pattern of accumulation in
which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and
commodity production,” has glorified the pursuit of profits through illicit means.74
According to Yeager, these developments create a low risk of legal sanction for
corporations that reduces the deterrent power of prosecution. John Braithwaite was more
critical of the piece, arguing that the lack of reliable data on corporate crime makes it
difficult to study deterrence. Echoing Sutherland, he noted that the discretion afforded to

(1990): 444–66; Hazel Croall, Understanding White Collar Crime (Philadelphia: Open University
Press, 2001); Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager, Corporate Crime (New York: Free Press, 1980).
71
Schell-Busey et al., “What Works?,” 388, 407.
72
Peter Yeager, “The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime,” Criminology & Public Policy 15, no. 2
(2016): 439–51.
73
Garrett, Too Big to Jail; Jed S. Rakoff, “Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied,” New York Review of
Books, February 19, 2015; Jesse Eisinger, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to
Prosecute Executives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017); Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals; Roger
Lowenstein, The End of Wall Street (New York: Penguin Press, 2010); Ferguson, Predator Nation.
74
Greta Krippner, “The Financialization of the American Economy,” Socio-Economic Review 3, no. 2
(2005): 174; Foroohar, Makers and Takers; Tillman, Pontell, and Black, Financial Crime and Crises.
31

agencies in responding to corporate behavior makes it hard to quantify corporate crime in
the first place.75 Analyses of corporate crime deterrence are limited by the fact that
available datasets reflect the dispositions of the agencies charged with reporting them.76
Despite their differences, Schell-Busey et al., Yeager, and Braithwaite agreed that
the responsive regulation approach outlined by Braithwaite and Ayres is the best means
of monitoring corporate crime.77 Suggesting that the state should initially respond to
corporate crime through cooperative regulatory approaches before escalating to punitive
interventions, Braithwaite and Ayres claim that regulations only work as deterrents if
prosecution is used regularly enough that corporate actors view it as a “big gun”
constituting a meaningful threat.78 Schell-Busey et al. state that their results validated the
model by showing that a mix of sanctions had deterrent effect.79 This indicates that
relying on a combination of sanctions while using prosecution consistently enough to be
a credible threat is more effective than a few severe sentences. The increased certainty of
prosecution for serious offenses would enhance the deterrent force of the entire sanctions
pyramid. This project’s claims comport with the responsive regulation model, noting how
an overreliance on regulatory sanctions masks corporate criminality, reinforces classbiased ideas of crime, and weakens the law’s potency without calling for harsh justice.
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Unpacking the deterrence debate within an APD analysis highlights a central limit
of this literature. By focusing on what does and does not work to deter corporate crime,
deterrence research is constrained to considering the effects of existing structures without
questioning how and why those structures have been designed as they are. This misses
how favorable ideational constructs of corporate criminality have been embedded into
regulatory institutions in ways that compromise the law’s force. Understanding the
interaction of these ideas with state development requires looking outside of traditional
criminal justice machinery and at the origins of regulatory institutions.
The Political Development of the Regulatory State
The regulatory state is a distinctly American model of business-government
relations.80 While businesses have been hostile to regulators throughout the twentieth
century and decried regulations as impediments to capital accumulation, the regulatory
state was designed to support capitalist structures.81 In lieu of public ownership or more
directive instruments, regulatory frameworks allow the state to react to the economy in
ways that leave it responsive to industries. Agencies create rules of the road to maintain
balance in markets without altering the direction or layout of the road itself.82 In contrast,
a competing literature has presented U.S. agencies as exceptionally hostile to business.83
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This debate fosters all-or-nothing statements about the U.S. being either pro- or
anti-business that overlook nuanced qualitative dimensions of regulatory policy. For
instance, some scholars argue that the litigious and adversarial style of U.S. regulation
makes the American regulatory state anti-business. But others have shown that businesses
have resource advantages in court and are adept at choosing which cases to settle to avoid
hostile rulings and which to push to secure favorable precedent.84 So sweeping claims
about the regulatory state’s pro- or anti-business inclinations are often overbroad. More
useful is noting how the regulatory state is both pro- and anti-business. Michael Moran
captures this complexity in his description of the regulatory state as “snarling and smiling
at business.” On one hand, it smiles because it was built to sustain capitalist structures
and intervene in markets only when necessary to restore balance. But regulators snarl
when they rely on litigation and broad liability rules to exact punitive damages.85
Understanding this snarling and smiling dichotomy requires an analysis of the
regulatory state’s origins. There is a sizable APD literature on this topic. Skowronek has
described late nineteenth century development as “state-building as patchwork,” as
and Graham Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9–34 p. 11 for a summary of this
literature. For literature on agency capture, see Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by
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reform-driven professionals and bureaucrats secured piecemeal victories against political
elites in initially designing the administrative state.86 Gabriel Kolko, Gerald Berk, and
Richard Bensel have shown how corporations helped facilitate the shift from laissez-faire
economy to a corporate capitalist one overseen by a minimal regulatory state.87 While
this research outlines economic debates and institutional forces involved in the regulatory
state’s early development, it overlooks how the regulatory state in part a product of crime
politics. In many ways, the regulatory state is a relative of the criminal justice system.
By exploring the origins of regulatory ideology and how debates about regulation
have been wound up with debates about crime, this project makes sense of the regulatory
state’s “snarling and smiling” dualism. Agencies snarl at business because they monitor
activity defined as criminal and reflect the adversarial dynamics of American law. But the
regulatory state was also designed as an alternative to the criminal justice system for
corporate actors. Regulatory ideology does not rule out prosecution but gives regulators
the discretion to attribute non-criminal meanings to behaviors defined as crimes through
the use of alternate sanctions. This institutional framework channels corporate criminality
away from criminal justice institutions and can thus be viewed as smiling at business.
In The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, Jeffrey Reiman’s critical
criminological account veers from traditional Marxist analyses of crime by suggesting
that the disproportionate incarceration of the poor not only serves a functionalist purpose,
but an ideological one. By being intentionally designed to fail to reduce crime, prisons
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send an ideological message that the poor are dangerous.88 By suppressing the criminal
law under regulatory sanctions, the regulatory state serves an inverse purpose to the one
Reiman attributes to prisons. The design of the regulatory state both expresses and
legitimizes the idea that corporate criminals are honorable people who neither require nor
deserve the types of punishment meted out to conventional criminals.
The Nature of Business-Government Relations in the U.S.
Although the regulatory state emerged in response to the rise of large
corporations, businesses shaped regulatory legislation to facilitate growth and insulate
policy from popular control.89 As a result, this project is attentive to the ways in which
businesses can and have influenced political development. Scholars offer many theories
on the general dynamics of business-state relations. In 1977, Charles Lindblom argued
that businesses constrain the authority of democratic institutions by limiting the options
political actors have to those that please business.90 Whether or not corporations enjoy
advantages that produce suboptimal policy has been debated by scholars of pluralism,
power-elite theory, agency capture, and lobbying.91 In 1960, E.E. Schattschneider
famously said that the Republican Party was the “political instrument of big business.”92
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For many reasons, this literature tends to promote overgeneralized claims leading
to the conclusion that big business always secures its policy goals with ease. In three
ways, this project resists this tendency. First, analyses of business-government relations
often treat economic, social, and political contexts as static in order to make broad
statements that the political power of business is near absolute. But David Vogel has
shown that big business has had “fluctuating fortunes” in U.S. history, growing in
influence during periods of economic decline when the state is fearful of impeding
enterprise and losing influence during times of prosperity when the public feels more
comfortable with regulation.93 This project draws on Vogel’s work, acknowledging that
business-state relations evolve and adapt in response to the political economic climate.
Second, scholars often use the phrase "business community” or similar blanket
phraseology to refer to corporate interests as a homogenous bloc without differentiating
between businesses of different sizes, sectors, or regions. This ignores divides among
businesses and within sectors of industry. At certain moments in history business
interests have concentrated their party allegiances, while at other times they have divided
into diverse coalitions.94 And while the Republican Party has been the political
instrument of big business at times, party ideologies shift. With contemporary Democrats
embracing big business, Schattschneider’s claims seem like a relic of a previous era.95
Treating the “business community” as a monolithic entity with fixed political
allegiances obscures the role that specific industries have played in driving change and
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transmitting regulatory ideology over time. Lead advocates of regulatory ideology have
reflected shifts in power among sectors of the political economy. Railroads defended
regulatory ideology in the nineteenth century, the financial sector modified it in the
Progressive Era, and Wall Street bankers and exchange officials supported it during the
Great Depression. These shifting coalitions consisted of prominent business leaders from
different industries dominating the political economy at different times, not a
homogenous business community. Appreciating how shifting business interests deployed
similar ideas about crime to affect change and embed favorable understandings of
corporate criminality into regulatory frameworks entails attention to shifting power
balances in business-state relations and the political economy.
Examining splits among businesses highlights when and why certain coalitions
have been more effective than others. This illustrates the third way this analysis is distinct
from many studies of business-government relations. Recognizing differences among
businesses reveals that the successful corporate coalitions have framed their goals within
prevailing political, social, and economic discourses. By drawing on dominant ideas
about crime in debates about regulation, business leaders in effective coalitions framed
themselves as contrasts to prevailing understandings of criminality.
This demonstrates the conditioning power ideational and ideological discourses
can have on politics. Businesses are powerful interests, but general analyses of businessstate relations and quantitative assessments of elite influence on policy overlook nuances
in how that power is exercised. This project shows how successful corporate coalitions
have framed their policy goals within the discursive parameters of a moment. In the late
nineteenth century, railroads drew on regulatory ideology to contrast business leaders
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from ideas of natural criminality. As Progressives favorable to expert administration
gained power in the twentieth century, the financial industry reframed regulatory
ideology to emphasize the role administrators could play in preventing crime among
those who were not naturally criminal. In the 1930s, bankers and exchanges repackaged
regulatory ideology as a familiar and safe approach to managing the Depression.
That discursive contexts have conditioned the politicking of businesses leads to
reinterpretations of historical accounts of corporate power. For instance, in The Age of
Acquiescence (2015), Steve Fraser argues that while Americans exhibit a complacent
acquiescence to organized wealth during the “Second Gilded Age” today, the Populists
effectively mobilized to rein in the power of the robber barons during the “first Gilded
Age” of the nineteenth century.96 He notes that many business leaders resisted regulatory
reform during this period by defending laissez-faire, leading him to conclude that the
creation of regulatory agencies were victories for the Populists. But he overlooks that
some of the robber barons were not laissez-faire purists. In legislative debates over the
Interstate Commerce Act examined in chapter 3, leaders from the railroad industry
pushed for a regulatory commission as an alternative to strict criminal prohibitions on
their behavior. Essential to their political strategy was how they portrayed railroad
executives as foils to prevailing conceptions of born criminality—as inherently good men
with no criminal histories who could be monitored through gentler rules and regulations.
These business leaders used regulatory ideology to limit state administrative
authority and obscure the prevalence of corporate crime. By drawing on prevailing crime
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ideologies, they reoriented the debate and ensured that corporate behaviors that could be
conceptualized as forms of theft took on distinctive meanings because they were
committed by men who did not fit prevailing constructions of criminality. Their actions
were instead rationalized as functions of markets and healthy competitive dispositions.
Exploring how different business coalitions articulated their goals reveals nuances
to business-government relations that are unappreciated in current scholarship. Successful
corporate coalitions have spoken to prevailing political and ideological discourses so that
their demands resonate with lawmakers. This illustrates that discourses can condition the
range of policies that can be pursued at a given moment, even for powerful interests, and
that sometimes businesses lose their political battles. While studies of agency capture,
party control, and lobbying highlight many ways in which businesses influence politics,
business-state relations are also subject to ideational, institutional, and ideological forces.
Dissertation Structure
Chapters are structured into pairs to analyze the politics of street and corporate
crime during specific historical periods. Chapter 2 examines the politics of street crime
from roughly 1870 through 1900, when criminal anthropology became the prevailing
framework for understanding criminal behavior. Lawmakers used ideas about inherent
criminality to justify punishment for blacks, immigrants, poor whites, and organized
labor. Chapter 3 analyzes the politics of corporate crime during the same period, focusing
on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. In debates over the law, corporate criminality
was explained as a function of market realities and the competitive dispositions of
railroad executives, not deviant natures requiring punishment or rehabilitation. These
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ideas justified Congress’s decision to give the Interstate Commerce Commission
discretion to respond to corporate crime through non-criminal sanctions.
Chapter 4 studies psychological, cultural, and eugenic theories of crime that
emerged in the early twentieth century. These schools reinforced the idea that crime was
a function of innate pathologies among “undesirable” social groups such as the poor,
blacks, and “mental defectives” for whom eugenic interventions were necessary. Chapter
5 examines regulatory reform during the same period. Progressives’ faith in professional
administration led them to create the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914 to
identify anti-competitive practices in industries. But by not giving the FTC power to
initiate prosecutions, Progressives designed the agency to guide businesses towards
ethical behavior and push persistently unethical ones out of markets. The chapter also
discusses the origins and development of corporate criminal liability.
Chapter 6 studies the politics of street crime during the New Deal and postwarperiod. In the 1930s, an emergent group of scholars challenged prevailing theories by
attributing crime to socioeconomic disadvantage. But an analysis of the Wickersham
Crime Commission’s reports and state-level debates over sentencing reform reveals how
politicians reinterpreted these ideas to be consistent with the individualized rehabilitative
model. Although new ideas could have promoted change, their meanings were modified
as they were channeled through preexisting rehabilitative frameworks that proved
resistant to change. Chapter 7 examines corporate crime during this period, beginning
with the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Bankers and
securities exchange officials repackaged regulatory ideology in the context of the Great
Depression by arguing before Congress that criminalizing activity on securities markets
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would further disrupt the hurting economy. The chapter also examines reforms to
regulatory proceedings and operations in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
In chapter 8, this analysis is connected to the current moment. Developments from
1870 through 1965 formed the ideological and institutional terrain on which the carceral
state rests by cultivating a focus on the pathologies of offenders, instilling a class slant
into constructions of criminality, and channeling corporate crime into regulatory venues.
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CHAPTER 2: PUNISHING BORN CRIMINALS: CRIMINALIZING POVERTY,
RACE, AND LABOR IN THE GILDED AGE
“The tramp and the millionaire have always existed… put them down side by side
naked and helpless on a desert island; and in one year the one will be what he was
at first, namely, a pauper, while the other will have become a capitalist.”
- New York Daily Tribune, July 26, 188797
During the final decades of the nineteenth century, industrialization, urbanization,
waves of immigration, and the emancipation of millions of former slaves upended the
nation’s political economy and social structure. With all of this change came extreme
economic and racial inequality, a tremendous concentration of wealth, and intense
conflicts between capital and labor that ended in working class repression.
An assessment of crime politics during these decades cannot be divorced from the
broader political and ideological currents of the late nineteenth century. It was a period of
frequent political contestation characterized by the use of state violence against a range of
groups that were politicized as criminal threats. In the wake of the Civil War, racial
ideologies maintained old racial hierarchies in part by depicting blacks as criminal
deviants.98 Repressive criminal justice policies targeted immigrants as menaces to the
evolving urban order that also challenged the nation’s white Anglo-Saxon identity.99 And
state violence was frequently directed against the urban poor out of fear that they were
prone to serious crime, especially because they were often perceived as a violent ally of
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organized labor, with which the state had frequent conflicts. All of these groups were
viewed as threats to social and economic stability and depicted as criminals.100
Existing literature treats the punishment of these groups as separate phenomena
attributable to unique social, political, and economic forces. This chapter illustrates how
prevailing constructions of criminality in late nineteenth century politics helped to
facilitate the punishment of all of these populations. Building on dominant currents in
American political and intellectual thought, late nineteenth century scholars viewed
criminality as a natural phenomenon. Darwinism and evolutionary theory were a crux of
Gilded Age political thought, so the emergent school of criminal anthropology, which
attributed criminal behavior to the biological traits of individuals, was amenable to
scholars and lawmakers of the late nineteenth century. Studying the development of
criminal justice policy during this period through the lens of criminal anthropology’s rise
demonstrates that while diverse dynamics drove the criminalization of various social
groups, ideas about innate criminality colored all of these debates. The behaviors of
immigrants, blacks, the poor, and organized labor groups were “naturalized” by being
attributed to their inherently pathological nature. Each group was seen as a variant of the
“born criminal” concept articulated by Lombroso. The deterministic disposition of
criminal anthropology operated as a genus out of which anti-black, anti-poor, antiworker, and anti-immigrant anxieties flourished. Thus, the biological crime discourse of
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the era stabilized multiple systems of inequality by locating the causes of various
inequalities in nature.
Section I unpacks the general currents of American political thought in the late
nineteenth century out of which the born criminal idea emerged and took hold. Section II
examines how Gilded Age scholars articulated ideas of natural criminality in their work,
condemning various social groups as inherently criminal and recommending new policy
instruments to regulate crime. Their work drove the rise of the “rehabilitative ideal,” the
philosophy that punishment should reform inmates, but exhibited a dual commitment to
reform and incarceration. Section III explores how deterministic constructs of criminality
stigmatized four groups as inherently criminal—the urban poor, blacks, immigrants, and
organized labor—through examinations of national prison conference hearings, charities
conference meetings, and reports from State Boards of Charities (SBCs). SBCs were
advisory boards designed to oversee and supervise state welfare institutions while making
policy assessments and recommendations to state legislatures, and their annual reports
demonstrate how ideas about criminal incorrigibility were used by state-level reformers
to justify punitive public policy. Given the lack of state legislative records from this
period, SBC reports provide insights into state policy debates, and analyses of SBCs in
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York—industrialized states with high
immigrant and urban poor populations—illustrate how deterministic ideas of criminality
shaped vagrancy law reform.
I. Ideological and Ideational Currents of Gilded Age Politics
The late nineteenth century is frequently depicted as a period characterized by
struggles between capital and labor. For many scholars, this is a warranted focus. As the
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country moved away from being an agrarian society of small farmers to a manufacturing
society of large corporations and masses of workers, industrial growth and scientific
innovation facilitated the emergence of unruly urban centers dominated by financial,
manufacturing, and transportation corporations. This growth, especially in the North and
Midwest, promoted rapid industrialization, a concentration of wealth, and exacerbated
income inequality. The emergence of the large corporation dwarfed Jeffersonian ideals
about localized agrarian life, and labor organizations and discontented agrarian
communities clashed with the large corporations running the economy.101
While conflicts about class and inequality were fundamental to Gilded Age
politics, this was also an era of nativism, sexism, and racism. Millions of new immigrants
flooded the country seeking to capitalize on the growing number of jobs in the U.S.,
prompting exclusionary responses to curb non-Nordic immigration. Reconstruction era
egalitarian ideals were displaced as the seeds of Jim Crow were planted, promoting
segregation

and

African-American

disfranchisement.

Industrialization

promoted

urbanization, but cities were often populated with the out-of-work poor living in abject
poverty. Numerous ascriptive legal systems were designed to promote restriction,
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exclusion, and repression for segments of the population that did not fit the nation’s
middle-class, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant identity.102
This heated political context gave rise to multiple countervailing political and
ideological discourses, two of which are emphasized in this chapter—a populist politics
challenging the inequalities associated with the growth of industry and a responsive
conservatism favoring industrial expansion and free markets. Republicans became the
party of business, seeking to facilitate government assistance to businesses by supporting
the industrial tariff and aiming to nationalize the economy.103 Democrats remained the
party of states’ rights, only shifting towards a more distributive and regulatory politics as
the Populists became credible threats to their survival. But both major parties remained
dedicated, at least when convenient, to doctrines of laissez-faire, particularly Republicans
who opposed regulatory initiatives hostile to industry. Alternatively, Populists voiced a
strict anti-monopolist politics positing that robust administrative reforms to state
apparatuses could and should be used to create competitive market conditions.104
In his analysis of the Gilded Age, historian Robert Wiebe called 1870s America a
“distended society” in which international markets, large corporations, and mass urban
centers trampled over the “island communities” of self-contained rural towns that
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organized American life before the Civil War.105 It was these agrarian communities that
formed the backbone of Gilded Age populism. Populists articulated a class-based farmlabor politics, influencing the latter platforms of the People’s Party, Socialist Party, and
Progressives. Populists preached a redistributive and bureaucratic politics, condemning
the growth of corporate power and articulating a strict anti-monopolism.106 But while
populism challenged industrialization, it was not a re-creation of Jeffersonianism.
Populists used grassroots activism among poor farmers to break from laissez-faire,
insisting on national ownership of railroads, democratic control over the money supply,
and anticipating the modern regulatory state.107 The Populists fueled discourses about the
“robber barons” as ruthless manipulators, painted trusts as “soulless,” and denounced
business leaders as “morally pathological” and “robbers” of the public good.108
At its core, Populism was driven by agrarian discontent and labor activism.
Populists made some attempts to include the urban proletariat within their discourse, but
as Steve Fraser has argued, the movement “remained ambivalent about the city.” The
growth of abusive financial networks was, “an irreducibly urban phenomenon,” and
Populists often “recoiled from the visage of proletarian squalor and demoralization.”109

105

Wiebe, The Search for Order.
Charles Postel, “The American Populist and Anti-Populist Legacy,” in Transformations of
Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies, ed. John Abromeit et al.
(London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 116–35; Charles Postel, “TR, Wilson, and the
Origins of the Progressive Tradition,” in Progressivism in America: Past, Present, and Future, ed.
David Woolner and John Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3–13.
107
Fraser, The Age of Acquiescence, 87–102; for more on populist debates over the political economy,
see Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization; Skowronek, Building a New
American State.
108
For a particularly excellent account of the origins and development of agrarian populism, see
Fraser, The Age of Acquiescence chapter 4 in particular.
109
Fraser, 103.
48
106

Their fight essentially pitted farmers and labor against capital, leaving the urban poor and
immigrants out of their politics.
This is important when recognizing the broad appeal of Darwinian theory in the
late nineteenth century. The flourishing of race science, biological determinism, and
evolutionary theory laid a foundation for the development of the eugenics movement. But
as Rogers Smith has written, “Across the spectrum…from laissez-faire enthusiasts and
white supremacists through Socialists and black separatists, leading writers accepted
evolution in ways that permanently altered how they understood even the features of
American life they endorsed.” As a result, even “poor white voters suffered from the
inegalitarian political trends they all too often embraced.” Support for evolutionary
theory was not universal but was embraced across political ideologies, legitimating racist,
nativist, and classist sentiments even among segments of the Populists. With poor urban
whites, immigrants, and African Americans absent from the era’s major political
coalitions, they were left vulnerable to criticisms that their conditions of inequality were a
function of the fact that they were socially and biologically “unfit.”110
Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform provides an account of Populism in
which he suggests that Populists were driven by a nativist consensus. His thesis rests on a
number of questionable premises, and his conceptualization of Populism encompasses
such a diverse collection of forces that he denies the movement any cohesion.111 He
overlooks the Populists’ forward-looking redistributive, bureaucratic, and pro-labor
politics that rejected laissez-faire, as well as divides within the movement over Social
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Darwinism.112 Still, sizable numbers of Populists invoked Social Darwinist principles to
legitimate their hostility to immigrants and the poor. They did not use Darwinist logic
like Progressives would to justify an expansion of state power, nor did they use
Darwinism like their laissez-faire opponents to naturalize free markets. Rather, they
entertained essentialist narratives of group difference in endorsing a view of America as a
white Christian nation. This underscores how Populism was able to coexist with support
for exclusionary immigration and racial policy.113
The onset of a robust populist politics hardened conservative opponents who
remained dedicated to laissez-faire, freedom of contract, and hard money.114
Conservative countercurrents to Populism built on Herbert Spencer’s theory of Social
Darwinism. While populist politics portended the emergence of a modern bureaucratic
state, large segments of the upper middle class clung to free market ideologies, which
were legitimated through the doctrines of natural selection and “survival of the fittest.”115
Corporate actors particularly exerted enormous political influence during this period and
ensured that economic development suited the needs of major industries. Many
corporations and conservatives remained dedicated to a purist conception of laissez-faire
and fought hard against demands for economic regulation.116 Some leading scholars, such
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as Steven Fraser and Michael McGerr, contend that middle-class resistance checked the
growing power of corporations by securing significant regulatory reform against the
wishes of the robber barons.117 Chapter three will expose flaws in this narrative by
illustrating that while some robber barons remained dedicated to laissez-faire, others
pushed for regulatory reform as an alternative to criminalization of corporate activities.
Laissez-faire economics particularly found scientific validation in the works of
Herbert Spencer. Spencer’s theory of evolution was not an appropriation of Darwin’s
work, but he did coin the phrase “survival of the fittest” as his own description of
Darwinian theory. He portrayed social Darwinism as a variant of political economy that
could explain the inequalities of late nineteenth century industrial conditions. For
Spencer, evolution implied support for free markets and opposition to government social
and economic assistance.118
Social Darwinism aligned with the goals of ideological conservatives, and
economist William Graham Sumner was the most prominent voice making this
connection. Sumner used Spencerian logic to criticize state provision of social assistance
for the poor. According to Sumner, markets spurred people to action through competitive
dynamics that promoted productivity. Natural selection was an unsentimental science, so
he said that society “does not need any care or supervision” to lead to the emergence of
the “natural social order.” To reach said order, society must return to the doctrine of
laissez-faire. Sumner wrote, “Let us translate it into blunt English, and it will read, Mind
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your own business.”119 If government simply stayed out of the way, society would order
itself naturally into appropriate social and economic hierarchies.
Captains of industry used Social Darwinism to justify their perceptions of their
own superiority, which the next chapter will address. But advocates of Spencerian theory
also used his logic to reject labor protection, discredit social policy assisting marginalized
communities, and naturalize classical economics. Pecuniary success was deemed a result
of thrift, diligence, and intelligence, while socioeconomic struggle was a function of
natural unfitness. According to Sumner, inequalities in industrial economies were a
natural process of eliminating the unfit. Such individuals should be left behind for the
race to succeed and progress.120
Reverend Josiah Strong’s book Our Country (1885) exemplified how ideas about
natural inequality manifested in a resurgent nativism. Strong celebrated the nation’s
economic and scientific advances while articulating fears that immigration posed
challenges for the nation’s homogeneous citizenry. He feared that ill-educated
immigrants were sources of vice, crime, and civic incompetence and would be unable to
assimilate into American culture. He wrote that most immigrants were from “the pauper
and criminal classes” and cited selective statistics to argue that immigrants were “twelve
times as much disposed to crime as the native stock.” He wrote that inferior immigrants
would die off and be left behind in “the final competition of races.” 121
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Hofstadter’s critical account of the Populists neglects the force with which they
rejected the brands of laissez-faire economics endorsed by Sumner and their long-term
influence in shaping Progressivism, New Deal politics, and the Great Society.122 But in
important ways, Populists shared affinities with their conservative opponents by
accepting elements of Darwinist and Spencerian theory. The fact that many Populists
embraced ideas about naturalized hierarchy left room for Darwinist theories of inequality
to flourish across ideological divides.123 Debates over Populism, nativism, racism,
socialism, and laissez-faire were crucial to Gilded Age politics, but almost any social
scientist could enlist evolutionary ideas to support a different view. This consensus on the
basic precepts of Darwinism and natural selection was fundamental to political
development during this period. Prevailing constructs of criminality reflected these
deterministic ideas of human behavior and naturalized understandings of inequality.
II. The Genealogy of the “Born Criminal” Idea and the Rehabilitative Ideal
Darwinism clearly numerous political goals outside of legitimating criminal
justice reform, but Gilded Age constructs of criminality reflected these biological
ideational currents. Darwinist and bio-determinist theories of criminality played crucial
roles in the politics of the era by promoting policies that have had enduring legacies on
American criminal justice.
Law-and-order campaigns have been recurring features of American political
development, and their long-term effects can only be understood by examining how ideas
about crime have evolved and interacted with changing political contexts. Ideas about
122
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biology were useful ideational weapons for Gilded Age political entrepreneurs and
reform-oriented actors seeking to change public policy. These changes were geared
towards repressing the urban poor, racial minorities, and immigrants who challenged the
nation’s WASP identity. New ideas of criminality in American scholarship often adopted
the “born criminal” idea of Cesare Lombroso to justify policies targeting the poor,
immigrants, and blacks through a discourse of rehabilitation. Given the Darwinist ideas at
its foundation, the rehabilitative model comported with bio-deterministic ideas embraced
by Populists, conservatives, and Progressives, and thus had broad political appeal.
Ideas about crime associated with biology challenged older and established
ideologies, particularly Beccarian utilitarianism. In his 1764 publication On Crimes and
Punishments, Italian scholar Cesare Beccaria depicted crime as a function of free will that
could be deterred through clearly defined terms of incarceration. Beccaria was a
significant influence on American penology during the Founding.124 But ideas associated
with biology and evolution advanced new claims theorizing criminality as a natural trait,
upending deterrence theory’s assumption that each criminal was a rational actor. This
was driven by the rise of criminal anthropology, the school of thought founded by
Lombroso. Criminal anthropologists like Lombroso argued that certain biological defects
rendered some individuals as evolutionary throwbacks unable to control their violent,
selfish, and amoral natures, thus earning them the classification “born criminal.”125
Criminal anthropology quickly eclipsed Beccarian deterrence theory in influence
as Lombroso’s seminal book Criminal Man (1876) became popular in the United States.
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Importantly, Lombroso’s work sparked the onset of criminological positivism. Positivist
criminologists claim that through the measurement of criminal behavior, the causes of
crime can be identified. Whereas Beccarian deterrence theory focused on punishing a
specific crime—that is, issuing a punishment appropriately proportional to the criminal
act in order to deter it—criminal anthropology focused on analyzing individuals to assess
their natural criminality. In short, it focused on punishing the criminal more than the
crime. In the early the 1800s, most states used sentencing structures influenced by
Beccarian thought that issued clearly defined terms of punishment in response to specific
crimes.126 But this changed with the emergence indeterminate sentencing in the late
nineteenth century, through which sentences were tailored to the individual. This model
was heavily influenced by Lombrosian theory, as inmates capable of rehabilitation were
to be reformed and released early while incorrigible ones were to be contained.
As articulated in Criminal Man, Lombroso’s theory was individualistic and
deterministic. In the book, Lombroso contended that physiological stigmata like skull
thickness and protruding ears were indicative of a primitive biological inheritance that
left an individual predisposed to crime. He argued that 40% of offenders were “born
criminals.” The final edition of Criminal Man stated that, “born criminals must be
interned in special institutions for the incorrigible.”127 Lombroso extended the label of
“born criminal” widely, concluding in an 1891 study of Italian revolutionaries that 34%
of anarchists shared the stigmata of born criminals. He clarified that the instincts of
radicals could be used to pursue meaningful social change, but his argument was that the
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dispositional instinct that drove political revolutionaries was the same one that drove
criminal behavior.128 He also identified black men as innately criminal, writing in 1897
that “the great obstacle to the negro’s progress [in America] is the fact that there remain
latent within him the primitive instincts of the savage.” He attributed high rates of
homicide in America to the natural criminality of black men.129
By aiming to punish the criminal rather than the crime, Lombrosian theory was
built on a biased image of the “criminal type.” Having the traits of a criminal type
became a more important metric for determining whether someone deserved punishment
than their behavior. This emphasis on personal pathologies and traits entailed a narrow
focus on “street crimes” commonly committed by social undesirables and deviants who
fit this preconstructed idea of the criminal. By emphasizing only specific types of crime
and criminals, Lombrosian theory rested on class-skewed a priori assumptions about what
counted as crime and who was likely to commit it. The ideas and ideologies that grew out
of Lombrosian theory inherited these biases.
By contemporary standards, Lombroso’s claims were clearly substantiated with
unsophisticated statistical methods. Nonetheless, his work resonated with American
penologists. An intellectual milieu dominated by race science and Darwinism was
amenable to the idea that crime was a function of biology. Some American scholars had
suggested that criminals were biologically defective even before Lombroso’s work was
transmitted to the U.S. In his 1877 book The Jukes, Richard Dugdale traced the ancestry
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of the “Juke” family in New York and concluded that the family’ biology was
predisposed to crime.130 Though often read as purely bio-deterministic, his work noted
that bad environments can “produce bad habits which may become hereditary,” revealing
Dugdale’s commitments to the Lamarckian theory that acquired traits could become
hereditary.131 This allowed him to acknowledge the variety of social factors that caused
crime while accepting the idea that crime was still the result of inherited pathologies. He
concluded that reform was possible for some, but “perpetual imprisonment” was
necessary for “habitual criminals” for whom “we cannot accomplish individual cure.”132
American criminal anthropologists were intellectual descendants of Lombroso
and Dugdale. They adopted deterministic frameworks viewing criminals as naturally
distinct from ordinary individuals. They understood criminal behavior as immoral actions
attributable to the pathologically deviant natures of people. And like Lombroso and
Dugdale, they endorsed treatment for curable offenders and incarceration for incurable
ones deemed “born criminals.” The men who brought criminal anthropology to America
were responsible for embedding the idea of the born criminal into a new and influential
rehabilitative ideology of punishment.
Scholars of American criminal justice broadly agree that from the late nineteenth
century through 1970s, American penology was influenced by the rehabilitative ideal—
the idea that incarceration should be a reformative experience for inmates, equipping
them to lead law-abiding lives upon release. But since it was built on Lombrosian
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constructs, rehabilitative ideology conceptualized criminality as a function of individual
defects rather than a symptom of social, political, and economic forces. Bio-deterministic
constructs of criminality shaped two prongs of rehabilitative theory—one premised on
reforming and releasing inmates, and another punishing those deemed “incorrigibles”
who fit the born criminal image and proved impossible to reform. Thus, rehabilitative
ideology inherited Lombroso’s class skewed assumptions about what counted as crime
and who was a likely criminal.
This class ideology was deeply embedded into rehabilitative theory from its
origins. In 1870, the American Congress of Corrections held its first inaugural meeting in
Cincinnati, where it articulated its support for rehabilitative penology. Attended by penal
scholars, practitioners, and prison wardens, the Congress famously published and
presented its “Declaration of Principles” at the conference. The Declaration has been
widely recognized as establishing the rehabilitative ideal.133 The document directed
prison administrators to implement indeterminate sentencing, “moral training,”
“industrial training,” and educational programs behind bars.134
One of the attendees who assisted in the writing of the Declaration was Zebulon
Brockway. In the following years, Brockway would receive national praise for his
implementation of these techniques at New York’s Elmira Reformatory. Elmira was little
more than a work camp in the years immediately after its opening in 1876, but under
Brockway’s wardenship it established educational programs, indeterminate sentencing
systems, and a marks system offering rewards for good behavior. This earned Brockway
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the title “father of the rehabilitative ideal.” Nearly all the reformatories that opened across
the nation in subsequent decades emulated Elmira.135
Despite this reformative rhetoric, Elmira’s staff psychologically and physically
abused inmates while “reforming” them into members of the working class.136 This
mutual embrace of “rehabilitation” and harsh justice can only be understood by
examining Brockway’s conception of criminality, which entailed support for both
rehabilitation and punishment. He endorsed a Lamarckian conception of evolution that
saw degeneracy as an acquired trait that could become a hereditary cause of crime.137 For
example, he suggested that a “lack of proper education and other unfavourable
circumstances” could create biologically transmittable defects in one’s moral and mental
faculties. Brockway argued, however, that environmental factors contributed to crime
only indirectly by altering biology and concluded that only 4% of criminals sprang from
“healthy stock.”138
His embrace of Lombrosian theory led him to suggest that despite the potential
influence of environmental factors, inherently inferior types could be identified with
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reference to physiological traits.139 He argued that such “defective fellow beings” were
driven by “undeveloped, incongruous, or unbalanced condition[s] of their higher mental
faculties” that left their “animal instincts” unchecked.140 He proposed that the elimination
of criminals through rehabilitation and incarceration would lead to “a perfect race.”141
Given the influence of Lombroso and Lamarck on his thinking, Brockway
mounted a defense of rehabilitation while espousing a belief in the existence of natural
criminals who required indefinite containment. He reiterated that indeterminate sentences
should offer opportunities for inmates to reform while being used to indefinitely contain
incorrigibles.142 His discussion of the Elmira inmate Macauley—a man first committed
for burglary, then twice for parole violations—provides a good example of his thinking.
He suggested that Macauley typified the class of “incorrigible criminals.” Brockway
stated that, “Such offenders, could they be committed under the absolute indeterminate
sentence plan, would be continuously held under enough of custodial restraint to protect
the public.”143 His indeterminate model thus carefully balanced his dual commitments to
rehabilitation and containment.
Brockway’s ideological duality conditioned the work of criminologists drawn to
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his rehabilitative philosophy and to Lombrosian theory. In Creating Born Criminals
(1997), Nicole Hahn Rafter identifies seven prominent criminologists during the turn of
the century who built on Lombrosian theory—Arthur MacDonald, Henry Boies, Charles
Henderson, August Drahms, William McKim, G. Frank Lydston, and Philip Parsons.144
Their writings also built on Brockway’s philosophy and became essential to the
development of the indeterminate sentence and rehabilitative model.
Consistent with emergent progressive trends towards combining scientific
expertise with policy reform, these men frequently held significant institutional power.
They constituted a core of scholar-reformers who, like Brockway, were theorists who put
their ideas into practice. For instance, Arthur MacDonald held a federal appointment with
the U.S. Bureau of Education. Henry Boies served on the Pennsylvania Board of
Charities for well over a decade. Brockway regularly served on New York’s Charities
Board. And Charles Henderson, one of the nation’s most respected sociologists, was
routinely a headlining speaker at American sociological, medical, and criminological
conferences. Henderson served as the President of the National Conference of Charities
from 1898-99, American Commissioner to the International Prison Commission in 1909,
and president of the International Prison Congress in 1910.
Arthur MacDonald’s 1893 book Criminology provides a good example of the
influence of Lombroso and Brockway in these scholars’ works. One of the earliest
American works dedicated studying crime, MacDonald’s book opened by claiming that
Lombroso left it impossible to “deny the organicity of crime, its anatomical nature and
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degenerative source.” MacDonald insisted on the construction of special institutions for
incorrigibles, as Lombroso did.145 Henry Boies similarly asserted in Prisoners and
Paupers (1893) that “a large proportion” of prison inmates “were born to be
criminals.”146 Along with Charles Henderson (1893), Boies argued that criminals should
not reproduce until they are rehabilitated so their children do not inherit criminal
tendencies.147 This joint endorsement of Lamarckian and Lombrosian ideologies reflects
the influence of Brockway on their thinking.
Support for the rehabilitative model and its assumptions about incorrigibility and
biology manifested in endorsements of indeterminate sentencing. This was consistent
among these scholars, who criticized former determinate systems for failing to offer
offenders adequate reform incentives.148 Alternatively, indeterminate sentences were
praised as providing reform incentives and serving as a long-term containment tool.149
For example, MacDonald stated that, “The indeterminate sentence is the best method of
affording the prisoner an opportunity to reform, without exposing society to unnecessary
dangers” because it permitted long-term detainment for incorrigibles.150 August Drahms
(1900) further claimed that the permanent containment of incorrigibles was a more
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important justification of indeterminate sentencing than granting curable criminals
incentives to change. Henry Boies’ wrote in 1893 that three convictions, regardless of
severity, warranted life incarceration.151 In 1901, Boies stated that reformatories should
separate criminals into “corrigible and incorrigible subdivisions.” He claimed that, “those
who can be cured will be cured before liberation. The chronic incorrigibles will be found
to consist of two classes: the incurably vicious, the physical, mental, and moral imbeciles;
and those whose organization is so defective as to be incapable of restoration…they
should be confined under entirely different conditions.”152
From its origins, this rehabilitative model was built on bio-deterministic
conceptions of criminal behavior and validated by the methodologies of race science. The
ideal could not have flourished without a favorable political and ideological context
reflecting a consensus around the precepts of race science and natural selection. This laid
the basis for the later emergence of the eugenics movement. Growing out of Francis
Galton’s work, the eugenics movement sought to regulate human evolution by controlling
breeding. The logic of these reform-oriented penologists led them to defend indefinite
detention and eugenic solutions like compulsory sterilization, marriage restrictions, and
extermination to control criminality.153 This rendered rehabilitation a useful weapon for
pro-eugenics Progressives in the early twentieth century.
In their works, Brockway, Boies, and other criminal anthropologists emphasized
crimes common among racial minorities, the urban poor, and working class. Depicting
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these groups as naturally criminal complemented Spencerian theory and the works of
Sumner. Sumner’s use of Social Darwinism to wage war social reform and state
economic assistance by depicting all social and economic hardship as incidental to the
struggles of natural selection.154 This provided a cosmic rationale for the inequalities
common among the criminal classes. Sumner thus criticized leniency towards crime,
arguing that it is a “false doctrine” that “criminals have some sort of a right against or
claim on society.”155 He argued that if the state were to disperse the “poverty-stricken,
vicious, and criminal inhabitants” of industrial slums, they would be forced into a society
where they would either be “crushed by the competition of life” or be incarcerated.156
These ideas had real political purchase that translated into policy. Gilded Age
penology was driven by assumptions about what the likely criminal looked like and
subjective judgments about the reformative capacity of inmates. Behavior and personal
traits common among the poor and working classes were pathologized as signs of an
incurable criminal disposition, warranting anything but punishment meaningless. This
reveals that the racism, classism, and nativism rampant in late nineteenth century politics
cannot be entirely understood as isolated phenomena. The holistic perspective outlined
here recognizes the interrelation of these dynamics by showing how deterministic
framings of criminality were weaponized to punish a range of groups including blacks,
immigrants, poor urban whites, and organized labor. The ideologies of Lombroso and
Brockway laid fertile ground in which various ascriptive ideologies could flourish.
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IV. The Broad Reach of Brockway: The Punishment of Poverty, Race, and Labor
As inequality became more pronounced, the idea of natural criminality guided the
restructuring of public policy as part of an effort to control the “dangerous classes.” This
included social undesirables like the poor, low-income working class, immigrants, and
racial minorities. This section examines the treatment of four populations deemed
“incorrigible” criminals and subjected to punishment—tramps, blacks, immigrants, and
organized labor. Deterministic crime discourse served as an ideological foundation that
legitimated anti-poor, anti-black, anti-immigrant, and anti-labor sentiments.
Vagrancy Laws in the Industrial Northeast and Midwest
The regulation of vagrancy was a contested political question at the turn of the
century. What to do with the growing population of the urban poor deemed offensive to
bourgeois sensibilities became a significant concern for lawmakers. Maligned by
conservatives and neglected by Populists, the urban poor were subjected to enhanced
social control through a dramatic revamping of state and local vagrancy laws. The urban
poor often came from the unemployed white working class, but the growing classes of
vagrants in American cities were generally assumed to consist of immigrant populations,
so vagrancy law reform was tightly wound up with xenophobic beliefs.157
Vagrancy laws had a long history in America predating the late nineteenth
century. Having inherited vagrancy laws from England, Americans have always viewed
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the poor with a degree of hostility. But unlike the vagrancy statutes of England, American
vagrancy laws eventually developed to control criminals and social undesirables instead
of managing worker migration.158 The evolution of these laws, shifting conceptions of
vagrancy, the relationship of vagrancy statutes to political debates about crime illustrates
how and why U.S. vagrancy laws diverged from their British antecedents.
Preceding the mid-nineteenth century, American vagrancy laws generally
operated similarly to their British counterparts and regulated the flow of migratory labor.
Jobless transients were rarely punished with extended prison sentences, and typically
spent a night in the station house if found by police.159 Through most of the nineteenth
century, urban police were not formally institutionalized. They bore little resemblance to
the professionalized and regimented forces of today, instead performing general social
welfare functions beyond crime control like providing vagrants with lodging and meals.
The duties of mid-eighteenth century urban police thus included managing the welfare of
the poor, which did not entail harsh criminal sanction.160
Beginning in 1873, popular understandings of poverty changed. An economic
crash generated a social crisis as urban poverty became a more visible problem.
Unemployment estimates soared to 3 million, and some scholars have suggested that 25
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percent of urban workers were unemployed.161 The crash generated a moral panic over a
fictitious “tramp army,” an imaginary revolutionary force consisting of homeless men
that wandered from city to city and threatened the nation’s social and political stability.
In combatting this “tramp crisis,” the idea of pathological criminality became a tool for
the state to depict the poor as criminals necessitating containment. Poverty became an
indicator of an innate criminal disposition, which deflected attention away from the
socioeconomic causes of poverty and permitted the state to harshly punish vagrancy.162
As a qualification, many people were forced into poverty during this period, but
others chose a life of unemployment as a means of protest. Varying synonyms for the
urban poor thus emerged with distinct meanings. Hobos, for example, were homeless
man wandering between cities in search of transient work opportunities. Tramps traveled
between cities, but to avoid work and challenge the cultural archetype of the self-made
man valuing employment, home ownership, and family life. Both tramps and hobos were
paupers, which simply was a term for a poor person.163 Despite these distinctions, the
urban poor were often treated as one mass of deviants in political discourse, and “hobos,”
“tramps,” and “paupers” were closely linked to criminality. Punishing the poor thus
served to both hide the disorder produced by the economic crash and discipline people
who willfully defied prevailing social ideals.
Dugdale, Brockway, and their protégés concluded that tramps shared the same
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biological defects as criminals. In 1877, Dugdale argued that the Jukes’ criminality could
be attributed to the same genetic traits that contributed to their pauperism, including the
record of laziness, sexual licentiousness, immorality, and idiocy in the family tree.164 In
1898, Brockway argued that “the deprivation and dissipations of the improvident class”
produced degeneracies that were “transmitted to generation after generation.” His
rationalization for punishing the poor asserted that the experiences and social
environments of poor individuals implanted a tendency towards crime into their biology.
Brockway concluded that if provided with money, inmates will “proceed to squander
them before exerting themselves for a living.” He argued that, “such habitual
improvidence, with its attending poverty, must constitute one of the chief causes of the
condition of mind we are considering.”165
Other criminal anthropologists argued that tramps were equivalent to incorrigible
criminals and necessitated containment. Henry Boies argued that two classes of paupers
existed: the physically and mentally impaired or the “incorrigibly idle, dissolute, and
criminal,” including “beggars, vagrants, and tramps.” He argued that this class existed
due to poor heredity, should be imprisoned, and either “transformed into honest selfsupporters” or kept behind bars “for life.” Boies claimed that pauperism was a crime
against the state, suggesting that “The attempt to procure an unearned living, the practice,
or habit of securing it, is in itself a theft from society” warranting a criminal sentence.166
G. Frank Lydston went even further, claiming to find common physiological defects
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among the skulls of tramps and born criminals.167 Other scholars described tramps as “a
distinct social peril” and “constant iniquitous menace[s] to life and property.”168
Ideas of natural criminality appeared in policy debates about vagrancy. In 1877,
the Annual Conference of State Charities focused its deliberations on the tramp crisis.
Attendees came from a variety of State Boards of Charities (SBCs). These boards had
close relationships with the American Social Science Association (ASSA) and the social
scientists and humanitarian reformers that made up the ASSA’s membership.169
Attendees of the 1877 conference were particularly convinced by Richard Dugdale’s
address, in which he presented his Jukes research linking poverty, crime, and biology.
Most attendees dismissed the notion that men were not working because of a lack of jobs
and agreed that the cause of the crisis was that tramps did not want to work.170
Attendee Francis Wayland III, the Dean of Yale Law School, particularly attacked
tramps by claiming that men became tramps due to personal defects in biology. Wayland
was arguably the most nationally respected expert on poverty during this period. He
argued that 94-99% of tramps were natural criminals and described the tramp as,
a lazy, shiftless, sauntering or swaggering, ill-conditioned, irreclaimable,
incorrigible, cowardly, utterly depraved savage…he seems to have wholly lost all
the better instincts and attributes of manhood. He will outrage an unprotected
female, or rob a defenceless child, or burn an isolated barn, or girdle fruit trees, or
wreck a railway train, or set fire to a railway bridge, or murder a cripple, or pilfer
an umbrella, with equal indifference, if reasonably sure of equal impunity. Having
no moral sense, he knows no gradations in crime.171
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Wayland’s claims reflected broader anxieties common among authors like Lee O. Harris
who viewed tramping as a precursor to more serious crimes like rape.172 This logic drew
on themes of evolutionary savagery tied to Lombrosian theory and criminal
anthropology. Between the works of Dugdale, Wayland, and the scholar-reformers
associated with the conference of Boards of Charities, physiology was linked to poverty
and deviant behavior before criminology explored the connection.173
Political anxieties over tramps were related to demands that indeterminate
sentences should indefinitely contain the naturally criminal. With the rehabilitative ideal
taking root, SBCs pushed legislatures into passing indeterminate sentencing laws as both
curative and repressive tools designed to reform the savable and contain incorrigibles.
For instance, the Ohio SBC secured an indeterminate sentencing statute in 1885. The
SBC argued that not only felons, but also petty thieves who had “failed to reform”
warranted life incarceration. The board relied on correspondence from Brockway to guide
their structuring of the indeterminate system.174 Indiana followed suit, establishing an
indeterminate system in 1897 after the State Board repeatedly cited Elmira as proof that
indeterminate sentencing protected society through “reforming the corrigible criminals
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and indefinitely containing the incorrigible.”175 In 1891, Illinois similarly passed an
indeterminate sentencing act by arguing that it was necessary for containing the “the most
dangerous” and “born criminals.”176 The Pennsylvania Board, on which Henry Boies sat
from 1887 to 1901, praised the state’s indeterminate sentencing law for increasing
average periods of confinement for its inmates.177
The politics driving the indeterminate sentence were wrapped up with arguments
that laws regulating poverty should look more like indeterminate sentencing, specifically
in the sense that they needed longer potential maximums so incorrigibles could be
incarcerated for longer. For example, in 1892, the Ohio Board suggested that recidivist
misdemeanants were members “of the incorrigible class” and should receive “indefinite
sentences” so that society could be “protected by [their] permanent imprisonment.” The
Board favored extended sentences for “all misdemeanants of the incorrigible class.”178
Indiana’s Board made comparable recommendations in 1891 to expand sentences for
misdemeanants. 179 In 1896, Pennsylvania’s Board suggested that “better results would
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come from longer periods of detention” for both paupers and serious criminals.180 At the
1892 National Prison Association Meeting, it was clear that the poor were increasingly
being categorized as a criminal type when Francis Wayland insisted on “the indefinite
imprisonment of all habitual criminals, paupers, and drunkards.”181 Wayland would go on
to defend harsh anti-tramp laws in states like Connecticut in Nevada, since “tramping,
such as we have seen it, if not a crime at first, soon becomes one.”182
The fear of innate criminality among the urban poor was not limited to intellectual
and policy circles. The term “tramp” first appeared in an American newspaper in 1875,
when the New York Times criticized tramps as willing to “do anything mean or
disagreeable to maintain themselves in a condition of idleness.”183 In 1877, during the
height of the tramp crisis, the Chicago Daily Tribune cited New York’s enhanced
vagrancy law as a laudable reform meant to “check the extent of pauperism, thereby of
course checking the extent of crime.” The article described vagrancy as a “growing evil”
that could “endanger society, and result in a frightful increase of crime.”184 Later that
year, a Tribune article argued for “putting a little strychnine or arsenic in the meat and
other supplies furnished to tramps” to send “a warning to other tramps to keep out of the
neighborhood.”185 In 1894, the North American Review wrote that, “The relation of the
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vagrant to the criminal class…is of the closest character; it is hard to say where the one
begins and the other ends,” and that they deserved to be “severely punished, and by force
exterminated.”186
The political conflation between tramps and incorrigible criminals resulted in
policy changes at the state level. Through the final decades of the century, forty states
revamped their vagrancy laws into “antitramp” acts.187 Of those forty, thirty-seven
authorized incarceration in penal institutions as a legal punishment for tramping. This
marked a shift from the vagrancy laws of the earlier nineteenth century, which were used
to lodge the urban poor for short periods before moving them to different neighborhoods.
Naturally, state laws varied. While some treated incarceration as a first option,
other states fined tramps before incarcerating them—although fines, which most tramps
could not pay, almost invariably led to incarceration. Still others mandated hard labor.188
The laws broadly embraced expansive definitions of vagrancy, extending the laws’ reach
beyond disorderly behavior to simply wandering without work. Some laws also converted
certain misdemeanors into felonies if committed by tramps.189 By the 1890s, many
observers went so far as to advocate for a national antitramp act.190 Statutes also varied in
severity; for example, New Jersey sentenced tramps to a maximum of six months, but
Massachusetts established a two-year maximum and Rhode Island a three-year maximum
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for tramping.191 States also got creative in targeting tramps. New Hampshire and
Pennsylvania paid the public for information on the whereabouts of tramps while
Connecticut and Nevada gave police and prosecutors bonuses for catching tramps.192
The expansion of vagrancy laws into antitramp acts entailed sharp changes in
urban policing. Crackdowns on the poor became increasingly common, especially given
that tramps were commonly blamed as instigators of working class unrest in cities.193 The
rate of growth of urban police departments far outpaced the growth of city populations
from 1882 to 1909, with some city departments in the Northeast and Midwest growing at
rates doubling population growth. Victimless social disorder offenses topped the lists for
causes of arrest.194 Increased crime rates at the time were thus not simply functions of
urban growth, but a reflection of a decreased tolerance for social disorder and poverty.195
The Dangerous Classes: Punishing Immigrants
An 1897 survey of antitramp acts found they were generally more severe in the
Northeast.196 That vagrancy laws were harsher in the industrial core, especially as they
were transformed into punitive anti-tramp acts, makes sense given that tramps tended to
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be white industrial workers. But this ran counter to the false but prevailing image of
tramps as predominantly being indolent immigrants. Given the xenophobic and nativist
overtones in the work of Sumner, Strong, and others, it makes sense that vagrancy laws
would be the harshest in Northeastern areas with high immigrant populations.
Khalil Gibran Muhammad’s rich analysis of the Progressive Era illustrates
important differences in how freed slaves and European immigrants were punished at the
turn of the century and how they were pathologized as inherently criminal in race science
research.197 As an intellectual discipline, race science purported to have discovered scores
of races globally in the late nineteenth century.198 Included in these categorization
schemes were immigrant groups coming to America at high rates. Claiming that the
influx of European immigrants into the U.S. “seems to have something to do with the
volume of crime in our own country,” Brockway argued that immigrants should be
subjected to eugenic restrictions. He thought that such eugenic policies would contain the
spread of their “dangerous tendencies” into American gene pools, highlighting
Brockway’s conflation of immigrant status with criminality.199
Scholars of immigration commonly connected immigrant groups to criminality
and, more frequently, political violence. In 1880, Charles Loring Brace condemned
immigrants as “the dangerous classes” fueled by “the same explosive social elements” as
supporters of the Paris Commune.200 In Social Problems (1883), Henry George claimed
that urban immigrants were “barbarians who may be to the new what Hun and Vandal
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were to the old.”201 Henry Cabot Lodge wrote in 1891 that lax immigration laws let in
“low-class labor from the far East” that contributed to the criminal classes.202 These
authors exemplified the chorus of opinion linking immigrants to crime.203 Newspapers
called immigrants “scum and offal,” “venomous reptiles,” “reckless foreign wretches,”
and “human and inhuman rubbish.”204 Arguing that races were not “equally endowed,”
Daniel G. Britton told the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1895
that “the black, the brown, and red races” each had a “peculiar mental temperament
which has become hereditary” and rendered them “recreant to the codes of civilization,
and therefore technically criminal.”205
Exclusionary immigration policy was presented as necessary to prevent letting
criminal classes flood through the nation’s borders. Policymakers in favor of restrictive
immigration policy often spoke in terms that stigmatized new immigrants as criminal
threats. For example, while newly freed slaves were the most frequent targets of lynch
mobs, immigrants were also subjected to this form of vigilante justice. Recounting the
lynching of eleven Italian men in New Orleans in 1891, House Representative Henry
Cabot Lodge (R-MA) denounced the mob’s activity as “deplorable,” but stated that the
more problematic underlying cause of these events was the “utter failure of any laws or
regulations which we now have to exclude members of the criminal classes.”206 Theodore

201

Henry George, Social Problems (Garden City: Country Life Press, 1883), 6.
Henry Cabot Lodge, “Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration,” The North American Review
152, no. 414 (May 1891): 607.
203
Fraser, The Age of Acquiescence, 110–13.
204
Quoted in John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 55.
205
Daniel Brinton, “The Aims of Anthropology,” Science 2 (1895): 241–52; discussed in Smith, Civic
Ideals, 356.
206
Cabot Lodge, “Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration,” 604, 609.
76
202

Roosevelt, serving on the U.S. Civil Service Commission at the time, referred to the
lynching as “a rather good thing.”207 Vigilante killings of immigrants were not blamed on
the instigators of the violence, but rather on the state for allowing criminals into the
country in the first place. As will be shown later, lawmakers excused the harsh justice the
state doled out to organized labor by defending the misperception that hostile and violent
immigrants and an army of tramps were the ones driving labor unrest.
Given the links drawn between poverty and immigration by Sumner, Strong and
others, it is unsurprising to see the era’s crime scholars link crime to immigrants. That
tramps were widely feared to consist disproportionately of immigrant groups helped to
legitimate their punishment. However, vagrancy laws were not only important in
Northern states. Enhanced vagrancy laws were connected to efforts to punish groups
other than homeless white men. In particular, vagrancy laws were important in the South,
but served a different purpose—preserving the racial caste system.
Punishing Blackness: The Unique Purposes of Southern Vagrancy Laws
The 1897 analysis of vagrancy laws which found that they were particularly
punitive in the Northeast and Midwest ignored how southern vagrancy laws were
specifically designed to bridge the South’s transition out of a slave-based economy. In the
South, convict-lease systems relied on vagrancy statutes and were justified by the idea
that black offenders were innately criminal. The convict-lease system was in large part
justified by economic factors, as it gave planters cheap labor while the southern economy
adjusted to abolition. But deterministic conceptions of crime complemented preexisting
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ideas about black deviance and violence. Vagrancy laws became crucial to Black Codes
built to control recently freed blacks, and ideas about innate racial dispositions helped
justify the construction of a unique system of punishment for southern blacks.208
As David Oshinsky has demonstrated, vagrancy laws were fundamental to turn of
the century southern criminal justice. But unlike their northern counterparts, southern
vagrancy laws were more likely to authorize fines as a punishment for vagrancy. Free
blacks over 18 were required to provide proof of employment in order to avoid a
vagrancy charge, and if they could not provide proof nor pay the fine, local police would
sell their labor to whatever planter paid the fine. Police would often perform sweeps of
local vagrants when local companies were in need of cheap labor. The use of vagrancy
laws to stock the convict-labor pool solved multiple problems for southern Democrats—it
provided industry cheap labor, served as a system of racial control, and appeased white
resistance to funding penitentiaries.
Political resistance to incarcerating blacks was justified by race science and
biological literature concluding that blacks were incorrigible and could not contribute to
society unless compelled. For example, Henry Boies’s Prisoners and Paupers included a
chapter studying “The Negro Element of Increase,” in which he stated that, “The inbred
habits of life, confirmed by generations of slavery, when all were the property of a
master…have tended to utterly obliterate all consciousness of meum and tuum.” Latin for
“mine and yours,” Boies suggested that blacks lack a biological capacity to distinguish
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private property, so they were likely to be thieves. Boies states that blacks were
“compelled often to steal or starve” due to a lack of “conscientious scruples to deter
them.” 209 While Boies condemned southern states for neglecting to reform black inmates,
his language provided a basis for condemning blacks as naturally prone to crime. Charles
Henderson contradicted himself in a similar fashion, suggesting that, “The negro in a
northern city is urged downward towards pauperism, and especially toward crime, not
alone by his racial defects, but also by…social prejudices.” But he also claimed that in
regards to the high levels of crime and poverty among blacks, “The primary factor is
racial inheritance, physical and mental inferiority, barbarian and slave ancestry
culture.”210
Muhammad’s historical analysis provides an in-depth account of the link between
race science, prejudices about black criminality, and punishment during this period. He
discusses the nature and prevalence of ideas about innate black criminality in intellectual
circles, demonstrating how these ideas influenced policymakers in the South and North.
Muhammad directs attention onto the work of Frederick L. Hoffman, and particularly his
book Race Traits (1896).211 Relying on 1890 census data, Hoffman showed that the
proportion of black crime was higher than the proportion of blacks in the population. He
used this data to conclude that blacks had a “decided tendency towards crime.” Claiming
that social interventions in black communities had no reformative effects, Hoffman
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alleged that blacks were criminal by nature.212 Alluding to racial stereotypes, Hoffman
described rape by black men as marked “by a diabolical persistence and malignant
atrocity of detail that have no reflection in the whole extent of the natural history of the
most bestial and ferocious animals.” This analysis drew on common notions, often
“verified” in race science research, that black men had biological proclivities to rape
white women.213 Hoffman’s work seamlessly blended white supremacist discourse, race
science, and Lombrosian theory in ways that reinforced fears that sexual aggression was a
biologically engrained trait in black men. Hoffman went so far as to defend lynching as
“the effect of a cause, the removal of which lies in the power of the colored race.”214
Lynching was a crucial form of crime control from the Reconstruction era through
the mid-20th century. As David Garland (2010) has shown, lynching was a form of de
facto capital punishment as local, state, and federal officials acquiesced to the practice,
especially in cases where black men were accused of raping white women. Garland
concludes that the “specter” of lynching shapes the dynamics of capital punishment to
this day.215 Given its influence on the development of the criminal justice system,
ignoring lynching because it was not a state-sanctioned practice would downplay how
blacks and immigrants were stigmatized as incorrigible criminals and punished as a
result. In conjunction with convict-leasing, lynching was in part a response to stereotypes
about the predispositions of black men.
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This rationality spread into the work of race scientists purporting to prove that
blacks were an inherently inferior race. As southern penologist Dr. Albert Henley
informed the National Prison Association in 1891, “We have difficulties at the south
which you at the north have not…We have a large alien population, an inferior
race…The Negro’s moral sense is lower than that of the white man.” Henley rationalized
the convict-lease system on the grounds that blacks would only work if they were
compelled and that southern penologists “do not yet know” of any way to meaningfully
reform black criminality.”216
The idea that black criminals were incapable of reform had broad appeal.
Taxpayers in the South often refused to waste money on “incorrigible” young blacks by
building reformatories. In “Worse than Slavery” (1996), David Oshinsky recounts the
efforts one Mississippi state legislator who pushed to protect juveniles from the convictlease system at the turn of the century by constructing a state reformatory specifically for
juveniles. However, the proposal faced significant pushback in the state legislature and
was rejected by legislators who suggested that “it was no use trying to reform a negro,”
leaving the convict-lease system intact as a means of controlling black youths.217
The memoirs of J.C. Powell, a convict labor camp captain, also provide insight
into the link between ideas of innate criminality and the convict-lease system. Powell
explicitly connected notions of black criminal incorrigibility to poor labor potential.
Powell wrote, “We have little material for skilled labor among the criminals of the South.
The bulk of our convicts are negroes who could not by any possibility learn a trade, and
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how to employ them at anything save the simplest manual toil is a problem not yet
solved.” Powell argued that black criminals must, and should, be forced to work. They
were only capable of low-skill labor, and as a result could never learn a useful trade or
meaningfully contribute to society on their own volition. Since they could not be
transformed into independent workers, the convict-lease system was designed for
irredeemable black criminals who needed compulsion to work.218
Historical accounts from Oshinsky and Muhammad provide insightful analyses of
the ways in which racialized ideas about criminality contributed to the criminalization of
blackness. But their works do not recognize how the repression of blacks was, in some
ways, related to the forces legitimating state violence against immigrants and poor
whites. Convict-leasing and lynching were driven by ascriptive hierarchical racial
ideologies that were irrelevant to the punishment of tramps or labor, but southern
Democrats and penologists were also able to justify convict-leasing through the
deterministic ideologies that facilitated the repression of poor whites, organized labor,
and immigrants. These race-based historical accounts miss how racialized punishments
were partially justified by the same ideational forces driving additional developments in
criminal justice. In some ways, convict leasing and lynching were expressions of the
broader deterministic mindset of the late nineteenth century American crime politics.
Punishing Labor: Equating Organized Labor with Criminality
Equated with criminals, immigrants, and tramps, organized labor was not immune
to the violent hand of the criminal law. More than any other group, immigrants were
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widely presumed to be a driver of labor aggression at the century’s end. The United
States Industrial Commission, appointed by President William McKinley in 1898 to
investigate capital-labor relations, ended up dedicating a large portion of its nineteen
volumes to studying high rates of criminality among paupers and immigrants.219
This complemented the rhetoric of conservatives, who depicted tramps as the
instigators of labor agitation. Blending ideas about criminality with xenophobic attitudes
was a useful strategy to those seeking to quell labor activism. By associating labor
organizations with radical immigrants and a “tramp army,” conservatives delegitimized
organized labor by connecting it to ideologies of criminality. Anxieties that an
insurrectionary labor force could decimate the social order facilitated state repression of
labor organization in ways that targeted the urban poor and immigrants.220
Brockway himself noted that “the labor question…bears directly upon crime”
given that his own research concluded that 82% of prisoners were laborers. He contended
that many laborers had potential to reform, but his arguments created opportunities to
connect labor unrest to criminality.221 Other scholars connecting criminality to labor
protest had a more pejorative perspective. In 1893, Henry Boies argued that American
cities were welcoming “criminals, anarchists, and ferocious beasts of prey.”222 G. Frank
Lydston employed an unusual argument in The Diseases of Society, claiming that
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paleontological discoveries of mammoth and mastodon fossils found that they traveled in
close packs, suggesting that “among the lower animals true communism is found.”223
Lydston, like many others during his day, connected the criminal behavior of strikers to
“foreign-born anarchy” and argued that the pursuit of equality by labor was a result of
“the ill-advised and incoherent efforts of diseased and undisciplined minds.”224 The large
immigrant membership of pro-labor organizations like the International Working
People’s Association seemingly validated these concerns.225
As a result, when the United States experienced its first nationwide strike in the
1870s, the middle-class and propertied elements panicked. The strike began with workers
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Martinsburg, West Virginia in July 1877, but
outrage over wage cuts and poor working conditions ignited a national response,
prompting thousands to join the cause. St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Chicago were shut
down, and federal troops were sent to seven states and state militias into many more. By
the strike’s end in August, over one hundred people were dead and thousands injured.226
Several states responded to the experience of 1877 by expanding criminal
conspiracy doctrines making it easier to obtain injunctions against labor and repress the
coordination of dissent before action was taken. Courts commonly ruled that injunctions
against labor could be sought if it was shown that a strike could damage the “probable
expectancies” of business. This allowed strikers to be arrested preemptively and
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summarily tried before a judge for contempt.227
That tramps were relatively absent from the 1877 strike did not prevent them from
being politicized as the villains of the events.228 Lee O. Harris attributed the strike in
Pittsburgh to tramps and Francis Wayland claimed that the series of riots was caused by a
“standing army of professional tramps.”229 Wayland declared that tramps were “at war
with society.”230

Newspapers described tramps as the proletariat’s “lowest layer,”

claiming that they were willing to “gladly participate in any mob action” while wearing
“badges of red.”231 Other observers—including Allan Pinkerton, who would later found
the Pinkerton Detective Agency that became crucial in business’s efforts to control
labor—argued that the unrest was due to communists.232 The 1877 strike was thus
perceived as caused by a combination of communists, labor organizations, and tramps,
especially since so many strikers were arrested on broad vagrancy charges.233
According to this narrative, an army of immigrants, tramps, and labor
organizations threatened social and political stability. While this idea was widely
accepted, an alliance between these groups was unlikely in reality. The inflow of
immigrants undercut the wage labor market and caused labor organizations to advocate
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for restrictions on immigration.234 The culture of tramping was steeped in Anglo-Saxon
masculinity, so while some immigrants and blacks were homeless, tramping was a
racially exclusionary counterculture.235 Even poor whites embraced race science to
protect the hegemony of native-born white men.236 And while labor initially defended
tramps as victims of circumstance, they reversed their position as governments blamed
labor unrest on tramps by calling for antitramp laws to differentiate between honest
unemployed workers and criminal tramps.237
Linking labor unrest to populations associated with innate criminality opened the
door to revisions in the criminal law. States pursued several reforms after 1877 enhancing
their ability to punish labor. State militias were expanded through private subsidies from
business.238 Corporations hired private police to fight labor, which facilitated abuses of
workers’ rights. The deputization of private police during strike suppressions and the
business-led expansion of state militias underscored a remarkable convergence between
business, the state, and the criminal justice system.239 Facilitated by anti-statist sentiment,
the emergence of private police to respond to labor aligned the police with corporate
interests. And in unintended ways, Populists like William Jennings Bryan inadvertently
helped to expand carceral institutions by objecting to private policing in favor of public
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policing.240
When labor was accused of violence in capital-labor conflicts, it justified severe
criminal justice interventions. A good case in point is the 1886 Haymarket affair. What
started as a peaceful rally in support of an eight-hour day ended in violence after an
unknown person threw a bomb at the police seeking to end the rally. The incident
validated perceived connections between the natural violence of immigrants and labor,
even though the identity of the bomber was unknown. In the wake of Haymarket,
businesses subsidized police crackdowns on known anarchists. Chicago police continued
to carry on unnecessary raids for years after the threat subsided in order to maintain the
funding arrangement.241
The depression of 1893, which increased the population of unemployed men,
coincided with an increase in strike activity, and again it was widely feared that tramps
were responsible. At the peak of the crisis in 1894, seventeen groups of unemployed men
totaling 10,000 people marched towards Washington to demand unemployment relief.
This physical manifestation of a “tramp army” validated popular links between tramping,
workers’ rights, and violence. Marchers were frequently arrested on vagrancy charges,
including Jacob Coxey, the leader of “Coxey’s Army,” the biggest group marching. The
arrest of Coxey and others broke the movement, calming alarmed conservatives.242
The 1894 Pullman strike was a particularly crucial moment in American labor
history. Due to wage cuts in 1893 and 1894, labor discontent within the Pullman Car
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Company in Illinois prompted 3,000 employees to strike in June of 1894. Under the
leadership of Eugene Debs, the American Railway Union (ARU) carried out sympathy
strikes in 27 state and territories involving over 250,000 strikers. With public anxieties
piqued over Coxey’s Army, the public landed on the side of railroad management.
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With the support of Attorney General Richard Olney, a former corporate attorney with
ties to railroads, the railroads’ General Managers Association (GMA) secured injunctions
hampering the ARU’s efforts. Federal troops and marshals were dispatched nationally to
aid state and local authorities. In total, 190 strikers were indicted and 515 arrested. Under
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court upheld Debs’ six-month sentence and the threemonth sentences given to several of his associates for violating the injunctions.244
The Pullman strike was a crucial conflict not only in that it criminalized labor
violence while private violence carried out by corporations went unaddressed; the state’s
victory also put to bed larger debates about the economic order. Labor’s demands for
workers’ rights ran counter to conservatives’ defense of the economic status quo and lawand-order responses to labor uprisings. But the ARU was decimated after the Pullman
loss, prompting other labor organizations like the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to
swing rightwards to avoid the same fate. Victoria Hattam has shown that the AFL’s
retreat from leftist politics to business unionism was a response to a conservative
judiciary that repeatedly overturned the labor movement’s victories in court, one which
ultimately precluded an embrace of political commitments that could have formed the
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basis for a broader working class movement.245 Other scholars concur that under
Gompers’ leadership, the AFL pursued change within the system rather than challenging
it as a survivalist response.246 The pattern of growing labor militancy, repression, and a
rightwards swing would be repeated in the future.247 The AFL’s choices at this time
stunted the development of the labor movement, and it is key to recognize that this choice
was partially driven by criminal crackdowns on labor in the nineteenth century.
Links between organized labor and criminality gave the state the validation to
punish labor and prevent the emergence of a strong leftist politics. The way crime politics
framed capital-labor conflicts in the Gilded Age helped settle broader debates between
labor and capital on the terms of political conservatives. The delegitimization of
organized labor as innately criminal quieted the strongest opponents of corporate power
and undermined the best means workers had for challenging corporate power and abuse.
IV. Conclusion
Naturalized constructs of criminality were not just functionalist tools in late
nineteenth century politics. They did not emerge only as a mechanism for solving social
problems involving poverty, race, and labor on the terms of the white upper middle class.
These ideas emerged within a larger ideological context amenable to race science and
bio-determinism. Within this ideational milieu, an embrace of Darwinism and biodeterminism spanned political ideology. Ideas about “born criminality” and
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“incorrigibility” were outgrowths of general ideational and ideological currents that had
broad political appeal.
The rehabilitative ideology articulated by late nineteenth century scholars and
reformers has exhibited remarkable resilience over time. Rehabilitative ideology has
waxed and waned in influence, but never fully disappeared from American crime politics.
Parole, probation, and the indeterminate sentence have become durable features of
American criminal justice. And the notion that crime is best solved through individuallevel micro-interventions—whether that means reformative or punitive interventions—
has conditioned how American scholars, activists, and policymakers conceptualize
criminality. Criminal anthropologists and rehabilitative scholars fundamentally
restructured constructions of criminality in American politics by fostering a focus on
“criminals” rather than “crimes” and on people who fit the image of the likely criminal so
they can be preemptively detained before committing more serious crimes. By
conceptualizing criminality as a function of individual faults and traits, rehabilitative
frameworks naturalized criminality while hardening class and racial distinctions.
Rehabilitative ideology and the biological constructions of criminality that
informed it had wide-ranging effects. During the Gilded Age, anti-poor, anti-black, andimmigrant, and anti-worker sentiment spawned out of a shared well of ideas and
ideologies related to rehabilitation and bio-determinism. Treating the punishment of these
groups in distinctive silos would overlook important dynamics of American politics that
justified punishment of them all. This sheds new light on the nature of American crime
politics and the complex ways in which racism, classism, and nativism are interrelated.
This reveals important political developments that give us insight into the rise of
90

mass incarceration. The urban poor, blacks, immigrants, and organized labor were all
punished through the indeterminate sentence and vagrancy laws. The indeterminate
sentence has been a mainstay of American criminal justice since its creation, but today is
often believed to be a benevolent alternative to the determinate sentence. This neglects its
punitive origins and effects. And though vagrancy laws were struck down as
unconstitutional in the 1960s, many scholars have argued that contemporary ordinances
regulating conduct common among the homeless and urban poor are merely versions of
vagrancy laws dressed in modernized language.248 Understanding the development of
vagrancy laws provides insight into the development of their contemporary counterparts.
The story of Gilded Age crime politics illustrates an underappreciated dynamic in
American political development—the mutual constitution of class and criminality.
Poverty, socioeconomic disadvantage, and criminality were all theorized as outcomes of
a common set of personal traits among Gilded Age crime scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers. By focusing on the atomized individual, criminal anthropology and
rehabilitative ideology naturalized crime in a way that embedded constructions of
criminality into class relations. Class hierarchy and criminal behavior became linked as
associated phenomena and outgrowths of the same individual faults. Being of a certain
social or economic class became more important than what you actually did in
determining if you should be punished, and behaviors common among certain classes of
people were criminalized to preemptively detain individuals deemed prone to crime. By
naturalizing class difference and criminality, Gilded Age politics charted a developmental
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trajectory in which class and criminality have defined and been defined by each other.
Bio-determinism and Darwinism were essential facets of Gilded Age American
political thought, but they did more than shape repressive criminal justice policies.
Darwinist ideologies were also deployed by business leaders as defenses of laissez-faire
economics. Corporate actors involved in debates over the regulatory state’s design drew
on laissez-faire defenses of market competition and prevailing notions of criminality to
depict business leaders as inversions of the born criminal—good men driven by healthy
capitalist self-interest. By drawing on prevailing discourses in this way, politically savvy
railroad executives and industry leaders defused the potential for an explosive politics
founded on the idea that the “robber barons” deserved harsh punishment.
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CHAPTER 3: PRIVILEGING CORPORATE CRIMINALS: CRIME POLITICS AND
THE BIRTH OF THE REGULATORY STATE
“The millionaires are a product of natural selection…They may fairly be regarded
as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work.”
- William Graham Sumner, 1882249
Criminal anthropology and rehabilitative ideology justified punitive policies for
racial minorities, the urban poor, and organized labor in the late nineteenth century.
These developments mostly unfolded at the state and local level. On first glance, the
prevalence of this discourse was less evident on the national stage where there was no
national brand of crime politics to invoke the crime-as-pathology discourse. But this
interpretation rests on a narrow definition of crime politics by only considering the
politics of street crime. The politics of economic regulation during the Gilded Age was,
in many ways, a brand of crime politics, and prevailing ideas and ideologies about crime
featured prominently in regulatory debates.
Widely condemned as ruthless and exploitative “robber barons,” the leaders of
America’s rapidly growing industrial sectors were commonly disparaged as criminals in
the public eye. As Populists mobilized in response to the conditions of industrial
capitalism and the abuses of a growing plutocratic class, an angry public embraced the
rhetoric of corporate criminality. Executives’ actions were deemed harmful and
dangerous, so it was argued that they should be punished. This rhetoric leads historians
like Steve Fraser to argue that popular resistance to economic elites successfully limited
the economic inequalities produced by the Gilded Age industrial order.250
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Fraser’s emphasis on this public outcry ignores how and why it failed to produce
meaningful policy change. Populists expressed outrage at the robber barons and were
quick to equate their behavior with criminality, so the origins of the regulatory state
cannot be separated from the politics of criminal justice. However, research emphasizing
populist rhetoric and literatures on the development of U.S. regulatory frameworks miss
how crime has been politicized in regulatory debates.
The “robber barons” were not a homogenous bloc, but a diverse group of
corporate leaders with different policy preferences who made different strategic choices.
Fraser is not wrong in suggesting that those who embraced a strict laissez-faire
philosophy lost in debates over regulation, but not all shared this position. Perceptive
industry leaders, cognizant of the political climate, fought for rather than against
regulatory reform by articulating a regulatory ideology that framed their arguments
within prevailing modes of American political thought, including dominant discourses
about criminality. Their endorsement of a regulatory commission was voiced in
opposition to demands for straightforward criminalization of market activity. A
commission was presented as an appropriate alternative for ethical business leaders who
would be responsive to light sanctions and administrative guidance, minimizing the need
to codify severe criminal sanctions. Only by framing their goals within prevailing
discourses were these business leaders able to reach a favorable compromise in the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Fraser’s narrative thus simplifies the political development of the regulatory state.
It is true that many conservatives and corporations exhibited a dogmatic adherence to
laissez-faire, but other sectors of business endorsed regulatory reform. These corporate
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interests, particularly railroads, combined the rhetoric of laissez-faire adherents who
naturalized markets through Social Darwinist language with prevailing rhetoric about
crime in which criminality was explained through similar Darwinist principles. This
promoted a unique regulatory ideology in which corporate executives were depicted in
contrast to dominant understandings of criminality. Railroad leaders used these ideas to
advocate for regulatory reform in ways that minimized state intervention into markets.
In their endorsement of regulatory ideology, argued that rapacious businessmen
should be viewed as natural capitalists rather than natural criminals. The natural capitalist
became an inversion of the born criminal, one whose competitive and creative nature led
him to succeed in the market. Railroads were thus able to alter the nature of regulatory
debates. Instead of focusing on whether businessmen committed criminal acts, debates
were focused on whether businessmen were criminal types. Legislative deliberations
became centered on determining whether the average businessman’s behavioral history,
character, socioeconomic background, or personal traits demonstrated a criminal
propensity.
Debates about the Interstate Commerce Act became less about whether executives
did bad things and more about whether they were bad people. Situating the debate within
the framework of regulatory ideology made for a stark contrast between railroad
officers—reputable men with no criminal record—and prevailing ideas natural
criminality. Corporate actions that could reasonably be compared to theft took on unique,
non-criminogenic meanings because they were committed by people who did not fit
prevailing constructions of criminality. Instead, corporate crimes were viewed as rational
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responses to market dynamics and healthy displays of capitalist self-interest, not
manifestations of criminal dispositions warranting rehabilitation or incarceration.
Again, regulatory ideology does not rule out prosecution as an option. Rather, it
promotes a degree regulatory discretion that allows regulators to respond to criminal
behavior through non-criminal sanctions, permitting corporate actors to evade the label of
criminality even after they commit criminal acts. Regulatory ideology thus treats
corporate crimes as “less criminal” than street crimes, and it does so by virtue of the traits
of the perpetrators. The regulatory approach to corporate crime is consequently more
attentive to correcting market conditions rather than the people running businesses.
The emphasis on punishing the criminal, not the crime, turned debates over the
Interstate Commerce Act’s criminal provisions into a moral and political choice as to
whether corporate executives were judged to be “bad people,” regardless of the nature or
consequences of their actions. The prevailing interpretive understanding of corporate
criminality that emerged from these debates was a logical reciprocal to prevailing ideas
of natural born criminality. This helped to produce institutional arrangements that
channeled corporate criminals, who lacked criminal dispositions, away from the criminal
justice system and into regulatory venues like the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Siphoning corporate crime off from the criminal justice system was a political
decision that has had long-term institutional and ideological ramifications. Regulating
rather than punishing the activities of corporate executives reflected a choice to embed
normative meaning into these actions that was distinct from the normative meaning
ascribed to street crimes. That corporate executives were deemed superior to poor and
working-class criminals is predictable, but the a priori positing of corporate criminals as
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not innately criminal and thus not deserving of punishment is a testament to the class
character of the crime ideational framework. The choice to control corporate malfeasance
through regulatory oversight has conditioned the subsequent development of the
regulatory state while conveying the ideological message that corporate crime is different
and somehow less “criminal” than common street crimes.
The following section reviews key changes in the industrial economy and the
development of the large corporation in the late nineteenth century. Section II describes
trends in prevailing modes of political, economic, and criminological thought that
depicted the corporate criminal as a natural capitalist and granted scientific legitimacy to
market competition. Section III explores how these ideas and ideologies manifested in
debates over the Interstate Commerce Act. Section IV reviews how the politics of
corporate crime evolved in the aftermath of the Interstate Commerce Act’s passage.
I. The Development of the Nineteenth Century Political Economy
As the nation industrialized in the final decades of the nineteenth century, the
nation’s small towns described as autonomous “island communities” by Robert Wiebe
transformed into a “distended society” in which citizens shed small town ideals to
accommodate a bureaucratic state capable of ordering a national market.251 This
experience with a more localized economy fueled resistance to the growth of corporate
capitalism and elite power Steve Fraser highlights in The Age of Acquiescence (2014).252
Literature on Populism often stresses the movement’s enduring ideological impact
and the reining in of corporate power during this era. Primarily southern and western
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farmers and laborers, the Populists articulated a class-based politics that was previously
unable to attain national support. But after they gained traction in the nineteenth century,
the movement laid ideological foundations that would condition early twentieth century
Progressivism and New Deal politics. However, Populist coalitions also demanded
radical change that hardened conservative dedication to laissez-faire and freedom of
contract.253 This is often overlooked by scholars who overstate the power of populists by
concentrating on the radical character of their ideology and potency of their rhetoric.
Some scholars are more attentive to how and why populist political energies
failed to produce institutional reform. They tend to attribute this failure to the fragmented
nature of the working-class. Scholars like Jefferson Cowie and Martin Shefter suggest
that the lack of a coherent working-class identity inhibited workers from fighting
corporate power with any sense of class-consciousness. 254 Others recognize how
influential business coalitions countered populist politics by advocating a conservative
politics in policy arenas.255
The arguments in this chapter complement literatures highlighting the limited
achievements of Populists in securing reforms by showing how agents of big business
politicized crime to their advantage in order to shape regulatory reform. Legislators allied
with corporations, especially railroads, articulated more favorable depictions of corporate
criminality in policy arenas than was presented in popular rhetoric. This was critical in
containing attacks on corporate abuse and the robber barons. Historical analyses of the
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regulatory state’s origins understate the influence debates about crime had on its
development, but understanding these debates requires examining the broad story of
economic and regulatory development in the late nineteenth century.
The corporations that appeared in the final decades of the nineteenth century were
unusual by historical standards, dwarfing the businesses that drove the local economies of
previous decades. Alfred Chandler has argued that such large enterprises emerged at this
moment to coordinate the growing national market, and railroads served as organizational
models replicated across various industries. But a nationalized market posed unique
challenges for large businesses. Requiring vast amounts of capital to be raised quickly,
corporations became increasingly reliant on investment banking, facilitating a rapid
growth in the financial industry. Institutional maintenance and financial coordination on a
national scale also required the operation of diverse geographic units and detailed cost
accounting procedures. To adapt to these changes, railroads employed specialized tiers of
managers trained to perform distinctive tasks. Chandler argues that the class of
professional managers performing these distinct functions was essential to reconstituting
business enterprises into larger hierarchical organizations.256
Chandler’s account has since been critiqued as excessively functionalist by
depicting the emergence of large corporations as an adaptive and inevitable response to
the development of a nationalized market and new technologies. Historically oriented
political scientists have revised this narrative by demonstrating that politics were crucial
to reconstituting the industrial order. Describing late nineteenth century development as
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“state-building as patchwork,” Stephen Skowronek has demonstrated that political elites
and judges resisted attempts to undermine prevailing institutional arrangements as
piecemeal administrative reforms displaced judicial regulation of industry. This limited
the state’s reconstruction into one capable of managing the new industrial order, throwing
the state into a constitutional stalemate that was not settled until the ICC emerged in 1920
as the “signal triumph of the Progressive reconstitution.”257
In Alternative Tracks (1997), Gerald Berk highlights other dynamics that shaped
political economic development. He demonstrates how the industrial order was molded
by constitutional and political choices through which courts buttressed a system of large
national railroads by revising receivership laws and locating control over corporations
with officers and directors rather than shareholders. In a case study of the Great Western
Railroad, he shows that an alternative economic model that was regional, relied on flat
hierarchies, split authority between owners and managers, and achieved economies of
scope offered distinct advantages to a large national model. That the latter prevailed was
due to political and constitutional choices.258
More generally, Richard Bensel has shown how the Republican Party constructed
the industrial economy. As agents of big business, Republicans represented the financial
core and manufacturing belt in the Northeast and Midwest. Countering Chandler’s claim
that the corporation was a response to market forces, Bensel shows that a minimally
regulated national market was a precondition Republicans deliberately pursued to enable
large corporations to grow. But this goal was a liability for Republicans, as producers in
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the West and Plains states paid exorbitant rates to large railroads to ship their goods to
urban markets. Republicans kept the market minimally regulated by using tariff policy to
attract labor, western sheep raisers, southern sugar refiners, and Union veterans to their
coalition in order to maintain their opposition to market regulation.259 The emergence of
corporations was an outcome of this push for an unregulated national market. Bensel
complements the work of Gabriel Kolko, who concludes that by 1900 American politics
was dominated by businesses that facilitated a shift away from a laissez-faire economy to
a corporate capitalist one with a minimized regulatory state.260
While Progressives would later embrace corporate capitalism, many Gilded Age
robber barons deployed laissez-faire ideology as a weapon to fight discourses critical of
corporate power. Businessmen were aware of the rhetoric depicting them as callous and
manipulative thieves. As discussed, evolutionary theory was embraced by supporters of
various political ideologies during this period, including laissez-faire proponents.261
Doctrines of “survival of the fittest” and natural selection not only legitimated racial,
gender, and class hierarchies while protecting the place of the upper-middle classes—
they also validated the sense of superiority among industry leaders.
Business leaders embraced the precepts of Spencerian theory and accepted
Darwinist discourse as a justification for their own conditions. Not only was natural
selection doctrine an apology for inequality; it also satisfied elites’ desire for a scientific
rationale of individualist economics. The men who popularized Spencer in the U.S. were
259
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typically conservatives who used his philosophy to paralyze efforts at social and
economic reform. Spencerian theory rationalized capitalist economics by attributing
inequality to the pathologies of the poor and the superiority of capitalists.262 Again,
William Graham Sumner was in large part responsible for the theoretical move of
applying Social Darwinism to capitalist economics.
Sumner and Spencer embraced property rights and individualism as instruments
in humanity’s battle for progress and as laws of the economic jungle. In their philosophy,
schemes of state regulation would only impede racial progress. More appropriate would
be to reward rather than disincentivize voracious economic competition so as to promote
racial improvement. By grounding laissez-faire economics in evolutionary science, they
offered ammunition to corporations opposed to regulatory reform.
Drawing on the ideas of Darwinism and race science, defenders of laissez-faire
drew from similar currents in political thought as those who fought for enhanced
punishments for vagrants, immigrants, minorities, and labor. But they did so by
articulating constructs of corporate criminality that warranted less punitive responses
from the state and by depicting business leaders as healthy competitive capitalists rather
than criminals. While laissez-faire purists failed to prevent the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, other industry leaders successfully blended these defenses of
laissez-faire rooted in Social Darwinism with prevailing discourses of criminality steeped
in bio-determinism. The regulatory ideology they advocated thus combined arguments
from proponents of laissez-faire with popular discourses of criminality in order to present
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corporate criminals as inversions of the natural criminal, helping them to champion the
ICC as an alternative to the strict criminalization of market activities.
II. Robber Barons or Natural Capitalists? Constructions of Corporate Criminality
Synthesizing classical economics and survival of the fittest appealed to
businessmen. It resonated with their beliefs in their natural superiority in contrast to the
lower classes, served as a weapon against critical rhetoric, and rationalized laissez-faire
and economic inequality. Sumner was the pivotal player in bringing evolutionary theory
to economics. He argued that, “The millionaires are a product of natural selection…They
may fairly be regarded as the naturally selected agents of society for certain work.” He
wrote that while the “intensest competition” may produce inequality, “the bargain is a
good one for society” because it ensures that “all those who are competent for a [given]
function will be employed in it.”263
Sumner’s defense of the status quo rationalized corporate greed and rapacity as
natural social goods. Scholars of crime deployed similar arguments in studying the
actions of business elites that were often condemned as dangerous. Criminologists of the
period naturally focused on behavior commonly deemed deviant, so it is somewhat
surprising that some of them addressed economic crime, but they rationalized these
behaviors as products of a distinctively competitive rather than criminal nature. For
instance, Charles Henderson claimed that destructive competition and business practices
among industry leaders were natural and healthy. He wrote that,
It would be strange…if the ‘captain of the industry’ did not sometimes manifest a
militant spirit, for he has risen from the ranks largely because he was a better
fighter than most of us. Competitive commercial life is not a flowery bed of ease,
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but a battle field where the ‘struggle for existence’ is defining the ‘industrially fit
to survive.’264
He went on to write that market competition develops a “peculiar type of manhood,
characterized by vitality, energy, concentration, skill…great foresight…[and] integrity.”
Henderson concluded that, “the sense of fairness and justice is strong in business
men.”265
Defenders of the status quo deployed language about the natural capitalist to fight
attempts to criminalize economic activity. For instance, during a banquet honoring
Hebert Spencer’s visit to New York in 1892, Richmond and Allegheny Railroad
executive Eugene Leland said that businessmen “give nominal adherence” to doctrines
designed to govern their behavior because such policies are typically “wholly
inconsistent” with the realities of business operations. He claimed that “the fundamental
laws upon which the doctrine of evolution rests have a bearing on the questions that daily
confront business-men,” promoting competitive dynamics in market that will always
trump incentives to follow state-made rules and render regulation futile.266
Needless to say, these perspectives resonated with the common sense of
superiority shared by titans of industry like John Rockefeller in oil and Andrew Carnegie
in steel. With the language of biology providing a scientific validation of laissez-faire,
this common sense was substantiated through “empirical” findings that corporate abuse
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was healthy. In a famous Sunday school address, Rockefeller declared that, “The growth
of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest.” Employing the metaphors of nature
and Darwinism, he stated that, “The American Beauty rose can be produced…only by
sacrificing the early buds which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in
business. It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law of God.”267
In 1889, Carnegie penned a defense of laissez-faire in The North American
Review. He drew directly on the philosophy of Sumner and Spencer, offering a biological
foundation for the laws of industrial competition and economic inequality. He dismissed
critics of the inequalities of industrialism, stating, “It is a waste of time to criticise the
inevitable.”268 Carnegie claimed that laissez-faire was not only economically sound, but
also necessary to promote racial progress. He said of laissez-faire that,
It is here; we cannot evade it; no substitutes for it have been found; and while the
law may sometimes be hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it
insures the survival of the fittest human in every department. We accept and
welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves,
great inequality of environment, the concentration of business, industrial and
commercial, in the hands of a few, and the law of competition between these, as
being not only beneficial, but essential for the future progress of the race.”269
Carnegie went on to say that “not evil, but good, has come to the race from the
accumulation of wealth by those who have the ability and energy that produce it.”270
The idea of the natural capitalist served as a contrast to the idea of the natural
criminal, and this gave businessmen ammunition against populist rhetoric that even
spread to popular discourse. In his book Democratic Vistas, Walt Whitman offered a
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stinging critique of Gilded Age corruption, but still wrote that, “I perceive clearly that the
extreme business energy, and this almost maniacal appetite for wealth prevalent in the
United States, are parts of amelioration and progress.”271
These divergent constructions of criminality—the “born criminal” and the
“natural capitalist”—were rooted in common ideological and theoretical trends.
Evolutionary and Darwinist discourses naturalized criminality as a class problem by
depicting the criminal as a natural phenomenon tied to a specific class. In contrast, the
businessman was not a criminal, but a naturally competitive capitalist.
The scientific naturalization of pure laissez-faire as endorsed by Carnegie and
Rockefeller did not prevent any and all regulation of markets. But although the
proponents of laissez-faire did not defeat attempts at regulatory reform, leaders of the
nation’s largest industry—the railroads—took a different approach. To justify regulatory
oversight as an alternative to criminal sanction, railroads and their legislative allies
brought this language about the natural capitalist to debates over the Interstate Commerce
Act (ICA) and presented it in contrast to prevailing discourses of criminality. In doing so,
they successfully distinguished railroad executives from popular constructions of
criminality while arguing for the creation of a commission in lieu of strict criminalization
of their actions. This uniquely favorable construction of corporate criminality embedded
into their regulatory ideology was reflected in the design of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).
III. Crime Politics in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
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A Brief Legislative History of the ICA
Democrat John H. Reagan of Texas, the lead architect of the ICA, was first
elected to Congress in 1857 as the representative for Texas’s 1st District in the House. His
stint in Congress proved short when Texas seceded in 1861, prompting him to resign and
serve in Jefferson Davis’s cabinet. Ten years after the war ended, he was reelected to the
House, fueled by agrarian discontent with railroads that charged rural farmers exorbitant
rates to ship their goods to urban markets. States like Texas where agrarian frustration
was palpable initially pursued relief through state-level “granger laws” regulating the
rates railroads could charge shippers. But in 1877, Reagan became the first lawmaker to
suggest granting the federal government the power to oversee the railroad industry.272
Multiple versions of an interstate commerce bill were debated before its passage
in 1887, but Reagan consistently insisted on criminalizing abusive rate-setting practices
by railroads. Attuned to the anger in his base, his 1877 proposal addressed every
complaint lodged at railroads by criminalizing rebates, drawbacks, pooling, and long- and
short-haul discriminations as misdemeanors and punishing the agents responsible with a
$5,000 fine.273 The bill contained no mention of a commission, meaning that the state’s
only response to the actions outlined in his proposal was prosecution. This highlights how
from the beginning of this debate, crime politics were central to the law’s development.
Legislators of varying partisan and regional alliances agreed that the use of
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common law to regulate business practice was becoming futile. Corporations were
growing in complexity and becoming adept at exploiting ambiguities in judicial
precedent in their favor.274 But questions about whether or not corporate abuses counted
as crime, whether executives were motivated by criminal intent, and what the most
appropriate state response was to these behaviors were contested as Congress considered
various versions of the law. With competing answers being put forward, the one that
prevailed was that business executives, agents, and officers should be treated as
inherently good men just seeking to survive in the capitalist jungle. While some corporate
leaders fruitlessly used this idea to support absolute opposition to regulation, others used
it as a persuasion tool to garner support for a regulatory approach as an alternative to the
strict criminalization proposed by Reagan. Even many populist legislators who were
hostile to railroads came to accept this logic over the course of debate.
In 1877, Reagan’s initial interstate commerce bill passed in the House with
support from the South and West before dying in the Republican Senate.275 Railroad
magnates demanding to be heard by Congress stymied his efforts to reintroduce it in
1880. In a series of hearings before the House Commerce Committee, numerous
representatives of railroads pleaded with the committee to instead create a commission to
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regulate ratemaking, investigate conflicts, and make policy recommendations.276 Reagan
secured passage of his bill in the House once more in 1885 by incorporating compromises
to satisfy the most fervently anti-railroad members of his coalition, but the Senate
responded with a bill sponsored by Shelby Cullom (R-IL) proposing a commission.
Cullom eschewed a hard line against the railroads and felt that the complexity of the
railroad system left legislators ill-informed to write policy details. He favored a law
“which could not possibly harm the railroads or other business interests of the nation.”
The more moderate Senate, where corporations had more pull, avoided decisions that
could hurt railroads and favored creating a commission with wide discretion.277
A committee led by Cullom opened hearings in March of 1885 to explore avenues
for railroad regulation. A variety of experts and railroad allies testified in support of his
bill. It authorized the ICC to respond to common carriers violating the law by instituting
proceedings in equity, the body of law authorized to provide relief through remedies like
injunctions and other decrees forbidding specific actions.278 The committee’s final report
claimed that Reagan’s reliance on criminal sanction “would assuredly have retarded the
building up of the country.” The new bill accommodated calls to punish railroads by
defining violations as misdemeanors punishable by a $1,000 fine, but also created the
ICC as an initial venue to adjudicate disputes, pursue equity proceedings to stop
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violations, and monitor railroad crimes through administrative sanctions.279
A conference committee ironed out the differences between the bills in 1886, with
both sides making concessions. 280 Long- and short-haul discriminations and pooling were
banned, satisfying agrarian radicals, in exchange for a commission. The law contained
provisions through which a carrier’s officers, agents, and directors could be criminally
punished with a fine of up to $5,000 for violations of the law, which were deemed
misdemeanors. But the ICC was also allowed to issue cease and desist orders to impede
those behaviors and was given the authority to petition for proceedings in equity if
common carriers disobeyed the law.281 As a result, the law defined specific behaviors as
criminal actions—like rebating, a practice through which railroads attracted business
from large shippers by reducing their shipping rates and shifting costs onto smaller
shippers—but gave the ICC a variety of mechanisms to respond to them, including civil
and administrative interventions. The law did not specify at what point or in what cases a
violation of the law called for prosecution versus a civil suit, administrative response, or
equity proceeding, instead leaving that choice to the discretion of the ICC. This meant
that a railroad could break the law regularly and repeatedly be enjoined or sanctioned by
the ICC without ever being charged criminally. This statutory design not only
complicated the application of the criminal law—it expressed an ideological message that
railroad rate-setting abuses were substantively different than the crimes punished through
279
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the criminal justice system.
This constituted an innovative but comparatively unusual institutional design.
Comparative work has drawn attention to the relative weakness of American regulatory
bureaucracies historically and comparing the ICC to its global counterparts throws these
differences into relief.282 Comparable bureaucracies that emerged in the UK in the 1840s
and 1870s were granted far more robust powers, as the British treated railroad
combinations as inevitable and regulated them to minimize injury to shippers. In
Belgium, Prussia, France, Austria, Italy, and Canada, railroads were either nationalized or
regulated with the understanding that large combinations were unavoidable and should be
controlled closely by the state.283 Alternatively, American policymakers relied on a
combination of regulatory and criminal provisions to enforce competition. This fostered a
uniquely antagonistic relationship between American business and the state.284 By
neglecting to nationalize the railroads or directly regulate monopoly, the American state
relied on a vague set of criminal and regulatory controls that engendered hostile businessgovernment relations.
Scott James has meticulously outlined the legislative coalition that drove the
ICA’s passage. James shows that in 1884, Democratic Party leaders set themselves up for
a conflict with their own rank-and-file. Agrarians in the Democrats’ base long insisted on
stringent restrictions on railroads, but Democrats courted Mugwumps in the 1884
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elections. Republicans who abandoned their party to vote for Cleveland in 1884,
Mugwumps were a swing constituency that delivered Democrats the White House. But
“business Mugwumps,” including large manufacturers, commercial wholesalers, and
others who relied on national transportation services, were supportive of railroads. James
shows how the demands of coalition maintenance trumped the party’s historic
commitments. Democratic leaders gamed the lawmaking process to ensure that agrarian
discontent would be quieted in order to maintain support for a commission and satisfy
Mugwumps. The party’s commitment to this state-building exercise legitimized the
ascendance of corporate capitalism through the commission.285
It is not enough to understand the story of the ICA as purely driven by economic
debates. A Republican-controlled Senate and a tenuous Democratic-Mugwump alliance
in the House created a window of opportunity for the creation of a commission, and
economic ideas were obviously central to debate. But this should not downplay the ways
in which policymakers politicized crime in this process. Senators, Republicans, and
Mugwumps politicized ideas about corporate criminality to defend railroads, and even
Democrats with records of agrarian sympathy came to embrace this ideational
construction. Politicizing corporate crime was crucial to the interests and legislators
pursuing the construction of a commerce commission.
By mixing regulatory and criminal policy, policymakers imbued railroad crime
with a distinctive meaning that differed from conventional understandings of crime. The
law sent the message that businessmen were tangibly different than criminals and

285

Scott C. James, Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic
Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 36–122.
112

deserved sympathy from the state.
Competing Ideas to the Corporate Criminal as “Natural Capitalist”
In the ICA, legislators deemed several actions common among railroads to be
criminal misdemeanors but created the ICC to adjudicate disputes before resorting to
criminal sanction. Ideas that businessmen were not criminals but “natural capitalists”
driven by healthy competitive dynamics were crucial to this policy choice. But the
legislative record reveals that over ten years of debate, lawmakers deployed many
frameworks to try to understand executives’ actions. Analyzing how these ideas
competed reveals the complex way crime politics shaped this debate and why the politics
of the moment favored the conception of corporate criminality that prevailed.
First, some legislators used a retributivist logic asserting that railroad executives
should be treated equally to other criminals. The term “retributive” in this context refers
to the idea that the actions of corporate executives or agents were deemed morally wrong,
thus necessitating criminal sanction proportionate to the harm done.286 Legislators from
the south, west, and plains with constituencies aggrieved by railways commonly invoked
retributivist logic. Reagan was its most ardent advocate. In 1882, he wrote in a minority
committee report that his bill “does not provide for punishment for anything except for
manifest wrongs, which injure citizens and the public…it is framed on a theory which
respects their [the public’s] intelligence and sense of moral right.”287
Several legislators voicing retributivist arguments relied on James Hudson’s book
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The Railways and the Republic. Through a case study of Standard Oil, Hudson argued
that, “greed for wealth can corrupt commercial morality.” He summarized how Standard
Oil coerced railroads into granting rebates for Standard at the expense of their
competitors. Calling the organization “an unmitigated evil,” Hudson concluded that
Standard’s actions were crimes against the public.288 Senator James Beck (D-KY)
referenced Hudson’s work on the Senate floor to note that if “Western bandits” amassed
the wealth Standard did through comparable means, they would be punished
criminally.289 Many legislators invoked Hudson’s work to similarly argue that criminally
punishing railroads was an appropriate expression of moral judgment.290
Despite being associated with the party of big business, some Republicans from
regions susceptible to agrarian populism employed this language. Albert Hopkins (R-IL)
suggested that the law’s criminal provisions were nothing “but the assertion of a just
principle.”291 Representative John Anderson (R-KS) maintained that, “morally I can see
no difference between [railroad crimes] and absolute, naked, bald-headed robbery.” He
supported making “every violation” of the law “a criminal offense.”292 His claims
explicitly challenged the politically and socially constructed nature of crime, disputing
the idea that there was any moral distinction between robbery and financial crime.
Partisanship was thus not an absolutely determinative factor of a legislator’s perspective,
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but such arguments were predominantly made by legislators (often Democrats) from
regions where populist sentiment was strongest.
Ideas about moral fairness and retributive justice were the starting point of debate
over the ICA and were essential to Reagan’s initial proposal. However, retributive ideas
were derided as irrational and unreasonable impediments on markets. Legislators
commonly criticized this logic as barbaric, outdated, and inappropriate for men who had
proven themselves to be contributors to society. Nonetheless, this language was central to
the Populists’ “robber baron” rhetoric and prompted the corporate defenses of laissezfaire and opposition to regulation tracked in numerous historical narratives about Gilded
Age populism.293 But focusing on these two camps, the Populists and their most
conservative opponents, makes it seem like business lost and Populists won. However, a
closer look at the nuances of this debate reveals that railroads and their legislative allies
employed diverse arguments, some of which were more successful than others.
A second and more frequently employed ideational framework was utilitarian in
nature, focusing on the deterrent effect of the criminal law. For instance, Senator Charles
Van Wyck (R-NE) and Representatives Poindexter Dunn (D-AR) and Charles O’Ferrall
(D-VA) used deterrence rationality to justify criminal sanctions. As early as 1884, Dunn
argued that a commission would lack the force of the criminal law and would permit
railroad abuses to “go unprevented and unrestrained.”294 Van Wyck claimed that, “the
only thing required” of the ICC is to “write essays,” which constituted a less effective
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response than criminal penalties.295 O’Ferrall stated that the penal section of the bill “will
go much further in securing adherence to the law” than civil or equity remedies.296
Democrats routinely argued that a commission would fail as a deterrent.
Representative John Glascock (D-CA) called the commission bill “valueless” with
weakened criminal provisions, and suggested that the proposed commission had “none of
the elements of the English commission so potent to regulate railways abuses.”297
William McAdoo (D-NJ) agreed, decrying the commission as “impotent” and “a
harmless safety-valve for popular and individual discontent.”298 Thomas Wood (D-IN)
called it a “farce” to “declare certain acts and practices of railroad companies wrong and
a crime and then leave it out to a commission to investigate.”299
Opposition to the commission was strong in agrarian precincts, with Andrew
Caldwell (D-TN) calling it a “Trojan horse and a deception to close courts” to aggrieved
parties, and Charles O’Ferrall (D-VA) suggesting that a commission would usurp the
authority of Congress and the Courts to write and enforce laws.300 In his analysis of rollcall votes on the Interstate Commerce Act, Scott James found that agrarian Democrats
widely opposed the commission in the proposals made preceding 1887.301 Party leaders
seeking to satisfy Mugwumps later engineered the Democrats’ capitulation to the
commission bill, but during debates, Democrats often opposed the commission by
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employing retributive or deterrence-based frames to justify strict statutory criminal
prohibitions.
Lawmakers aligned with railroads easily inverted this deterrence-based defense of
criminal sanction by arguing that the ICC would shine enough “sunlight” on corporate
behavior that it would induce compliance in rational businessmen. In House hearings in
1882, Chauncey Depew (an attorney for Vanderbilt’s railroads) and Wayne MacVeagh (a
former attorney general and the chairman of the Pennsylvania Civil Service Reform
Commission) claimed that “the open sunlight” afforded by a commission would deter
fraudulent activity without having to resort to criminal punishment.302
Corporate defenders in Congress readily picked up their logic. Representative
William Rice (R-MA) stated that the commission afforded “the bright sunshine of
publicity” and would “be more potent to reform than fines or imprisonments.”303
Representative John Stewart (R-VT) asserted that a commission’s existence “would exert
a strong and constant tendency to bring and keep the management of the roads of the
country within the limits of righteous dealing” in a way that criminal provisions could
not.304 Senator John Sherman (R-OH) concluded that the ability of a commission to
enforce obedience “would be greater than the judgment of fifty State courts.”305 The
deterrence framework thus cut in different ways depending on how it interacted with
one’s policy preferences. Those who favored criminal punishment employed a Beccarian
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deterrence logic that criminal law would deter crime, but allies of railroads suggested that
a commission would deter reasonable executives who did not require the heavy hand of
criminal punishment to follow the law.
That Congress created the ICC partially under the theory that “sunlight” provided
adequate deterrence indicates that the regulatory deterrence argument carried more
influence than the criminal law deterrence logic. A key reason the regulatory version
prevailed was that many railroad agents and their legislative allies deployed regulatory
ideology during debate to suggest that executives were rational men who committed
crime due to market dynamics and competitive dispositions and would thus be more
responsive to mild interventions than common criminals. This framework was frequently
invoked during debate to explain railroad criminality and emphasize the character,
background, and personal traits of corporate actors. It mirrored the prevailing
anthropological theories of criminality by drawing attention to the behavioral history and
disposition of offenders rather than their actions. But by meshing these arguments with
Darwinist interpretations of laissez-faire, the business criminal became a logical
reciprocal to the born criminal—a virtuous and productive individual whose arguably
criminal actions should not be judged as fully criminal because they were functions of
market dynamics, not personal pathologies. Debates about the law’s criminal provisions
thus became hinged less on whether executives did bad things and more on whether they
were judged to be “bad people.”
While the most ardent corporate defenders of laissez-faire were unsuccessful in
their fight against regulation in all forms, numerous railroad agents and executives
deployed regulatory ideology to good effect. Treating the Populists and business
118

community as homogenous entities in opposition during this period oversimplifies the
complex nature of these economic debates, not least by obscuring meaningful differences
in the politics of business leaders. The railroads and legislators who drew on regulatory
ideology designed an agency that reflected the interests of railroads by minimizing the
criminal oversight of markets. Doing so involved effectively drawing on prevailing
understandings of criminality and parts of the arguments from laissez-faire advocates.
Much like in debates over rehabilitation and vagrancy, the political focus in the
criminal aspects of the ICA debate became punishing the criminal, not the crime. But
men of high social standing without criminal backgrounds made for a stark contrast to
prevailing ideas of criminality. Corporate actions that could be reasonably compared to
theft took on unique substantive meanings because they were committed by people who
did not fit the image of the natural criminal. Their behaviors were consequently
interpreted as rational responses to market dynamics and displays of healthy capitalist
self-interest, not as manifestations of criminal dispositions.
The “Natural Capitalist” As Inversion of the “Born Criminal”
The idea that natural capitalists were inappropriately viewed as corporate
criminals cut across partisan and regional divides. It mirrored the dominant way
lawmakers, intellectuals, and experts on criminal behavior understood street crime at the
time. By emphasizing the absence of personal pathologies in corporate offenders and
their personal dispositions and background, legislators conceptualized corporate
criminality in a way that reflected the basic ideological features of criminal anthropology.
This focused their attention on whether they should punish the criminals being targeted
rather than whether their particular crimes warranted punishment.
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Legislators aligned with railroads articulated this framing to defend regulatory
rather than criminal sanctions and persuade others to adopt this perspective. Legislators
with anti-railroad sentiment in their constituent base eschewed criminal provisions for
many reasons, but these ideas played a role in their reasoning—either as a reason for
making that decision or as a post-hoc justification of said decision. In either case, these
ideas had meaningful political purchase for legislators who needed to justify their choice
to regulate rather than criminalize railroads.
A cursory historical analysis indicates that the activities criminalized in the ICA
were generally monitored through regulatory rather than criminal interventions.
However, by overlapping criminal sanctions with regulatory ones for a common range of
behaviors, the law established oft-ignored institutional and ideological legacies. It served
an ideological function by reflecting and validating the idea that corporate crimes were
normatively different than street crimes while channeling corporate crime into alternate
institutional venues from criminal courts, setting an institutional precedent that
conditioned the development of the regulatory state.
This reciprocal image of the natural criminal consisted of four facets: corporate
agents were not driven by criminal dispositions but by healthy competitive ones; their
worst behavior was a function of market forces that excuse their actions; those market
forces were also dynamics that produced social goods, imbuing their potentially criminal
behavior with non-criminogenic meanings; and victims or corporate crime were ignorant,
vindictive, and would use the criminal law to hurt men who do not deserve punishment.
This construct reflected the natural capitalist idea that appeared in the work of William
Graham Sumner, Charles Henderson, and others.
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Railroads’ lawyers and agents routinely brought the rhetoric of Sumner,
Henderson, Carnegie, and others to debates over the law. They testified for years
preceding the law’s passage that railroad men were morally upright and that there were
no pathologies driving their behavior that necessitated reform or containment. For
example, legally representing Vanderbilt’s railroads, Chauncey Depew told the House
Commerce Committee in 1882 that railroad executives “have outlived the penitentiary for
mistakes.”306 He later stated that the bill did not target the “convicted thief,” but “as fair,
as honorable, as reputable a class of our fellow-men…as any other.”307 For Depew, the
officers and agents were not the pathologically deviant “others” depicted in the politics of
street crime—they were as normal, healthy, and honest as anyone else. To depict them as
criminals drew on archaic ideas that he argued were inappropriate when applied to this
class of men. When he told Congress “We have outlived the penitentiary for mistakes,”
he did not mean we as a society, but rather the class of honorable men running industry.
John C. Brown made similar arguments. Tennessee’s former Governor and future
president of the Texas and Pacific Railroad, Brown informed the same committee that
railroad managers “are just as honest as lawyers, doctors, legislators, and…any other
class of people.” He argued criminal punishment was excessive for such men. Albert
Fink, a nationally respected expert railway engineer, made comparable claims in the 1882
hearings. He stated that, “the evils encountered in the management of this great property
in this country are not the result of any wickedness on the part of the American railroad
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managers.”308 By pointing to their moral senses, Depew, Brown, and Fink painted an
image of executives as more similar to functioning members of society than pathological
criminals.309 These arguments suggested that corporate offenders did not need to spend
time behind bars because they lacked the tendencies, traits, and dispositions criminal
sanction was meant to punish or correct, regardless of what they did.
Many Republicans from the Northeast and Midwest drew on this logic in
legislative debates. Representative Roswell Horr (R-MI) panned Reagan’s bill for
targeting a class of people undeserving of punishment. He said Reagan’s proposal would
“take men who stand well among their neighbors, who are honored and respected by
those who know them best, who are well spoken of by the entire community in which
they live” and associate them with “‘cut-throats,’ or…‘naked, bald-headed robbers.”310
Representative Byron Cutcheon (R-MI) criticized the notion of punishing “upright and
enterprising men” who have “never been accused in [their] community of being
dishonorable.”311 Both of these legislators vocally noted that criminal sanctions would
unfairly lump corporate executives into the same category as ordinary criminals. It was
inappropriate to characterize these men as criminal “robber barons” as populists did. In
opposition to Reagan’s bill, Representative William Rice (R-MA) alleged that the “the
managers of these roads are no longer robber barons, but practical and able business
men.”312 This emphasis on the clean behavioral histories, upright character, and “normal”
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dispositions of executives justified opposition to the criminal sanctions in the Reagan bill
and the anti-robber baron rhetoric more generally.
Lawmakers opposed to criminalization praised the final law’s inclusion of a
commission, viewing it as a suitable alternative to criminal sanction for men who lacked
criminal natures. Representative Ralph Plumb (R-IL) stated that the commission was a
“practical measure,” necessary to alleviate the threat of prosecution for men who are
“fair-minded and just” with “as much probity as any other class.”313 Even Rep. Albert
Hopkins (R-IL), an advocate of the criminal provisions throughout debate, came to
support the commission shortly before the law’s passage. He defended his shift on the
grounds that “the officers and managers of some of the great railroads of the country are
just and honorable men can not be denied, and that they manage the affairs of their roads
in a spirit of fairness to the public must, too, I think, be admitted.”314 Again, the actions
of executives became irrelevant. The focus of debate was whether or not executives fit
prevailing images of the criminal person.
Many legislators from regions with populist sympathies did not defend criminal
provisions, despite the anti-railroad sentiment in their constituencies. This is not to
assume that criminalization would have been more effective than regulation, but
Populists were strident in their critiques of capitalism and the robber barons. Support for
punishing rate-setting abuses was strong in the south, west, and plains, and on a symbolic
level, criminal sanction constituted a stronger attack on railroads than regulation. It
makes sense that lawmakers like Poindexter Dunn (D-AL), Senator Charles Van Wyck
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(R-NE), and Reagan opposed the commission as too weak, fearing that its convoluted
powers left it susceptible to being captured by railroads.315 But they were unable to
garner support for their perspective, and many Democrats accepted sympathetic
arguments about corporate criminality to justify their absence from Reagan’s coalition.
Representative Edward Seymour (D-CT) serves as a good case in point. Seymour
declared that railroad executives “are no saints,” acknowledging Reagan’s critiques, but
also admitted that they were “prudent men.” He concluded that they would respond to a
commission’s interventions without prosecution.316 Days before passage, Senator John
Morgan (D-AL) said the criminal provisions only served to “make a moral point on” an
executive, “damage his reputation,” and “hurt his feelings.”317 Similarly, Senator Edward
Walthall (D-MS) stated that, “I have no word of denunciation for the railroad managers
of the country as a class.” He argued that railroad industry leaders “are just like other
men.”318 Ignoring the actions of executives in favor of emphasizing their character gave
Democrats a justification for supporting a policy that may not have had strong support
among their base.
Many of these legislators could have been using these ideas in an instrumental
sense. While their political allegiances and regional associations indicated otherwise, they
easily could have been in the pockets of large corporations. However, there is evidence
that at least some of these legislators were foes of railroads. As Democrats grew more
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powerful in the 1880s, the Senate—controlled by Democrats from 1879-1883—was
occupied by opposing camps of Democrats, one more receptive to industrial development
and another sympathetic to small-town economics. For instance, John Morgan of
Alabama long exhibited agrarian sympathies that countered the politics of Alabama’s
other Senator, the pro-business James Pugh. Nonetheless, Morgan supported the
commission and dismissed the law’s criminal provisions as only designed to “make a
moral point on” executives.
Edward Walthall is also a good case in point. A Senator from Mississippi elected
in 1885, Walthall lacked a long legislative record at the time the ICA was being debated,
but he was a protégé to the popular Mississippi Senator L.Q.C. Lamar whose advocacy of
states’ rights was only compromised by his support for federal economic regulation. The
regional associations and political records of both men suggest that they aligned with the
agrarian wing of the Democratic Party.319 That they held a favorable perception of
railroad executives, despite their personal politics and constituents’ attitudes, indicates
that the ideas put forward about corporate criminality had some meaningful power.
Whether these ideas convinced them to vote against their politics or helped them mask
pro-business sympathies, the idea of the natural capitalist as an inversion to the natural
criminal had political value for them.
By arguing that personal pathologies did not drive rate-setting abuses, this proregulatory coalition of railroads and legislators generated the second facet of the
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“corporate criminal” construct—the attribution of corporate criminality to market forces.
This argument had several effects. Some legislators conceded that the rate-setting abuses
were moral wrongs, but also feared that punishing them would interfere with markets in
counterproductive ways. Alternatively, others argued that because the actions at issue in
the bill were byproducts of forces that provided social goods, actions that would have
been labeled criminal in other contexts took on different substantive meanings. In either
case, criminal sanction was deemed inappropriate because the behaviors were functions
of markets rather than pathologies.
Legislative hearings were replete with examples of this reasoning. Pennsylvania
Civil Service Reform Chairman Wayne MacVeagh argued in 1882 that although rebates,
drawbacks, and other rate-setting discriminations may cause injury to shippers, they were
industry norms. He argued that, “no man believes that it is a crime or a wrong” for
railroads to take these actions, stating that criminal punishment should be reserved “for
some of the manifold forms of crime, in the ordinary acceptation of that term.”320
MacVeagh’s use of the phrase “in the ordinary acceptation of that term” is particularly
telling. It embodied common assumptions about what constituted crime, which economic
crime did not fit. MacVeagh neglected to challenge this assumption, serving as a
testament to the class-skewed character of the political construction of criminality.
During his 1882 testimony, Albert Fink made similar claims. After defending the
character of railroad executives, he concluded that their arguably criminal behaviors were
“inherent in the system of railroad transportation itself.”321 Fink repeated this argument in

320
321

"Arguments and Statements," Committee on Commerce, House (1882), 4-5.
U.S. House Committee on Commerce, 162, 185.
126

1884, calling it “a great injustice to hold the railroad companies responsible for those
evils of the transportation business which are the result of the system adopted by the
people in creating these railroads.”322 His rationale excused harmful or injurious actions
by railroads as necessary costs of industrialization, and went on to attack the penal
provisions defended by Reagan while making no reference to the behaviors targeted. His
argument was rooted in the idea that it was wrong to punish people for actions that were
not the result of personal “wickedness.” By locating the causes of corporate criminality in
markets rather than pathologies, Fink defused defenses of the criminal provisions.
Testimony before the Cullom Committee in 1885 was no different. John D.
Kernan, chairman of the New York Railroad Commission, argued that penal sanctions
were inappropriate for regulating railroad’s policies “because they relate to and are a part
of and share in the vicissitudes and disturbances of business.”323 George Richardson,
former president of the Northern Pacific Railroad, stated that, “Sometimes the nature of
trade is such that a man feels excused for being dishonest. It would be very difficult to
enforce the [criminal] law.”324 By explaining their behavior through reference to markets
rather than traits, Richardson and Kernan made their behavior seem less “criminal.”
Comparable claims were advanced on the floor of Congress. Representative
William Phelps (R-NJ) claimed that Reagan’s bill foolishly attempted to “interfere with
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[the] general laws” of the economy.325 He did not defend what the railroads did but was
concerned that market functionality would be impeded by criminal sanction. This was an
argument in which ideas about criminality justified Phelps’ preferences for minimalist
state intervention in the economy.
Senator Orville Platt (R-OH) made a particularly emphatic defense of railroad
leadership using this logic in the days preceding the law’s passage. One of the primary
leaders of the Republican Party in the Senate, Platt opposed the inclusion of any criminal
provisions, even as additions to the commission’s administrative interventions. He stated
that penal sanctions should be reserved for actions that were “inherently wrong” and “not
a necessary result of the system.”326 Platt argued that if these actions were driven by
market structures, they were not “inherently wrong” and deserving of sanction.
Several Democrats agreed. Rep. Edward Seymour (D-CT) argued that,
“experience shows that there must sometimes from the necessity of the case be rebates
and drawbacks” and that criminalizing rebates constitutes “an attempt to make that a
criminal offense which in the very nature of things ought not to be so made.”327 Senator
James Pugh (D-AL) called penal provisions “impracticable” because they were designed
“without any regard to differences or changes in the conditions, relations, or surrounding
of the twelve hundred railroads running all over thirty-eight States.”328 Rep. Gilbert
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Woodward (D-WI) similarly argued that the crimes specified in the law were really
“[errors] of judgment” that “should not be treated as a crime.”329
Even Representative Martin Clardy (D-MO) agreed with this sentiment. Hailing
from Missouri with a Populist base, Clardy was the second longest tenured member of
the House Commerce Committee behind Reagan in the 1880s. But in 1885 Speaker John
Carlisle went to great lengths to minimize Clardy’s role on the committee, appointing
Charles Crisp to the second seat over Clardy. Crisp was a second-term representative that
Democratic leaders felt was controllable, allowing party leadership to accommodate the
interests of the Mugwumps that favored a commission. In 1885, Carlisle gave Crisp the
seat instead of Clardy deliberately to minimize the voices of agrarian discontent so that a
commission bill could be more easily passed.330
Despite the party’s assumption about his agrarian sympathies, Clardy spoke out
against provisions in the Reagan bill. He stated that he disagreed with Reagan’s
assessment “as to the justness” and “equity of the principle” embodied by the penal
sanctions. He felt that it wrongly punished executives for errors of judgment that,
although harmful, were outcomes of decisions made in the course of business.331 It is
telling that even Clardy, who party leaders feared would identify with agrarian radicals
and oppose a commission, fought the penal sanctions on the grounds that the behaviors
were not criminal but parts of business life.
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The first two pieces of this political construct of corporate criminality formed the
core of the idea and laid the basis for the two other aspects of it. The notion that market
structures were the cause of corporate crime led to the idea that punishing executives
risked impairing economic functionality. In effect, it was a precursor to “too big to jail”
politics. There was certainly hostility to government intervention in business before this
point, but with the rise of large corporations, “too big to fail” and “too big to jail” became
common philosophies of monitoring corporate activity.
This point was made repeatedly before the House Commerce Committee in the
1882 hearings. E.P. Alexander, an executive of multiple southeastern railways, criticized
Reagan’s bill for treating railroad leaders as “robbers…of the most villainous kind”
because this neglected to weigh the “compensating advantages” of their actions.332 The
day after Alexander testified, Chicago lawyers Emory Storrs spoke on behalf of several
western railways. He similarly suggested that criminal provisions would “impair, and, as
a final result, destroy, inter-State commerce.”333 Weeks later, director of the New York
and Erie Railway George Blanchard stated before the committee that, “we [railroad
directors] are not robbers or malefactors.” He claimed that punishing executives would
interfere with the “great public trusts and benefits” they provide.334 Later during those
same hearings, Albert Fink suggested that the “evils of the transportation business have
been magnified to you by interested classes” who have represented those evils “as a great
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mountain, and its benefit as mole-hills.” He said that an accurate picture would depict the
benefits as “a great mountain chain” while the evils would be a molehill.335
Legislators of varying partisan allegiances employed this logic. As early as 1885,
Senator James Pugh (D-AL), a staunch ally of railroads and big businesses generally,
argued that the Reagan bill would “impede the whole transportation of business of this
country.”336 In the days before the final vote, Senator Joseph Brown (D-GA) argued that
that there “is no reason why Congress should seriously cripple all the great railroad
interests of this country” due to the actions of “a few bad men.”337 Representative
Jonathan Rowell (R-IL) similarly expressed these concerns, qualifying his support of the
bill by criticizing the penal provisions and asserting that “There is another class of men
who see only a set of robbers in transportation companies,” and that those who seek to
punish them forget “that a bankrupt railroad company is like any other kind of
bankruptcy, a bad thing for the community.”338 By focusing on the negative collateral
consequences of a criminal prosecution, these arguments drew attention to the benefits of
industrial growth in ways that obscured the harmful actions of railroads.
Concerns about market functionality raised a concern that formed the final feature
of the corporate criminal image. It was feared that because the public did not understand
the complexities of business, they would abuse the criminal law through frivolous
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prosecutions. Railroad executives were thus not potential criminals, but potential victims
of a vindictive public.
A legal representative of several Midwestern railways, attorney Darwin Hughes
argued before the House Commerce Committee in 1882 that penal provisions would
create “a hungry and mercenary swarm of informers and spies” hunting for violations.339
Albert Fink similarly argued that executives would “be treated as criminals” due to the
allegations of people “entirely ignorant of the facts and the principles” of business. This,
Fink warned, would “ruin the railroad companies,” and “the commerce of the country.”
He stated that “the railroads have been wronged, not the people,” because the public has
condemned railroads as criminals out of “misapprehension and ignorance.”340 Future
Texas & Pacific Railway President John C. Brown stated that the punitive elements of the
bill were “calculated to make railways and their officers and agents the prey of a horde of
harpies.”341 Two years later, Brown repeated that penal provisions would “crowd the
dockets with blackmailing informations” because they offer “a premium for men to
become spies.”342 The assumption became that railroad executives, having not committed
any crime, would be subjected to unwarranted prosecutions should the criminal
provisions be included in the law.
Lawmakers shared this fear, suggesting that the penal provisions were a poorly
thought out response to populist uproar. Rep. Roswell Horr (R-MI) suggested that the
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bill’s supporters have “mistaken…local clamor for genuine public sentiment.”343 Senator
Orville Platt (R-CT) stated in the days preceding passage that the criminal provisions
punish behaviors “entirely misunderstood in character, in purpose, [and] in results.”344
Those like Horr and Platt concluded that the bill authorized criminal prosecutions only to
satisfy an irrational and vindictive public.
This reasoning again crossed partisan and regional lines. Representative Edward
Seymour (D-CT) stated that without a commission, the bill “tempted a new swarm of
spies and informers.”345 Senator Johnson Camden (D-WV) declared that a “class of
agitators” was advocating for criminal provisions.346 Senator John Morgan (D-AL)
argued that the criminal sanctions expose corporations “to a set of men who have no
other interest in the world in the matter than to levy blackmail and to profit.”347
The Commission received the most support from the more conservative Senate,
although there was agrarian opposition to the commission from Democratic regions in
both chambers. For example, Representative Andrew Caldwell (D-TN) called the
commission “a Trojan horse and a deception to close the courts” against the rural
shippers aggrieved most by railroads, while Charles O’Ferrall (D-VA) stated that a
commission usurped the authority of Congress to enact the laws and the authority of
courts to enforce them.348 Similarly, Iowa’s James Weaver (D) expressed dismay that
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Reagan and the House conferees permitted the commission in conference committee and
retreated from the unambiguous statutory prohibitions Reagan had long defended.349
Scott James and Stephen Skowronek both attribute the agrarian House
Democrats’ capitulation on the commission to the political maneuvering of party
leadership and the necessity of maintaining their tenuous coalition. James has shown that
the final votes on the ICA were heavily correlated with partisan allegiance and region.
Particularly, Democrats from Mugwump districts or areas with a threat of electoral
contestation were more supportive of the bill, while Democrats from agrarian strongholds
were more consistently opposed.350 However, in the final House vote, Democrats split
with 128 in favor and only 15 against, showing remarkable consensus within the party.351
A bipartisan consensus in both chambers led to a bill that weakened the initial
statutory prohibitions, gutted the original agrarian proposal, and granted discretionary
judgment to a commission. How a coalition of railroads and pro-business lawmakers
politicized crime to achieve their goals is an ignored feature of this debate. The
discourses they drew from embedded ideologies into regulatory law that distinguished
corporate crime from street crime. Federal lawmaking relied on a political construct of
corporate criminality that inverted popular images of natural criminality, which helped to
produce institutional arrangements that channeled corporate criminals away from the
criminal justice system and into regulatory venues.
There are many practical reasons that might explain why legislators from
Democratic or Populist strongholds with records of support for agrarian demands rejected
349
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criminal penalties. For example, many Republican Senators argued that small shippers
could not defeat large railroads in criminal court and claimed that the commission would
provide a more effective avenue for relief.352 This argument could easily have been
appreciated by agrarian Democrats. Nonetheless, the idea that corporate criminals were
substantively different from “street” criminals had visible political significance during
these debates. Whether they rejected or accepted the idea, lawmakers who opposed big
business had to grapple with questions as to whether railroad executives fit popular
assumptions of what a criminal looked like. The fact that the law submerged criminal
sanctions underneath regulatory interventions indicates which political understanding of
corporate criminality, the natural capitalist who could be regulated or ruthless robber
baron who deserved punishment, prevailed in the debate.
The complexities of this debate illustrate was is missing by characterizing it as a
confrontation between Populists and big business. It is true that some business leaders,
like Rockefeller and Carnegie, drew on the rhetoric of the natural capitalist to justify their
dogmatic adherence to laissez-faire. But while the ICA may not have been their favored
outcome, other business leaders articulated a regulatory ideology that helped create a
commission that served the interests of railroads while limiting the railroads’
susceptibility to prosecution. Unlike their strict laissez-faire counterparts, these business
leaders drew on prevailing understandings of criminality in effective ways to achieve a
favorable political outcome. While Populists often harshly condemned corporate power,
many also accepted the era’s Social Darwinist discourses and were thus able to
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rationalize their anti-robber baron rhetoric with the idea that the robber barons were also
not fully “criminal.” By speaking to the prevailing ideational currents of the period,
railroads and their friends in Congress built a sizable enough coalition to lay the
foundation of a regulatory state that reflected and reinforced the idea that law-breaking
business leaders should be not be equated with common criminals.
IV. Crime Politics and the Aftermath of the Interstate Commerce Act
The politicization of crime in the ICA was entrenched within larger debates about
economics, state power, and regulation. But in ensuing years, questions about corporate
crime increasingly became subjects of debate in their own right. This section examines
three political developments in the 1890s that grew out of the ICA debate and laid
foundations for changes that will be explored in other chapters. Those developments
include the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, amendments to the ICA, and shifts in
discourse concerning corporate criminal liability.
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, the statutory cornerstone of
American antitrust law. The act specified three means of punishing corporate efforts to
restrain trade or create artificial monopolies. Violations could be punished through
prosecutions resulting in a $5,000 fine and one-year prison sentence, injunctions, or civil
suits rewarding triple damages to injured parties. The use of equity and civil proceedings
to suppress criminal violations mirrored the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, a
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fact overlooked by Edwin Sutherland in White-Collar Crime when he argued that the use
of injunctions and civil remedies to enforce the criminal law originated in Sherman.353
Notably, the Sherman Act did not create a commission. Discretion over how to
punish wrongdoing was granted to the Department of Justice. Whereas legislators were
commonly concerned that the DOJ lacked the institutional capacity to enforce the
Interstate Commerce Act, lawmakers seemed less concerned with this in passing the
Antitrust Act. This offers some validation to historical analyses arguing that legislators
viewed the law as largely symbolic, but the lack of a commission became essential
decades later in early twentieth century debates over antitrust law.
The act, which passed almost unanimously, has been explained as the product of
consumer interests, producer interests, or as a disingenuous attempt at regulating trusts to
satisfy the public.354 The legislative record offers significant evidence in support of Mark
Graber’s argument that Congress intentionally wrote the law vaguely and left the details
to the Supreme Court in order to avoid politically charged questions.355 Nonetheless,
legislators’ widespread agreement over the bill is puzzling. Having just gained unified
control of Congress and the White House, it is surprising that Republicans pursued
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antitrust policy before tariff policy given the tariff’s centrality to the 1888 election.356
Historians have also noted that Senators with connections to big business including Rufus
Blodgett, Henry Payne, Orville Platt, Leland Stanford, William McKinley, and Thomas
Reed were inactive during debate.357 Sherman introduced the bill in December 1889, and
it was signed after little debate the following July.358
An outspoken protectionist, John Sherman (R-OH) denied Democrats’ allegations
that the industrial tariff fostered trusts.359 He condemned Democrats’ calls for tariff
reform as a means of checking trust formation as “quack medicine.”360 However, upon
passage of the McKinley Tariff in September of 1890, Sherman stated industries “must
not degenerate into monopoly, intro trusts or combinations” after the law’s passage. He
claimed that if manufacturers formed trusts after the tariff’s passage that he would, “be as
ready to repeal this law as I am now ready to vote for it.”361 That he threatened to repeal
the tariff instead of using antitrust law to break up trusts not only reveals that Sherman
was aware of the relationship between trusts and tariffs, but also that he had little faith in
356
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the antitrust law he sponsored. In this context, the antitrust law appears to have served as
political cover to pass the more controversial McKinley Tariff.
What little debate there was over the bill involved some discussions over
criminalizing trusts and concerns about corporate criminal liability. Sherman’s original
bill included provisions making violations of the law punishable by a fine of $5,000 and
prison sentence of five years. Senator James George (D-MS) voiced the only significant
concern, arguing that the difficulties in proving that a trust acted with the intent to
prevent competition brought with it difficulties that would render the law ineffective.362
A revised version in March removed criminal provisions entirely, which Sherman
attributed to George’s complaints. He concluded that determinations of how exactly trust
formation should be punished “shall be defined by the courts.”363 When Democrats
opposed the removal of criminal provisions, including now Senator John Reagan (D-TX),
Richard Coke (D-TX), and the moderate James Pugh (D-AL),364 Sherman claimed that it
was “best to omit the criminal clause and to leave that for future consideration.”365
The bill was transferred to the Judiciary Committee in March, away from
Sherman. It was amended once more to include penal provisions instituting a maximum
fine of $5,000 and prison sentence of one year for violations.366 But on the floor,
Republicans fought to include injunctions in the law as well. Senator George Vest (DMO) railed against the regulatory ideology defended by Republicans, contending that the
362
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inclusion of fines and injunctions sent the message to trust executives that “You are a lot
of criminals, thieves, and robbers, but if you will give us a thousand dollars we will let
you go on robbing.”367 Equity proceedings were incorporated as an alternative to the
criminal law, giving Republicans the ability to proclaim that they incorporated a “grave
penalty” while making the law almost wholly nominal in effect.368
Five years after its passage, the Supreme Court constrained the scope of the law in
the decision US v. EC Knight Co. (1895). The EC Knight Company controlled 98% of the
sugar refining business, prompting lower courts to issue an injunction. When the case
reached the Supreme Court, it concluded that EC Knight only possessed a monopoly over
manufacturing, which was confined to one state and thus not vulnerable to congressional
control via the interstate commerce clause. The Court concluded that the trust did not
engage in restraint of trade and that its monopoly only “incidentally and indirectly”
impacted interstate commerce.369 As Arnold Paul has written, EC Knight cleared “the
way for a tremendous concentration of capital, unrestrained by fear of effective
prosecution; by the time court views were modified in the next decade, ‘bigness’ had
become entrenched in the economy.”370 To evade antitrust actions, businesses integrated
into consolidated holding companies insulated from prosecution.371
The Sherman Act quickly became a useful tool in the federal government’s fights
367
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against labor.372 One of the first cases of the Sherman Act’s application occurred in 1892
during the general transportation strike in New Orleans. Upholding an injunction against
the strikers, District Judge Billings stated that in writing the Sherman bill, it sought to
“include combinations of labor, as well as of capital” in targeting “combinations in
restraint of commerce.”373 Billings’ conclusions do reflect some of the tensions in the
debates over the bill. As early as February of 1889, James George expressed concern that
the Sherman law would target organized labor.374 Sherman stated that unions “are not
affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be included in the words or intent of the bill
as now reported.”375 He added an amendment exempting labor that disappeared before
passage, giving judges a weapon in the state’s efforts to repress labor organizing.
Railroad Managers, the ICC, and Amending the Law
The Interstate Commerce Act did not remain in its initial state for long. Congress
amended the law on several occasions through the 1890s, and the ICC repeatedly pleaded
for legislative reforms to improve the law’s efficacy. But many of these changes were
often made at the behest of railroads and further insulated them from punishment.
The law was first amended in 1889. While the initial ICA only instituted fines as
punishment for criminal violations, legislators quickly revived debates about whether
imprisonment was necessary. Shelby Cullom argued that, “the law will be more strictly
obeyed and more thoroughly enforced if those guilty of violating it are…made subject to
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imprisonment,” contradicting his earlier arguments opposing Reagan’s proposals. Cullom
proposed amendments that passed in 1889 granting courts the authority to mete out fines,
prison sentences, or both if the ICC referred evidence to the DOJ.376
While Cullom’s amendments seemed to counter the railroads’ preferences,
Thomas Bayne’s (R-PA) comments suggest otherwise. His statements on the floor of
Congress indicate that the passage of these facially strict prohibitions may have been
disingenuous. Bayne called the amendment “a scheme in the interest of the railroad
corporations,” noting that railroads favored clear prohibitions on rebating since large
shippers like Standard Oil frequently extorted rebates from carriers. But Bayne pointed
out that the criminal provisions would more likely hurt small shippers who erroneously
underreported the weights of their shipments, not bigger corporations like Standard Oil.
Given that the purpose of the ICA itself was to protect shippers, Bayne pleaded with
Congress to hear from both sides before accepting an amendment recommended by the
carriers it was designed to regulate.377
On the day of the bill’s passage, Albert Anderson (R-IA) seconded Bayne’s
concerns. He argued that the proposal was pushed by railroads to divert sanction away
from executives. He was dismayed that the amendment “makes the shipper particeps
criminis [an accomplice] with the common carrier” and was critical that “the Interstate
Commerce Commission was pushing this amendment, unasked and uninvited, on the
376
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floor.” He pointed out that the amendment not only directed the law’s attention onto
small shippers, but onto lower-level employees of railroads, a trend that reflected the
insistence of railroad presidents that “their clerks and subordinates are the law-breakers,
and that they [directors and presidents] are honest men and not responsible.”378
The statements from Baynes and Anderson were futile as Congress approved the
amendments almost unanimously. There is evidence that railroads were the ones pushing
for these criminal provisions. Railroads had long been hostile to large shippers, most
famously Standard Oil, which could strong-arm them into offering rebates.379 Reports
from the ICC indicate that these amendments were designed to target shippers more than
carriers. In its first annual report, the commission stated that shippers’ billing practices
should be the object of punishment. They cited the Chicago Board of Trade’s demands
for amendments “which should make the fraudulent shipper criminally responsible for his
conduct.” The ICC agreed and suggested that, “The possibilities for fraud which may be
contrived between unscrupulous shippers and weak or unreliable employees are
enormous.” Particularly interesting are the ICC’s comments that the agents who process
merchandise are often “not upon the highest plane of honorable conduct,” suggesting that
the dispositions of lower-level agents tend towards criminality more than those of
executives. The ICC proposed amendments penalizing shippers for false billing,
classification, or weighing.380
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The railroads’ demands for harsher criminal provisions served two purposes.
First, it deflected blame from executives onto lower-level employees who, as the ICC
argued, operate on a lower plane of conduct. As Albert Anderson stated, the reasoning for
the amendments “is in keeping with the charge of the railroad presidents and their clerks
that their subordinates are the law-breakers, and that they are honest men and not
responsible.”381 Second, the law redirected criminal sanction onto shippers rather than
carriers, which put smaller shippers—who were the main constituency the bill was
supposed to protect—in the sights of the criminal law. Through character defenses of
their executives and directors, railroads were able to deflect blame lower down the
corporate hierarchy and onto other corporate actors.
The Political Foundations for Corporate Criminal Liability
An ongoing debate during the ICA’s passage was whether or not corporate
entities should be the subject of punishment instead of individuals. For years prior to the
Interstate Commerce law’s passage, state and federal courts began holding corporations
criminally responsible for their agents’ actions.382 The Supreme Court would validate this
practice in 1909, but in the late nineteenth century statutory law remained unclear on the
question. In debates over the ICA, members of Congress were largely resistant to the idea
that corporations could be criminally punished and thought it was impossible to attribute
criminal intent to a faceless organization. But the foundation for the twentieth century
debates over corporate liability actually had its origins in deliberations over the ICA.
Shifts towards corporate liability were part of the development of corporate
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personhood in the common law, as the Supreme Court ruled in the 1886 case Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad that the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause
applied to corporations.383 In conjunction with personhood doctrine, the emergent notion
of corporate “souls” further anthropomorphized the corporation. In order to restore faith
in the moral integrity of their businesses, directors of railroads and other corporations
instituted public relations campaigns in the 1870s and 1880s. By highlighting their
community involvement, provision of benefits, and attention to social justice,
corporations aimed to counteract public anxieties about corporate wrongdoing through
metaphors of the “corporate soul.”384 Railroads and other big businesses used this
imagery to create a legal and social construct of the “corporate body” that had a degree of
moral legitimacy.
Despite emergent notions of corporate soulhood and personhood, congressional
lawmakers and railroad industry leaders were largely opposed to the prospect of
punishing corporations rather than individuals in the 1880s. Reagan particularly
disapproved of the idea, repeatedly referring to the adage that “corporations have no
383
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bodies to be kicked and no souls to be damned.”385 Former Tennessee Governor and
future president of the Texas and Pacific Railroad John C. Brown, a foe of Reagan’s
initial ICA proposal, agreed with him on this issue. He argued before the House
Commerce Committee in 1882 that, “a corporation…is not an individual” and “cannot be
vindictive,” claims that he reiterated two years later.386 This rationality suggested that
guilt is personal, and that to commit a crime one has to have exhibited criminal intent.
It should be noted that corporate personhood doctrine was used in diverse ways.
Some legislators cited the idea of corporate personhood to criticize Reagan’s bill. For
example, Representative Thomas Browne (R-IN) stated that Reagan’s proposal was
excessively punitive and that, “We ought to treat corporations as we treat others who
have rights under the law.”387 This logic posited that corporations should be the targets of
the criminal law in order to afford them the rights granted to anyone accused of a crime.
The idea of punishing corporations was rarely discussed on the floor of Congress,
as the general assumption guiding legislative debate was that the law would target
individuals. But courts continued to issue decisions treating corporations as criminally
punishable entities through the 1890s.388 Congress’s decision to punish individuals rather
than corporations set the stage for a political conflict over the question of corporate
versus individual liability. Political demands for corporate criminal liability came most
conspicuously from the ICC. Interestingly, the ICC cited the testimony of railroad agents
as their reasoning for supporting corporate liability.
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The ICC’s reports in the 1890s indicate that railroad managers consistently
influenced the Commission’s policy positions. The ICC regularly cited testimony from
railroad managers as favoring corporate liability because they were unwilling to provide
incriminating testimony against colleagues. Directing liability against the corporation
rather than individuals protected middle-tier managers in ways that would make railroad
employees more willing to turn over incriminating information. The ICC’s reports also
claimed that district attorneys lacked the institutional capacity to convict individual
offenders and supported corporate liability as a practical alternative. It is unclear why the
ICC thought prosecutors could charge large corporations if they lacked the capacity to
convict individuals. The ICC’s support for entity liability was rooted in the political
demands of railroad managers seeking to insulate themselves from the criminal law.
A strong case in point of the railroads’ influence on the ICC appears in the ICC’s
1890 report. The Commission noted that carriers were resistant to retaliate against
competitors through prosecution. Because “few carriers feel themselves entirely secure in
the matter of the observance of the law,” they tried to avoid invoking penal provisions.
The prevalence of legally questionable behavior as an industry norm impeded the
criminal law’s enforcement. The report concluded that without cooperation from carriers
or the injured parties, the ICC was powerless to enforce the law. The ICC concluded by
considering without definitively supporting the notion of corporate criminal liability.389
In 1891, the ICC went further by condemning the criminal provisions of the Act
as “defective” for only applying to individuals and not corporations. The fact that

389

U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
vol. 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), 8, 66, 337.
147

criminal proceedings were instituted against individuals who did not directly benefit from
the violation created “a sentiment in the minds of the public” that “militates against
conviction.” The report noted that the ICC’s primary means of enforcement—that its
findings were to be treated as prima facie evidence in courts—had been gutted by court
rulings reviewing ICC findings de novo, essentially affording no deference to the
commission’s findings.390 This left the ICC even more desperate to find a workable
means of enforcement.
By 1894, it became clear that railroad managers were pushing for corporate
criminal liability. The ICC’s report stated the following:
…we may properly allude to certain modifications of the penal provisions of the act,
which are advocated by many railroad managers. It is proposed by them to exempt
the officers and employees of carrying corporations from criminal liability for rate
cutting and similar offenses, and to impose such liability solely upon the corporations
themselves. In brief, the argument is that the extreme severity of the present law
operates to prevent its enforcement; that railway managers will not give information
against their rivals when the consequence might be the imprisonment of individuals
with whom their personal relations are friendly and familiar, but that such disclosures
would be freely made if they resulted only in the imposition of a fine upon the
offending corporation.391
Railroad managers openly informed the Commission that they would not provide
incriminating information against individuals with whom they “are friendly and
familiar,” but would gladly do so if it meant the imposition of a fine against a
corporation. The Commission claimed that the wrongs committed involved “a high
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degree of moral turpitude” warranting imprisonment, but that they were not ready to
attach liability to corporations in lieu of individuals without further consideration.392
The 1895 annual report explored this point further. The ICC stated that it was at
“the special insistence of railroad managers…that the imprisonment features of the
present law be repealed” and that all penal sanctions be limited to fines. The managers
argued that the imprisonment clause acted as a “shield to the guilty.” Given the “resultant
disgrace” following a conviction, managers claimed that persons with knowledge of
incriminating facts refused to share them with prosecutors, aware “of the possible
consequences to the wrongdoer.” Yet the report still stated that the ICC was not yet ready
to take a stand on the question.393
Testimony from Aldace Walker before the ICC was cited directly in the 1898
report. As the former president of the Santa Fe Railroad and current receiver of the
Atlanta and Pacific Railroad, Walker’s testimony demonstrated how high-ranking
railroad directors and executives perceived the criminal provisions.
Mr. Walker: …It is very difficult to get the absolute facts which are considered as
necessary by the courts to punish railroads that are suspected…It results to a
considerable extent from the reluctance of the railways to help.
The Chairman: To have the penalties attached to the misdemeanors enforced
against their rivals?
Mr. Walker: Against their associates. That puts them in the position of being
informers, and, as has been said, in this country an informer is worse than the
criminal in the eyes of the public.394
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Walker’s testimony indicated that he and other railroad men disobeyed the law because
of a widespread lack of cooperation among railroads. Industry norms of legal violations
of the act did not result in prosecution, but instead fostered reciprocal relationships
between competitors—everyone violated the law, so no one reported it.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the ICC completed a reversal in its policy
position. In 1899, its annual report argued that the law targeted “Men who in every other
respect are reputable citizens” for “acts which, if the statute law of the land were
enforced, would subject them to fine or imprisonment.” The commission argued that, “It
is difficult to estimate the moral effect of such a condition of things upon a great section
of the community.” It concluded that, “we are convinced that criminal remedies as
applied to the present situation are utterly inadequate to prevent departures from
published rates.” In lieu of individual liability, the ICC endorsed corporate criminal
liability.395
The ICC’s reorientation towards corporate criminal liability was largely
facilitated by managers’ demands, but it is remarkable that this is not how the ICC
justified its policy recommendations in 1899. Instead, it referred to the agents and
officers punished as “reputable citizens” whose punishment would have a negative
“moral effect” on the community. That judgments about the dispositions of corporate
executives emerged in this context even though the debate seemed removed from these
ideas highlights the broad political purchase of the “corporate criminal” construct present
in the ICA debates. It is true that the shift towards corporate liability appears to have been
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rooted in debates about efficacy, but that these ideas resurfaced as the ICC made a
significant shift in their policy position after a decade of equivocation indicates that these
ideas were still powerful forces in political discourse. This ideational construct of the
corporate criminal remained a prevailing idea that policymakers had to address when
justifying their policy positions.
By 1902, the ICC’s annual report made strong demands that without amendments
to criminalize corporate entities, the law’s criminal sections “are practically a dead
letter.”396 This trajectory towards corporate criminal liability is surprising given the
attitudes of the ICC Commissioners in the early 1890s. Commissioners’ correspondence
with lawmakers and attorneys repeatedly expressed concerns that district attorneys lacked
the resources to carry out litigation under the ICA. Calling them “unequal to the
work…[and] duties” required of them in the law, commissioners stated that prosecutors’
failures to secure convictions made the ICC appear weak. Commissioners frequently
requested that DAs receive extra resources to perform the functions required of them.397
In this context, it is hard to understand why the commission shifted towards
supporting corporate criminal liability. If prosecutors lacked the capacity to charge
individuals, requiring them to punish large corporate entities without additional resources
made little sense. There were arguments that the ICC could have made, such as that
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detecting individual liability within a large corporation was difficult or that corporations
benefitted more directly from criminal acts than individuals, but these arguments were
not advanced. Instead, the ICC abandoned their concerns about prosecutorial capacity
over the course of the decade. This suggests that railroad managers were essential to
framing and defining what ideas and concerns mattered to this debate.
The shift towards corporate criminal liability was politically constituted by the
demands of railroad managers as channeled through the ICC. This complements
Chandler’s conclusions regarding the “managerial revolution” in American business in
the late nineteenth century, demonstrating that railroad mangers were key political
players shaping policy.398 But it highlights how these managers shaped political debate
by defining the nature and scope of the conflict and delimiting the range of possible
solutions policymakers considered.399 Chapter 5 unpacks regulatory developments during
the early twentieth century, further exploring these political origins to corporate criminal
liability and the doctrine’s development during the Progressive era.
V. Conclusion
Gilded Age constructions of corporate criminality sharply countered prevailing
constructions of criminality. The thief, the murderer, and the vagrant were born criminal
and could be preemptively identified on sight based on their class, skin color, or accent.
In contrast, the ruthless robber baron was born to be a capitalist. His actions may have
looked similar to theft, but he was a survivor of capitalism rather than a criminal. These
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divergent constructions of criminality reflected a shared set of assumptions of who and
what counted as “criminal.”
The inequalities of American crime policy have long been rooted in social,
economic, and material inequalities, but scholars have failed to appreciate how these
inequalities have been embedded into political constructions of criminality. Of course,
corporations can avoid prosecution by buying strong legal defense teams, capturing
agencies, or initiating capital strikes, but the story presented in this chapter reveals other
dynamics that shape business-government relations. Businesses cannot simply achieve
their goals by bullying political actors into conceding to their demands. They must be
strategic, remain attentive to prevailing discourses, and frame their demands within them
so as to communicate their policy goals in ways that resonate with policymakers and the
public. While the creation of the ICC was a loss for business leaders who exhibited a
dogmatic adherence to absolute laissez-faire, it was a victory for those who advocated
regulatory ideology and deployed prevailing discourses about crime and social
Darwinism to design the ICC to their liking. This group of business leaders knew that
supporters of laissez-faire countered anti-robber baron rhetoric with Social Darwinist
discourse, understood that criminality was popularly conceived in bio-deterministic
terms, and realized how these ideas could be synthesized into a regulatory ideology that
could insulate them from criminal sanction. This illustrates how dominant ideas,
ideologies, and discourses of a moment can powerfully shape how business interests
behave politically and articulate their policy goals.
The Interstate Commerce Commission’s creation is often understood as the laying
the foundation for the modern regulatory state. But agencies like the ICC are explicitly
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designed to monitor behavior defined as criminal, and research on the political
development of the regulatory state often ignores its relation to crime politics. This
chapter illustrates why regulatory politics should be understood as a brand, or at least a
relative, of crime politics. The regulatory politics of the nineteenth century were shaped
by the same collection of ideas and ideologies that informed the politics of street crime
during this period, but Darwinist theory and bio-determinism were used to conceptualize
corporate criminality favorably. The strategic use of these ideas entailed articulating a
unique construct of corporate criminality that diverged from prevailing constructions of
street criminality, which then became embedded into the regulatory state’s design.
Studying street crime politics in juxtaposition to regulatory politics can shed light
on how prevailing discourses and modes of thought in American politics have been used
to rationalize inequalities in crime policy. Divergent Gilded Age political constructions of
street and corporate criminality reflected and reinforced common ideas about who and
what counted as crime and became embedded into state institutional frameworks. In the
early decades of the twentieth century, similar developments would unfold out of
common ideational and ideological currents relating to eugenics and state administration.
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CHAPTER 4: EUGENICS, CRIME SCIENCE, AND PROGRESSIVES
“I wish very much that the wrong people could be prevented entirely from breeding; and
when the evil nature of these people is sufficiently flagrant, this should be done.
Criminals should be sterilized and feeble-minded persons forbidden to leave offspring
behind them.”
- President Theodore Roosevelt, 1913400
As America adapted to rapid industrialization and urbanization, the nation
continued to experience unprecedented levels of immigration, inequality, labor
mobilization, and industrial consolidation. But the Progressives of the early twentieth
century widely rejected the “survival of the fittest” ethos of Social Darwinism that
dominated late nineteenth century politics. Whereas Gilded Age political actors viewed
Social Darwinism as a rationalization for the inequalities of capitalism, Progressives
believed the government could be a powerful tool that could eradicate social ills.
Progressives insisted that an active government promoting an agenda of social welfare
could solve social problems related to class warfare, racism, inequality, and criminality.
They fought for a stronger state that they believed could humanize industrial capitalism.
However, Progressives did not believe the system could or should be humanized
for everyone. Progressives routinely coupled welfarist impulses with a politics of
exclusion built on scientific racism and eugenics. Instead of allowing natural selection to
run its course, Progressives pursued an agenda of artificial selection in which the state
proactively identified the “unworthy,” including mental defectives, minorities, and
undesirables, and sorted them out of the “worthy” population before they damaged
society or infected the nation’s racial stock. This governing philosophy produced rigid
400

Theodore Roosevelt, “Twisted Eugenics,” The Outlook 106 (1914): 32.
155

immigration restrictions, repressive monitoring of poverty, labor, and racial minorities,
and state sanctioned compulsory sterilization laws.
The two prongs of the rehabilitative ideal had a natural appeal to Progressives
articulating an agenda of inclusion for the worthy and exclusion for the unworthy. They
adapted the works of Lombroso, Brockway, and rehabilitative scholars by attaching them
to a new set of policy commitments and a new understanding of the state’s role. The state
should not sit idly by and wait for natural criminals to reveal themselves, but rather
engage in a process of artificial selection by proactively identifying, detaining, and
sterilizing them before they committed serious crimes or spread their racial stock.
Progressives’ social welfarist and exclusionary politics were thus both rationalized in the
name of progress and necessitated an expansion of the government’s crime control
powers.
In this context, the class-skewed character of the rehabilitative ideal took on a
new significance. The criminal repression and sterilization of the poor, minorities, mental
defectives, and criminals became a project of class sorting in the Progressive Era. The
rehabilitative model directed lawmakers and penologists to look to individuals’
behavioral histories, personal and racial traits, and socioeconomic background as
evidence of their propensity to commit crime. This justified the Progressives’ political
choices to mete out harsh justice for the poor and disadvantaged while the crimes of elites
continued to take on alternative meanings.
The chapter begins by unpacking the meaning of “progressive” during the
Progressive Era, outlining core ideological and ideational consistencies across varying
strands of progressivism in the early twentieth century. This is followed by an analysis of
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the constructions of criminality produced within this context. Hereditarian theory is
particularly emphasized, as it was widely embraced by race scientists, economists, and
eugenicists in the early twentieth century. This section stresses the evolution of the social
sciences at the turn of the century, showing that while criminal anthropologists and
sociologists dominated the social science of crime in the nineteenth century, eugenicists
and economists became critical intellectual forces in the twentieth century. The
subsequent section explores the legacies of Gilded Age crime politics, illustrating how
Progressives rationalized forms of class control, racial control, and criminal sanction
created in the nineteenth century through eugenics-based politics. This is followed by an
account of how eugenics scholars, reformers, and political activists deployed eugenic
ideas about crime to secure policy reform through compulsory sterilization statutes. The
chapter concludes with a brief examination of the influence of progressive constructs of
criminality on 1920s politics, examining the rise of the crime commission and the
influence of eugenic criminology.
I. The Ideational and Ideological Currents of the Progressive Era
The label “progressivism” has had multiple meanings over the course of
American political history. During the Progressive Era, it is important to realize that the
phrase was not attached to a particular political ideology or set of policy commitments.
Rather, “progressivism” referred to a specific set of philosophical and governing
principles about the role the state should play in modern society. Progressives adopted
such diverse ideological perspectives that in 1912 the three major presidential candidates,
all from different parties, identified as Progressives.
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Progressives of varying party allegiances shared a few basic precepts. They
critiqued the constitution, its emphasis on individual rights, and the role of parties,
corruption, and bossism in American politics. They favored a state that was administered
by experts and professionals, advised by knowledge-based communities, and anchored
governance in science. Discourses of determinism, heredity, and eugenics flourished in
this setting.401
Three ideational and ideological features of Progressive political thought created a
fertile ideological terrain for these developments. First, Progressives believed that the
modern state should be guided by science rather than politics. It was thought that
disinterested, nonpartisan, objective experts would run the state more efficiently than
politically motivated individuals selected by party bosses. Despite their diverse factions,
Progressives relied on expertise by drawing from a historically specific set of scientific
and intellectual discourses that shaped the politics of the early twentieth century.402
Central to this discursive universe were the sciences of heredity, including
Darwinism, scientific racism, and eugenics. These frameworks presented social, moral,
and economic failure as outcomes of biological inferiority among society’s weakest and
most defective. But it was the eugenics movement that pushed the conclusions of race
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science and evolutionary theory to new extremes. Whereas bio-determinist logic during
the Gilded Age rationalized a “survival of the fittest” approach to economics and social
policy, eugenics called for a greater expansion of state power. Eugenicists believed it was
the state’s duty to identify and sort out the unfit as part of an effort to regulate breeding
and promote racial progress. This replaced the “natural selection” logic of Gilded Age
politics with a project of artificial selection led by expert administrators who proactively
identified the unfit to prevent them from propagating.
This allowed Progressives of varying ideologies to defend invasive and repressive
legal regimes. Jim Crow laws, restrictive immigration statutes, compulsory sterilizations,
and repressive policies for the poor, women, and “unfit” became essential to the state’s
program of improving the nation’s racial stock. Progressives consequently defended
social uplift for some members of society and repression for others because they relied on
discourses that lent scientific credence to established hierarchies of race, class, and
gender, believing that eugenics would enable the state to improve the polity by uplifting
the worthy and repressing the unworthy.403 So despite similarities with Gilded Age
political thought, the eugenics movement changed the state’s relationship to the citizen
by promoting new interventions to monitor social behavior.
The Progressives’ embrace of eugenics is related to a second theme of the era’s
politics—an emphasis on the primacy of the collective over the individual. As Daniel
Rodgers has argued, Progressives embraced the “rhetoric of the moral whole” while
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rejecting the individualist ethos of American political culture.404 Progressives articulated
anthropomorphic depictions of American society as a living organism that needed to be
cared for.405 But to protect society as social organism required exclusionary politics;
undesirable groups were viewed as uninvited parasites and social diseases that threatened
collective national health and survival. This drove the move from natural selection to
state-administered artificial selection; instead of allowing nature to run its course through
minimal intervention into economic and social policy, restrictive immigration regimes
and invasive eugenic policies were means of protecting the social organism of the polity
from invasive and parasitic undesirables.406
The Progressives’ embrace of eugenics was premised on exterminating, or at least
controlling, the unfit to improve the social body. This required the “fittest” to be
determined prior to the selection process. As a result, eugenicists constructed elaborate
taxonomic hierarchies of naturally occurring human types to guide the state’s selection of
the fit and unfit. By asserting the primacy of the collective over the individual,
Progressives ironically justified great social control over the individual in the name of
collective health. Their articulation of social unity thus relied on a mix of eugenics and
race science to justify exclusionary politics and state expansion in service of a greater
good. Worked into these taxonomic structures were constructs of criminality.
This emphasis on science and expertise during the Progressive Era was not simply
nominal. A third important current of progressive politics was that scientific experts
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believed it was their duty to be public figures. Men like Charles Henderson, Frederick
Winslow Taylor, and Richard Ely threw themselves into academia and public policy
debates. They worked with professional organizations, held federal appointments, worked
on state policy boards, and were active members of prominent academic associations.
Progressives believed that experts should not only identify the public good and instruct
the public as to what it was—they should help the state pursue it through public service.
This ensured that eugenics and race science travelled from intellectual circles into policy
ones.407
It was in this political milieu that state-sponsored eugenic selection came to be the
state’s logic of social control. According to Progressives, it was the state’s duty to
identify and target biologically inclined criminals, among other defectives, for
segregation out of the population. This is not to say there was no contestation over
understandings of criminality in the Progressive Era. Lombrosian theory still persisted
alongside psychological and eugenic theories. Cultural theorists and critical race scholars
attacked notions of natural criminality, and their work forged new directions for
sociological and criminological research. But hereditarian theory and eugenics were
among the most widely accepted strands of expertise among Progressives studying race,
economics, sociology, and crime. These discourses fueled repressive crime policy in
ways that promoted a state-sponsored program of class control.
II. Constructs of Criminality in the Progressive Era
The Persistence of Lombrosian Orthodoxy and Its Challengers
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Late nineteenth century constructs of bio-criminality persisted into early twentieth
century scholarship. Books by William Duncan McKim, G. Frank Lydston, Philip
Parsons, and August Drahms transported Lombrosian ideologies about crime into
twentieth century debates.408 But these scholars were more skeptical of Lombroso than
their late nineteenth century predecessors while still accepting his basic claims. McKim,
for example, posited that the criminal type was not simply recognizable by an analysis of
anatomical differences, even though he agreed that, “the tendency to crime is essentially
inborn.”409 G. Frank Lydston (1906) similarly concluded that “undue importance” was
assigned to Lombrosian theory, but still included a chapter in his book on criminal crania.
He suggested that Lombrosian physiological defects were indicative of “mental or moral
defects” likely associated with criminal behavior.410
These scholars’ works only differed from the standard Lombrosian narrative in
trivial ways. The rationale of McKim and Lydston added an intermediate step to
Lombrosian theory—physiological defects were signs of inherent moral defects that
manifested as crime—but left intact a causal arrow from biology to crime. They still
paired bio-determinism with rehabilitative philosophy, as McKim, Lydston, Parsons, and
Drahms supported the indeterminate sentence both as a reformative measure and a
punitive one.411 Their proposed treatments for incorrigibles entailed eugenic solutions of
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extraordinary severity, including indefinite containment, sterilization, or extermination.412
Their works maintained the marriage of an ostensibly progressive rehabilitative discourse
to punitive interventions.
Despite the work of these scholars, Lombrosian orthodoxy was uncommon among
Progressives. Two new schools of thought purported to challenge Lombrosian theories of
crime in the early twentieth century—cultural and hereditarian theories. In an evolving
social science terrain in which scholars of culture, eugenics, and economics became
increasingly prominent, the primary intellectual carriers of ideas about crime shifted. The
ways in which cultural theorists and especially eugenicists built on and modified the
ideas of nineteenth century criminal anthropologists shaped the character of American
crime politics in the early twentieth century.
As will be discussed, hereditarian scholarship was little different from
Lombrosian theory. Although many presented themselves as breaking from Lombroso’s
work, hereditarian scholars endorsed ideas of natural criminality first articulated in
Lombroso’s research and defended the rehabilitative ideal as a tool for the eugenics
movement. Scholars of culture posed more meaningful challenges to bio-deterministic
science, but even they failed to wholly dislodge the assumptions of race science and biodeterminist theory. Cultural theorists commonly articulated essentialist narratives of
group difference to explain divergences in behavior across race.413 When “black culture”
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was used to explain disparities in crime, it still pathologized black crime as a distinct
social problem. Even as a cultural phenomenon, “black crime” was treated as a function
of one’s racial identity, impeding the capacity for cultural scholarship to fully discredit
the arguments of bio-determinists and race scientists.
In The Condemnation of Blackness, Khalil Gibran Muhammad demonstrates why
Progressive Era cultural theory failed as a counter-discourse to biology. Muhammad
points to Franz Boas’s publication of The Mind of Primitive Man in 1911 as a critical
juncture. A foundational text of cultural anthropology, The Mind of Primitive Man
claimed to break from biological explanations of racial inferiority by arguing that
perceptions of racial inferiority were truly outcomes of social neglect.414 But Muhammad
argues that Boas simply “erased the color line and replaced it with a culture line.” By
linking inferior behavior to black culture, Boas fostered a discursive shift from biological
to cultural essentialism. His emphasis on the distinctiveness of black culture grounded his
work in an a priori assumption of racial difference, leaving room for readers to accept his
arguments in addition to claims about innate racial inferiority among blacks.415
Other studies of race and culture by scholars like W.E.B. Du Bois attributed crime
to cultural forces in ways that reinforced the idea that black culture was distinctively
criminogenic.416 Du Bois’s analysis in The Philadelphia Negro (1899) was a rigorous
examination of poverty and discrimination against black Philadelphians. He attributed
black criminality to socioeconomic and cultural forces that could only be understood with
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reference to the long history of racial repression in America. It was a study of significant
import that constituted a pivotal reformulation of the concept of race and laid
groundwork for the development critical race theory. But Du Bois’s contemporaries
classified his work under the “Negro question,” separating his research from larger
questions about labor, immigration, and poverty, even though Du Bois made a strong
case for their interrelation.417 Despite its longer historical significance, The Philadelphia
Negro’s immediate impact was shaped more by the leading scholars interpreting it than
its author.
Nonetheless, even Du Bois’s work was infected with strains of determinism. He
wrote there were degenerates among blacks just as there were among Europeans, noting
that “some [blacks] were fitted to know and some to dig.”418 This is a testament to the
tremendous sway of hereditarian theory in the Progressive Era—even a leading opponent
of race science feared the excessive breeding of the unfit and argued that there existed,
within each racial type, natural hierarchies of superiority.
Among eugenicists, race scientists, and even cultural theorists, criminality
remained intimately connected to racial identity and biological makeup. Numerous
progressive scholars accepted the work of hereditarians and determinists.
The Emergence of Hereditarian Theory
Hereditarian theorists often presented their work as challenges to biological
scholarship, but hereditarian theory was mostly a repackaging of ideas related to biodeterminism. The central difference between hereditarian and biological theory was that
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atavistic features were not seen as direct causes of criminality. Rather, they were
indicative of lower intelligence or moral defects, which were the true causes of crime.
This was a distinction of marginal import, as in both schools of thought, criminality
remained a congenital defect requiring predictive containment. The shift from biological
and anthropological to hereditarian theories of crime kept the basic ideology of crime the
same while changing its scientific clothing. The more important difference were the
unique policy implications of hereditarian theory, which insisted that the state play a
greater and more interventionist role in selecting the unfit out of society. The hard
science of heredity proved valuable to Progressives. Expressing a deep faith in objective
science, Progressives relied on the science of heredity to hierarchically order humanity
into natural tiers of superiority, which justified an agenda of state administered artificial
selection.
Stephen Jay Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (1981) tracks the origins and
development of early twentieth century hereditarian scholarship. French psychologist
Alfred Binet sparked the emergence of psychology as an intellectual field by developing
mental tests to quantify intelligence and correlate it with human behavior. Binet was an
“anti-hereditarian,” in the sense that he did not measure mental capacity hoping it would
uncover each individual’s developmental ceiling. Rather, he sought to use it to identify
individuals who had unique educational needs.419
American scholars quickly perverted Binet’s aims, interpreting his tests as proof
that people had natural limits to their development. Scholars like H.H. Goddard and
Lewis Terman linked this to criminality. In his seminal book Feeble-Mindedness (1914),
419
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Goddard argued that, “The so-called criminal type is merely a type of feeblemindedness.” He estimated that 25 to 50 percent of the people in prisons were mental
defectives “incapable of managing their affairs with ordinary prudence.”420 He suggested
that criminality was heritable through intelligence.421 Goddard was primarily concerned
with “morons,” a diagnostic label for people whose testing scored them at a mental age
between 8 and 12. Morons typically lacked the observable physiological features of
mental deficiency, and Goddard feared they could be mistaken as healthy and interbreed
with the healthy population.422
In 1916, Lewis Terman built on Goddard’s ideas in The Measurement of
Intelligence. Terman identified intelligence as the most relevant trait in explaining crime,
asserting that, “the most important trait of at least 25 percent of our criminals is mental
weakness.” Like Goddard, Terman saw himself as challenging criminal anthropology by
pointing to the role of intelligence in criminality. He stated that, “The physical
abnormalities which have been found so common among prisoners are not the stigma of
criminality, but the physical accompaniments of feeble-mindedness. They have no
diagnostic significance except in so far as they are indications of mental deficiency.”423
It was a trivial difference. Terman and Goddard disagreed that Lombrosian
stigmata were indicative of a criminal biology but suggested that they were markers of a
defective intelligence that caused crime. Their causal connections had an extra step but
Henry Herbert Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences (New York: Macmillan,
1914), 6–7.
Goddard, 188–92; Rafter, Creating Born Criminals, 136–41.
Goddard, Feeble-Mindedness, 4–6, 171.“Imbeciles” scored from age 3-7, and idiots less than 3. See
Gould (1980), 188-90.
Lewis M. Terman, The Measurement of Intelligence: An Explanation of and A Complete Guide for
the Use of the Stanford Revision and Extension of the Binet-Simon Intelligence Scale (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1916), 7.
167
420

421
422

423

accepted the correlations Lombroso claimed to identify. It is predictable that Terman
made policy proposals similar to the ones that Lombroso, Brockway, and biologically
oriented rehabilitative scholars defended. He insisted on “permanent custodial care” for
the “hopelessly feeble-minded.”424
Hereditarian scholarship was closely tied to race science and eugenics
scholarship, but there were meaningful differences between the three. Hereditarian
scholarship viewed heredity as the primary explanation for human behavior and
intelligence, implied the necessity of more state intervention in monitoring the selection
process, but presented itself as an objective science without the normative spin attached
to race science and eugenics. Scientific racism alternatively aimed to uncover scientific
proof of racial inferiority and superiority explicitly in the service of a white supremacist
agenda. Eugenics constituted both an intellectual discipline and a political and social
movement, seeking to use the state to improve the human race through selective
breeding. Hereditarian scholarship, scientific racism, and eugenic scholarship thus
intersected and overlapped in complex ways. As a movement, eugenics channeled the
ideas and ideologies articulated in all three fields into political demands for expanding
the state’s powers to engage in artificial eugenics-oriented selection. The tight
intertwining of these intellectual and ideological threads justified the targeting of
undesirables, including criminals, for harsh justice.
Concepts like “feeble-minded” and “mental defective” emerged in these
intellectual traditions independent from debates about crime. But scholarship published
by Goddard and Terman blurred the lines between intelligence, mental illness, and
424
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criminality by treating the “feeble-minded,” “insane,” and “epileptics” as “criminal
types.” Goddard explicitly stated that “Lombroso’s famous criminal types…may have
been types of feeble-mindedness on which criminality was grafted.”425
Consequently, early twentieth century scholars of crime defended eugenic
solutions for criminals, and the idea of incorrigibility became instrumental to their
theories. It was scholars like Lydston, Boies, and McKim who helped transport ideas
about innate criminality into Progressive Era politics, while hereditarians like Goddard
and Terman repackaged these ideas into ideational frameworks amenable to Progressives.
But it was scholar-reformers who helped put them into practice through policy change.
As the social sciences evolved in the twentieth century, hereditarian theory was
deployed by three groups of scholar-reformers to pursue policy reform and depict various
sub-populations as inherently criminal and unworthy of social assistance. Economists
presented criminals as inherent defectives that impaired the functionality of the American
economy and labor market. Race scientists depicted immigrants and racial minorities as
likely criminals and as threats to the survival of American society. Finally, eugenicists
used hereditarian theories to label the urban poor, racial minorities, immigrants, and
mental defectives natural criminals, offering scientific legitimacy to state sterilization
laws. Although eugenics was a fundamentally racist project, it took a broad range of
forms and legitimated ascriptive hierarchies of race, class, gender, and ethnicity. The
embrace of eugenics by a diverse class of scholar-reformers highlights how eugenics
legitimated the durable racist, classist, and nativist biases of American political culture.
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Hereditarian Theory and Economists
Thomas Leonard has shown how economists like Richard Ely, John Commons,
and Edward Ross pushed for progressive reforms like minimum wage laws in ways that
embraced social exclusion. Driven by race science and eugenics, Progressive economists
pursued legislation that would uplift the worthy poor while excluding the unworthy poor,
including immigrants, blacks, women, mental defectives, and “white trash.” They formed
the American Economists Association in the late nineteenth century in order to connect
intellectuals and scholars to policymaking circles.426
These scholars were Progressives in that they viewed criminals as pathologies to
the collective social body. Fears of “race suicide,” the idea that the unfit were
outbreeding their betters, fostered anxieties that natural selection was inefficient at
breeding out social undesirables in modern society. Scholars of political economy viewed
criminality as a tendency common among undesirables who were a drain on community
resources, weakened society’s productive capacity, and thus needed social control,
typically through compulsory sterilization.
For instance, Richard T. Ely wrote in Introduction to Political Economy that, “the
dependent and criminal classes…impair the productive power of the community.”427 He
wrote that there were three divisions of the unemployable population, specifically “the
defective, delinquent, and dependent.” He argued that these classes were “morally
incurable” and “should not be allowed to propagate their kind.”428 Economist Frank
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Taussig made similar claims, arguing that there existed only two classes of
unemployables—the aged and disabled, and the “feebleminded” who mostly consisted of
“irretrievable criminals and tramps” who were “tainted with hereditary disease” and
should be “prevented from propagating their kind.”429 In these contexts, criminals were
perceived as defectives and drains on the nation’s political economy.
Edward Ross’s work particularly carried ideas about criminality carried into
progressive discourse. He argued that the criminal law should not punish a crime in
proportion “to the measure of harm” it incurred. This, he said, was more common in
“rude communities” that over-sympathized with victims. Alternatively, he insisted that,
“offences should be repressed according to the badness of character they imply.” This
emphasis on the character of the offender rather than the action reflected ideas from
nineteenth century debates. Whether someone fit the idea of the criminal type was the
most important factor in determining their punishment. Ross thus drew conclusions that
“the trolley company, the quack medicine man, the insurer or rotten ships, and the jerry
builder” should not be punished as harshly as other offenders “because they are morally
superior” to ordinary criminals.430
Ross connected criminal punishment to the health of the collective society. In his
1896 article “Social Control,” he wrote that society should be focused on the “moulding
of the individual’s feelings and desires to suit the needs of the group.”431 He said that
“insuring greater harmony of social life by segregation of the insubordinate and
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elimination of the criminal, aims…at progress.”432 He drew on rehabilitative ideology to
package ideas of innate criminality into progressive economics. Ross wrote that, “the
principle of individual responsibility is another great improvement in the technique of
control.” He concluded that, “as to the mass of small-witted, weak-willed, impulse-ridden
human ‘screenings’ that collect in prisons, our care should be to reform the reformable
and to hold fast the incurable the rest of their days.”433
These economists regularly argued that artificial selection was preferable to
natural selection. In his 1901 book Social Control, Ross wrote that “we can regard this
society as a living thing” and social control “as one of the ways in which this living thing
seeks to keep itself alive.”434 He wrote a few years later in defense of “sterilization of all
congenital criminals as the only means of thinning out the bad breeds.”435 He even
defended Wisconsin’s sterilization statute in 1914 by connecting it crime prevention,
stating, “Sterilization is not nearly so terrible as hanging a man, and the chances of
sterilizing the fit are not nearly so great, as are the chances of hanging the innocent.”436
Economist John Commons similarly wrote that “We cannot placidly rely on any
abstraction of natural selection to wipe out crime…Evolution is not always development
upwards.”437 Ely also pointed to the “superiority of man’s selection to nature’s
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selection.”438 It was through this logic that economists justified sterilization for
defectives, the unfit, and criminals, among others who were viewed as drains on the
national economy.
Hereditarian Theory and Race Scientists
Race scientists also transported ideas about natural criminality into twentieth
century debates. It should be noted that the term “race” had broad, vague, and multiple
meanings to progressive scientific racists, often being used to refer to the human race,
national races (e.g. “the American race,”) or phenotypic racial categories. The eugenics
movement largely focused on the preservation of the American Anglo-Saxon racial
identity, which involved sterilizing or segregating non-Anglo-Saxon elements away from
native white racial stock. Rather than discussing racial differences between blacks and
whites, race scientists were more focused on growing immigrant races that posed a threat
to Anglo-Saxon dominance. Expansive conceptions of racial difference were used to
connect non-white European populations, like Italian and Irish immigrants, to criminality.
Scholars of political economy like Commons, Ely, and Ross commonly linked defective
heredity, and hence criminality, to immigrant populations.439 President William
McKinley’s Industrial Commission, appointed in 1898 to study capital-labor relations,
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devoted a significant portion of its reports to linking pauperism and vice crimes like
alcoholism and gambling to certain immigrant populations like Irish and Italians.440
Given their emphasis on purifying the Anglo-Saxon race, eugenicists initially
remained unconcerned with purifying black genetics as long as they were kept within the
black community. Scholars and medical professionals like Robert Bean and Bernard
Barrow eventually helped bring sterilization into the South by linking eugenics to black
inferiority. Bean even applied Lombrosian methods in studying the cranial patterns of
blacks to make his case. But the South started passing sterilization laws several years
after Northern states, as Jim Crow laws and anti-miscegenation statutes had long been the
primary way blacks were kept from interbreeding with whites. Counter-intuitively,
eugenic solutions like sterilization were delayed in their application to black citizens in
southern states.441
Still, race science research about black inferiority persisted within the intellectual
currents of progressivism. Scholars like William Hannibal Thomas reaffirmed the
conclusions drawn in Frederick Hoffman’s research. A black man born into a family of
former slaves, Thomas called blacks “savages,” who were doomed to a “lawless
existence.” He concluded that blacks were naturally inferior in “mind, morals, judgments,
and character” to whites.442 Race scientists like Robert Shufeldt and Charles McCord
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mirrored the work of Thomas and Bean by connecting race and crime.443 Their works
hardened the well-established link between blackness and criminality within eugenics
frameworks.
Hereditarian Theory and Eugenicists
Progressives were especially drawn to the research of eugenicists who were quick
to build on the work of Terman, Goddard, and hereditarians. Active players in the
eugenics movements eagerly picked up this research, funded similar projects, formed
organizational centers, and lobbied for eugenic policy in the name of social and racial
progress. Eugenicists had organizational centers and institutional infrastructure that
enabled their ideas to be heard louder and more clearly than alternative ideas.
The Eugenics Records Office (ERO) was established in 1910, proclaiming itself
as the national center for the study of human heredity. Founded by Charles Davenport,
the ERO sought to sterilize the most defective 10% of the human population. This
included the feeble-minded, the poor, and criminals, among others. Arguing that the “fact
of incorrigibility” mandated the sterilization of criminals, the ERO targeted a range of
criminals from vagrants to convicted felons, defended long sentences for mentally
defective criminals, and deemed sterilization a condition of release. The ERO served as
an organizational center for the eugenics movement, producing research and engaging in
lobbying campaigns.444
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In 1916, Arthur Estabrook published a follow-up study of Richard Dugdale’s The
Jukes under the ERO’s auspices. Titled The Jukes in 1915, Estabrook’s research followed
the lead of Terman and Goddard. He distanced himself from Lombrosian theory, writing
that, “There is no evidence in the Jukes which points to the existence of a trait of
criminality.” However, he concluded that criminality is “closely associated with mental
defect and lack of moral restraint.” He claimed that there exists a “close correlation
between feeble-mindedness and crime.”445 Estabrook concluded that, “the eradication of
crime in defective stocks depends upon the elimination of mental deficiency.” He
defended sterilization by arguing that it would, “interfere with the real liberty of the
individual less than custodial care.”446 Estabrook was dedicated studying degenerate
families in the tradition of Dugdale, having also co-published The Nam Family in 1912
with Davenport.447 Goddard also studied degenerate families, publishing The Kallikak
Family in 1912. In the book, Goddard reiterated his conclusion that “Lombroso’s famous
criminal types” were just “types of feeble-mindedness.”448
Leading scholars of the eugenics movement continued to tie criminality to
heredity when advocating for sterilization. In The Passing of the Great Race (1916),
arguably the most authoritative text on eugenics in the early twentieth century, Madison
Grant wrote that compulsory sterilization “will in self-defense put a stop to the supply of
feebleminded and criminal children of weaklings.” He called sterilization “a practical,
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merciful, and inevitable solution” that “can be applied to an ever-widening circle of
social discards, beginning always with the criminal, the diseased and the insane.”449
Another leading race scientist William Ripley wrote in The Races of Europe (1899) that
certain racial categories are particularly prone to certain varieties of crime.450
Davenport himself repeatedly linked crime, feeblemindedness, pauperism, and
heredity. He bemoaned the fact that, “criminality is ascribed to poverty, to bad example,
to bad or inadequate education, despite the fact of incorrigibility” and concluded that
eugenicists provided “a more fundamental explanation for these non-social traits” than
scholars of culture or social disadvantage did.451 He embraced the progressive perspective
on science and expertise, arguing that eugenicists should actively participate in public
debates to ensure that “public spirit is aroused” so that the public will is “crystallized in
appropriate legislation.” He defended sterilization for criminals, claiming that “idiots,
low imbeciles, incurable and dangerous criminals…may under appropriate restrictions be
prevented from procreation—either by segregation during the reproductive period or even
by sterilization.”452
Davenport was widely acknowledged as a respected national authority on
eugenics. Most famously, President Theodore Roosevelt endorsed the work of Davenport
on multiple occasions. Roosevelt called race suicide “the great problem of
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civilization.”453 In a 1913 personal letter to Charles Davenport, he wrote that, “society
has no business to permit degenerates to produce their kind.”454 The next year, he wrote
in a public letter that, “criminals should be sterilized, and feeble-minded persons
forbidden to leave offspring behind them.”455
Research across the disciplines of economics, race science, and eugenics in the
Progressive era cannot be neatly disentangled. These disciplines were fundamentally
intertwined and reliant on one another. Each legitimated the nativist, racist, and classist
impulses of American politics through the veneer of objective science. This provides a
compelling case that questions about race, poverty, labor, and criminality should not be
viewed as separate phenomena in the Progressive era. The science of heredity and
eugenics served as a framework that scientifically legitimated an assortment of ascriptive
biases. Constructions of criminality spanned across race and class but were all rooted in
scientistic discourses of crime and heredity.
III. The Political and Institutional Legacies of Gilded Age Crime Politics
Criminalizing Class Through Eugenics
Like many Progressive scholars, economists like Ely, Commons, and Ross sought
to play an active role in pursuing reform. Many of them worked with or testified before
President McKinley’s Industrial Commission from 1898 and 1902, participating in its
analysis of industrial concentration, labor markets, and the impact of immigration on the
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economy. Thomas Leonard has noted the political attention received by the Industrial
Commission and its reports, which made recommendations on antitrust law and
regulatory policy for corporate criminals that are examined in the next chapter. But
interestingly, eugenic perspectives also appeared in the Commission’s nineteen reports to
defend harsh justice for street criminals, racial minorities, the urban poor, and
immigrants.
In their own work, these economists linked pauperism and criminality to a shared
hereditary basis. Ely, for instance, wrote that there are two classes of paupers—one that is
willing to work but simply has not learned the requisite skills for labor, while it is
“practically impossible” to reform those in the second group that “belongs to the criminal
class.”456 Frank Taussig similarly tied “criminals and tramps” together as variants of the
feeble-minded class who are “unemployable.”457 Their language was little different than
the language of “incorrigibility” employed by Brockway and his adherents, but their
conclusions were cloaked in the sciences of heredity and eugenics rather than
anthropology and phrenology.
The Industrial Commission thus advocated for putting the urban poor and tramps
to work behind bars, arguing that they were inherently criminal and needed compulsion
to work.458 Commission members wrote that Italians, Hebrews, and Irish were prone to
pauperism and criminality, and consequently made up majority of this class of the lazy
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criminal poor.459 For instance, when Commons testified before the Commission, he
claimed that “foreigners and children of foreigners are the worst element which we have
in this country,” made up a disproportionate number of the poor and criminal classes, and
should be put to work in prison.460
In its volume on prison labor, the Commission embraced ideas of incorrigibility
just as scholars like Ely and Taussig did. In evaluating prison labor, the Commission
identified the Elmira Reformatory as the premier example of prison management. Being
“intended for the reclaiming of the younger lawbreakers, who could not be properly
classified as hardened or incorrigible criminals,” the Commission endorsed the
segregation of inmates based on categories of corrigibility. The Commission suggested
that reformatories should follow Elmira’s lead of grading convicts in three tiers of
reformability, with the third grade consisting of “the incorrigible” who should be “kept in
confinement” and “at such labor as practicable.”461 The Commission endorsed the
indeterminate sentence, stating if criminals “are becoming habitual criminals, they can be
sent for a longer time, even to the extent of a life sentence,” which could arguably “be
applied to all delinquents, including the pauper.”462
Late nineteenth century trends linking poverty, crime, and heredity persisted into
the early twentieth century, even though the image of the tramp underwent a significant
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transformation in popular culture. In Tramping with Tramps (1899), sociologist Josiah
Flynt argued that it is “better for criminology to study the criminal’s milieu” instead of
his skull, contesting ideas of innate criminality among the poor.463 This contributed to a
more positive image of tramps in pop-culture. Vaudeville routines depicted tramps as
victims of circumstance, not social threats.464 But this trend romanticized poverty by
labeling behaviors once criticized as faults as virtues. Even Charlie Chaplin’s famous
“little tramp” character was a thief and con artist.465 Despite its positive connotations, this
comedic imagery did little to divorce perceptions of tramps from ideas of criminality, and
kept poverty linked to laziness and deviance.
As a result, this nostalgic imaging coexisted readily with ideologies and rhetoric
justifying exclusionary policies targeting the poor. Praising Pennsylvania’s anti-tramp
law, the Los Angeles Times reported in 1901 that, “Tramps have multiplied here at an
alarming rate in the last few months, and a notable increase in the number of robberies
and assaults has resulted.” Brockway connected the criminal poor to cultural
determinism, with the Washington Post quoting him as saying, “The culture of
crime…the mass of misdemeanants, and the present shiftless methods of treatment
produce hardened criminals.”466
This contrast between the pop-culture image of the tramp and public anxieties
over the poor was not lost to observers of American criminal justice. In 1901, the Los
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Angeles Times wrote that, “The hobo of the comic page is an amiable soul, with a tomato
can; the hobo of real life, when he gets to California, is thoroughly vicious, degraded and
dangerous…An epidemic of crime invariably follows the coming of the tramps.”467
William A. Pinkerton stated in 1903 that, “The chief criminal work of this age is done by
hoboes or professional tramps.”468 In 1907, the New York Times stated that the vagrant or
tramp “is necessarily a dangerous element, whether or not, or rather even before, he
blossoms out into a professional criminal.”469 This indicates that those in policy circles
were less willing to accept the makeover the poor received in popular culture, instead
holding onto ideas linking criminality to poverty.
Links between poverty and criminality remained tenacious in intellectual circles
as well. For instance, The Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology frequently published articles relating poverty to crime.470 In his 1914 study
of New York’s municipal lodging house, Robert Gault argued that, “A large proportion
of vagrants” were “pathologic” and 12% “showed definite evidence of defective
mentality.”471 In the next issue, John Lisle wrote that the tramp class “must be destroyed”
and that tramps’ criminality “is not due to their failure to bear their share of the social
burden…but in their dangerous characters.”472 These ideas served as the basis for
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multiple proposed bills to create a federal criminological laboratory in the Justice
Department to study the criminal and pauper classes.473
Journalists and intellectuals clearly held onto the connection between poverty and
innate criminality, but people with institutional power also shared these beliefs. For
instance, Director of the National Association for the Prevention of Vagrancy James
Forbes stated in 1911 that, “It is practically impossible to reform a tramp.”474 State laws
relating to tramping thus remained as punitive as they were in the Gilded Age. In 1916,
46 states had statutes authorizing the incarceration of tramps for varied periods of time.
Twenty of these states authorized a maximum between 3 and 6 months behind bars for
tramping; eleven authorized a maximum of anywhere from one to three years.475 As
noted in chapter two, these laws were justified on the logic that vagrancy laws should
look more like the indeterminate sentence in the sense that they required a longer
maximum sentence so that incorrigibles could be incarcerated for longer periods of time.
FIGURE 4.1: Maximum Sentences of Vagrancy Laws in the US States, 1916476
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In his research, Eric Monkonnen (2004) found that arrests for victimless crimes
like vagrancy declined in the early twentieth century. He concludes that early twentieth
century police focused on punishing criminal behavior rather than repressing poverty.477
But this data should not lead us to overlook the fact that urban police remained agents of
class control. Monkonnen notes that those who were considered part of the “dangerous
classes” had both negative and positive interactions with police in the nineteenth century,
often being lodged and fed by urban police. In the early twentieth century, the police
became a blunt negative instrument that enforced neighborhood boundaries. As skid rows
emerged in cities to accommodate seasonal labor, police reinforced class lines by
ensuring the poor were contained in certain neighborhoods.478
Progressives continued to associate the urban poor with labor violence, fearing
them as likely instigators of a working-class revolution. Police often targeted tramps
while criminalizing protests and strikes.479 While exaggerated, this link was not wholly
unwarranted; the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or Wobblies), helped to infuse
hobo culture with a leftist fervor. The IWW newspaper Solidarity wrote in 1914 that
hoboes were “admirably fitted to serve as the scouts and advance guards of the labour
army,” and could become “the guerillas of the revolution.”480 As Todd DePastino has
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argued, Wobbly folklore built on the image of the savage tramp to romanticize the
tramp’s primitivism and masculinity as part of the class struggle.481
State, local, and federal authorities continued to punish radical labor
organizations, especially those with high foreign-born membership, into the Progressive
Era.482 The reports of the Industrial Commission often linked certain ethnic groups to
working class radicalism, and President Theodore Roosevelt stoked public anxieties
linking foreign radicals to deterministic discourse about crime.483 Roosevelt claimed that
the cause of the anarchist’s criminality is “his own evil passions.”484 Politically, the
repression of labor was still justified by links between criminality, race, and determinism.
State laws criminalizing anarchy and federal crackdowns on Wobblies satiated
fears that workers were prone to criminality. Private organizations like the American
Protective League (APL) also emerged as security forces funded by local businesses to
infiltrate radical organizations. With the DOJ’s endorsement, the APL demonstrated how
intertwined the interests of big business, the police, and the state became in controlling
labor through criminal sanction.485

DePastino, Citizen Hobo, 116.
Goldstein, Political Repression, 63–66.
U.S. Industrial Commission, Reports of the Industrial Commission on Immigration, Including
Testimony, with Review and Digest, and Special Reports, and on Education, Including Testimony,
with Review and Digest, XV:xliv, 27, 50–51.
Theodore Roosevelt, “Message of the President of the United States, Communicated to the Two
Houses of Congress, at the Beginning of the First Session of the Fifty-Seventh Congress, December 3,
1901,” in The Works of Theodore Roosevelt: Presidential Addresses and State Papers, Part 2 (New
York: P.F. Collier and Son, 1910), 534–35.
Harring, Policing a Class Society, 144–47; DePastino, Citizen Hobo, 105 note 34; George Mowry,
The California Progressives (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1963), 48–50; “Execution of Anarchists,”
Washington Post, February 25, 1908; Goldstein, Political Repression, 68–80 note 17, 108–10, 139153. Four states passed laws criminalizing anarchism, indicative of an acceptance for a greater state
role in handling political repression that foreshadowed the robust federal interventions that came
during World War I.
185
481
482
483

484

485

After a sharp uptick in strike activity in 1919—the height of the first “Red
Scare”—Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer instituted a series of raids in 1919
resulting in thousands of arrests. The climax came in January 1920, when federal agents
arrested between 5,000 and 10,000 individuals across thirty cities. Palmer defended the
raids by attributing the behavior of radical workers to their innate criminality. He drew
explicitly on language from anthropological assessments of criminality, suggesting that
“from their lopsided faces, sloping brows, and misshapen features,” anarchists and
strikers arrested “may be recognized [as] the unmistakable criminal type.”486
Into the twentieth century, the poor and working classes were still viewed as
dangerous criminals. But eugenics and hereditarian theory were not only crucial to
helping Progressives rationalize class repression through criminal law. These same ideas
translated readily into the repression of racial minorities as well.
Hereditarian Theory, Race, and Crime
A large proportion of Progressives supported racial segregation. Academics like
Booker T. Washington and politicians like Theodore Roosevelt clung onto scientific
discourses of racial inferiority and defended the segregationist policies and strict
immigration laws of the Progressive Era.487 Within this exclusionary agenda,
Progressives used ideas about hereditary criminality to defend a harsh justice politics
targeting African Americans and immigrants.
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For instance, as reviewed in chapter two, vagrancy laws played an important role
in southern criminal justice by stocking the convict-lease system. Crimes such as
“mischief,” “insulting gestures,” and “pig laws” punishing theft of farm animals were
variants on vagrancy laws and were disproportionately enforced against young black men
in states like Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas. Convict lease
officially ended in 1928 when Alabama abolished it, but for decades the system
encouraged police to sweep up vagrants and minor offenders in line with the labor needs
of a state’s dominant industries.488
The convict-lease system was not a purely instrumentalist project fueled by
economic interests, but one also justified by the logic of bio-determinism. State
legislators and southern medical and penological professionals routinely defended
convict-lease on the grounds that reformatories would not help to reform an inherently
inferior race.489 David Oshinksy’s analysis of James Vardaman’s term as Mississippi’s
Governor from 1904-1908 provides an example of how politicians deployed these ideas.
Vardaman, nicknamed the “Great White Chief” for his white supremacist politics,
deployed rhetoric depicting blacks as pathologically criminal. He described blacks as
“lazy, lying, lustful animal[s]” with an “increased capacity for crime,” favored the use of
vagrancy laws to compel black men into labor, and defended lynching as an appropriate
response to black crime.490
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The practice of lynching persisted into the Progressive Era and was justified by
the notion that black men were innately violent and prone to raping white women.491
Even Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft qualified their concerns with the
practice in ways that validated prevailing ideas about black criminality. Contending that
lynching targeted black men accused of rape, Roosevelt feared that lynching posed a
challenge to the state’s authority to punish crime. He wrote in 1903 that such cases
should be processed more quickly in order to preempt lynching.492 Two years later, he
stated at a luncheon in Arkansas that, “Long delays of justice, abuses of the pardoning
power, [and] the sluggishness with which either court or attorney moves…[bring] about
the condition of affairs which produces lynch law.”493 Roosevelt repeatedly stated that
lynching could be prevented if blacks reported black crime and worked to change black
culture.494 Taft’s conclusions were little different, as he stated in 1909 that lynching was
caused by “the uncertainties and injustice growing out of delays in trials, judgments, and
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the executions thereof by our courts.”495 Both voiced their opposition to lynching not by
expressing concerns about racial injustice, but by expressing concerns that lynch mob
justice usurped the state’s authority to punish black men who committed crime.
Progressives also used racialized crime politics to condemn immigrant crime. The
U.S. Immigration Commission, known as the Dillingham Commission, particularly
linked immigrants to criminality. A bipartisan body in operation from 1907 to 1911, the
Commission concluded that immigration from eastern and southern Europe seriously
threatened U.S. society. Its reports were essential to the design of the immigration
restrictions of the 1920s.496 Staffed by a combination of congressmen and experts
including eugenicists like Jeremiah Jenks, the Commission dedicated volumes to
studying immigrant physiology, intelligence, and criminality.
The Commission examined more than 3 million immigrants from over 300
American communities.497 They linked certain varieties of criminality to certain racial
categories. For example, Italians were linked to blackmail, extortion, rape, and homicide,
Russians to larceny, and Greeks to minor ordinance violations.498 The Commission
concluded by advocating for stringent immigration restrictions and defending literacy
tests, race-based quotas, and barring unskilled laborers from entry, among other
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proposals.499 The expansive reach of race science targeted a diverse collection of
populations as natural criminals deserving of exclusion.
IV. Crime, Eugenics, and Rehabilitative Ideology
In 1911, Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Cesare Lombroso’s daughter, published a book
summarizing her father’s work. In the opening pages, her father wrote an introduction
recognizing America as a place where his ideas were given “a warm and sympathetic
reception” and “speedily put into practice.”500 The reorientation of American penality
towards rehabilitative programming built on the conception of criminal behavior
espoused in Lombroso’s work. This rehabilitative penology thrived in the political milieu
of the Progressive Era. The spread of indeterminate sentencing and sterilization laws
during this period was driven by ideas rooted in Lombrosian-influenced rehabilitative
ideology.
Progressives often endorsed a politics founded on pseudo-science to separate
mental defectives, minorities, and undesirables from the population’s worthy elements. In
this framework, the incorrigible criminal idea had a potent political value that allowed
Progressives to espouse a philosophy of reform while also reaping the benefits of
cracking down on criminals. In the forty years following Elmira’s opening, seventeen
reformatories opened across the country emulating Brockway’s model to varying
degrees.501 Nicole Rafter (1997) and Alexander Pisciotta (1994) have demonstrated how
the ideas of criminal anthropology and rehabilitative penology influenced the
U.S. Immigration Commission, Report of the Immigration Commission, Vol. 1, 1:47–48.
Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Criminal Man According to the Classification of Cesare Lombroso (New
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development of these institutions at the turn of the century. But ideas of incorrigibility in
these older philosophies were of crucial importance in justifying the politics of
eugenicists. There was significant regional variation in the compulsory sterilization laws
advocated by Progressives, as some states emphasized psychiatric sterilization while
others targeted poor citizens or women of color, but in many states, criminality was used
as a reference point to justify sterilization.502
Elmira was a leader in facilitating a shift towards the eugenics model. The
institution hired doctors in the early twentieth century to identify mental defectives
among its inmates, and as of 1910, 38 percent of the institution’s population was declared
mentally defective with either congenital or acquired defects indicative of incorrigibility.
The Massachusetts Reformatory followed suit, concluding that 58% of its inmates were
incorrigible mental defectives. By 1919, Elmira had a positive reformative prognosis for
only 4% of offenders, and many of the medical professionals employed by the institution
explicitly advocated to put such offenders in penal colonies or sterilize them.503
Outside of Elmira, a variety of Progressive intellectuals, professionals, and
reformers advocated for sterilization of the criminal classes. Some of the earliest
endorsements of criminal sterilizations came from doctors who cited nineteenth century
criminal anthropologists espousing ideas of incorrigibility. In 1899, Doctor A.J. Oschner
defended sterilization in The Journal of the American Medical Association by noting that
Lombroso proved that “there are certain inherited anatomic defects which
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characterize…born criminals,” who commit the majority of crime.504 The next year,
President of the American Academy of Medicine George Makuen endorsed compulsory
sterilization. He cited Brockway in stating that penology should be about caring for
criminals while also preventing their propagation. He claimed that William McKim’s
suggestion to provide “a gentle and painless death” to incorrigibles was excessive, but
that McKim’s proposal revealed the broader “drift of thought with reference to these
matters” in criminological circles. He used McKim’s extreme arguments to depict
compulsory sterilization as humanitarian. Makuen also cited Boies’ Prisoners and
Paupers in claiming that “Pauperism, criminality, [and] insanity” are “all one
interdependent family” that should be grounds for sterilization.505 In the next year’s
Academy Bulletin, S.D. Risley similarly drew on McKim to depict sterilization laws as
benevolent.506
Important players in the eugenics movement drew on ideas linking rehabilitative
potential to criminal sterilization. In 1904, Dr. Martin Barr explicitly presented
sterilization as a curative tool for offenders, writing, “Let asexualization be once
legalized, not as a penalty for crime but a remedial measure preventing crime.”507 In 1908
the American Prison Association (APA) established a Physicians Association, and at the
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1908 meeting eugenicist Dr. Charles Carrington stated that he “unreservedly” supported
sterilization for “habitual” and “incorrigible” offenders.508 At the next year’s meeting,
Daniel Phelan, Theodore Cooke, and former APA president Charles Henderson discussed
sterilization as a means of controlling the “incorrigible criminal” identifiable by “physical
irregularities.”509
As early as 1893, inmates of reformatories across the country were being
subjected to compulsory sterilization off the books. Physician Harry Sharp performed at
least 176 vasectomies in Indiana reformatories between 1893 and 1907, when the state
finally legalized the practice. A prominent advocate for inmate sterilization, Sharp wrote
in 1909 that, “In treating upon this subject [of criminal sterilization] there must ever be
borne in mind the distinct understanding that degeneracy is a defect, and that a defect
differs from a disease in that it can not be cured.”510 Targeting “confirmed inebriates,
prostitutes, tramps, and criminals, as well as habitual paupers,” Sharp argued that the
vasectomy was the most humane means of ensuring that mental defectives would not
interbreed with the general population.511 However, he noted that, “this operation shall
not be performed except in cases that have been pronounced unimprovable,” pointing out
that traditional reformative interventions should be a first resort.512 But he stated that the
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“decidedly defective individual is very easily recognized,” and argued that this “mental
abnormality is usually accompanied with prominent physical defects, described by
Lombroso” and others.513
In the early twentieth century, Sharp, Barr, and other medical professionals were
essential in passing sterilization laws in many states. Sharp played an important role in
Indiana, Ross in Wisconsin, and as the chief physician at the Pennsylvania Training
School for Feeble-Minded Children, Barr played a critical role in Pennsylvania.514 In
doing so, these eugenic theorists and practitioners drew on multiple ideas undergirding
rehabilitative penology, and prominent eugenicists paid attention. Invoking the notion of
incorrigibility, Charles Davenport defended sterilization as the only way to stop
incorrigibles from reproducing.515 Similarly, David Starr Jordan of the American
Breeder’s Association argued that the criminal “can perhaps be healed,” but if he was
incurable, “he can be kept in confinement; and to physicians, and to them alone, the
community must look for help in these matters.”516
This highlights how eugenicists of varying stripes endorsed the logic of
rehabilitation. Sharp and Davenport viewed criminals as incorrigible, rendering
sterilization a necessary solution. Others like Martin Barr viewed sterilization itself as a
rehabilitative procedure for those who had limited rehabilitative potential. For instance,
Barr rationalized sterilization thusly:
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Let asexualization be once legalized, not as a penalty for crime, but a remedial
measure preventing crime and tending to future comfort and happiness of the
defective; let the practice once become common for young children immediately
upon being adjudged defective by competent authority properly appointed, and
the public mind will accept it as an effective means of race preservation. It would
come to be regarded just as quarantine, simple protection against ill.517
Both punitive and rehabilitative eugenicists drew on presumptions of rehabilitative
penology to rationalize sterilization. In his typology of sterilization laws for criminal
offenders, ERO officer Harry Laughlin noted this distinction. He wrote that some state
laws were “therapeutic” in design (like California, which called the procedure “beneficial
and conducive” to the inmate), while others were punitive (like Washington, which called
the procedure “an addition to punishment”).518 This contrast in logic is reminiscent of
Ross’s defense of Wisconsin’s sterilization statute as more humane than hanging for
crime.
Harry Laughlin’s work particularly highlighted the relationship between
Lombrosian theory, hereditarian scholarship, and the eugenics movement. Superintendent
of the Eugenics Records Office for its entire existence, Laughlin frequently cited
rehabilitative penologists, including Henry Boies and G. Frank Lydston. His treatise
Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (1922) cited multipage-length quotes from
Boies’ Prisoners and Paupers (1893), including Boies’ statements that imprisonment
permitted the reproduction of “those who would perish without its aid” and that, “in no
sense could the deprivation of [sexual] organs inflict injury or damage to criminal[s].”519
Laughlin noted that Washington State similarly cited Boies’s work to defend its
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sterilization statutes from legal challenges. He defended sterilizations for “born
criminals” and argued that many state sterilization statutes were informed by Lombrosian
theory. He wrote that, “asexualization can only be justified in the case of born
criminals.”520
Laughlin’s work underscored the relationship between sterilization and
rehabilitative ideology. He defended the indeterminate sentence as it was envisioned to
work by Lombroso but wrote that while “Reformation of the individual is humane…but
absolutely undesirable and poor sociological economy if at the expense of the rights of
organized society.”521 What to do with the incorrigibles, then, became the central
problem of rehabilitative thought.
The opening to Laughlin’s book answered this problem. Laughlin’s close friend
and fellow eugenicist, Chief Justice Harry Olson of the Chicago Municipal Court, wrote
the introduction. Olson wrote that “the segregation of incorrigible defectives…as a
measure of crime prevention is urgently needed…however, in a number of
states…experiments have been made with sterilization. The two theories of segregation
and sterilization are not antagonistic, but both may be invoked.”522 Olson’s quote
illustrates that segregation and sterilization were both seen as appropriate state responses
for dealing with incorrigible populations.
Olson’s career as a prominent jurist shows that support for eugenics was not
limited to medical professionals and penologists. In his article “The Two Percent
Solution” (1998), Michael Willrich has demonstrated that the convergence of eugenics
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discourse and urban court operations in the early twentieth century facilitated the
emergence of “eugenics jurisprudence,” defined as “the aggressive mobilization of law
and legal institutions in pursuit of eugenic goals.”523 Willrich outlines the history of
Olson’s Chicago Municipal Court as the prime example of eugenics jurisprudence. Olson
believed that courts should use psychological testing to identify mental defectives
requiring long-term confinement.524 In 1914, the Court opened a Psychopathic
Laboratory to identify genetically predisposed criminals, and tens of thousands of
defendants were tested in the lab during Olson’s tenure as Chief Justice until 1930. The
lab assisted judges in sentencing, directed clinical research on crime, and served as a
model for similar labs in other cities and for a proposed national laboratory. Olson argued
that crime control was “the first step in the eugenics programme.”525
By 1922, sixteen states authorized criminal sterilizations. Several laws focused on
violent and sexual offenders, but others cast a wider net. When signing New Jersey’s law,
Governor Woodrow Wilson explicitly stated that it was designed to target “the hopelessly
defective and criminal classes.”526 California’s 1909 law and Oregon’s 1917 statute
included anyone convicted of any three felonies as eligible for the procedure, and four
states targeted the “habitual criminal.” Three states provided no definition of the term
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“habitual criminal” and Kansas vaguely defined it as, “a person who has been convicted
of some felony involving moral turpitude.”527
The link between sterilization and crime was not only apparent in state statutes.
The Supreme Court upheld compulsory sterilization laws in the 1927 decision Buck v.
Bell. In the most famous passage of the decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
explicitly discussed criminality. Holmes wrote,
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.528
It is significant that Holmes linked degeneracy to crime. In his famous speech “The Path
of the Law” given thirty years prior to Buck v. Bell, Holmes stated that, “If the typical
criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or murder by as deep seated an organic
necessity as that which makes the rattlesnake bite…he cannot be improved.”529 Holmes’
linkage between criminality and heredity reflected both a broader national acceptance of
these connections and his personal longstanding beliefs in eugenics. After Buck v. Bell,
the national rate of sterilizations skyrocketed to nearly 2,000 annually.530
There is reason to believe that sterilizations were less common in prisons than in
mental facilities, especially since some states passed sterilization laws that targeted the
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mentally impaired but not criminals.531 But as Rafter (1997) has shown, early twentieth
century eugenics research published by the likes of H.H. Goddard and Lewis Terman
blurred the lines between low intelligence, mental illness, and criminality by treating the
“feeble-minded,” “insane,” and “epileptics” as various “criminal types.” Further, courts
with psychopathic laboratories like Chicago’s routinely sent criminal defendants to
institutes for the feeble-minded. This suggests that the occupants of mental institutions
where sterilizations were most common may have included many “criminal types,”
demonstrating how constructions of criminality overlapped with diagnoses of mental
illness. While not all were convicted criminals, at least 70,000 people were subjected to
compulsory sterilizations between 1900 and 1970, with the majority of them occurring in
the Progressive Era.
The Court’s ruling in Buck v. Bell briefly rejuvenated the eugenics movement,
leading to a new wave of sterilization laws so that 28 states had them by 1931.
Nonetheless, eugenics did not exhibit resilience into the latter twentieth century. But how
the legacies of eugenics conditioned crime politics through the twentieth century will be
explored in chapters 6 and 8.
Some scholars suggest that eugenicists created the idea of criminal
incorrigibility.532 The incorrigibility idea was present in eugenic debates, but this
argument ignores consistencies between eugenic and anthropological theories of
criminality. Both treated crime as a function of immutable physiological pathologies,
concluded that many offenders were incorrigible, and lent scientific credence to the
Joel Hunter, “Sterilization of Criminals: Report of Committee ‘F’ of the Institute,” Journal of the
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racist, nativist, and classist strands of American political culture. Arguments for
sterilizing and indefinitely detaining “incorrigibles” were not new in the early twentieth
century. Eugenic reformers reframed established ideas about crime in pursuit of a new
policy agenda, repackaging ideas associated with rehabilitative ideology to further their
aims.
V. Crime Politics in the 1920s and the Rise of the Crime Commission
The crime politics of the 1920s in many ways looked remarkably different from
the crime politics of the early twentieth century. A series of crime waves and high-profile
cases fueled new public anxieties over criminality in the 1920s. Culture wars over
narcotics regulation, prostitution, and prohibition pushed different issues of criminal law
onto the national agenda.533 The rise of organized crime gave the federal government a
reason to increase its involvement in crime control. Strike activity was consistently
derided as criminal, serving to further discredit unionism as a threat to public safety.534
The Red Scare, Boston Police Strike, and race riots of the early 1920s all laid the basis
for the federalization of crime control in the 1930s.535 A new managerial penal
philosophy also took root, focusing on efficiently managing prisoners with little regard
for their reformation by repurposing rehabilitative tools to make convicts complacent
inmates rather than reformed citizens. This shift was ostensibly rooted in a
disillusionment with the rehabilitative model.536
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While these were major differences, there were also consistencies between
Progressive Era crime politics and the politics of the 1920s, two of which are essential for
understanding the crime politics that would develop during the New Deal. First, the
managerial penology of the 1920s bore key similarities to rehabilitative penology by
drawing on ideas of incorrigibility. The spread of “habitual offenders laws” in the 1920s,
1930s, and 1940s were rationalized as mechanisms for incarcerating incorrigibles but had
roots in these managerial shifts. The relationship between the managerial model and the
rehabilitative ideal will be studied more closely in chapter six.
The second major consistency can be seen in how the state and the federal
governments responded to the unique issues of the 1920s. Public concerns over gangs,
prohibition, and culture wars prompted the “crime commission” to become a principle
instrument of criminal justice reform. Crime commissions were outgrowths of
progressivism’s reliance on science and expertise. Commonly created at the state and
federal level, crime commissions were regularly tasked with employing experts to
address social and political problems related to crime. Crime commissions were so
common that historian Samuel Walker has referred to the 1920s as “The Era of the Crime
Commission.”537 Commissions regularly shook up public opinion and created support for
an enlarged federal role in crime control. The rapid spread of commissions set the
precedent for the creation of the national Wickersham Crime Commission in 1929, whose
reports shaped federal crime politics and political discourse about crime during the New
Deal.
Often funded by business interests, state-level commissions as well as one
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National Crime Commission in 1926 published many reports through the 1920s. They
addressed a variety of issues relevant to criminal justice including corrections, police
behavior, law enforcement, and plea-bargaining, and often expressed disillusionment
with rehabilitation. Often, their prime focus was on the success or failure of prohibition
and the rise of organized crime. These commissions had real political power, discussing
numerous reforms that shaped how states responded to crime. In doing so, they regularly
reviewed popular theories of criminal behavior, informing lawmakers as to which
theoretical explanations of criminal behavior had the strongest empirical basis. From
1919 through 1931, at least 35 crime commissions were created at the state or federal
level to examine such questions.538 Through the reports of these crime commissions,
scientific experts kept ideas about eugenics, bio-determinism, and innate criminality
alive.
Of these thirty-five, the three best known were the Cleveland Crime Survey
(1922), the Missouri Crime Survey (1926), and the Illinois Crime Survey (1929).539 The
Illinois Crime Survey endorsed what it called the “School of Modern Penology,” which
was founded on the logic that “uncontrollable hereditary impulses…[make] the
commission of crime almost inevitable.” The report supported the “individualization and
segregation” of inmates called for by rehabilitative ideology but decried the
sentimentalist impulses of rehabilitative scholars and suggested that extended punishment
was often necessary. The commission thus expressed approval when they found that the
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indeterminate sentence had increased the average term of incarceration for inmates.540
The Missouri Crime Survey similarly linked its support for indeterminate sentencing to
concerns about incorrigibility, writing that repeat offenders “should be dealt with by
specially devised habitual criminal laws and be subjected to wholly indeterminate
incarceration.”541
In studying the causes of crime, state commissions routinely validated the ideas of
eugenics scholars. In fact, biological factors were often the only causes of crime
commissions explored. The sole examination of the causes of crime in the Cleveland
Commission’s report came in a section called “Medical Science and Criminal Justice,”
which directed attention onto juvenile delinquency, mental health, and how health
workers and medical professionals could detect criminality.542 The Missouri Commission
also only had one chapter on the causes of crime, called “Mental Disorder, Crime, and the
Law” which explored “feeble-minded persons,” “psychopathic personalities,” and mental
disorder among adult and juvenile criminals.543 Similarly, the Illinois Commission’s only
attention to crime’s causes was a chapter titled “The Defective or Deranged Delinquent,”
exploring the “psychopathic conditions” of individuals charged as criminals and the
psychiatric assistance provided to the Cook County Court system by the Psychopathic
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Laboratory.544 And it was not just crime commission reports that kept the eugenic
tradition alive; work by H.H. Goddard, Clarence Darrow, and Ernest Hoag and Edward
Williams kept links between biology, psychology, and crime strong through the 1920s.545
There were some commission reports that endorsed perspectives emphasizing the
sociological or cultural causes of crime. For example, the Chicago Commission on Race
Relations’ report The Negro in Chicago (1922), published after the Chicago riots of 1919,
emphasized environmental factors contributing to crime. While it was not a “crime
commission” but a race-relations commission, the Chicago Commission discussed the
“tangle of predisposing circumstances” driving black crime, including poor housing and
deteriorating neighborhood conditions. Its report claimed that socioeconomic factors and
biased media coverage produced “an exaggerated picture of Negro crime.” But in doing
so, the report emphasized the distinctive criminal character of black culture as having “a
pathological attitude towards society.” Such an attitude, the commission concluded,
promoted “violence and other lawlessness” driven by “a desire for social revenge”
against a history of abuse. In this way, the few reports that heard the arguments of Du
Bois, Boas, and others succumbed to the same deficiencies as cultural theory.
Essentializing black culture as a cause of crime propounded a theory of cultural
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difference that was rooted in assumptions of racial difference and did little to discredit
claims that black criminality was a unique social problem rooted in black pathology.546
While the commissions of the 1920s were responses to a historically specific set
of concerns, they reflected the progressive tradition of relying on expertise to solve social
problems. The fact that commissions commonly endorsed the biological tradition
highlights the tenacity of bio-determinist theories of criminality among experts. However,
the eugenics movement began to lose steam in the 1920s as eugenicists increasingly
struggled to secure funding for research and courts began to question the utility of
eugenics measures. Calls for explicit eugenics laws quieted during the 1920s in favor of
calls for managerial efficiency in prisons.547 While biological ideas remained alive in
academic and political discourses to some extent in the 1920s, they began to lose the
potency to produce policy change they had in previous decades.
Nonetheless, the ideational structure of the theories expounded Lombroso,
Brockway, and their eugenicist followers contributed to what is called the positivist
school of criminology, a school of thought premised on the notion that the causes of
crime can be scientifically identified through empirical testing. The works of Lombroso,
Brockway, and their adherents sewed assumptions about class, determinism, and criminal
behavior into positivist criminology. These assumptions would crucially shape the ideas
articulated by scholars of crime that aimed to discredit biological and eugenic theories in
the 1930s and 1940s.
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One of these assumptions was the basic notion that criminality was a personal
individual trait that could either be curable or incorrigible. This put an emphasis on the
focal individual that proved useful for penal practitioners, experts, and lawmakers even
after support for eugenics measures faded. The idea of incorrigibility, absent its
biological flavor, was still used to politically through the 1930s and 1940s to portray
crime as a personal trait that could only be addressed through individual-level
interventions. Through the New Deal and mid-century, the rehabilitative model
encouraged policymakers to pursue individual-level reforms to rehabilitate inmates in
lieu of structural reforms, detaching new social-structural theories of crime from demands
for economic reform.
Criminal anthropology and eugenics also established a second discursive
parameter in positivist criminological scholarship. By explicitly challenging biological
theorists, positivist social-structural scholars of crime accepted terms of debate dictated
by biological theorists. Specifically, by only examining the crimes eugenicists and
anthropologists studied, they focused on crimes common among the poor. Much as
cultural schools of race and crime inadvertently verified the idea that the crime problem
was a race problem, social structural theorists reaffirmed the notion that the crime
problem was a class problem. The influence of these ideas through the New Deal era and
post-war years will be explored in more depth in chapter six.
VI. Conclusion
The eugenics movement built on the arguments of Lombroso, criminal
anthropologists, and rehabilitative scholars. But eugenicists repackaged the ideas of
Lombroso and Brockway to defend a unique political agenda that appealed to
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Progressives. By advocating that scientific experts could and should play a role in
weeding out the unfit criminal incorrigibles in order to preserve social health and the
national racial stock, eugenicists modified preexisting ideas about incorrigibility to justify
policy proposals that fit within progressive political thought. The repression of the “unfit”
and emergence of criminal sterilization statutes reflected older ideas of incorrigibility in
ways that abandoned the Gilded Age emphasis on “survival of the fittest” in favor of a
program of state-sponsored artificial selection driven by science.
In this way, we can see how the story of Progressive Era crime politics can be
understood on Smith’s “spiral of politics.”548 Operating in a preexisting institutional and
ideational universe, political actors drew on and refashioned preexisting ideas in ways
that changed the character of those ideas and promoted institutional change. The ability
of Progressives to create new ideas was conditioned by preexisting and prevailing ideas,
and the influence of Lombroso, Brockway, and others on progressive thought is evident.
But through a creative process of ideational modification and appropriation, political
actors reattached these altered ideas to a new set of policy commitments that comported
with progressives’ political philosophy and served their policy goals. By the New Deal,
the cyclical process of development outlined in the spiral restarted within an ideational
and institutional universe that had been altered and modified by Progressives.
The class-skewed crime politics of the Progressive Era not only reflected trends in
eugenics, race science, and criminology, but also economics. This chapter showed how
economists became some of the most vocal proponents of criminal sanction and
sterilization for the unfit, who they viewed as drains on the nation’s political economy, as
548
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economics developed into a prominent intellectual discipline. In this evolving social
science milieu, economists were key actors who brought comparable ideas into debates
about economic regulation. Much like Progressives believed scientific experts should
proactively identify and segregate the unfit out of the population, they also believed that
scientific experts should proactively identify and segregate unscrupulous businessmen
out of the marketplace. This rationale embedded into Progressive Era regulatory politics a
unique political construction of corporate criminality that was rooted in similar ideational
and ideological trends.
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CHAPTER 5: REGULATING COMPETITION AND PUNISHING CORPORATIONS
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
“The law-making power of the State of New York…has put on the same footing
prostitutes, gamblers, and corporations… It is a great deal safer…to be a
prostitute or gambler than it is to be a corporation.”
– Walter S. Logan of the New York Bar, 1901549
Progressives generally viewed laissez-faire economics as outmoded and
inefficient. The industrial behemoths and robber barons that rose to power in the
nineteenth century had been viewed as the most “naturally fit” of the late nineteenth
century economy, but the Progressives of the early twentieth century questioned whether
or not that was truly the case.
The last chapter emphasized how Progressives called into question natural
selection, Social Darwinism, and survival of the fittest, claiming that undesirable traits
could sometimes become commonplace absent state regulation. This logic led
Progressives to insist that natural selection dynamics be replaced with artificial selection
processes driven by the state. This rationale for state expansion was mirrored in
Progressives’ regulatory politics. As chapters two and three outlined, market competition
was politicized as an economic analog of natural selection in the Gilded Age. Absent
robust state intervention, competition would permit the best in the market to succeed. But
just as Progressives questioned the efficiency of natural selection, they also questioned
the efficiency of laissez-faire. Progressives argued that the state could do a better job if it
actively selected out criminals before they committed crimes and if it actively selected
unscrupulous businessmen out of markets rather than relying on competitive dynamics to
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do it. Progressives thus concluded that a stronger state reliant on objective science and
expertise had a crucial role to play in monitoring the industrial economy.
Progressives were more critical of corporate power than either the advocates
laissez-faire or regulatory ideology were in the late nineteenth century. They were more
disposed to condemn business practices as criminal and were willing to use the state to
monitor markets as a result. In fact, some progressive economists included the unethical
businessmen within their eugenic taxonomies of human types. Due to this rejection of
individualist classical economics, many Progressives also embraced the real entity theory
of the firm—the idea that the corporation was an autonomous entity with an identity
distinct from that of its owners or shareholders. Many defended this concept in order to
give the state a means of regulating corporations and ensuring that businesses act in
civically and socially responsible ways.
Intuitively, this suggests that Progressives likely instituted meaningful reforms
that checked the crimes of large corporations. A closer look reveals a different story.
While Progressives contended that laissez-faire allowed the unethical rather than the
fittest to survive, they generally claimed that most businessmen were good people. Only a
few men in industry were rapacious capitalists driven by primitive predatory impulses.
The problem was that these few bad men compelled good men to engage in unethical
activity to effectively compete. Progressive regulatory reforms, most notably the creation
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), were built not to protect the public from
predatory capitalism, but to protect good businessmen from bad ones by preventing the
bad ones from committing crime in the first place through cooperative mechanisms.
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As a result, the FTC was designed to work with rather than against business. After
much debate, the FTC was granted no meaningful way of pursuing criminal sanctions.
Legislators feared that the threat of prosecution would deter good businessmen from
innovation and risk-taking, and the FTC reflected the design advocated by Louis
Brandies. It was built to regulate competition by working with businesses to identify
industry-specific restraint of trade practices, prevent them from occurring, and discourage
concentration rather than prosecute criminal wrongdoing. By reframing regulatory
ideology to new purposes, Brandeis constructed the FTC primarily as an ally to business
and less as a protector of the public welfare, leaving it vulnerable to cooptation by
corporate interests shortly after its passage. While this collaborative and cooperative
approach was a worthwhile pursuit, the lack of any robust enforcement mechanism left
the FTC with little ability to compel obedience. In the context of Braithwaite and Ayres’
sanctions pyramid, the FTC only had cooperative regulatory sanctions at its disposal
without a credible threat of prosecution backing them up should corporations disobey.
Further, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability counted as many libertarian
adherents as it did liberal ones. While advocates of regulation assured that the doctrine
would allow the state to hold big business accountable, those who opposed regulation
noted that the principle granted corporations the same legal and constitutional protections
as a human person. A close analysis of the doctrine’s origins demonstrates that it was not
liberal progressives who drove its creation, but rather railway managers who insisted that
it was a more pragmatic means of punishing corporate crime than punishing individuals.
This history indicates that the railways’ political push for corporate liability was a
disingenuous move that served to further insulate corporations from the criminal law’s
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reach. In a criminal justice system premised on the existence of free will and proof of
criminal intent, corporate criminal liability stands out as an anomaly, and punishing
corporate entities has proven historically difficult.550
This chapter begins by outlining core currents of progressive political thought in
relation to economic regulation. The next section discusses the way corporate criminality
was constructed within this ideological milieu, highlighting the crucial role economists
played in this process as economics established itself as a prominent intellectual
discipline. Then, the relation of Progressive Era constructions of corporate criminality to
policy change is traced through antitrust law. Given the changing role of the Presidency
in the early twentieth century, this begins with an analysis of the antitrust politics of
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. This illustrates how
Progressive antitrust politics created a unique context for the emergence of the FTC in
1914. This culminated in the design of a commission that was built to protect big
business from itself rather than protect the public from predatory business practices. As
the financial sector grew into a dominant force in the political economy, financial
corporations helped transmit and effectively adapt regulatory ideology in debates over
financial reform and the FTC. The penultimate section reviews the political development
of corporate criminal liability, highlighting its broad-ranging political appeal and the
politicking that facilitated its articulation in the Elkins Act of 1903 and in the Supreme
Court ruling New York Central and Hudson River Railroad v. New York in 1909. The
final part of the chapter highlights how these developments shaped the crime politics of
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the 1920s and set the stage for the Great Depression, while leaving the state with a
limited capacity to respond to the corporate abuses and negligence that caused it.
I. Progressive Political Ideologies and Big Business
As the last chapter noted, despite their diversity of political views, Progressives
drew from a shared collection of intellectual discourses relating to race, economics,
human behavior, and politics.551 Four broad currents of progressivism are essential for
specifically understanding the politics of regulation in the early twentieth century.
First, Progressives believed that industrialized society should be supervised by a
modern administrative state. They expressed a strong faith in the state’s “visible hand” to
diagnose and treat the social ailments of industrial capitalism.552 Confidence in the visible
hand reflected Progressives’ rejection of laissez-faire. Progressives viewed laissez-faire
as economically unsound and obsolete, concluding that markets were not always efficient
and that an active state could correct for market inefficiencies. Progressives pushed to
shift regulatory and economic oversight authority from courts and parties to independent
agencies. As Robert Wiebe noted, the central emphasis of progressivism was that the
state “should fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means.”553
Monitoring industry required more than simply creating networks of regulatory
agencies. A second tenet of progressivism was a belief that bureaucratic experts who
relied on objective science should guide these administrative bodies. It was thought that a
dependence on science would insulate bureaucratic administrators from politics, but true
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autonomy proved difficult to attain. While agencies remained deeply political in their
behavior and decision-making, Progressives rationalized their faith in scientific expertise
and bureaucratic administration as alternatives to political decision-making.554
As with crime politics, social scientists were key players in policy debates about
regulation. To understand these debates, one must look to the prevailing discourses about
economics. The field of economics grew in prominence in the 1900s as the American
Economic Association (AEA), founded in 1885, evolved into a political and intellectual
force. Richard Ely, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin,
became the AEA President in 1900. The AEA has been under the control of academics
ever since.555 Ely called economists a “natural aristocracy,” claiming that because their
authority and power were derived from scientific knowledge, they were wholly
incorruptible. This commitment to disinterested truth-seeking is what Ely said
differentiated economists from capitalists pursuing profits or politicians seeking power
and thus made them necessary to policy debates.556
Progressive economists thought that they had the knowledge to cure social and
economic problems while promoting market efficiency and articulated new ideas about
corporate capitalism, criminality, and regulation that diverged from laissez-faire
ideologies. Economists critiqued the inefficiencies of Gilded Age capitalism, suggesting
that the robber barons once deemed the most “fit” were really the most unscrupulous.
554

See Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) on how
bureaucracies achieve autonomy most effectively when mid-level officials build relationships and
reputations among a diverse range of interests for providing unique services.
555
Michael Bernstein, “A Brief History of the American Economic Association,” The American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 67, no. 5 (2008): 1007–23.
556
Ely, Studies, 456; Leonard, Illiberal Reformers, 34.
214

Constructs of naturalized hierarchies were also incorporated into economic analyses of
industrial reform. Particularly, Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1911 book The Principles of
Scientific Management promoted what was thought to be state of the art business theory.
His theory of management aimed to improve labor efficiency by fragmenting jobs within
the production process, thus minimizing the skill requirements of workers, easing the
execution of their jobs, and simplifying managerial supervision of factory operations.
Taylorism is now associated with inhumane work conditions, but at the time was
universally praised. Louis Brandeis, John Commons, Thorsten Veblen, Theodore
Roosevelt, and even muckraker Ida Tarbell embraced “Taylorism.” But Taylor justified
his theory with eugenics, believing that workers were lazy, unintelligent, and required
simple jobs and close supervision to be productive.557
This is related to a third crucial theme of progressivism—that Progressives’ faith
in science legitimated faith in natural hierarchy. Discourses of Darwinism justified
systems of racial and class oppression and simultaneously infused regulatory discourse
with naturalized constructions of criminality. Progressive race scientists often included
categorizations of the rapacious capitalist in their racial taxonomies, presenting them as
products of archaic predatory instincts. Such scholars argued that Gilded Age analysts
mistook immoral and unscrupulous businessmen for the “fittest” of the market jungle,
and that a stronger administrative state was necessary to monitor them.558
It is reasonable to think this would lead to harsh criminal laws targeting the
destructive capitalists. But Progressives’ hostility to the few predatory businessmen was
557
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checked by their faith in the character of the majority of businessmen. Among
Progressives, some defended populists’ insistence for the destruction of large businesses
while others supported large corporations as inevitable and efficient.559 But a third
perspective endorsed the model of regulated competition, which fused faith in expertise
with populist sympathies for markets. Gerald Berk has shown how historical actors led by
jurist Louis Brandeis convinced policymakers to design the Federal Trade Commission
based on this model, aiming to foster industry habits of productive experimentation,
innovation, and collaboration rather than cutthroat competition.560
It was within the model of regulated competition that the dichotomy between the
criminal and ethical capitalist flourished. It was rationalized that ethical businessmen
needed protection from unethical ones through state regulation, and Progressive experts
were uniquely well suited to distinguishing the good from the bad. This approach rested
on a belief that capitalists could be morally rehabilitated and their behavior channeled
into productive directions by the state without punishment. As a result, the FTC was
empowered to work with business leaders in ways that promoted cooperation. This
interpretation of corporate criminality facilitated the regulation of competition, not the
punishment of cutthroat business tactics, and regulatory ideology was thus intertwined
into Brandeis’s model of regulated competition.
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Progressives thought laissez-faire was inefficient in the same way they thought
natural selection was inefficient. Just as assertive state interventions monitoring
criminality like sterilization replaced natural selection with artificial selection, state-led
market coordination replaced a “survival of the fittest” market mentality with an artificial
selection process. The state was to be used to weed out predatory capitalists from the
good ones, direct predatory impulses into productive directions, and displace remnants of
laissez-faire with state monitoring. This philosophy still entailed a belief in the
superiority of capitalists but authorized more involvement from the state to efficiently
sort between bad and good businessmen. So as shifts in discourse from the Gilded Age to
Progressive Era adapted and transmitted aspects of rehabilitative and regulatory
ideologies over time, a political shift followed. In place of a natural selection philosophy
(“born criminals” and “survival of the fittest” markets), Progressives endorsed state-led
artificial selection as more efficient (eugenics and regulated competition).
A fourth and final important theme is that progressives commonly attributed a
collective identity to social bodies and organizations, including corporations. Much in the
way Progressives viewed the social body as a collectivity rather than a disaggregated
collection of individuals, they also embraced the real entity theory of the firm—the idea
that the corporation was “a real and natural entity whose existence is prior to and separate
from the state.”561 Leftist Progressives thought real entity theory could be a means of
holding capital accountable. Aware of the state’s reluctance to regulate industry, they
depicted corporations as organic entities that had the duty to act in civically responsible
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ways so as to give the state a way to hold corporations responsible for antisocial behavior
through doctrines of corporate criminal and civil liability. Corporate criminal liability
particularly was contingent on the belief that the corporate body possessed the requisite
mens rea to commit a crime.562
Despite its leftist appeal, real entity theory had right-wing libertarian supporters.
Treating the corporation as an autonomous being granted it as much legal protections as
an individual. This provided a rationale for an anti-regulatory politics aiming to insulate
the corporation from the state.563 In early twentieth century policy debates about
corporate criminal liability, both leftist Progressives and conservatives agreed that
punishing the corporation rather than the individuals within it was a more efficient means
of sanction. But driven by mid-level railroad managers, the doctrine ultimately served to
insulate executives from the reach of the criminal law.
It is within these ideological currents that constructions of the corporate criminal
evolved. Gilded Age accounts steeped in the rationality of market competition presented
robber barons as the naturally fittest of the capitalist setting, limiting state responses to
predatory business. Progressives were more willing to criticize the unscrupulous
capitalist, but only as a foil to the ethical businessman, and most Progressives supported
the large corporation as an efficient phenomenon that should be monitored in lieu of the
individuals within it. This made for a precarious combination of policy commitments that
produced a unique set of policy outcomes. The regulated competition philosophy that
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undergirded the FTC embodied the idea that the state could and should differentiate good
and bad businessmen and morally rehabilitate the bad ones.
II. Progressive Era Constructs of Corporate Criminality
There were three key facets to the Progressives’ conceptualization of corporate
criminality. Most fundamental was the idea that market-driven natural selection was
inefficient, minimal state intervention had allowed the unscrupulous to run upright
businessmen out of business, and that bureaucratic experts would effectively distinguish
between good and bad capitalists. As Richard Ely wrote in his 1901 book Introduction to
Political Economy, “Competition, if unregulated, tends to force the level of economic life
down to the moral standard of the worst men who can sustain themselves in the business
community.”564 Edward Ross made similar claims, linking wealth accumulation to his
concerns about racial progress. In 1903, he wrote that, “The struggle for wealth does not
bring to the top the intellectual aristocracy…[t]he plutocracy of to-day is far, very
far…from favoring the multiplication of the best.”565
Economist and eugenicist Irving Fisher clarified that while ideas about natural
criminality justified social repression, ideas about natural corporate rapacity justified
regulation. In his 1907 article “Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez-Faire Been
Abandoned?” Fisher discussed the shift from the laissez-faire to “modern doctrines of
governmental regulation and social control.” He claimed that the lower classes rarely
knew their best interest, saying that “some men need enlightenment…and others need
restraint.” This reflected the dichotomy between reformation and incorrigibility. But
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Fisher went further, arguing that the educated should always “be allowed to dominate,”
the “ignorant” classes. And for those at the top, cutthroat competition produced
inefficient outcomes and should be replaced with rationalized regulatory interventions.566
Economists recognized that concepts of fitness in Social Darwinist thought were
contingent constructs. Progressive luminaries like Lester Frank Ward, Henry Carter
Adams, and John Bates Clark shared this belief. They saw themselves as antagonists to
Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner’s efforts to weaponize Darwinist ideas to
rationalize laissez-faire, instead understanding natural selection as an environmentally
conditioned process.567 Like Gilded Age apologists for laissez-faire, Progressives argued
that those who succeeded in business were naturally distinct human types, but unlike their
predecessors they critiqued the unprincipled businessman as driven by a natural
disposition. For instance, famous sociologist Thorsten Veblen argued that the rapacious
capitalist could be understood as a natural racial type driven by an animalistic predatory
instinct.568 The most successful capitalists were sometimes products of natural selection,
but at other times were unscrupulous men who exhibited undesirable traits to thrive in the
competitive dynamics of capitalism. Progressives thought that state monitoring could
differentiate such individuals from successful businessmen who were morally sound, and
thus help to create markets in which ethical businessmen could succeed. Regulation
would thus save capitalism from itself.
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Arguments about the unethical businessman were intertwined with a second
current in Progressive debates—the idea that most businessmen were ethical and the few
who were not were reformable. Progressives hinged their support for regulation on the
need to protect good businessmen, not the public, from their unethical competitors.
Absent regulation, as economist Edward Ross said, economic life would be brought down
“to the moral standard of the worst men who can sustain themselves in the business
community.” This inclination to protect business against itself rather than protect society
from predatory practices checked their impulses to punish corporate malfeasance.
This also does not mean that rationalizations for corporate greed disappeared in
Progressive Era scholarship on crime and human behavior. G. Frank Lydston particularly
rearticulated older Gilded Age rationalizations of corporate rapacity. He defended
businessmen accused of wrongdoing by saying, “None of them have a previous criminal
record,” reflecting tendencies in rehabilitative ideology to use past behavior as a metric of
criminal tendencies and rehabilitative capacity.569 Lydston claimed that businessmen
were driven by a “great inherent capacity for good, and the force of character that makes
men great,” but that they also can make “great criminals.” He argued that the
businessman driven to crime is fueled by a different instinct than the typical criminal, but
one that can still result in undesirable behavior. He wrote that, “Whether ambition results
in great crimes or in good deeds, the individual will be found to be of a forceful
character. The petty thief is not impelled by it.” Given that the capitalist lacked criminal
instincts, Lydston wrote that “Certain influences may divert the force of a strong
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character in the direction of criminality.”570 His arguments supported regulatory ideology
by contending that businessmen who committed crimes were inherently good, deserved
mild regulations rather than punishment, and could be pushed in non-criminal directions
if the state created healthy market conditions. Hereditarians like Lewis Terman similarly
endorsed arguments about the innate superiority of the business classes. Terman argued
that IQ scores perfectly corresponded to class, economic success, and criminality.571
While progressive economists remained concerned about the rapacious capitalist,
they presented him as a rare deviation from the positive construct of the businessman
articulated in laissez-faire ideologies, and one who was still not fully criminal. Edward
Ross wrote that “The trolley company, the quack medicine man, the insurer of rotten
ships, and the jerry builder,” should not be dealt with like the common criminal “because
they are morally superior to him.”572 Thus in Progressives’ logic, businessmen should not
be punished for two reasons. First, good businessmen who resorted to crime to compete
with their corrupt rivals should not be punished. They simply needed protection from
lesser men who engaged in unethical practices and forced their competitors down to their
level. Richard Ely argued that such men had “inferior natures” and “have not been able to
endure” the temptations of material power.573 The second reason businessmen should be
punished is that these weak-willed businessmen tempted by material power did not
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deserve punishment. Rather, the market conditions tempting them should be corrected so
they could be encouraged to engage in more productive practices and activities.
Constructs of businessmen as superior human types clearly did not disappear.
Chauncey Depew, formerly Vanderbilt’s attorney and now a retired Senator from New
York, wrote in his autobiography in 1922 that men of fame and fortune succeeded due to
their “superior ability, foresight, and adaptability.”574 Railroad magnate James J. Hill also
wrote in his autobiography in 1910 that, “the fortunes of railroad companies are
determined by the law of survival of the fittest.”575 The idea that businessmen succeeded
by virtue of their own intelligence, work ethic, and innate ability still persisted, but
alongside new ideas that unscrupulous competitors were lowering the best in the industry
down to their level.
A third tenet of progressivism that checked the impulse to punish businessmen
was Progressives’ embrace of real entity theory. Scholars like Richard Ely discussed the
corporation as an artificial person with a degree of autonomy.576 But viewing the
corporation as a collectivity rather than aggregation of individuals forced Progressives to
contemplate whether individuals were the only unit through which selection could be
monitored or if competition among collective entities like corporations could be
explained through Darwinism. Thomas Leonard has shown that while Progressives were
skeptical that industry leaders were the fittest products of natural selection, they were
willing to accept natural selection doctrine “when the competitors were nations or races
or even the trusts.” Societies, races, and corporations could be understood as existing in a
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natural state of competition with one another, meaning that in regulated markets,
industrial behemoths that outpaced competitors were simply the most efficient.577
Treating the corporation as the unit of social control further insulated corporate
agents from the criminal law. As an artificial person, it was nearly impossible to
understand a corporation’s criminality in terms of innate predispositions. The difficulty in
identifying a corporate mens rea rendered it hard to attribute blame to corporate forms.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability was something Progressives from
both the right and left supported. Its emergence was not simply an organic outgrowth of
the common law, but a politically contingent outcome.
Progressives did not discredit ideas about the natural superiority of capitalists
embedded into regulatory ideology. Rather, these ideas were repackaged into the
Progressives’ defenses of corporate liability and regulated competition. Richard Ely
neatly summarized this perspective, writing that, “statutory regulation, well-enforced,
would simply confirm the efforts of the most intelligent and most just employers” rather
than the more manipulative and exploitative ones.578 Ely endorsed a logic resembling the
philosophy of regulated competition, stating that, “Turning now to competitive
businesses, what is required with respect to them is that sort of regulation which, without
destroying competition, will raise its ethical level…Regulated competition within its own
proper sphere is one of the conditions of social progress.”579 John Commons similarly
wrote that without regulation, all employers are “forced down to the level of the most
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grasping.”580 The fact that ethical businessmen existed next to unethical ones warranted
regulation to ensure that the unethical were monitored and reformed without intruding on
the actions of good capitalists. Regulated competition was less about punishing
criminality or protecting the public than promoting economic growth in the least intrusive
way. The Progressives’ perspective on regulated competition thus bundled core elements
of regulatory ideology into a new brand of politics.
III. Progressives and Antitrust Reform: Regulating Competition and Criminality
Given progressive debates over the benefits and drawbacks of industrial
consolidation, the growth of trusts became an issue of enormous political significance in
the early twentieth century. From 1890 through 1903, the federal government initiated 23
antitrust cases, sixteen of which were civil and seven were criminal. Only one criminal
conviction was obtained despite the frenzy of mergers that occurred in the years
following the Sherman Antitrust Act’s passage.581 In its early years, the Sherman
Antitrust Act actually proved most effective in state confrontations with organized labor
rather than trusts.582 But in 1903, there were signs of change as the Department of Justice
received congressional funding specifically for an antitrust division.583 This ushered in an
era of “trust-busting” according to the narratives presented in standard history textbooks.
In reality, Progressives had varied views on trusts. Only a minority shared the
strict anti-monopolist attitudes of Populists insistent on the destruction of big business.
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Most Progressives, including prominent economists like John Commons and politicians
like President Theodore Roosevelt, saw bigness as inevitable.584 They were not pure
apologists for corporations and were not hesitant to criticize monopoly, but they
supported consolidation as more efficient than competition among small business.585
Others like jurist Louis Brandeis charted a middle ground, hoping to regulate and monitor
competition through expert-run bureaucracies. Gerald Berk’s analysis of early twentieth
century antitrust policy demonstrates that Brandeis’s model prevailed in the passage of
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.586 But a long series of political decisions led
to the creation of the FTC, and the politics preceding its creation were colored with
questions about the nature of corporate criminality.
Only by assessing the interaction of competing strands of progressive thought in
relation to consolidation can we get a full picture of the antitrust politics of the period.
Roosevelt and his successor William Howard Taft viewed big business as efficient and
inevitable to different degrees, while Woodrow Wilson embraced regulated competition.
But despite the bluster of their antitrust politics, each relied on core elements of
regulatory ideology to advocate for policies to support industrial capitalism. Their
different approaches built on common ideas about corporate criminality that were drawn
from the prevailing ideological currents of progressivism.
Political Context: Variations in Progressives’ Antitrust Politics
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Most accounts analyze progressive antitrust politics in the context of debates over
economic growth, stability, and regulation. This is usually a warranted focus. But in
important ways, the enforcement of antitrust law reflected Progressives’ notions of
corporate criminality. This becomes clear upon examining the politics of one of the era’s
most prominent alleged “trust-busters”—President Theodore Roosevelt.
It is reasonable to focus on the “trust-busting” Presidents of the early twentieth
century to track understandings of corporate criminality through the development of
antitrust policy. Stephen Skowronek has argued that presidential leadership has changed
over time in relation to the emergence of new institutional resources and governing
responsibilities relative to the institution of the Presidency that have altered the power
resources and strategies a President has at his disposal to affect policy change.
Skowronek argues that a major change occurred at the turn of the century, which he
describes as a shift from the “partisan” Presidency in which Presidents served as the
broker for national party coalitions by distributing patronage to party factions and local
machines to the “pluralist” Presidency. In the pluralist mode of governance, which
Skowronek argues emerged in 1900 with the presidency of Roosevelt, the President
became “the steward of national policymaking,” who bargained between leaders of major
governing institutions, national organized interests, and the executive establishment.587
Beginning with Roosevelt, Presidents played a key role in negotiating between sectors of
the political economy, warranting closer attention to the actions of Roosevelt, Taft, and
Wilson than the presidents of the nineteenth century in relation to antitrust policy.
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Roosevelt was unafraid to condemn big business’s actions as criminal wrongs and
supported state intervention in response.588 He claimed that if the state acted as “neutral
ground” to regulate businesses, it would “serve as a place of refuge” for “the lawless man
of great wealth.”589 He said he supported any and all means of punishing corporate
wrongdoers.590 But in spite of this rhetoric, Roosevelt remained a pragmatic Hamiltonian
who accepted industrial consolidation as inevitable and efficient. In his first State of the
Union Address, he suggested that combinations were “natural” and provided “great good
to our people.”591 He criticized the Sherman law because it “struck at all business,”
rendering it “a constant threat against decent businessmen” in addition to criminal
ones.592 Roosevelt repeatedly insisted that the law should only forbid combinations that
do “harm to the general public,” cautiously differentiating between “good” and “bad”
trusts.593
By anthropomorphizing the corporation, Roosevelt employed physiological
metaphors to discuss business. He insisted that to “care for the body” of society,
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industrial development must be promoted.594 He called the railroads “arteries” through
which the “commercial life-blood of this nation flows.”595 By drawing on Darwinist
language, he claimed that the emergence of big business was a “mere law of nature.”596
Comparing economic development and trust formation to notions of human fitness and
competition appealed to the axioms of Darwinism present in Progressive Era thought.597
If trusts were natural outcomes of competition, Roosevelt concluded that attempts
to overthrow the “more prosperous” trusts would be reckless.598 He was critical of
muckraking anti-business journalists seeking to disrupt the natural economic order. He
compared muckrakers to “quack” doctors whose solutions would be “more dangerous” to
the “patient,” meaning the economy, than any “disease” infecting industry. While
Roosevelt did not offer a blanket defense of big business, he thought that trusts were
natural and should be treated with care and caution.599
Roosevelt also discussed the individuals running the trusts through Darwinist
metaphors. He argued trusts led by immoral men could threaten the economic order. He
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claimed that the “predatory capitalist” order and men driven by “wolfish greed”
threatened this system.600 He said that such individuals should be seen as wild predators,
“stand[ing] on the same moral level with the creature who fattens on the blood money of
the gambling-house and the saloon.”601
In spite of his rhetoric, Roosevelt’s criticisms of industry leaders were tempered
by his belief that such men were capable of moral reform. Roosevelt thought neither
regulation nor legislation could formalize a system of ethics in business but claimed that
he could rehabilitate executives through moral leadership.602 Writing about the unethical
activity among titans of industry, Roosevelt wrote that, “[I]t is only by a slow and patient
inward transformation” that these men can be “helped upward in their struggle for a
higher and a fuller life.”603 His public statements aimed to raise the moral standards of
industry. For instance, he stated in 1905 that using profits as a metric to judge business
success was a “delusion.” Profits are only a useful metric “so far as it is accompanied by
and develops a high standard of conduct—honor, integrity, civic courage.”604
Roosevelt’s antitrust politics thus hinged on two constructs of corporate
criminality—good trusts were natural and bad trusts needed to be controlled, and
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unethical businessmen running trusts could be reformed through moral leadership.
Consequently, Roosevelt’s preferred mode for monitoring trusts was not prosecution or
regulation, but private agreements in which executives promised to alter their practices in
exchange for lenience.605 Roosevelt believed that juries were often reluctant to convict “a
reputable member of the business community for doing what the business community has
unhappily grown to recognize as wellnigh normal in business,” rendering informal
agreements more practical.606 His efforts to broker negotiations with trusts is perfectly
consistent with the model of pluralist presidential leadership described by Skowronek.
Roosevelt stated that, “publicity is the only sure remedy which we can now
invoke” to regulate trusts, as “the courts of law are powerless.”607 While he generally
negotiated private agreements quietly, he occasionally resorted to publicizing the
activities of trusts as a deterrent measure. He did this particularly by working with the
Bureau of Corporations (BOC). Established in 1903, the BOC was a predecessor to the
Federal Trade Commission and was primarily designed to report on major industries and
search for monopolistic practices. The Bureau’s enacting legislation gave the President
the right to release any information gathered, which Roosevelt sometimes did.608 More
frequently, Roosevelt reached informal agreements with corporations by working with
the Bureau’s first chair James Garfield. While a few publicized high-profile prosecutions
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maintained his anti-business image, Roosevelt’s relationship with the Bureau exhibited a
willingness to work with corporations.609 The Bureau actually complicated prosecutions,
as private agreements with businesses like International Harvester and Standard Oil
granted organizations immunity from the criminal law.610
One example of Roosevelt’s approach to antitrust enforcement occurred during
the Panic of 1907. In the middle of the crisis, Roosevelt permitted U.S. Steel to purchase
Tennessee Coal and Iron after Gary Frick of U.S. Steel convinced him that the merger
would keep the market afloat. Shortly thereafter, it became clear that Frick’s claims were
disingenuous, and U.S. Steel gained tremendous market advantages at a bargain.611 In the
case, Roosevelt’s faith in businessmen and the advantages of bigness backfired, leading
him to reach a flawed deal rather than intervene in the market directly.
Roosevelt’s support for consolidation, faith in the reformability of businessmen,
and belief that trusts could be “good” or “bad” complicate his image as a trustbuster. His
actions reflected a desire to save honest business from unscrupulous competitors more
than protect the public from predatory capitalism. His successor, William Taft, exhibited
a more aggressive approach. Taft’s administration quickly filed an antitrust suit against
U.S. Steel after it negotiated its purchase of Tennessee Coal and Iron with Roosevelt,
angering Roosevelt so much that some suggest it was why he made a third party
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presidential bid in 1912.612 The case highlights how strong the tensions were among
Progressives regarding antitrust politics.
Early in his presidency, Taft attributed the “prevalence of crime and fraud”
among business to the failure of the criminal law and aimed to bolster the state’s antitrust
enforcement.613 In four years, Taft and his Attorney General George Wickersham filed
eighty-nine antitrust suits, more than doubling Roosevelt’s seven-year total.614
Nonetheless, Taft still expressed faith in the moral capacity of businessmen, arguing that
antitrust crusades of the early twentieth century encouraged an unfair “impeachment of
the motives of men of the highest character.”615 He also criticized Roosevelt’s tendency
to differentiate good from bad trusts, saying the public “ought to rid themselves of the
idea that such a distinction is practicable.”616 This reveals a core distinction between
Roosevelt and Taft’s approaches to antitrust. They agreed that there existed good and bad
businessmen, but unlike Roosevelt, Taft was less willing to tolerate the idea of “bigness”
by distinguishing between good and bad trusts.
Perhaps the most significant antitrust case during Taft’s administration came
against Standard Oil. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that Standard Oil monopolized
the petroleum industry and mandated its dissolution into competing firms. But in doing so
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the Court endorsed the “rule of reason,” which interpreted the Sherman Act as
authorizing judges to deem combinations illegal only if their effect was to unreasonably
restrain trade.617 Donald Cressey has discussed how this facilitated a shift away from
strict liability by requiring that intent be proven in restraint of trade cases, complicating
the state’s ability to secure convictions by requiring proof of intent from a corporate
entity.618
Critics have argued that the rule of reason gave activist judges the authority to
label a restraint of trade as “reasonable” or “unreasonable” based on their personal
preferences.619 There does seem to be some circumstantial evidence that this is true, as
the decision was followed by an immediate reduction in the rate of antitrust
convictions.620 But more importantly, Standard exacerbated partisan divides over
antitrust politics. Democrats, who were more attuned towards populist attitudes, were
incensed at the decision, whereas Progressives were welcoming of it.621 Taft himself
endorsed the rule of reason, saying he only sought to punish trusts that demonstrated
intent to suppress competition.622 But the rule of reason assumed the existence of a
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corporate mens rea, which has proved difficult and long since plagued the enforcement of
the corporate criminal law.623
Taft’s inclination towards tougher antitrust enforcement aggravated corporations
and contributed to his failed reelection bid.624 After his term, however, he appeared to
regret his punitive stances. He wrote in 1914 that sentencing trust leaders to prison terms
would only have deterrent effects “in theory,” because the public is reluctant to punish
businessmen “for doing what some years ago was only regarded as shrewd business.”625
Upon his appointment to the Supreme Court, Taft issued several pro-business rulings.626
Despite expressing stronger opposition to big business than Roosevelt, Taft still accepted
industrial consolidation as a social good.
Roosevelt and Taft embodied varying visions of progressive thought in regards to
big business, but both packaged elements of regulatory ideology into the political
currents of the Progressive Era by defending the character of business executives and
advocating for regulation rather than criminalization of trusts and their leaders. This
illustrates both the durability of regulatory ideology and the way the “trust-busters”
fashioned an antitrust politics that combined regulatory ideology with the politics of the
Progressive Era. In contrast to Roosevelt and Taft, Woodrow Wilson endorsed the
regulated competition model Brandeis favored, which was crucial in facilitating the
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design of the Federal Trade Commission and also hinged on familiar constructions of
corporate criminality from regulatory ideology.
Woodrow Wilson and Reforming the FTC’s Precursors
Unlike many Progressives, Woodrow Wilson was skeptical of regulatory
commissions that he feared would entrench business power.627 He also rejected realentity theory as it applied to corporate criminal liability, stating that, “guilt is
personal.”628 So while he shared many affinities with his predecessors, like his belief that
businessmen were generally honest, Wilson articulated a different brand of
progressivism.629 It was under his administration that the Federal Trade Commission was
created, one of the most significant regulatory innovations of the Progressive Era.
Constructs of corporate criminality were intertwined into Wilson and Brandeis’s brand of
progressivism and became embedded into the FTC’s design.
The FTC was designed with the power to prevent “persons, partnerships, or
corporations, except banks, and common carriers…from using unfair methods of
competition in commerce.”630 It was not designed to intervene in markets in particularly
robust ways and had two institutional warrants—to work with industries in a deliberative
manner to identify common industry-specific predatory and restraint of trade practices,
and to curb those practices through education and information provision to corporations.
It was argued that this would preclude power from becoming concentrated and prevent
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markets from becoming criminogenic. The law’s only criminal provisions punished the
inclusion of false entries in reports to the commission, refusal or failure to file reports, or
the destruction of records. It did not criminalize any specific restraint of trade practices.
Gerald Berk’s research carefully unpacks Brandeis’s philosophy of “regulated
competition” and its influence on the FTC. According to Brandeis, economic competition
was ambiguous. That is, it could promote either good or bad outcomes, like innovation
and efficiency or concentrated power and abuse. Progressives often glossed over this
ambiguity, and Brandeis argued that the state should regulate competition to prevent the
concentration of power by steering predatory competitive instincts into behavior that
enhanced product quality and production efficiency. Wilson was the ideal candidate to
assist Brandeis in enshrining this philosophy into law, given his appeal to both populists
who favored market competition and pro-regulation Progressives dissatisfied with Taft
and Roosevelt. Especially in his first term, Wilson drew heavily on Brandeis’s counsel.631
Although Brandeis and Wilson were key players in its emergence, the FTC did
not come out of nowhere. Its creation was the result of almost two decades of institutional
development and debates over antitrust policy, within which debates about corporate
criminality were embedded. The FTC actually had its origins with its institutional
precursor, the Bureau of Corporations. Created in 1903, the Bureau was designed to
regulate trusts but was almost entirely advisory. It was authorized to investigate industrial
consolidation and make policy recommendations, but essentially served a non-invasive
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information-gathering role for the state and industry.632 The Bureau was a central
recommendation of McKinley’s Industrial Commission, which claimed the Bureau
should be modeled off the ICC, investigate industrial consolidation, collect reports,
disclose the conditions of business, and monitor industries for monopoly.633 But the
eventual Bureau’s lack of enforcement mechanisms made it non-controversial, ensuring
its swift passage over more stringent proposals.634
A need for stronger trust regulation became apparent in the 1910s as public
anxieties over the growth of a “money trust” spread. As the financial sector became a
more powerful element of the political economy, fears that a group of wealthy Wall
Street financiers and bankers controlled a vast number of corporations brought new
attention to the trust issue. The financiers and bankers feared to be at the heart of this
money trust were the targets of a high-profile congressional subcommittee inquiry from
1912-1913. Known as the Pujo Committee for its chairperson Representative Arsene Pujo
(D-LA), the inquiry’s findings inspired public support for a number of reforms.
Led by Pujo and legal counsel Samuel Untermyer, the committee found that the
“money trust” not only was real, but also controlled over $22 billion across the mining,
manufacturing, transportation, telecommunications, and financial sectors. Headed by the
Morgan Empire, the trust held 341 directorships spanning 112 corporations. In statements
before the committee, participants saw nothing wrong in their activity. When asked about
632
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how the trust regularly altered stock prices to their advantage, former NYSE president
Frank Sturgis defended the practice before the Pujo Committee. When pressed on the
topic, he told the committee, “You are asking me a moral question, and I am answering
you a stock-exchange question…They are very different things.” He described short
selling as defensible during panics, and when asked whether it worsened economic
conditions, he stated, “It might. Self-preservation is the first law of nature…I do not
consider it wrong.” Sturgis’s comments did not go unnoticed. Newspapers the following
morning noted that Sturgis’s testimony proved that “manipulation is well approved” and
considered “regular and legitimate” on the New York Stock Exchange.635
It was commonplace for the financiers behind the money trust to divorce
questions of business from questions of morality as Sturgis did by rationalizing corporate
rapacity as the actions of reasonable men fighting to survive in the capitalist jungle. The
New York State Chamber of Commerce cautioned the committee against mistaking the
actions of executives as mala in se when they were only mala prohibita. The Chamber
argued that criminalizing restraint of trade practices violated economic law because it
“shackle[d] the genius of this country” while also being “inconsistent with moral law” for
punishing actions that were not moral wrongs.636
Much as the robber barons of the nineteenth century did, money trust financiers
defended their character as non-criminal to rationalize their anti-regulatory politics. For
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instance, William Sherer, the manager of the New York Clearing House Association,
defended the discretion clearing-houses had to determine memberships of banks on the
grounds that “the average business man…is a person of some moral status.” He claimed
that even in the absence of regulation, abusive practices are not prevalent because
businessmen “are going to do right anyway.”637 Nonetheless, the Pujo committee’s report
recommended expanding regulations on stock exchanges, prohibiting holding multiple
directorships of competing corporations, and regulating the securities industry.638 It
influenced the design of several reforms, including the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.
Lawmakers who supported the law were quick to treat the money trust’s
monopolistic actions and attempts to restrain trade as crimes. Populist Democrats spoke
in support of the bill by deploying rhetoric of moral right. Representative Edwin Webb
(D-NC) said that the law prohibited actions that should be forbidden “in conscience.”639
Senator Lewis (D-IL) argued that anything contrary to good public policy should “be
treated as also a violation of public morals.”640 Still their colleagues drew on facets of
regulatory ideology, criticizing the bill for targeting men who should not be viewed as
criminals given their track record as upstanding members of their communities.
Representative Joseph Moore (R-PA) and Senator Albert Cummins (R-IA) argued that
637
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the Clayton law’s provisions unfairly punished “the industrious and progressive business
man” who “has lived an upright, moral, and manly life, building up a character that
should stand in his support when accused.”641 This language thus mirrored debates during
the Interstate Commerce Act. Instead of punishing bad behavior, more pro-business
legislators tried to reframe the debate to be less about whether executives did bad things
and more about whether they were “bad people.” But in the Clayton Act, it seemed that
this political reframing did not achieve the desired outcome.
The Clayton Antitrust Act was in large part based on the recommendations of the
Pujo Committee’s report. The law did not create a commission but rather clarified the
Sherman law’s provisions by prohibiting price discrimination, multiple directorships
deemed anti-competitive, and more closely monitoring acquisitions and mergers. The law
specified that if a corporation were guilty of any violation, any directors or agents who
authorized the act would be punished with a $5,000 fine and up to a year of
imprisonment. It also authorized injunctive relief for any person or firm suffering
potential losses due to a violation of the statute.642
Based on this account it appears as though the Clayton Act was a loss for the
financiers and bankers who fought regulation, given the reforms it made to the criminal
aspects of antitrust law. This story becomes more complicated upon exploring related
reforms of the early Wilson Administration. The Pujo committee claimed in its final
report that given the success of the ICC, the Clayton Act should make few clarifications
to the Sherman law and be supplemented with a new commission to identify restraint of
641
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trade practices specific to various industries.643 Thus, it opened the door to the creation of
the Federal Trade Commission. Many scholars have since outlined the numerous
loopholes in the Clayton Act, with some suggesting that the original proposal’s more
robust criminal provisions were weakened in committee because it served a strategic
purpose for Wilson by securing southern Democrats’ support for the Federal Reserve
Act.644 But it also opened the door to Brandeis’s influence in the White House, enabling
him to play a pivotal role in designing the FTC.645 While the Pujo hearings show how
elements of the financial sector failed in their efforts to oppose regulation in whole,
debates over the FTC show how Brandeis carried ideas associated with regulatory
ideology into Progressive Era policy.
The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)
The FTC Act was a response to anxieties over the money trust and an expression
of bipartisan backlash to the rule of reason in the 1911 Standard Oil decision. Businesses
feared the rule of reason would result in politically motivated enforcement, while anticorporate forces feared it limited the fight against concentration by aiming to distinguish
“efficient” from “inefficient” arrangements.646 The FTC was borne out of this conflict,
with populists insisting on an informational commission designed to prevent bigness and
Progressives favoring a strong agency to regulate natural monopolies. Ultimately,
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Brandeis’s model of regulated competition used “progressive techniques to realize
populist ends,” as Berk has argued. Regulation was used to discourage concentration,
promote competition, distinguish natural from artificial monopoly, and work with
businesses to identify industry-specific unfair trade practices.647
Berk’s research shows that through education on cost accounting, benchmarking,
and the promotion of trade monitoring, the FTC was built to enhance competition by
working with rather than against businesses. The agency promoted collaboration within
industries, encouraging companies to collectively identify effective practices for their
operations. Even though the FTC lacked the standard features of a Weberian bureaucracy,
state builders were able to construct a unique bureaucracy that attempted to redirect
destructive habits into productive ones.648 But Brandeis’s conceptualization of regulated
competition also entailed the notion that businessmen were rational and could be
monitored in ways that preempted the need for criminal sanction entirely. Thus, his
philosophy rested on a construct of corporate criminality embedded into regulatory
ideology and reflected Progressives’ inclination to protect the good businessmen from the
bad ones through milder regulation rather than invasive sanction.
Brandeis’s criticisms of trusts have often been interpreted as a strict antimonopolism. It is true that he was critical of trusts and famously condemned the way
trusts worked with investment bankers not to improve their products or engage in
647
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innovation but instead to promote consolidation.649 He insisted that there “are no natural
monopolies in the industrial world,” and said to describe monopoly as natural was
“misleading.” But he insisted that the “regulation of competition” was “essential to the
preservation of competition and to its best development.” While Brandeis was skeptical
of Progressives’ faith in the state to monitor monopolies, he argued that competition was
necessary and endorsed a “policy of regulated competition” that he said was “distinctly a
constructive policy.” Different from both minimally regulated markets and progressivestyle regulation of monopoly, Brandeis’s philosophy threaded a middle ground aiming to
encourage competition and discourage concentration.650 He was able to pursue republican
ends of anti-monopolism through a modernized administrative apparatus that appealed to
Progressives.
The FTC was thus not granted a warrant to punish unfair trade practices, but to
work with business to identify industry-specific unfair trade practices. He argued that
regulated competition would make prosecution unnecessary because the FTC would be
positive and prophylactic, preemptively identifying and monitoring restraint of trade
behaviors. This is because according to his theory, restraint of trade was not the result of
the moral faults of men in business. Rather, the industrial system encouraged men to
engage in unscrupulous practices in the name of competition. If the system could be
appropriately monitored and reformed, businessmen would never resort to criminal
activity, averting the need for prosecution entirely.
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Brandeis’s statements to the U.S. House Committee on Commerce in January and
February of 1914 make these aspects of his philosophy clear. His testimony at this
moment was enormously influential in changing the tenor of debate. Legislators had been
deadlocked over how strong the FTC should be. Most Progressives supported a strong
coercive commission, whereas Populists favored a weaker informational commission
similar to that endorsed by libertarian-leaning Taft Republicans. 651 This impasse created
an opportunity for Brandeis to walk between both views. His testimony clarifies how his
philosophy reflected a specific understanding of corporate criminality. Instead of looking
to the character of business leaders, Brandeis told the committee that “industrial crime is
not a cause, it is an effect; the effect of a bad system.” He stated that, “if we adopt a good
system, we are very apt not to have much of industrial criminality.” He suggested that the
proposed FTC should “prevent breaches of the law and not punish breaches of the law”
by “preventing the conditions which lead to the criminal tendency.”652
Brandeis’s emphasis on the commercial environment was connected to his
genuine faith in the character of businessmen. He stated that the system should be
reformed so that crime becomes “unnatural,” because business leaders “who could be
exercising their powers in the right direction…are led by a bad system to do things that
are harmful to the community.” Brandeis’s support for regulation over punishment was in
651
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part driven by this faith in the character of business leaders to be guided by a reformed
system. He stated that such men do not deserve harsh sanction, because their offenses are
“not like those cases where the offense involves a moral taint in the individual.”653 He
explicitly stated that in designing the commission, “Our aim should not be to instill fear,
but to so develop the commercial conditions that crime becomes unnatural.”654
This statement reflected a deeper concern shared by economists like Ely, Ross,
and Commons. While there were bad businessmen lowering the moral standards of
competition and structural incentives driving businessmen to engage in unethical
behavior, Brandeis and the era’s leading economists believed that most leaders of
industry were not bad people. A coercive commission that instilled fear of prosecution
into economic actors would not only discourage innovation, but also unfairly discourage
good businessmen who sought to follow the law from engaging in any kind of risk-taking
behavior. It was thus crucial that the commission did not threaten criminal sanction, but
simply worked with industry to promote efficiency and innovation.
Brandeis’s argument that the state should not punish behavior with no “moral
taint” mirrored debates about distinguishing mala in se from mala prohibita in regulatory
law. To Brandeis, unfair trade practices could be harmful to the public welfare but lacked
the stigma of other crimes. Given that he viewed competition as an ambiguous process,
he claimed competitive practices could not be labeled inherently good or bad. Rather,
competition should be encouraged so as to reap its benefits and regulated to identify,
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preempt, and limit its dangers.655 Consequently, Brandeis’s moral judgment of
businessmen’s characters was translated into a favorable legal construction of criminality
in the FTC Act. Despite walking a middle ground, he relied on a construction of
corporate criminality inherent to regulatory ideology which depicted corporate crime as
morally superior to street crime and corporate criminals as more rational and reformable
than street criminals. 656
After Brandeis’s testimony in early 1914, the idea of creating a commission with
these goals in mind reoriented the legislative debate, although some contestation did
persist. Lawmakers still disagreed over the enforcement powers of the commission, with
some Progressives demanding a strong commission and some Populists insisting on a
purely informational one. This is also not to say that after Brandeis’s testimony, ideas
about criminality became the sole determining factor in these debates. In committee
reports, legislators from the House clarified that their support for the FTC was informed
by the apparent success of Roosevelt’s more informal approach to negotiating with
business.657 Committee reports in both the House and Senate also expressed support for
the FTC based on the perceived success of the ICC, noting that a similar commission to
enforce antitrust law would have “prevented or remedied many of the abuses which have
since grown up.”658 The support for an agency also was a function of a lack of faith in the
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Department of Justice, which was still underdeveloped institutionally. Given the
Department’s “varying policies, [and] its lack of tradition, record, and precedent,” the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce concluded that “an impartial quasi judicial
tribunal similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission” would make more headway in
antitrust enforcement than criminal prosecution.659
It was clear that Brandeis was not completely successful in his efforts. He had
long contended that any notions that the FTC should resemble the ICC, which Congress
explicitly endorsed, were “delusive.”660 But in important ways, his arguments were
critical to establishing discursive parameters for legislative deliberations over the FTC’s
design. Specifically, his contention that the FTC should preemptively monitor industry so
as to make prosecution unnecessary resonated with lawmakers. This rationale was hinged
on Brandeis’s belief that businessmen generally wanted to follow the law, and thus an
agency empowered to work with industry and target industry-specific restraint of trade
actions would improve the nature of economic competition without criminal sanction.
As a result, an important question in the debates in 1914 was whether or not the
restraint of trade practices should be considered mala in se or prohibita. Pro-business
legislators and industry leaders began drawing on regulatory ideology in ways that
comported with Brandeis’s model, defending regulation of restraint of trade over
criminalization. Legislators focused on their moral judgments of executives’ character
and behavior and reached the familiar conclusion that businessmen were good people
driven to bad actions by economic circumstance and competitive markets, not personal
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pathologies. Agents of oil, gas, and steel companies pleaded with legislators to create a
commission to regulate industry without the threat of criminal sanction, promising
lawmakers that businessmen “are as anxious to square their affairs with the morality of
the time as any other class of men.”661
Senator Albert Cummins (R-IA), a member of the Chamber’s Interstate
Commerce Committee, rested his support for the FTC on a moral judgment of character
and the idea that the agency should work with rather than against businessmen. He
expressed “a confident belief that the business men of this country are honest, faithful
men” who generally “intend to obey the law.” He argued on behalf of creating a
commission to which men who “have a real desire to uphold the law” can turn to for
advice and guidance “before they are branded as criminals.” He fought against giving the
FTC powers to initiate prosecutions in restraint of trade cases, stating that “I am
unwilling that the failure to obey these regulations…shall make the men who conduct our
business affairs criminals, without consciousness of moral turpitude or moral
dereliction.”662
This was not a partisan interpretation, as Democrats expressed similar ideas.
Tennessee Senator John Shields of the Chamber’s Commerce Committee expressed his
support for the Commission by discussing the alternative of criminalization. He stated
that such an approach would make the assumption that “the business men of this country
are all engaged in fraudulent practices and conspiracies.” Shields posed the question to
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his colleagues, “Have our business men a lower standing than criminals at the bar of
justice?”663 He proceeded to endorse the mode of regulated competition rather than a
stronger commission sought by more hard line Progressives.
As with debates over the ICC, centering legislative debate on the character of
businessmen fostered favorable interpretations of their actions. If businessmen were good
people, restraint of trade actions took on new substantive meanings distinct from
traditional definitions of criminality. For example, representatives for the Columbus Steel
Castings Company told the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee that criminal
provisions would punish “people who had done things which were not considered to be
immoral in themselves.” They argued that, “it is always dangerous to attempt too closely
to define acts which, while in the absence of statutory laws are neither immoral in their
nature nor savor of criminality.”664
Pro-business lawmakers voiced similar arguments. Representative Dick Morgan
(R-OK) stated that, “our criminal laws only prohibit things which are immoral; but when
we come to prohibit things which are involved in business transactions…we are entering
not only upon a difficult but a dangerous field, dangerous to business, and very difficult
to carry out without doing more injury than good.”665 His argument lent weight to the
Brandeisian approach of creating a proactive prophylactic commission rather than a
responsive one reliant on criminal sanctions.
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The difficulties involved in enforcing the Sherman Antitrust Act in comparison to
the Interstate Commerce Act also led legislators to conclude that a commission was
preferable to granting prosecutorial authority to the Department of Justice. Given its lack
of institutional capacity to crack down on corporate lawbreakers, many called into
question the notion that corporate behavior should be monitored criminally at all. As one
lawmaker said, the Sherman Antitrust Act “is a mere economic statute and not a moral
one,” rendering criminal prosecution inappropriate.666
As Brandeis did, legislators believed that businessmen were honorable people
whose actions should not be considered crimes or mala in se. Therefore, they viewed the
FTC as a prophylactic instrument that would improve business competition and economic
health without threatening to prosecute honest businessmen. The House Interstate
Commerce Committee concluded that the FTC will produce “an elevated business
standard” and “better business stability” since it was not designed to be punitive.667 The
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce similarly concluded that the FTC would
“promote fair competition,” but only because it was designed to be “persuasive and
corrective rather than punitive so far as well-intentioned business is concerned.”668 The
Commission was designed explicitly to not be punitive so as to avoid catching wellintentioned businesses in its grasp while improving the moral behavior of the most
unscrupulous.
Brandeis successfully articulated his approach during an opportune political
moment. With a Democrat in the White House, he had a political ally who shared his
666
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distaste for monopoly while also identifying as a progressive. But Wilson did not secure a
majority of the popular vote—with populist Democrats favoring a weak commission, Taft
Republicans demanding an informational one, and Progressives insisting on a coercive
agency, a commission could only be created through compromise. By empowering a
progressive-style commission to attain the ends pursued by anti-monopolists, Brandeis’s
proposal had enough broad political appeal to secure passage.
Brandeis’s model rested on a conceptualization of corporate criminality that was a
core part of the regulatory ideology that emerged in the late nineteenth century. But in an
evolving social science milieu where economists amassed credibility and a developing
political economy in which finance became dominant, regulatory ideology had to be
transmitted and articulated differently in the early twentieth century. When financiers
replicated the strategy used by railroads in the ICA debate during the Pujo hearings, it
backfired and generated an anti-corporate media frenzy in a political milieu constantly
skeptical of concentrated corporate power. But regulatory ideology had begun to evolve
into a durable governing ideology, even being picked up by corporate opponents like
Brandeis in new and innovate ways that meshed with the drift of Progressive Era politics.
When Brandeis incorporated regulatory ideology into his model of regulated competition,
he repackaged it in a way that had appeal to Populists and Progressives of varying
ideologies.
This underscores why it is essential to assess business-government relations
within an analysis of the political economy’s development, tracing how different sectors
of industry become more powerful and take leading roles in policymaking. Financiers
and bankers, not railroads, were the primary carriers of ideas related to regulatory
252

ideology and corporate criminality in the early twentieth century. They also were not
entirely successful in their initial attempts to counteract anti-corporate sentiment, given
the explosive findings of the Pujo hearings and passage of the Clayton Act. A more
favorable outcome only came when Brandeis repackaged regulatory ideology into a
political agenda that appealed to diverse factions of Progressives, highlighting once again
that business cannot unilaterally move policy without paying attention to prevailing
discourses.
V. The Political Construction of Corporate Criminal Liability
Progressives grappled with multiple questions inherited from Gilded Age debates.
A primary one concerned corporate criminal liability, the doctrine that corporate entities
should be punished criminally for the actions of their agents. Chapter three traced how
railroad managers defended corporate liability as a practical alternative to individual
liability in the final decade of the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, these
debates produced policies that inform American corporate law to this day. The doctrine
of corporate criminal liability, which crystallized between 1903 and 1909, made it harder
to conceptualize corporate crime as a function of innate pathologies and created
difficulties in attributing blame and intent to corporate entities. Historically, corporate
criminal liability has been an ineffective mechanism to rein in corporate abuse.669
Progressives generally embraced the real entity theory of the corporation, the idea
that the corporation is “a real and natural entity whose existence is prior to and separate
from the state.”670 Ernest Freund was one of the earliest individuals to attribute a
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personality to the corporation, calling it his “organic theory.”671 Real entity theory was
both ontological and prescriptive; it minimized the supervisory role of the state because
the corporation possessed its own authority and distinctive personality resembling that of
a natural human. Therefore, it deserved the autonomy rights afforded to individuals.672
There was some contention among Progressives as to whether the corporation
could or should be considered a person. John Dewey argued that corporate personhood
doctrine was used inconsistently, while others like Thorsen Veblen and John Commons
rejected neoclassical theory in favor of sociological accounts of market behavior. Leftist
Progressives claimed real entity theory could hold capital accountable and empower
unions. By treating corporations as moral communities with autonomy rights, the state
could require them to act in civically responsible ways, and corporate criminal liability
could hold business accountable for harmful behavior. But the theory also had libertarian
appeal since treating corporations as autonomous entities granted them the same legal
protections as human individuals, legitimating anti-regulatory politics.673
The rise of corporate criminal liability occurred within this context of political
contestation, and its development was more complicated than most accounts suggest. The
doctrine’s origins are often dated to the Supreme Court’s 1909 ruling in New York
Central and Hudson River Railroad v. U.S., which held that corporations could be held
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criminally responsible for their agents’ actions.674 Scholars typically attribute the ruling
to organic developments in the common law.675 This misses how the doctrine’s
emergence was contingent on historically specific circumstances. This analysis departs
from extant accounts of corporate criminal liability by studying the Elkins Act of 1903, in
which Congress reformed the ICA to make interstate carriers criminally liable for their
employees’ actions.
It is true that the common law provided a foundation for criminally punishing
corporations. Through the seventeenth century, English courts concluded that
corporations could commit crimes of nonfeasance—failures to prevent certain acts or
perform specific jobs—but not crimes that involved positive legal violations. This
evolved out of case law holding governmental units responsible for not maintaining
roads, canals, and waterways as failures to prevent public nuisances. In the early
nineteenth century, U.S. courts began recognizing corporations as capable of committing
crimes of nonfeasance, but rarely for positive legal violations. This kept liability confined
to a small class of crime while laying a basis for a broader principle of liability.676
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Liability rules changed significantly as large corporations emerged in the late
nineteenth century. Still, judges remained hesitant to attribute liability to corporations
given the difficulties inherent in identifying a corporate mens rea, or guilty state of
mind.677 Convictions of corporations were generally for crimes of nonfeasance not
entailing proof of intent. But through the 1880s and 1890s, prosecutors began to more
frequently initiate prosecutions against corporations for negligence, internal revenue
infractions, and other violations requiring proof of intent.678
In the decision New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. v. U.S. (1909),
the Supreme Court applied corporate criminal liability to all crimes. In the case, the New
York Central and Hudson River Railroad challenged the constitutionality of the 1903
Elkins Act, which declared that railroad corporations could be held criminally responsible
for agents who granted or sought rebates. The Court took the concept of respondeat
superior governing civil law—the notion that employers could be held responsible for
employees’ actions performed within the course of their jobs—and applied it to crimes.
This vicariously imputed liability for agents’ behavior to the corporation, expanding the
reach of the law to crimes requiring proof of mens rea.679
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The consensus among legal scholars and historians is that the 1909 decision was a
natural outgrowth of the common law.680 These accounts are typically plagued by two
faults. First, if this explanation is correct, then the U.K. and other common law nations
should rely on a similarly robust form of corporate liability that developed along a
somewhat comparable timeline. But most other common-law nations were far slower to
embrace the doctrine and have done so in a more limited fashion.681 Second, scholars
typically overemphasize the import of New York Central and the role of judicial agency
in shaping the doctrine.682
The Elkins Act of 1903 is an understudied piece of this story that sheds light on
why Congress imputed criminal liability for rebating to railroad corporations. Tracing
debates over the law highlights how the relationships between the ICC, Congress, and
railroads shaped the legislation. Debates over criminalizing rebates occurred primarily
before Congress and the ICC, and railroad managers convinced members of Congress
and the ICC that corporate liability was the most pragmatic option for punishing railroad
crime. By the time the Supreme Court ruled on the question, alternatives to entity liability
had been effectively discredited by railroads in these other institutional venues.
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The Elkins Act amended the ICA by imposing a criminal fine of $20,000 on
corporations that offered rebates to shippers.683 As reviewed in chapter three, ICC reports
showed that enhanced punishments for rebating were supported by railroads hostile to
shippers that coerced them into granting rebates. With support from President Roosevelt,
Attorney General Philander Knox, and railroads, the Act passed almost unanimously over
concerns that eliminating imprisonment would leave the law ineffective.684
The ICC’s annual reports greatly influenced debate over the Elkins Act. The
House Commerce Committee’s first report on the bill directly cited the ICC reports
reviewed in chapter three, in which the commission argued that corporations should be
criminally punished in lieu of individuals. The first page noted that punishing agents
instead of corporations “prevented the enforcement of the law.”685
The report extensively quoted ICC Chairman Martin Knapp’s statements before
the committee. Knapp told the House Committee that the ICA was inadequate in two
respects. First, “the corporation carrier is not liable, but only the officer, agent or
representative.” Knapp claimed that the “officials of that grade which participates
actually in transactions of this kind are a sort of fraternity” and are resistant to provide
evidence that could “inflict punishment and suffering upon some friend or send some
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associate to jail.” He argued that the individual who gets indicted is almost always “a
subordinate, a clerk carrying out the implied if not expressed order of his superiors.” 686
Knapp stated that he found rebating to involve “a very high degree of moral
turpitude.” However, because of the interpersonal dynamics among railway employees,
he claimed that, “punishment by imprisonment instead of being an aid is a hindrance.” He
concluded if the response to incriminating evidence were to punish the corporation via a
fine rather than prosecute an individual agent, railroad managers “would not hesitate to
furnish the proof and would actively engage in the prosecution.”687
Joseph Fifer, another ICC commissioner, employed arguments mirroring the
legislative debates over the ICA. He claimed that the behaviors targeted by the Interstate
Commerce law only violated statutory law, but no moral principles. He stated that,
[T]hese violations are what the law calls malum prohibita, and I care not what
certain individuals may think of it, mankind generally holds that the same moral
turpitude does not attach to an act of that kind as does to a crime, which is malum
in se, such as burglary and larceny, crimes in the absence of all law.688
Claiming that railroads’ crimes were only malum prohibita allowed Fifer to distinguish
these behaviors from traditional constructs of criminality. When confronted by
Representative Stewart, who asked, “Do you not think that in the form of malum
prohibita these railroad corporations commit greater offenses than highway robbery,
which, you say, is malum in se?” Fifer responded that these offenses “a short time ago
686
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were no offenses at all” and that the individuals targeted “have friends…[and] standing in
the community.”689 Fifer’s comments drew a sharp distinction between street and
corporate criminals. He defused concerns about whether railroad executives did bad
things by arguing that they were not bad people. This highlights how prevailing
discourses produced distinctive political understandings of street and corporate
criminality that persisted over time.
As chapter three showed, after hearing extensive testimony from railway
managers, the ICC concluded that the criminal provisions of the ICA were inadequate. Its
1903 report thus expressed clear support for the basic features of the Elkins law.
According to the ICC, directing liability onto the corporation “corrected a defect which
has been explained in previous reports, because [the law] gave immunity to the principal
and beneficiary of a guilty transaction.”690 Debate over the bill was brief and it passed
over concerns that punishing individuals was necessary for the purposes of promoting fair
outcomes or providing deterrence.691
When the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad challenged the Elkins
law in 1909, the company fought against the imputation of liability to the corporation. It
asserted that fining a corporation for a crime committed by individuals amounts to
“[taking] the property of every stockholder” and “destroys the presumption of innocence”
for common carriers. The railroad’s counsel argued that the “presumption of innocence
689
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prevails alike whether the defendant in a criminal prosecution be a corporation or an
individual.” It claimed that in order to secure convictions without adequate evidence,
“recourse was had to legislation introducing civil analogies into the criminal law,”
referencing the use of respondeat superior doctrine.692
The state responded that, “no railway corporation can ever be legally punished”
for rebating if conviction required proof of a director’s involvement, rendering corporate
liability the only feasible means of punishment. The state called the corporation “the real
offender” and claimed that it would be “anomalous and unjust” to punish agents. The
state’s brief cited committee reports, congressional debates and testimony, and annual
reports from the ICC indicating that the Elkins legislation “was aimed at the corporate
carriers because no [alternatives] practically existed.” The government noted that during
the sixteen years between the ICA and Elkins Act, “no single successful prosecution
[was] waged against a malefactor” because “the close relations that existed prevented one
member of that class from testifying against his fellows.” The state thus defended
corporate liability to cases involving mens rea as a practical necessity, stating that, “We
think that a corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses of which a specific
intent may be a necessary element. There is no more difficulty in imputing to a
corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings than in civil.”693 The Court reasoned
that corporations were the most direct beneficiaries of rebates.
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The Court drew repeatedly on the annual reports of the ICC as evidence that
corporate criminal liability was its only feasible option. Justice Day wrote in the majority
that the futility of punishing individuals was “developed in more than one report of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, [and] was no doubt influential in bringing about the
enactment of the Elkins Law, making corporations criminally liable.” The Court
concluded that to reject the doctrine “would virtually take away the only means of
effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at it.”694
While the decision did reflect trends in common law, it was also contingent on
political circumstance. The popularity of real entity theory shaped the political context in
which the Justices argued that corporations could be attributed a mens rea. Concerns that
shaped the ICA’s initial design and questions over whether executives were fully
“criminal” carried into these debates. And the ideas and ideologies railroads articulated
before Congress and ICC shaped how the Court ruled on the question by giving the
Justices congressional and commission documents to cite when writing the decision.
In the wake of New York Central, corporations devised multiple strategies to
avoid punishment. Businesses routinely emphasized the complexity of the corporate form
and their good-faith efforts to prevent wrongdoing through internal compliance rules as
defenses for crime. Many judges showed mercy when they believed corporations
exhibited due diligence to avoid wrongdoing. Arguments emphasizing due diligence, the
complexity of business, and the 14th amendment rights of corporations limited the impact
of New York Central in its immediate aftermath.695
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Literature painting the New York Central decision as an outgrowth of common
law ignores this longer developmental history. In this light, it becomes clearer that the
question posed to the Court in New York Central was an artificial binary. In only
considering whether the state should prosecute corporations or individuals, some scholars
have noted that the Court failed to consider a third option—to impose civil liability
against corporations and criminal liability against individuals in cases of corporate
crime.696 But scholarship misses that this binary was dictated by how railroads framed
debates over the course of two decades preceding the ruling. Railway managers’
testimonies provided Congress, the Court, and the ICC with a choice between two
options, obscuring alternatives that could have been considered and framing the debate
on terms favorable to the railway industry.
What emerged from New York Central was a construction of the corporate
criminal entity rather than the corporate criminal person. This contrasted the natural
criminal targeted by the criminal justice system, made it harder to conceptualize street
and corporate criminality in comparable terms, and hardened the idea that corporate
crimes lacked the moral stain of street crimes. Scholars have argued, however, that
criminal businesses actually behave with far less morality than street-level offenders.
Corporate entities often exhibit a willingness to break or bend legal and moral rules to
pursue the goal of profit maximization. This has become so commonplace that Joel
Bakan has argued that corporations are “dangerously psychopathic entities.”697
In spite of this, the state has not demonstrated a consistent concern with corporate
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social responsibility. In many ways, the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case Dodge v.
Ford helped to legitimate a normative discourse that the primary purpose of corporations
is to maximize value for shareholders, even if it means pushing the boundaries of the law.
The case involved a lawsuit between Henry Ford and the Dodge brothers, and it
articulated the notion that corporations should prioritize shareholder profit maximization
over the interests of customers, workers, and communities. This symbolized an
acceptance of potentially unethical behavior as part of the corporation’s legal obligations.
Henry Ford was never viewed as a stereotypical robber baron. He publicly praised
the virtues of the common man, earning him an image as a compassionate businessman
concerned with the working class. But this was a strategic ploy, as Ford regularly framed
his competitive choices as benevolent ones, enabling him to build his empire, cut costs,
and increase efficiency while maintaining support from his workers.698 Thus in 1916, he
presented a decision to limit dividends to shareholders (despite a cash surplus) as part of
a strategy to build better cars, a new factory, and pay higher wages.
The Dodge brothers, minority investors in the company, were displeased at the
decision and demanded that part of the surplus be distributed as dividends. Ford rebuffed
them, as he was hostile to the meddling of shareholders in his decision-making and aware
that the Dodges planned to use the payout to start a rival firm. In 1917, the Dodge
brothers filed suit to compel the distribution of dividends and secure an injunction
forbidding the construction of the new factory. They argued that Ford’s desire to build a
factory made no business sense because it was founded on a flawed logic that the firm
698
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was primarily a means of doing social good and that profit-making was its secondary
purpose. Ford stood his ground, responding that a business’s purpose should only
“incidentally [be] to make money.”699
The Michigan Supreme Court denied the injunction but mandated the payment of
dividends. Using specious mathematical analysis, the court reasoned that Ford’s new
factory would not increase the corporation’s profits. They then chastised Ford for
pursuing philanthropic goals over profit-maximization, writing that,
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to
the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.700
This principle not only tolerates but endorses the promotion of questionable ethical
incentives. The ruling indicates that if an executive testifies that a corporation’s decisions
were unrelated to shareholder profits, they will lose legal challenges to those actions. But
if executives claim that those actions were made in the pursuit of shareholder value, they
will win. The principle protects any behavior as long as it is justified in terms of pursuing
profit maximization.701 The court was less concerned with Ford’s actions than his
motives and prioritized the pursuit of profit while making protection of the competitive
ideal the primary goal of regulation.702
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The significance of the Dodge decision is contested among scholars. Some argue
that the decision is “bad law” and “a doctrinal oddity.” Lynn Stout argues that the
decision’s significance is that it embodies the normative discourse about the proper
purpose of the corporation. Others claim that the decision identified profit maximization
as a primary goal, but not the primary goal of business. 703 Still others argue that the
decision stands as accurate, reasoning that under corporate law, directors and executives
are required to maximize shareholder value.704
Regardless of the ruling’s legal sway or immediate effect, its impact has been to
legitimate a normative discourse in which the corporation’s best interests are linked to
profit maximization. This has had destructive effects on labor relations by prioritizing
corporate profiteering over wage expansion, infrastructure improvements, and worker
safety.705 And despite emerging from the Michigan Supreme Court rather than the U.S.
Supreme Court, the ruling in Dodge is more than a piece of trivia. Contemporary court
rulings and recent reports from legal organizations like the American Law Institute reflect
the principle articulated in the case, and activist investors today often insist that profit
maximization is the corporation’s primary goal in order to secure dividends and share
buybacks from companies in lieu of long-term investments in wages and infrastructure.706
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The principle in Dodge effectively outlawed prioritizing corporate social
responsibility over profit-maximization, and by the 1920s, the legal construction of the
corporate criminal made for a notable contrast to the image of the street criminal.
Corporate entities were legally and morally directed to pursue profit-maximization over
social responsibility, workers’ rights, and consumers’ interests. With a different ethical
mandate and without any identifiable pathological contributors to crime, the
anthropomorphized corporate criminal was a near total inversion of the natural criminal.
VI. Conclusion: The Political Development of Corporate Crime Politics in the 1920s
Samuel Untermeyer wrote in 1914, that, “[t]he corporate form is a mere shield
behind which the individual acts. The now trite saying that guilt is personal should be
written into every line of the law.”707 As crime politics took a turn in the 1920s,
Untermeyer’s statement proved prescient. State crime commissions emphasized street
crimes committed by individuals, largely neglecting the varieties of crime committed by
corporate entities. In this sense, the corporate form literally acted as a shield for
individuals within corporations not only from criminal prosecution, but also from the
attention of observers of the criminal justice system.
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Often funded by local businesses, it is unsurprising that none of the crime
commission reports of the 1920s significantly addressed corporate crime. The Missouri
and Illinois surveys each included a few passing references to antitrust cases in
comparison to the pages on psychological or eugenic theories of crime.708 Part II of the
Illinois report included twenty pages on racketeering in comparison to well over 200
pages on juvenile delinquents, violent offenders, and the “deranged or defective
delinquent.” The emphasis on the focal individual as the object of crime control, a legacy
of the Lombrosian shift in criminology, obscured conceptions of corporate crime that
emerged in the Progressive Era. This laid the foundation for the Wickersham
Commission and the federal crime politics of the 1930s to focus on street criminals.
Combined with increased reliance on due diligence and 14th amendment
protections, corporate entities were increasingly able to evade punishment in the 1920s.
Courts responsible for enforcing New York Central were reluctant to apply a strict
interpretation of vicarious liability and expressed sympathy with the realities of business
operations and the complexity of the corporate form. Accepting corporations’ arguments
about good-faith compliance efforts and due diligence, the doctrine of corporate criminal
liability had little value to regulators in the 1920s.709
As Braithwaite and Fisse have noted, American criminal law exhibits a bizarre
contradiction. It embraces the individualistic nature of American political culture but

708

Missouri Association for Criminal Justice and Thompson, The Missouri Crime Survey, 118; Illinois
Association for Criminal Justice and Chicago Crime Commission, The Illinois Crime Survey, 980–86,
1093.
709
Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 17–20.
268

allows for corporate responsibility for crime.710 This incongruity becomes clear when
contrasting the emergence of corporate criminal liability with prevailing trends in the
criminal law at the time of its development, which included an emphasis on the
rehabilitative ideal, individualizing sentencing to the offender, and eugenics justice. This
highlights a basic reality of American corporate law—the doctrine of corporate criminal
liability is uncomfortably situated within a justice system that emphasizes free will,
criminal intent, and the individualization of sentencing to the personal traits of offenders.
By the 1920s, it became clear that Progressives had overestimated the will and
power of the state to regulate corporations. Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover all
pursued revived brands of laissez-faire.711 Appointments to the FTC favored informal
compliance agreements and information provision became the agency’s primary activity.
Particularly, William Ewart Humphrey’s term as chair of the FTC during the Coolidge
Administration earned the FTC the approval of big business and the ire of
Progressives.712 Even in his positive account of the FTC, Gerald Berk notes that the
regulated competition model suffered setbacks in the 1920s. While the regulated
competition model was not destroyed, the FTC’s most robust powers were significantly
checked. In a series of rulings, most notably FTC v. Gratz in 1920, the Supreme Court
decided that courts, not the FTC, had the authority to determine the scope of unfair
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methods in competition. This limited the FTC to policing practices already illegal in
common law but nothing else practiced in trade.713
The ideational and ideological tides of progressivism facilitated developments to
regulatory and legal institutions that reflected particular constructs of corporate
criminality. Progressives’ endorsement of real entity theory culminated in a doctrine of
corporate liability that exists awkwardly within a justice system designed to punish the
individual. Progressives’ faith in the character of businessmen also led to the creation of
an agency designed to work with rather than against business. Facilitating cooperation
and collaboration between the state and industry was a worthwhile and admirable pursuit.
It reflected the Progressive perspective that markets were inefficient and that an expertadministered state apparatus would effectively sort out and reform bad businessmen
rather than letting them reduce the general competitive ethics of markets.
The problem with the FTC’s design can be conceptualized on Braithwaite and
Ayres’ responsive regulation pyramid. Without the threat of stronger interventions in
extreme cases, businesses have little incentive to abide by milder cooperative
sanctions. 714 The FTC was explicitly designed without the power to initiate prosecutions,
and after the Supreme Court deprived the FTC of what coercive powers it was granted,
the Commission’s capacity for deterrence was severely compromised. By adopting the
perspective that good businessmen needed to be protected from the bad ones—not that
the public needed protection from predatory capitalism—the architects of the FTC left it
without any real power to deter criminality and rendered it vulnerable to cooptation by
713
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business. Worried about discouraging innovation and risk-taking, legislators left the FTC
without any strong enforcement powers, limiting the regulated competition model’s
success as an alternative to the laissez-faire dynamics of Gilded Age capitalism.
The investment environment of the 1920s enabled bigger banks to grow in cities,
and industrial concentration became commonplace. A massive growth in securities
ownership through the 1920s was driven by businesses that became reliant on securities
for short-term financial needs and by growing public demand. With massive profits to be
had in underwriting and securities distribution, there was a decline in banking judgment,
ethics, and an exploitation of the public that laid the basis for the market collapse of
1929.715 The tools the state inherited from the Gilded Age and Progressive Era offered
regulators and lawmakers little ammunition for cracking down on the abuses and
negligence that caused the Great Depression. Unwieldy doctrines of corporate liability
and administrative agencies with meaningful regulatory but weak disciplinary powers
offered few mechanisms for responding to the crisis. Having drawn from a regulatory
ideology rooted in economics and Darwinism, lawmakers of the early twentieth century
articulated unique constructions of corporate criminality that gave the state little reason to
be attentive to corporate crime and a limited capacity to respond to it when it was found.
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CHAPTER 6: SOLIDIFYING THE CLASS-CRIME NEXUS: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW DEAL
“Individualization is the root of adequate penal treatment and the proper basis of parole.”
- The Wickersham Crime Commission, 1931716
The New Deal has been described by Jefferson Cowie as the “great exception” of
American politics, one in which the state used its resources to benefit working Americans
in ways that it never did before and has not since.717 Complementing this account of the
period is John Hagan, whose book Who Are the Criminals? argues that crime politics and
criminological theories during the New Deal era were characterized by progressive
impulses that produced relatively benevolent and equitable crime policy.718 He concludes
that from the 1930s through 1970s, U.S. crime policy reflected the reformist and
enlightened political discourse associated with the New Deal regime.
The reality of New Deal era crime politics is more complex than these narratives
suggest. It is true that intellectual developments in criminological theory in the early
1930s marked a significant break from earlier trends. Scholars like Robert Merton,
Clifford Shaw, and Henry McKay emphasized how crime was linked to social and
economic relations and the structural dynamics of the American political economy. But
the conclusion that their ideas contributed to a new kind of crime politics is the product of
a hasty analysis of political developments during the New Deal and postwar years.
While the New Deal witnessed the development of robust redistributive and social
welfare policy, the crime politics of the New Deal and postwar period followed a

716

U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Penal Institutions,
Probation, and Parole, 9 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 172.
Cowie, The Great Exception.
Hagan, Who Are the Criminals?
272
717
718

different trajectory. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, there was a
resurgent interest in the rehabilitation and individualized treatment of offenders. While
new developments in criminology were heard and appreciated by policymakers from the
1930s through 1960s, those new ideas were channeled into rehabilitative frameworks.
This changed the meanings of these ideas. The individualistic and deterministic basis of
rehabilitative ideology modified theories linking social and economic inequality to crime
in ways that reaffirmed a class-skewed construct of criminality. Whereas scholars
connected crime to poverty’s structural roots, once their ideas were reinterpreted through
the lens of rehabilitation, poverty was viewed as an individual trait correlated with crime
that required an individualized rehabilitative solution. This robbed the crime theories of
the New Deal of their most profound insights, dismissed the links they proposed between
criminality and structural economic factors, and detached them from demands for
political economic reform as a way to address crime.
The window of opportunity for potentially radical ideas about crime to reshape
policy during this period was narrow. Merton, Shaw, and McKay wrote in the early
1930s in the immediate wake of the Depression, but through the 1930s and 1940s,
political and economic discourse changed in ways that eschewed the Roosevelt regime’s
collectivist and redistributive instincts in favor of a politics that promoted private
consumption and compensatory policies to drive economic growth and correct for
inequality. Developments in crime theory followed suit. Scholars who followed in the
footsteps of Merton, Shaw, and McKay abandoned their predecessors’ macro-level
emphases on the political economy in favor of a narrow focus on the atomized individual.
As rehabilitative logic predominated crime discourse, crime scholarship’s emphasis on
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the individual fed into a politics of individualized treatment that brought a familiarity
duality—reformation for those who can change and punishment for those who cannot.
Changes in criminological thought were thus not central drivers of development
in the mid-twentieth century. Rather, the institutional makeup of the criminal justice
system reshaped the era’s crime theories in ways that deprived them of their urgency and
most radical implications. This can only be understood upon recognizing how political
actors were operating within an institutional context imbued with certain practices and
premises related to rehabilitative ideology. The indeterminate sentence, parole and
probation, and sentencing individualization had become core features of the justice
system by the 1930s. This institutional terrain kept policymakers tied to a governing
ideology in which rehabilitation and individualized treatment were the axiomatic and
unquestioned goals of the justice system. Even absent explicit biological ideologies, ideas
about incorrigibility and innate criminal dispositions were still embedded into these
practices and institutions. Interpreting social-structural theories of criminality through a
rehabilitative lens modified them to be consistent with rehabilitative ideology’s
individualistic and deterministic orientation.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, policymakers constructed key
features of the American criminal justice system by drawing from an ideational pool in
which criminal anthropology, evolutionary theory, Social Darwinism, and eugenics
dominated. These ideas became embedded into the institutional machinery of the justice
system through rehabilitative reforms. In the New Deal and postwar eras, this
institutional context interacted with an evolving alignment of political forces and kept
policymakers tied to the principles of rehabilitative ideology. Lawmakers remained
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connected to a durable class ideology of rehabilitation and its deterministic assumptions
even though they did not endorse biological ideas about crime. The institutional
arrangement of the criminal justice system, and the ideologies embedded into it, ensured
that there was a limited “New Deal” when it came to criminology.
Section I reviews literature exploring the shifting political currents of the 1930s
through 1960s, showing how the redistributive and collectivist politics of the 1930s was
in retreat by the late 1930s and how the New Deal regime’s political commitments had
changed by the 1940s. The section also reviews literature on simultaneous developments
in crime politics during these years, demonstrating how they reflected these discursive
shifts. Section II analyzes constructions of criminality in 1930s scholarship, which
marked a meaningful break from earlier crime theories by emphasizing class relations.
But through the 1940s and 1950s, crime theory evolved to reflect concurrent shifts in
political and economic discourse by refocusing on micro- rather than macro-level factors.
Section III explores how ideas of criminality traveled into politics through the
Wickersham Crime Commission. The Commission’s reports reveal how political powerholders reinterpreted the structural crime theories of the New Deal in ways that deprived
them of their political economic implications. The Commission linked these new theories
to constructions of the individual criminal, rehabilitative goals, and the individualized
treatment to offenders, not social and economic reform. Section IV reviews the spread of
individualized treatment models of punishment from the 1940s through 1960s. An
analysis of the constitutional validation of indeterminate sentencing, changes in deferred
prosecution programs, and the spread of habitual offender laws illustrate how
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rehabilitative ideology served as a framework that extinguished any potential to link
crime to structural dynamics in crime politics.
I. Fluctuations in New Deal Politics
Scholarship exploring the New Deal often depicts the period as marking the
arrival of the regulated, industrialized, democratic state that Progressives long sought. In
this account, a liberal consensus emerged after the Great Depression that the state could
and should actively redistribute wealth. Scholars in this vein claim that the New Deal’s
regulatory and welfarist measures rationalized the economy, pulled the nation out of
depression, and reshaped the future of U.S. domestic policy.719
Many scholars have challenged this narrative. Some suggest that the New Deal’s
greatest successes were transient and reversed by corporate interests in the latter half of
the twentieth century.720 Building on power elite theory, new left historians have argued
that the New Deal regime propped up capitalism from its beginnings and was driven by
businesses to serve their interests.721 Also emphasizing the New Deal’s illiberal features
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are historical institutionalists who have outlined the ways Roosevelt’s coalition excluded
blacks, immigrants, and women from its promises of social generosity while advocating
for facially egalitarian policies that institutionalized status distinctions.722 And the New
Deal has critics on the right who, in the tradition of Hayek and Friedman, argue that the
Roosevelt Administration undermined American values and aggravated the depression.723
Often, this literature defines the New Deal period as encompassing many years or
even decades. For instance, John Hagan’s account defines the New Deal as spanning
from 1933 to 1973. A perspective that eschews generalizations across the New Deal, Fair
Deal, and Great Society highlights the coalition’s fluidity, shifting political commitments,
and accommodations with conservatives and corporations. This complements work by
scholars who have exposed shifts in New Deal liberalism in the 1940s and 1950s.724
Outlining the political currents of the New Deal and the regime’s ideological evolution
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provides a foundation for understanding changes in crime politics from the 1930s through
1960s.
The Shifting Political Currents of the New Deal
Jefferson Cowie describes the New Deal as a historical blip, calling the class
realignments of the era a short-lived product of circumstance and its social initiatives
fleeting experiments in redistributive policy.725 The New Deal coalition never fully
transformed American political culture, as it left in place Jim Crow laws to accommodate
its southern bloc, ignored the demands of women and immigrants, and struggled to
organize labor in the South.726 The coalition’s political commitments and policy
successes ultimately promoted a working-class liberalism that defined workers as nativeborn Anglo-Saxon men. The New Deal can be broadly periodized into four phases—the
first New Deal from 1933-35, when FDR’s initial policies either failed or were
reactionary policies to keep the economy afloat; the second New Deal from 1935-1937
when liberals pursued a cohesive Keynesian vision; retreat from 1937 through 1945 in
the wake of a recession and war; and a postwar period driven by a moderate
Keynesianism shaped by organized business groups like the Chamber of Commerce
(COC), National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and Committee for Economic
Development (CED).727
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The choices of the first New Deal were relatively conservative and driven by an
imperative to prop up the economy. The NIRA, the core of the first New Deal, essentially
legalized the cartelization of the economy and freed industry from antitrust actions until it
was invalidated by the Supreme Court. Pillars of financial law including the GlassSteagall Act, Securities Act, and Securities Exchange Act were written with help from
investment bankers and capital-intensive industries to keep the economy stable.728 The
second New Deal was more redistributive as cornerstones of social welfare policy
including the National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) and Social Security Act
were passed.729 But the New Deal found itself in retreat its third phase when Roosevelt
charted a new pump priming approach to economic management in 1937. Insistent on a
return to fiscal orthodoxy, he cut public investment and shrank the money supply to
balance the budget, which prompted a recession. In response, southern conservatives and
Wall Street moderates coalesced and solidified their opposition to the New Deal after
1937.730 Most scholars describe the postwar version of Keynesian theory that emerged in
the New Deal’s fourth phase as “commercial Keynesianism,” a brand of thought pushed
by corporations and conservatives. Unlike social democratic Keynesianism, it enjoyed
greater support from private enterprise and was reliant on monetary policy and taxation to
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promote growth. A bipartisan persuasion, commercial Keynesianism encouraged the state
to back away from commitments to social welfare and public investment.731
After the war revitalized popular faith in capitalism, advocates of social
democratic Keynesianism began to lose debates to corporate Keynesians. Their politics
robbed social-democratic political impulses of their urgency while fusing social welfare
to a vision of sustained economic growth. Social and economic policy became less about
providing security to the working class and more about turning “forgotten men” into a
mass of consumers with the requisite purchasing power to drive economic growth.732 By
1945, New Deal liberalism bore little resemblance to the first or second New Deal.
Demands for redistributive policy were replaced by compensatory policies favorable to
capitalism.733 Redistribution was dismissed as a hindrance to growth, and increasing the
consumptive and productive power of individuals was the state’s goal rather than
promoting a communal social democratic vision.734 The shift to commercial
Keynesianism left the state with tools that could only redress imbalances in the private
economy, limited the state’s capacity to challenge capitalist structures, and made state
spending a means to promote consumption rather than provide economic security.
In this context, anything that smacked of social democratic Keynesianism was
quieted. For instance, the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), created in 1939,
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was designated during the war to study avenues for economic conversion in the postwar
years. But the Board’s 1943 publication Security, Work, and Relief Policies rattled
conservatives. It favored progressive taxation to fund public works projects and welfare
initiatives and outlined a social democratic benefits program that was incorporated into
an “economic bill of rights” in Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union. Conservatives
promptly disbanded the NRPB in the wake of the speech.735 This was followed up with
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which limited organized labor to collective
bargaining and legislative derailment as its only strategies to fight for social rights.736
By the 1960s, the labor movement’s third-party pretensions had been suppressed
as labor became an interest group rather a basis for a social or political movement.737
Since questions of class relations were reoriented to interest group politics in the 1940s, a
social democratic politics was impossible to achieve during the Great Society. The Great
Society conceived poverty as a matter of race rather than class relations, promoted selfimprovement to integrate the poor into the economy, and resisted redistribution as a
solution to inequality. This politics accepted a complacent Keynesianism that did not
challenge the class compromise of the 1940s.738 It instead relied on a Jeffersonian
individualism emphasizing rights and individual improvement to promote equality.739
The developments of 1940s reshaped New Deal liberalism into the 1960s.
Although Democrats used the term “liberal” as tactical cover to discuss collective rights
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by tying their politics to nineteenth century individualism, the collective economic vision
of the New Dealers was resituated under the rubric of individual liberty by the 1940s.740
The Evolution of New Deal Crime Politics
In 1934, Franklin Roosevelt became the first president to use the “war on crime”
metaphor. Speaking at a national conference, he stated that Americans must constantly
protect themselves against “the lawless and the criminal elements of our population.”741
For many reasons, crime became a prominent national political issue in the 1930s.
Politically savvy policymakers including Roosevelt, his Attorney General Homer
Cummings, and the head of the Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover politicized crime
to their benefit. Crime was also legitimized as a national issue by the Wickersham
Commission. Coming out of the “age of the crime commission” in the 1920s, President
Herbert Hoover appointed a National Crime Commission in 1929. Called the
Wickersham Commission for its chairperson George Wickersham, the Commission’s
final reports explored various questions of criminal behavior, crime policy, and statistics
while legitimating an increased role for the federal government in crime control.742
John Hagan has argued that the socially progressive shifts of New Deal politics
were reflected in crime theory and policy from the 1930s through 1970s.743 Hagan’s
analysis of the core claims of prevailing criminological theories during these decades is
thorough and accurate, but there are several problems with his argument. First is an
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oversimplified periodization scheme that overlooks shifts in political thought in the
1940s. Explanations of criminality and crime politics moved from emphasizing socialstructural factors in the 1930s to the individual in the 1940s, mirroring broader shifts in
political and economic thought. Further, Hagan misunderstands how these new ideas
operated within preexisting institutional contexts. The social-structural crime theories of
the 1930s were channeled into institutional machinery that changed the meaning and
political significance of those ideas by reinforcing an emphasis on the individual
offender.744 A survey of the literature on the era’s crime politics provides a basis for
contextualizing the relationship between crime theory and policy in these years.
In Hagan’s defense, some early New Deal policies were unusually progressive by
the standards of American politics. For example, the Civil Conservation Corps, which
provided public works jobs for 2.5 million men, employed a large portion of the
population that likely would have been incarcerated.745 Brooklyn district attorney Conrad
Printzlein also operated an innovative deferred prosecution program in Brooklyn from
1936 to 1940. Today deferred prosecution agreements are a cornerstone of the Justice
Department’s lax approach to corporate crime, but Printzlein’s initial plan delayed
charging first-time juvenile offenders for a specified time and dropped the charges if the
he or she exhibited good conduct during that period. The Justice Department endorsed his
program in 1946.746
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In spite of these examples, the populist nature of New Deal era crime politics
should not be mistaken for progressive crime politics. In the 1930s, crime transformed
into a federal issue that national lawmakers politicized for personal gain. Roosevelt and
Cummings routinely made public appeals on crime to foster an anticrime climate. They
secured several major crime packages in the 1930s and pushed unsuccessful proposals to
mandate universal fingerprinting, triple FBI personnel, and eliminate the unanimous jury
verdict in criminal cases. Law-and-order politics became a ticket to political stardom in
the 1930s, as evidenced by Manhattan DA Thomas Dewey, who used his crusades
against mobsters and Wall Street to secure the New York Governorship and launch
several White House bids.747 J. Edgar Hoover appealed to populist impulses by
politicizing high-profile criminals like John Dillinger or Bonnie and Clyde to facilitate an
expansion of the Bureau of Investigation’s powers.748 The Bureau also received a shot of
institutional legitimacy in 1930 when it became the clearinghouse for the Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR), the first national dataset on crime.749
The 1940s witnessed shifts in crime politics as the war exacerbated fears of
communism and foreign threats, which were played up by Hoover. Over 16,000 enemy
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aliens were arrested by the war’s end.750 Under Hoover’s leadership the Bureau used its
mandate to spy on fascist groups to criminalize nearly all forms of dissidence by placing
any organization deemed radical under federal investigation, including leftist
organizations and labor unions.751 Anti-union laws including Taft-Hartley criminalized
strike tactics like mass picketing and secondary boycotts, while the investigations of the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senator McCarthy’s hearings in
the Senate jailed communists under the Smith Act and ensured that citizens could be
“effectively stigmatized though never convicted of any offense.”752
The most crucial shift in postwar crime politics occurred at intersection of race,
crime, and procedural justice. An emphasis on criminal procedure as the best way to
promote equality in justice outcomes supplanted an emphasis on substantive equality, and
the state focused on ensuring that prosecutors, judges, and police did their jobs fairly
rather than critically considering what conduct was being punished.753 As the social and
economic dislocations of the war produced racial disorder and protest, local and state
attempts to improve police-minority relations emphasized improving criminal justice
procedures, protecting individual rights, and professionalizing police more thoroughly.754
Naomi Murakawa’s work shows how race liberals in the 1940s thought that building a
procedurally fair system would promote race-neutral criminal justice outcomes. By
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constraining the discretion of criminal justice practitioners to act on their prejudices,
liberals believed they could purge the criminal justice system of racial inequality.755
Murakawa details how and why this was a problematic strategy. Liberals pursued
an expansion of federal authority in criminal justice by introducing bills to equip and
professionalize police to promote racially fair outcomes. But in pushing proposals to limit
state violence against blacks, they reaffirmed linkages between blackness and crime. By
claiming that reformed procedural guidelines would produce race-neutral punishment by
checking the prejudices of police, liberals narrowly defined racial bias as a psychological
problem rooted in individual biases. This obscured the structural ways racial bias was
engrained into the criminal justice system. As a result, these reforms provided procedural
legitimacy to a system that was infused with racialized constructions of criminality.756
Mixed into New Deal crime politics in the 1940s was a resurgent interest in
rehabilitative programming. California sparked a revival of the rehabilitative ideal in the
1940s by establishing the “Youth Authority” and “Adult Authority,” expert-run boards
that took control of sentencing away from judges and made determinations regarding
terms, release dates, parole supervision, and other aspects of sentencing. But these
attempts to individualize treatment also brought about more sophistication in predicting
criminality and incorrigibility, as the state constructed prediction tables consisting of
various personal traits of offenders to predict the criminal tendencies of defendants. In
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pursuing the rehabilitative ideal, the state adopted a sole focus on reducing recidivism
and predictively identifying incorrigible defendants.757
While earlier New Deal programs exhibited some emphasis on the social and
economic conditions that cause crime, they were overshadowed in later years as crime
became a law enforcement issue characterized by questions of procedure and
rehabilitation. Criminals were treated as individuals trapped “outside of society, not
organic to it.”758 In this sense, crime politics moved from an emphasis on class-based
relations to a politics of individualism in the 1940s, mirroring comparable shifts in
political and economic discourse. This was part of a reorientation in American politics
from a collective politics to a politics of individualization that made it easier to control
individuals in the social realm and easier to punish them in the criminal justice realm.
II. Political Constructions of Street Criminality from the New Deal Through 1960s
Hagan argues that New Deal era crime theories focused on social and economic
relations and that criminology only reoriented its focus back onto individual behavior
after the onset of the Reagan era in 1973. His analysis of key theories of crime during this
period is thorough and accurate, so my account draws extensively on his but evaluates
these ideas within a more nuanced framework of the New Deal.759 The New Deal era was
not a singular cohesive epoch that persisted unchanged for four decades. The crime
theories of the New Deal era cannot be divorced from related shifts in political and
economic discourses during these years. Political actors drew on prevailing crime
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theories in selective ways and these ideas were modified as they were transmitted into
policy. This process changed the meanings of these ideas by running them through
preexisting institutions.
Hagan convincingly illustrates how prevailing explanations of crime propounded
in mid-century can be organized into three traditions—structural functionalism, symbolic
interactionism, and conflict theory. His argument is that these theories of criminality
“reflected in many ways the progressive politics of this era,” which is true to an extent.760
Many variants of these theories posed direct challenges to traditional criminology’s
emphasis on individual pathologies, especially in the early years of the New Deal. But the
window of opportunity for these progressive ideas to reshape American crime politics
was both remarkably small and remarkably fleeting.
These new theories did not wholly discredit biological theories of crime, but
simply quieted them. In 1939, Earnest Hooton published The American Criminal, a dense
600-page defense of the biological origins of crime. Ironically, Hooton opened the book
by admitting that, “What is known of human heredity really amounts to exceedingly
little,” but he did not hesitate to draw broad conclusions about biology and crime.761
Hooton reinforced Lombroso’s findings and leveled criticisms at sociologists by claiming
that Lombroso had, “never been scientifically refuted by a satisfactory demonstration.”762
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Nicole Rafter has described Hooton as an “interloper” during a period of change
in criminology.763 Hooton was an historical anomaly, as few studies during the 1930s
endorsed Lombrosian theory, but his work highlights how these older ideas were never
fully discredited. That he was able to garner attention in 1939 foreshadows biocriminology’s eventual resurgence in later decades. More importantly, his insistence that
alternative theories must disprove crime’s biological basis to attain empirical validity
serves as a testament to the orthodoxy of Lombrosian theory in criminological circles.
This underscores a crucial problem even in early New Deal theories of crime,
which is that they took as a starting point the crimes examined by older criminologists.
To disprove Lombroso and his adherents, they had to study the same types of behavior.
Consequently, structural scholars directed their focus on street crimes, thus internalizing
ideological biases embedded within the philosophies they critiqued. This imbued their
theories with a similar set of a priori assumptions about criminality that reinforced the
idea that the crime problem was a class problem. Nonetheless, at least in the 1930s, they
initially offered prospects for breaking from criminology’s emphasis on the individual.
Early New Deal Era Theories: The Significance of Class Relations
Early structural functionalist theories presented the greatest challenge to
criminology’s emphasis on natural criminality and the focal individual. Structural
functionalism theorized that crime was an outcome of a breakdown in social institutions
that typically produce conformity, including the family, school, and community. Early
structural functionalists focused on class relations and group-level processes. Rooted in
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Durkheim’s theory of anomie, structural functionalism ascribed criminality to a lack of
social regulation and “normlessness.” Without appropriate institutions to socialize
individuals, groups felt a sense of purposelessness and normlessness and thus disregarded
the standards and values commonly shared by the broader population.764
Durkheim’s precepts formed the basis of Robert Merton’s strain theory. Merton
famously gave anomie theory a structural twist through a Marxist framing. He described
anomie as an unequal distribution of resources and opportunities generated through social
structure, arguing that normlessness follows when people lack the necessary means to
attain socially prescribed goals. Merton emphasized how society identified widely shared
goals (such as a having family and owning a home) but denied certain groups the socially
acceptable means to achieve those goals (like educational and employment
opportunities). As a result, appropriate means for attaining success are only available in
higher socioeconomic strata. By imposing what amounted to unrealistic goals on the poor
and low-income working classes, society created a strain that pushed them towards
criminality. Merton concluded that disadvantaged groups are “in the society but not of it.
Sociologically, they constitute the true ‘aliens.’”765
Merton’s theory was not an explanation for why some individuals deviate, but a
theory of class relations explaining that disadvantaged groups deviated more because
they had the greatest disparity between goals and means. Merton provided multiple
examples of behaviors characterized by strain, describing economically motivated crime
as “innovation,” drug use as “retreatism,” radical responses as “rebellion,” and
See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1897).
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“ritualism” as abandoning socially prescribed goals but conforming to prescribed
means.766
While Merton’s was the quintessential structural functionalist theory, Clifford
Shaw and Henry McKay’s theory of social disorganization was the most influential.
Shaw and McKay also deployed structural conceptions of anomie but focused on inner
cities. Their 1931 analysis of Chicago found that people moved in and out of high-crime
neighborhoods, but that neighborhoods rather than people remained criminal. Problems
like truancy, infant mortality, mental disorder, and crime were clustered in geographic
areas. As different groups moved in and out, the neighborhood remained troubled. Shaw
and McKay explained these problems as outcomes of poverty, residential mobility, and
ethnic heterogeneity, which weakened the social bonds of the community.767
Shaw and McKay’s work was particularly influential. In fact, their research was
published as a sub-volume of the Wickersham Commission’s report on the causes of
crime as related to juvenile delinquency. But Shaw and McKay’s work had a racially
deterministic tinge by concluding that ethnic heterogeneity weakened community social
bonds, a logic resting on an essentialist conception of ethnicity. Their 1932 work further
linked criminality to race. In an article that conceptualized anomie in terms of intrafamily strain, they found that crime was significantly correlated to broken homes only
when their data was disaggregated by race. Given that black youth had the highest rate of
broken homes, they suggested that black households were specifically likely to generate
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delinquent children.768 While Shaw and McKay presented structural disadvantage as a
form of “anomie” driving criminality, they still maintained links between criminality and
racial difference. Nonetheless, Shaw, McKay, and Merton emphasized class relations
more than their predecessors and successors.
An alternative to structural functionalism was symbolic interactionism, which
offered a general theory of crime. The explanatory power of structural functionalism
depended on the individual committing a crime; it could explain crimes committed by the
poor in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but not comparable behavior among middle or
upper-class citizens. While structural functionalism offered an explanation for crime
rooted in social and economic relations, it also buttressed dominant presumptions about
the type of people who were criminals. Symbolic interactionism alternatively emphasized
the meanings involved in explaining, labeling, and defining crime. By imposing the label
of criminality on people, state responses to crime shaped individuals’ self-conception and
subsequent behavior. This emphasized the role social control agencies and communities
played in producing criminals through processes of social construction.
One of the original theoretical works in this intellectual tradition came from
Edwin Sutherland in 1924. Sutherland focused less on the role of social control agencies
than associations among social groups. His differential association theory argued that
criminal behavior is learned via personal relationships. The core of his theory was that an
individual becomes delinquent if his or her associates define crime so favorably that it
outweighs any unfavorable aspects of criminal behavior. These labels are transmitted
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within groups, including business organizations, which are isolated from competing
perspectives. Sutherland posited that individuals learn the values and techniques that
drive crime from their narrowly contained social circles.769
A famous take on symbolic interactionism was labeling theory, which first
appeared in Frank Tannenbaum’s 1938 book Crime and the Community. Tannenbaum
emphasized the labels imposed on individuals by social control agencies. In the book, he
claimed that police interventions change an individual’s conception of the self. By
segregating people for incapacitation, criminal punishment constitutes a “dramatization
of the evil,” forcing people into isolation in which they form relationships with similarly
defined individuals. This becomes a severe problem when adolescent street culture views
some behaviors as normal while those outside the community view them as a threat. The
consequent spectacle of punishment creates the criminal in Tannenbaum’s work,
upending deterrence logics of punishment.770
Labeling theory was not a positivist theory, as it was concerned with how
punishment influences self-conceptions rather than empirically identifying the causes of
crime. But unlike many other explanations of crime, it offered the basis for a general
theory with explanatory power reaching across social strata. It would later inform
Sutherland’s theory of white-collar crime and analyses of business culture by Donald
Cressey in the 1970s.771 However, as criminology returned to emphasizing individualism,
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labeling theory became more closely associated with street criminality, drug use, and
juvenile delinquency.
The third and final major school of criminology to emerge during mid-century
was conflict theory. Influenced by Marxist ideology, conflict frames directed attention
onto how dominant social groups used the power of criminalization to control
subordinate groups. Conflict theories explain criminality as a social construct that is
shaped by social, economic, and political power differentials.
Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer’s 1939 book Punishment and Social
Structure is the seminal Marxist analysis of crime as a social, economic, and political
construct. Rusche and Kircheimer rejected the emphasis on the atomized individual
prevalent in criminology and paved the way for the rise of radical criminology by
amalgamating conflict theory and crime theory. They argued that instantiations of
punishment systems have historically corresponded to the prevailing means of production
at a given moment, tracing the evolution of fines, corporal punishment, prison labor, and
containment from the Middle Ages through the era of industrial capitalism. Rusche and
Kirchheimer saw punishment as a species of class domination integral to the state’s class
control matrix. They concluded that punishment provides “the illusion of security by
covering the symptoms of social disease with a system of legal and moral value
judgments.” The criminal law was produced by an alliance between capital and the state
and detracted from the structures causing crime by emphasizing the individual’s faults.772
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Rusche and Kirchheimer’s work received little attention upon its release.773 But
by the 1950s and 1960s, it became foundational to the school of radical criminology.
Unlike structural functionalism and symbolic interactionism, conflict criminology had a
theoretical basis ill-disposed to a reorientation towards the individual. A case in point is
George Vold’s work in 1958, which depicted criminality as a value judgment placed on
subordinate groups. For Vold, the difference between losing and winning in businesslabor or revolutionary conflicts was the difference between punishment or glorification,
as he stated that “a successful revolution makes criminals out of the government officials
previously in power, and an unsuccessful revolution makes its leaders into traitors.”774 In
1969, Austin Turk defined criminality as a social status dependent on how dominant
decision-making authorities perceive inferiors, leading poor and nonwhite populations to
have high rates of criminalization.775 Richard Quinney’s social realist theory argued that
elites define crimes in ways that produce the “social reality of crime.” Because the
disadvantaged are not involved in the writing of laws, their behavioral patterns are likely
to be defined as criminal in elite discourse.776
The work of these scholars had significant influence in academic circles, but not
on policy. Radical criminologists, like most Marxist scholars, have struggled to reach
political circles, since they have had had few political allies to transmit their ideas to
policy arenas. Thus, while Hagan’s review of conflict theory is an accurate account of the
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theoretical principles of this school, his conclusion that conflict theories fostered more
attention to “white-collar and political crimes” primarily applies to academic contexts.777
As conflict criminologist William Chambliss admitted, “Criminological conflict theory
has had notable consequences in terms of subsequent theorizing and rethinking within
mainstream criminology but has had relatively little direct impact on social policy.”778
Crime Theories in the Latter New Deal
As the New Deal shifted away from a class-based politics towards an
individualistic politics of micro-empowerment, theories of criminality followed suit as
criminology drifted back to its deterministic and individualistic roots. An emphasis on the
inclinations of individuals reemerged as scholarship refocused on promoting rational
treatment programs. During the middle decades of the century, criminological science
reaffirmed its aim to perfect a program of individualized treatment, mirroring the
resurgence in political attention to the rehabilitative ideal.779
Structural functionalism lost its Mertonian emphasis on class dynamics in favor a
focus on the relationship between individual expectations and criminality. One of the
most influential and distinctive variants of structural functionalism came from Sheldon
and Eleanor Glueck. Their book Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency (1950) combined
Shaw and McKay’s emphasis on anomie within the family, individualized treatment, and
predictive targeting. They constructed a prediction table built on a five-factor scale to

Hagan, Who Are the Criminals?, 89, 100.
William Chambliss, “Social Power and the Construction of Crime: Conflict Theory,” in
Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences, ed. Robert Lilly, Cullen, Francis T., and Richard
Ball, 6th ed. (New York: SAGE, 2015).
Walker, Popular Justice chapter 8 discusses the push in criminological circles to make
individualized treatment a reality.
296
777
778

779

predict the likelihood of an individual’s criminality. The five factors included “discipline
of boy by father,” “supervision of boy by mother,” “affection of father for boy,”
“affection of mother for boy,” and “cohesiveness of family.”780 The Gluecks’ work
received a lot of attention, particularly in California. Leading the way in the rehabilitative
ideal’s revival and individualizing treatment, the state constructed a table of “base
expectancy rates” built on the Gluecks’ prediction tables to guide judicial sentencing
decisions for individual offenders.781
Also fitting into the structural functionalist tradition and its focus on anomie were
cultural theories of crime. Like their Progressive Era predecessors, cultural theories were
rooted in essentialized and deterministic understandings of racial difference. One of the
earliest cultural theories came from Frederick Thrasher in 1927, whose analysis of gang
culture in Chicago concluded that disorderly economic, moral, and social forces
reinforced individual tendencies towards criminal behavior.782 While Thrasher’s was the
most famous, his was not the only work to reexamine cultural theory. In a 1938 article
titled, “Culture Conflict and Crime,” Thorsten Sellin argued that crime was generated by
“a conflict of conduct norms” between different cultural systems.783 That same year in
Crime and the Community, Frank Tannenbaum argued that, “crime is a maladjustment
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that arises out of the conflict between a group and the community at large” and that some
cultural groups are “maladjusted to the larger society” and “at war with society.”784
Thrasher, Sellin, and Tannenbaum were preoccupied with identifying groups
likely to conflict with prevailing culture. Their work foreshadowed delinquent subculture
theories that emerged in the 1950s and stigmatized certain cultures as pathologically
deviant. Albert Cohen’s 1955 book Delinquent Boys sparked this trend. In the book,
Cohen argued that disadvantaged classes adopt delinquent subcultures due to their
individual failings. He argued that young boys in urban areas engaged in gang behavior
as a collective reaction to their dissatisfaction with their unsuccessful efforts to adjust to
middle-class norms. In this perspective, a sense of frustration drove delinquent
subcultures to repudiate the middle-class standards giving them a sense of inadequacy.785
Delinquent subculture theories of criminality were often built on assumptions
about the pathological nature of lower-class culture. In a 1958 article, Walter Miller
highlighted how this strand of thought divorced an understanding of lower-class crime
from structural inequality. He wrote that the values of delinquent subcultures were a
byproduct of the lower-class system, which include, “trouble, toughness, smartness,
excitement, fate,” and “autonomy.” He concluded that, “Following cultural practices
which comprise essential elements of the total life pattern of lower class culture
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automatically violates certain legal norms.”786 His work pathologized lower-class culture
as something deviant and viewed it through a deterministic lens.
Delinquent subculture theory bore similarities to a simultaneously emerging
theoretical explanation of poverty, the culture of poverty theory. This school argued that
poverty was a function of deviant subcultures that warped values and family structures.
Coined in the late 1950s by Oscar Lewis, the phrase initially referred to a “way of life”
adopted by marginalized communities to cope with “feelings of hopelessness and
despair” upon recognizing the “improbability of their achieving success in terms of the
prevailing values and goals.”787 In this sense, Lewis’s theory was a model of Marxist
anomie theory. He described the culture as “an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to
their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society.”788
He claimed that the poor are mislabeled as “shiftless, mean, sordid, violent, evil and
criminal” without recognition of the “irreversibly destructive effects of poverty on
individual character.”789 Lewis’s theory eschewed an emphasis on individual faults and
directed attention onto the structural dimensions of poverty. However, his theory would
quickly be warped by scholars who merged it with individualistic theories of inequality.
For instance, in their 1960 book Delinquency and Opportunity, Richard Cloward
and Lloyd Ohlin meshed an individualized structural functionalist theory with culture of
poverty theory. Their “differential opportunity theory” contended that to understand
various forms of crime, one must consider different types of legitimate and illegitimate
Walter Miller, “Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency,” Journal of
Social Issues 14, no. 3 (1958): 7, 18.
Oscar Lewis, “The Culture of Poverty,” The Scientific American 215, no. 4 (1966): 21.
Lewis, 21.
Lewis, 19.
299
786

787
788
789

opportunities available to those seeking their way out of disadvantaged environments.
They emphasized three ways people adapted to their differential opportunity structures.
Some communities had stable criminal subcultures, in which there was a high degree or
coordination between legitimate and illegitimate sectors like the police and criminal
underworld, which produced an organized crime culture. A second was a conflict
subculture, in which conflict and violence disrupted legitimate enterprises and obstructed
state efforts at social control. The third was a retreatist subculture, in which individuals
who failed in their opportunity structures retreated to drug abuse.790
John Hagan has shown that while working for the Johnson Administration, Ohlin
embedded differential opportunity theory into Great Society policy, which he calls the
“peak influence of a progressive crime theory.”791 But the influence of Cloward and
Ohlin’s ideas on policy was not straightforward. Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel
Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 report The Negro Family highlights how policymakers meshed
Cloward and Ohlin’s theory with culture of poverty theory to target the black poor. This
underscores that there was not a straight line from Lewis to Moynihan. Rather, Lewis’s
structural account of the culture of poverty was altered by scholars and policymakers who
interpreted his work through the lens of individualism.
Moynihan concluded that, “inability to delay gratification” explains “immature,
criminal, and neurotic behavior” among blacks. High crimes rates among black youth
were attributed to unstable home lives, and Moynihan cited “family disorganization” as
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the main cause of black crime.792 This is why Hagan admits that, “the eventual
implementation of Cloward and Ohlin's ideas bore a tenuous connection to their original
theory.”793 Lawmakers modified the ideas of Cloward, Ohlin, and Lewis to suit their
political needs. Although all three claimed that their theories applied to society, not
individuals, their ideas were worked into policy in ways that focused on individual-level
dynamics.
By the 1960s, structural functionalism had completed a reorientation towards
individual level processes rather than social ones. Travis Hirschi’s social control theory
highlights the nature of this change. His 1969 book Causes of Delinquency argued that all
that is necessary to explain crime is the absence of a bond to social institutions. He
argued that weaknesses in any combination of four social bonds (attachment to family or
friends, school or activities, values or principles, and commitments or goals) produced
criminality.794 In social control theory, no special strain had to exist between goals and
means to produce deviance. All that was necessary was a reduction in constraining social
bonds. Hirschi’s theory emphasized personal responsibility by assuming a natural
tendency towards deviance that required restraint through such bonds. 795
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These shifts towards individual-level dynamics in structural functionalism
mirrored shifts in Keynesianism, culture of poverty theory, and other strands of political
and economic thought. The development of human capital theory—the idea that
individual traits or skills determine one’s potential capital accumulation—had also begun
in the late 1930s, gaining political traction in the 1960s through the work of Chicago
school economists.796 Human capital theory presented poverty as a result of personal
failures to invest in enhancing one’s own productive capacities, by which logic social
assistance produced perverse incentives discouraging self-improvement. In the 1960s,
human capital theory meshed with an individualized culture of poverty theory,
differential opportunity theory, and social-control theory by putting the onus on
individuals to reform and correct for social and economic inequalities.
Symbolic interactionist research experienced similar shifts. In his 1963 book
Outsiders, Howard Becker provided the foundation for modern labeling theory, writing
that “deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of
the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender.’”797 But by the 1960s,
labeling theory and variants of symbolic interactionism almost entirely focused on street
criminality. For instance, David Matza and Gresham Sykes’s “neutralization theory”
posited that delinquent youths drifted into deviance through a process of rationalization.
They claimed that juvenile delinquents adhered to prevailing norms of conduct in their
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beliefs but drew on “subterranean traditions” of their subculture to “neutralize” those
norms by denying their responsibility and the legitimacy of those condemning them.798
Edwin Sutherland’s ventures into symbolic interactionism offered a basis to expand
beyond street criminality, as he extended his work into corporate boardrooms in his 1949
book White-Collar Crime.799 But in general, labeling theory focused on juvenile
delinquency in the latter twentieth century.800 Its emphasis on the social construction of
crime has even led it to be derided in mainstream criminological circles for lacking a
positivist bent. Without any theoretical consideration of the origins of deviance, it has
been criticized as untestable.801 As a result, symbolic interactionist criminology has
received less political attention than variants of structural functionalism.
Research in criminology influenced waves of correctional reform in the New Deal
and postwar periods, but the relationship between crime theory and policy operated
differently during these years than it did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. While the work of scholars like Merton, Shaw, and McKay made meaningful
distinctions from earlier brands of crime theory, their ideas were reinterpreted within an
institutional context that changed their meaning. Policymakers operated within an
institutional network infused with rehabilitative premises that transformed these new
ideas to focus on individual rather than class dynamics. As political discourse evolved in
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the 1940s and 1950s, criminology followed suit, solidifying its focus on identifying and
correcting the micro-level causes of individual criminal behaviors. This illustrates that the
window of opportunity during which new ideas could have led to meaningful reform was
narrow. The way in which the potentially radical ideas of the 1930s were constrained by
institutional contexts and rehabilitative ideological parameters is especially clear in the
reports and documents of the Wickersham Crime Commission.
III. The Wickersham Commission, the UCR, and Ideational Modification
In operation from 1929 to 1931, the Wickersham Commission was established by
President Herbert Hoover to investigate an array of issues related to criminal justice. An
11-person committee led by former Attorney General George Wickersham and staffed by
prominent legal experts including Roscoe Pound, Newton Baker, and Ada Comstock, the
Commission published fourteen volumes examining a broad range of issues related to
crime. Building on the success of the state crime commissions of the 1920s, the
Commission addressed these questions with the help of leading social scientists including
Clifford Shaw, Henry McKay, Edwin Sutherland, and Thorsten Sellin.
Fueled by anxieties over gangland murders and organized crime, one of the
Commission’s most anticipated volumes was on Prohibition. However, the Commission’s
immediate impact on policy was relatively moderate and it did not resolve issues
surrounding alcohol.802 This is not to suggest that the Wickersham Commission was
insignificant. Its final reports reveal crucial dynamics about New Deal era crime politics
and the way policymakers explained and conceptualized criminality. Further, while its
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volume on Prohibition was underwhelming, other volumes had more impact. The
Commission’s most famous report was its eleventh volume on “Lawlessness in Law
Enforcement,” which documented the frequency of police abuse referred to as the “third
degree” to obtain confessions. This fueled public resistance to policy brutality and
spurred public support for legal controls on police behavior. The Commission’s failure to
address racial inequalities in the use of “third degree” tactics also galvanized the NAACP
in its fight for antilynching legislation. And in many ways, the Commission has had longterm impacts on crime policy. Khalil Muhammad has argued that the Commission
disregarded evidence of racism in the justice system by ignoring how racial biases were
embedded into the police reports that informed the UCR, thus embedding “invisible
layers of racial ideology” into the data.803
In certain regards, the Wickersham Commission marked a sort of New Deal for
criminology. But its reports also demonstrate how the class ideology of rehabilitation
constrained the potential for criminology’s New Deal. Several of the Commission’s
volumes endorsed rehabilitative ideology and the instruments of individualized treatment.
Its ninth volume on penal institutions, parole, and probation restated the philosophy of
Zebulon Brockway, arguing that “Individualization is the root of adequate penal
treatment and the proper basis of parole.”804 Its thirteenth volume on the causes of crime
and third on crime statistics both built on the presumption that the causes and solutions to
criminal behavior can be found within the individual. The Commission’s analyses of
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crime statistics and the causes of crime were both oriented towards perfecting a program
of individualized treatment based on rehabilitation. It was these currents in New Deal era
discourse that divorced social-structural theories of crime from their political economic
implications, tying them to an individualistic and deterministic ideology of rehabilitation.
In its analysis of crime statistics, the Commission critiqued granting the Bureau of
Investigation the power to collect and disseminate crime data given that the agency’s
vested interests could encourage it to politicize crime in selective ways. Nonetheless, the
Commission signed off on the new Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) created in 1930, even
though the Bureau was made the clearinghouse for the dataset. The UCR was the product
of a lobbying campaign led by the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP),
Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial
Foundation (LSRM). While the SSRC suggested that the dataset be based off of
comprehensive records from courts, prison, and police, the IACP offered the only means
of coordinating multiple state and local actors to collect the requisite data, ensuring that
the statistics were compiled based on police reports. The dataset consequently only
counted seven “index crimes” included in police data to measure criminal activity that
were all violent and property offenses.805
Lawrence Rosen’s work offers insights into the politics that created the UCR but
the Wickersham Commission’s analysis of the data provides a different perspective on
how the UCR translated into national crime politics. The Commission’s records show
how lawmakers interpreted the statistics and reveal processes of ideational modification
through which political elites reinterpreted prevailing ideas about criminality. To
805
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understand how ideas about criminality related to New Deal politics, it is more useful to
examine how the UCR were interpreted rather than what went into their creation.
For two reasons, lawmakers interpreted the UCR in ways that changed the
meaning of prevailing ideas of criminality. First, the state saw the collection of crime
statistics as a means to an end. The systematic compilation of data offered a way to
empirically test theories about the causes of crime and identify avenues for treatment, so
the UCR was designed to be a testable dataset that could produce a composite picture of
the likely criminal. When the Commission reviewed the UCR and the causes of crime, it
reinterpreted structurally oriented theories of criminality within an individualistic
framework geared towards identifying likely criminals for rehabilitation or punishment.
Second, by focusing on individuals and police data, the UCR neglected to include
corporate convictions and data from regulatory agencies. Federal agencies have quasipolicing functions to regulate industry, but the data they produce often reflects the biases
of the agencies’ staff.806 Without including regulatory crimes and corporate convictions,
entire categories of offenses were absent from the reports, reaffirming the longstanding
construct of the criminal as a poor street offender driven by personal faults and flaws.
Just as the Commission legitimized layers of racial ideology within crime
statistics, it also legitimized the layers of class ideology in the UCR. The Commission
endorsed the UCR as an integral part of the state’s rehabilitative programming. The UCR
was thus designed within and interpreted through rehabilitative frameworks. It focused
entirely on street crimes and was viewed as a means of identifying the individual factors
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that cause criminal behavior. This affirmed rehabilitative ideology’s class skewed
premises. By excluding corporate crime from the data and reinterpreting New Deal era
theoretical criminology through rehabilitative frameworks, the UCR hardened the class
distinctions in political constructions of criminality.
To understand how theories of crime were reshaped by political discourse
requires an analysis of the Commission’s report on the causes of crime and its report on
crime statistics. An analysis of public and professional input to the Commission also
sheds light on the character of New Deal era crime politics. The Commission received
thousands of letters from citizens and legal professionals providing information, advice,
and explanations for the apparent increase in crime. The Commission directly solicited
input from judges and prosecutors, valuing their perspectives as frontline crime fighters.
Given that U.S. judges and district attorneys stand at the intersection of crime policy and
electoral politics and have strong incentives to sell themselves as law-and-order
candidates, their responses reveal which framings of criminality appealed to political
actors in the New Deal period.807 The subsequent analysis thus draws on an assessment of
the Commission’s reports as well as a survey of letters from district attorneys and judges
written to the Commission held in the National Archives.
The Wickersham Commission’s “Report on Criminal Statistics,” its third volume,
leveled numerous critiques at the UCR. It called the reports “unsystematic,” saying they
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were “often inaccurate” and “incomplete.”808 It criticized the UCR’s reliance on police
statistics, noting that precincts’ reports were laden with inconsistencies and rarely
recorded information about dispositions after arrest.809 The Commission suggested that
court statistics about prosecution were better indices for measuring crime rates, but noted
that a comparable lack of standardization in court records also prevented them from
having any immediate utility to federal officials. The Commission thus expressed serious
skepticism towards using police reports to tabulate the data but was not confident in any
proposed alternative. As a result, the report concluded the that police data were “of
doubtful statistical value,” but expressed fear that changing the basis of the UCR without
a viable alternative “would undo the work so well begun under the auspices of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police.” The Commission also criticized the fact
that the Bureau of Investigation was granted authority to collect the data, arguing that the
Bureau of the Census would serve this function in a more disinterested way. The report
concluded that despite its flaws, the UCR “should be conserved” and “perfected as much
as possible,” until it could be transferred to the Bureau of the Census and incorporate a
wider array of sources than just police reports.810
Scholars in APD have noted that timing and sequence are crucial to understanding
how developmental pathways are formed. In the case of the UCR, had the Wickersham
Commission’s reports been published a few years earlier, competing proposals to
authorize a more comprehensive statistical program from a variety of sources may have

U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Criminal Statistics, 3
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 3.
U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 32–34, 43–53.
U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 12–13, 15, 35, 40.
309
808

809
810

gained momentum over proposals to rely on police statistics. 811 Further, had the reports
been published earlier, the dataset may have been housed in the Census Bureau rather
than FBI, separating the dissemination of national crime data from the political interests
of the FBI. But the institutional linkages formed between police, the FBI, and the UCR
proved difficult to reverse even shortly after they were established.
The Commission viewed the UCR as a means of scientifically discovering the
causes of crime and predictively identifying likely criminals. The Commission thus
interpreted the UCR in ways that emphasized targeting individuals for reform or
punishment rather than addressing structural contributors to crime. This was particularly
clear at the end of the report on statistics, which concluded with a piece written by Morris
Ploscowe entitled, “A Critique of Federal Criminal Statistics.” Ploscowe criticized the
use of police data as a metric for measuring criminality just as the main report did, but
also noted that collecting crime data was necessary for identifying the causative factors in
criminal behavior and for rehabilitating offenders.812 He stated that criminal statistics
were essential for producing a “composite picture of the types of individuals” that are
likely to turn to crime. He wrote that,
The fundamental need is for more knowledge concerning the elements entering
into the crime problem, and the most important of these elements is the individual
delinquent. Statistics relating to the individual delinquent will not in and of
themselves enable us to understand the causes of criminality, but by revealing the
most frequently recurrent phenomena they can indicate broad trends which should
be bases for further investigation.813
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Ploscowe concluded that statistics should serve the purposes of “scientific penology”
which, “demands individualization in the treatment of the prisoner.”814
Ploscowe’s points mirrored claims in the primary report, which opened by stating
that among the core principles shared by the Commission’s members was the idea that
crime statistics should be centralized and published in order to create “a comprehensive
plan for an ultimate complete body of statistics, covering crime, criminals, criminal
justice, and penal treatment.”815 The first page of the report stated that, “Statistics are
needed to tell us, or at least to help tell us, what we have to do, how we are doing it, and
how far what we are doing responds to what we have to do.”816 Not only did the
Commission argue that the data was to be used to detail “the volume and character of the
offenses committed,” but also to get an idea of, “what persons or types of persons, if the
types may be differentiated, commit these offenses.”817 It is at this juncture that the
Commission’s thirteenth volume, its, “Report on the Causes of Crime,” becomes crucial.
The volume on the causes of crime consisted of two parts—one dissenting piece
written by Henry Anderson on the grounds that the primary report failed to adequately
specify the causes of criminality, and a majority report written by Ploscowe and the
remainder of the Commission. With chapters dedicated to biology, mental health, social
factors, economics, and politics, Ploscowe’s majority report opened and closed by noting
that nearly all theoretical explanations reviewed had some power in explaining crime to
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varying degrees and in varying contexts.818 But the report emphasized that, “The soundest
approach to the problem of the causation of crime…lies through a study of the individual
criminal.”819 In the Commission’s analysis, new ideas associated with structural
functionalist criminology were interpreted to focus on individual level faults rather than
structural political economic forces.
Interestingly, the first chapter in the majority report examined “Morphological
and Physiological Factors.” It was a straightforward reexamination of Lombrosian theory.
The Commission attacked the school of thought, arguing that Lombroso and his
adherents failed to identify any causal relationship between biology and crime. However,
they emphasized that Lombroso moved criminological thought in an important direction,
“By centering attention on the criminal rather than the crime committed.”820 The
emphasis on the focal individual in academic analyses of crime was thus not an
inadvertent or accidental legacy of Lombrosian theory. Even Lombroso’s foes
acknowledged that his emphasis on the individual criminal rather than his or her crime
was the most fundamental contribution of his work to criminology.
While throwing doubt onto Lombroso’s claims about atavism, the Commission
recognized that Lombrosian theory undergirded promising new research. On the first
page of the chapter, the Commission wrote that the “fundamental idea of Lombroso,” that
a man’s conduct “find[s] expression in his physical constitution…still underlies present
research.” The Commission praised work in the field of endocrinology that linked
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endocrine pathologies to crime. The authors wrote that analyses of “the functions of
glands of internal secretion in determining body build and personality” have the potential
to provide an explanation of criminality “in terms of physical and organic conditions.”821
Regarding psychology, the report closely examined Bernard Glueck’s research at
Sing Sing that pointed to the prevalence of psychopathy as a driver of crime.822 But the
report offered stinging critiques of this strand of theory. It warned against the circular
logic of psychological theories of crime since crime is viewed as evidence of
psychopathy and psychopathy is viewed as a cause of crime. The authors wrote that this
“fallacy seems to underlie the whole psychiatric approach to the problem of crime” and
concluded that the psychological approach to studying crime is just a “modern
manifestation of Lombroso’s idea that the criminal is a separate type.”823 Nonetheless, the
chapter on psychology ended on a surprisingly positive note given its overall critical tone,
with the Commission defending psychology as “in its infancy.” The authors wrote that
the school’s, “approach to the problem of crime through the study of the reactions of the
individual criminal may yet prove fruitful.”824
It was not only the Commission that offered support for biological and
psychological theories of crime. In response to mailers from the Commission requesting
their input, numerous judges and district attorneys wrote letters endorsing biological
theories of criminality. S.E. Metzler, the D.A. in Humboldt County California,
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exemplified this trend. He informed the Commission that “the greatest number of
criminals with whom the prosecutor has to deal, is born a criminal, he is a congenital
criminals [sic], he is defective from the day that he is delivered, and he will remain a
criminal all of his life.”825 County Attorney Ernest Jenkins of Payne County, Oklahoma
identified heredity as the primary cause of crime, claiming that “to substantiate that
statement I would refer my readers to the famous Jukes family.”826 He endorsed
sterilization as a means of remedying the problem of “habitual criminals.” Governor
Douglas Buck of Delaware similarly told the Commission that “sterilization appeals to
me as the best means” the states have to “curtail the breeding of criminals.”827
The Commission clearly did not ignore biology, psychology, and Lombroso.
These ideas had meaningful sway both among the Commission’s members and political
actors operating within the criminal justice system. What is most telling, however, are the
Wickersham’s Records regarding social, economic, and political theories of crime. The
report on social factors included an entire sub-volume by Shaw and McKay that focused
on the role of broken homes in driving juvenile delinquency and particularly how black
homes were likely to produce delinquent children.828 The chapter on crime’s social
causes blamed criminality on the absence of adequate parental supervision and also cited
cultural theory, suggesting that immigrant children are prone to crime due to parents who
raise them in cultural conflict with American society. The Commission cited scholarship
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about Polish immigrants that blended determinism and social disorganization theory by
arguing that, “the natural tendencies of an individual, unless controlled and organized by
social education, inevitably lead to a behavior which must be judged as abnormal.”829
The chapter concluded that social structures and community institutions inhibit
natural tendencies towards crime within individuals, a conclusion that was not implicit in
Shaw and McKay’s original work. The Commission argued that without the relationships
outlined by Shaw and McKay, some communities are high-risks for becoming criminal,
drawing on Thrasher’s work to argue that gangs emerge to fill the vacuums left in
communities by shuttered schools, churches, and other institutions. The chapter
contended that the breakdown of community and family institutions contributed to
criminality but argued that more research is needed to link these processes to the race,
nationality, and psychology of specific communities.830
The letters written to the Commission help to explain how and why the
Commission viewed both structural functionalist and biological theories as valid. A good
case in point is a letter written to the Commission from Judge J.B. Williams of
Guadalupe County, Texas. Williams wrote to the Commission that he believed, “that the
tendency to crime is innate or inborn in a child.” However, Williams went on to state that
two other central causes of crime include “extreme poverty and too much indulgence by
parents and a lack of co-operation in the selection of their associates.”831 Similarly, a
letter from Assistant DA A.L. Betke in Denver wrote that while crime can be caused by
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the environment in which one is raised, heredity is also a crucial factor, claiming that
most criminals “are inferior mentally and physically to the average man.” He said that
“with a casual glance [one] can see that these men are considerably different from other
men.” Betke pointed to the shape of men’s heads and bodies as indicators of their
criminal nature shortly after discussing how their upbringing and various social forces
contribute to criminality.832 A Solicitor General in Alabama made a comparable
argument, emphasizing that lack of employment opportunities is a central driver of
criminality, but that there are also “our natural criminals as well as their children who
have a tendency toward crime from the beginning.”833
This highlights an important pattern both in the letters written to the Commission
and the Commission’s reports. Structural functionalist theories of criminality and
determinist conceptions of innate criminality were not interpreted as mutually exclusive.
The Commission’s reports partially endorsed social-structural schools of criminology and
biological ones, and letters from prosecutors and judges often endorsed both. It is critical
to remember that Merton, Shaw, McKay, and other social-structural scholars were
explicitly aiming to undermine and refute biological theory. But when their ideas
translated into politics, many policymakers endorsed both, exhibiting a belief that both
theoretical perspectives could be valid without discrediting the other.
Structural functionalist accounts were clearly appreciated by the Commission. But
by insisting that they link their findings to race, psychology, and continuing to grant
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support to biological theories, the Commission reinforced the idea that crime was
pathological among certain populations. These connections revealed an important
reinterpretation of structural functionalism. The Commission did not view poverty or
structural disadvantage as conditions conducive to criminality, as Shaw, McKay, and
others suggested. From the perspective of the Commission, poverty and structural
disadvantage were correlates of crime associated with other causal connections between
criminality, psychology, and racial difference. The Commission overlooked the emphasis
on class dynamics in the works of Merton, Shaw, McKay, and others, instead opting to
refocus their theories on the focal individual.
Conflict theories directly challenged these sorts of assumptions, but the
Commission gave little credence to economic and political factors. The report’s chapter
on economics called research linking crime and socioeconomic factors “superficial,”
suggesting that it was overbroad to generalize any direct links between crime and
poverty.834 The chapter on politics stated that crime should not be understood as a
political construct driven by the choices of police, prosecutors, and political elites. The
report actually claimed that the biggest political factor shaping perceptions of crime was
that most crime went unnoticed by the state. Citing the Illinois Crime Commission, the
commission argued that police only catch about 20% of felons. This, the Commission
stated, contributed to an excess of crime in America relative to other countries.835
The Commission concluded that most of the factors they examined played some
role in causing crime, noting that there was no singular “criminal psychology” driving all
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types of criminals. Consequently, the conclusion stated that “this report recommends
further study of the individual criminal,” particularly suggesting that each criminal
type—such as the property criminal, sex offender, and murderer—be studied in
isolation.836 By focusing on the atomized individual, the Commission disregarded major
contributions from structural functionalism, conflict theory, and labeling theory. The
report assumed that criminal types could be categorized into discrete groups that could
only understood with reference to an analysis of individuals, reinforcing a disregard for a
structurally contextualized understanding of crime even though they were testing
structurally-oriented theories of criminality.
Ploscowe and the commissioners recommended that Congress provide funds for
“the establishment of a criminological laboratory where certain selected prisoners might
be more intensively studied for the light they may throw upon the elements entering into
the causation of crime.” A laboratory geared towards the “thorough study of the
individual criminal…could not fail to provide a body of knowledge of the individual
criminal from which considerable advance in the ascertainment of causes of crime might
be made.”

837

This did not pan out as the Commission hoped, but it is a telling

recommendation. The Commission was far less concerned with structural inequality as a
cause of crime than it was with studying the individual delinquent and the micro-level
causes of their individual behavioral patterns.
The Commission’s reports made it clear that crime statistics were designed to test
prevailing theories of scientific penology in order to improve the state’s responses to
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crime. But by interpreting prevailing theories of criminal behavior through rehabilitative
frameworks designed to identify likely criminals and determine their reformative
capacity, lawmakers reinforced a stereotype of the likely criminal reflecting class biases.
Rather than viewing poverty and social disadvantage as a cause of crime, the
Commission interpreted the UCR and prevailing theories of criminality through the lens
of rehabilitative ideology. This encouraged lawmakers to view socioeconomic
disadvantage not as a structural contributor to criminality, but as a personal trait
associated with the criminal disposition.
Input from judges and prosecutors demonstrate a revealing pattern that sheds light
on the Commission’s perspective on structural functionalism. A large number of public
officials utilized the language of structural functionalism to explain crime’s causes, often
alongside biological explanations of criminality. But in deploying structuralist
functionalist language, they rarely advocated for structural reform, instead opting for
punitive policy. For example, C.W. Barrick, a DA in Oregon, claimed that research
indicated that the cause of crime was a troubled upbringing and home. But he stated that
paroles are “over done” and that only the worst offenders receive incarceration due to
overcrowding, meaning that the state ends up “paroling large numbers from the bench
who should be incarcerated.”838 District Attorney G.G. Jewel of Eaton, Ohio spoke in
language reminiscent of Mertonian strain theory, stating that the “desire to make up a
deficit” and “obtain additional money” drives people to crime. However, he reinterpreted
strain theory through an individualized framing, claiming that offenders are driven to
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steal money “since their abilities to earn it are none too great,” a logic he used to suggest
that courts and prosecutors should work more speedily to put people behind bars where
they “should be taught something useful that will stand them in stead [sic] after their
release.”839 This reveals that structuralist functionalist theory was not linked to structural
reform in the New Deal political zeitgeist. Rather, policymakers rationalized structural
functionalist theory as complementary to the punitive prong of the rehabilitative ideal.
It is worth remembering that structural functionalism did not offer a general
theory of crime. The notion that socioeconomic disadvantage generates criminality
ignores crimes committed by people from upper socioeconomic strata. Theories about
broken homes, poverty, and crime had explanatory value only applicable to lower-class
offenders. That is why the Commission’s recommendations for “further study of the
individual criminal,” was so problematic. By reinterpreting structural theories to focus on
the individual, the Commission reaffirmed the idea that the likely criminal was poor. In
its analyses and recommendations for future work, the Commission ignored anyone that
did not fit the politically constructed image of the “individual criminal” frontloaded into
its analysis. In an institutional context in which the individualization of punishment was
the central goal of the criminal justice system, the social-structural crime theories of the
New Deal were imbued with the individualistic and deterministic flavor of the
rehabilitative ideal in ways that compromised their political economic foundation.
IV. Indeterminate Sentencing, Individualizing Treatment, and Habitual Offenders
In the 1940s, attempts to contextualize crime and inequality in social structure
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were regularly dismissed in political debates. The disbanding of the NRPB in 1942 serves
as a case in point. In its report Security, Work, and Relief Policies, the NRPB wrote that
the problems of juvenile delinquency and crime “are traceable to widespread
unemployment among young people.” It argued that the state could help check the crime
problem through the provision of education, health services, public housing, and social
welfare.840 Upset with the board’s recommendations, congressional conservatives
immediately disbanded the board.841 In the 1940s, this sort of structurally contextualized
understanding of crime was political anathema.
While some early New Deal policies exhibited structural understandings of
criminality—such as the Civilian Conservation Corps or deferred prosecution
agreements—latter New Deal discourse focused on the individual. An emphasis on due
process, rehabilitation, and individualized treatment drove 1940s crime politics.842 These
shifts affected the general development of American criminal justice but their impact is
particularly clear in three policy areas that are explored in this section. The first section
analyzes the spread of indeterminate sentencing during mid-century, paying attention to
developments in the 1940s that hardened the penal system’s emphasis on individuals.
Linked to rehabilitative ideology, reforms in indeterminate sentencing brought promises
of reform and harsh justice, and policymakers reinterpreted structural theories of crime to
be consistent with the individualized treatment model. The second section explores how
Conrad Printzlein’s deferred prosecution plan was modified by the Department of Justice
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to be consistent with discursive shifts emphasizing the individual offender. The final
section examines New York’s Baumes laws, a series of statutory reforms passed in New
York in 1926 targeting recidivists. The Baumes laws prompted the spread of habitual
offender laws across the states from the 1930s through 1960s. Analyses of the Baumes
laws and state court rulings upholding habitual offender laws reveals how they were
justified as part of rehabilitative programs taking hold in state penal systems.
The Spread of the Indeterminate Sentence and Revival of Individualization
As the linchpin of rehabilitative reform, indeterminate sentencing spread through
mid-century. Premised on the individualized treatment of the offender, the indeterminate
sentence subsumed structurally oriented theories of crime into its individualistic
framework, limiting their connection to structural reform. To understand how this
happened, it is useful to start with the 1949 Supreme Court case Williams vs. New York.
In Williams, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of indeterminate
sentencing. In the case, a sentencing judge in New York imposed the death sentence on a
defendant based on information not presented to a jury, which had only recommended
life imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence and drew on rehabilitative
logic to do so. Justice Black wrote that because, “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of jurisprudence,” the “punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime.” He concluded that as a result, judges should be
virtually unlimited in what they can consider during sentencing. Even conduct not
presented to juries and unrelated to the conviction at hand could be relevant factors in
individualizing a sentence to a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. That is why Justice
Black wrote that, “Today’s philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp
322

distinctions between first and repeat offenders.”843 That Black connected the logic of
individualization and rehabilitation not only to recidivism but also to capital punishment
reveals how deep the link was between rehabilitative ideology and punitive politics.
Black stated that “highly relevant—if not essential” to determining a defendant’s
sentence and rehabilitative potential was “the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s life and characteristics.” He wrote that judges should rely on the presentence
report written by probation officers when sentencing defendants. Probation in America
dated to the 1840s but became prominent with the rise of the rehabilitative ideal.
Probation officers supervise offenders released from prison or sentenced to non-custodial
sanctions. In the early twentieth century, most states passed probation laws to accompany
their indeterminate sentencing statutes, and Congress passed a Federal Probation Act in
1925.844
By the mid-twentieth century, probation officers in most jurisdictions became
regularly involved in preparing presentence reports (PSRs) for judges. PSRs included
recommendations regarding sentencing decisions and provided background information
on offenders for sentencing judges to consider. It was these reports that Black referred to
in Williams, noting that they outline a range of factors that judges should consider in
determining appropriate sentences and treatments. Black specifically cited a publication
from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts summarizing the purpose and design of
the PSR. The report indicated that the PSR was aimed towards improving individualized
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treatments and sentences. It stated the following:
Its [the PSR’s] primary object is to focus light on the character and personality of
the defendant, to offer insight into his personality needs, to discover those factors
underlying the specific offense and his conduct in general, and to aid the court in
deciding whether probation or some other form of treatment is for the best
interests of both the offender and society.845
The report, the authors said, would assist in “rehabilitative efforts” and help reformatories
“in their institutional classification and treatment programs.”846
It is telling that the publication opened by stating that the PSR was designed to
uncover information about the “character and personality of the defendant” and “his
personality needs.” The PSR focused on the individual’s personal rehabilitative potential
and needs, so factors connected to poverty or social inequalities were not understood as
structural problems but as factors that created personality faults requiring individual level
interventions or mitigated sentences. The report stated that the PSR should consist of 13
sections analyzing a defendant: “(1) Offense; (2) Prior Record; (3) Family History; (4)
Home and Neighborhood; (5) Education; (6) Religion; (7) Interests and Activities; (8)
Health; (9) Employment; (10) Resources; (11) Summary; (12) Plan; and (13) Agencies
Interested.”847 These factors were emphasized with an eye towards “an interpretation of
the defendant’s problems and needs” and an “evaluation of [the] defendant’s
personality.”848
The consideration of an individual’s prior criminal record and behavioral history
was particularly crucial. The authors not only clarified that a record of prior criminal
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convictions mattered to individualizing the sentence, but also noted that, “a long
succession of misdemeanors, even though the final disposition was ‘discharged,’ tells a
lot about the defendant.”849 This emphasis on the individual’s background and offense
history was a legacy of rehabilitative ideology embedded into the indeterminate model.
The consideration of past convictions, personal traits and background, and even charges
of which the defendant was acquitted were considered relevant as evidence of his or her
rehabilitative potential in addition to factors like physical health and I.Q.850
Socioeconomic status, educational background, family life, and neighborhood
conditions were all key considerations in the PSR. The authors noted that a probation
officer should address questions like, “is the neighborhood a delinquent area” and which
“races, nationalities, and culture predominate” the community. Questions about the
individual’s educational background were unrelated to the quality of schooling, but rather
the “defendant’s own reaction to school; his likes and dislikes” and “history of truancy.”
Questions about religion were premised on the notion that “religion may be a significant,
decisive factor in enabling an individual to overcome his difficulties,” reflecting the
presumption that criminality was a function of an individual’s lack of moral sense. Issues
related to employment did not consider the job opportunities in a community, or lack
thereof, but rather, “what kind of work is he [the defendant] best adapted? What field of
employment would he like to follow? What occupational skills has he,” and, “What is the
employer’s evaluation of the defendant’s personality, capabilities, punctuality,
reliability?” In addressing reasons for unemployment, the report suggested that these
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problems are often personal handicaps that should be addressed in the “health” section of
the report.851 Employment status was primarily regarded as evidence of an individual’s
merit, health, and character. The idea that the absence of a wage labor market in a
community could contribute to unemployment or criminality went unaddressed.
A revised version of the report in 1965 made similar interpretations. It stated that
the PSR’s main objective was to “present the respective problems and needs of the
individual offender in a meaningful way,” including his or her “needs, capacities, and
problems.”852 The report repeatedly contended that details relating to an individual’s
family background and employment history “have relatively little value unless they are
interpreted in relation to the defendant and how he thinks, feels, and behaves.”853 These
factors only matter in the sense that a “history of employment instability, family discord,
similar types of offenses, inability to tolerate tedium, and the need to be on the go, do, of
course, throw light on the defendant.”854 The 1965 PSR was a useful metric of how courts
implemented the indeterminate sentence, since by 1970 every state and the federal system
was using the indeterminate model.855
The emergence of probation officers and the use of the presentence report fit into
broader political trends in mid-century crime politics. The enhanced importance of PSRs
as a part of the indeterminate sentencing process fit into shifts towards promoting a
procedurally fair justice system in the 1940s. But socioeconomic disadvantage was not
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viewed as a structural cause of crime like theorists such as Robert Merton intended.
Rather, these factors became incorporated into a rehabilitative framework emphasizing
individualized treatment, individual faults, and individual-level solutions. Rehabilitative
frameworks neutralized the potential for a more progressive crime politics rooted in
political economic reform offered by new theoretical perspectives on crime.
The Evolution of Deferred Prosecution
Before they became one of the Justice Department’s primary tools in corporate
prosecutions, the deferred prosecution agreements originally envisioned by Printzlein
changed radically in the 1940s. In 1946, U.S. Attorney General Tom Clark authorized a
committee of Senior Circuit Judges to evaluate Printzlein’s program. The committee’s
final report, presented in September of 1947, suggested that the program had a bright
future. The judges wrote that they saw great value in the Printzlein program and believed
that its use “should be encouraged.”856
The DOJ’s endorsement came with serious alterations to Printzlein’s vision. The
committee wrote that “the plan should never be used except for first offenders,” and
claimed that recidivists deserved additional punishment. The report stated that deferred
prosecution should not be used “where there is a strong likelihood that the juvenile has
sustained delinquency traits and, although technically not a first offender, is actually a
recidivist who has been caught for the first time.” And for first-time offenders, the
committee argued that deferred agreements should only be offered “in cases where there
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is a reasonably good home background.”857
These constituted crucial changes from Printzlein’s original proposal. Printzlein’s
plan was designed to give disadvantaged juveniles a second chance. However, the
judicial committee believed that such deals should only be offered for individuals that
come from a “reasonably good home background,” which the committee saw as an
indicator of rehabilitative potential. This implied that deferred agreements should be
denied to the very people Printzlein wanted to help—juveniles from disadvantaged
backgrounds. The committee’s understanding of rehabilitative potential was built on class
assumptions that limited the program’s applicability.
Second, the report stated that deferred agreements should not be offered to
individuals with clean records if judges believed the individual might have committed
prior offenses for which he or she was not caught. This proposition hinged the entire
implementation of the program on subjective character judgments of individual
defendants made by sentencing judges. Two first-time defendants could be brought
before a judge for the same offense, but if the judge believed that one probably had
committed crimes before—despite no convictions, charges, or compelling evidence on
the person’s record—he or she should receive a more severe sentence while the other
could receive a deferred prosecution agreement. Again, this countered the original aims
of Printzlein’s proposal. Instead of giving individuals an opportunity to avoid exposure to
the justice system, this approach denied people that opportunity based on a judicial
evaluation of their personal background and character. The 1946 investigation led the
DOJ to formalize Printzlein’s practice in 1964 as a rehabilitative tool of the Justice
857
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Department, laying institutional groundwork for the deferred prosecution model to
become a core strategy of the DOJ’s approach to prosecuting corporate crime.858 These
modifications completely upended the initial reformist spirit of Printzlein’s program.
The deferred prosecution system was retooled to look more like the indeterminate
sentencing model. It was reformed to emphasize an individual’s background, personal
traits, and behavioral history in order to tailor punishment, reflecting the assumption that
these factors were strong indices of an individual’s rehabilitative capacity. This infused
Printzlein’s program with the class biases of rehabilitative ideology, suppressing his
program’s social-structural basis.
The Baumes Laws and the Spread of Habitual Offender Statutes
Rehabilitative ideology translated across time not only through the persistence of
its cornerstone policy innovation, the indeterminate sentence, but also through its
inseparable counterpart, the habitual offender law. Beginning in the 1920s, habitual
offender laws targeting recidivists with longer terms of incarceration spread across the
states. New York ignited the movement with the famous Baumes laws in 1926.
Sponsored by state Senator Caleb Baumes, these reforms abolished good behavior early
release incentives, increased sentences for repeat offenders, and instituted life sentences
for fourth felony convictions. Rebecca McClellan has presented these reforms as
consistent with the rise of managerial penology, a philosophy of prison management
more concerned with keeping inmates complacent than reforming them.859 In some ways
this is true, but rehabilitative ideology was fundamental to their design.
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This is clear in the statements of Baumes himself. He defended the laws by stating
that their purpose was “protection to the public” against “incurable” offenders, not prison
management.860 In 1927 the New York State Crime Commission reiterated Baumes’
arguments, claiming that law’s purpose was to contain offenders who “cannot be changed
by reform,” not to promote efficient prison administration. The Commission’s report
noted that the laws implemented ideas criminologists had long articulated about
individualization, particularly that, “punishments should be made to suit the criminal, not
the crime.”861
The Commission stated that, “there is nothing new about this statute” because it
simply replicated New York’s 1907 habitual offender law that had gone unenforced due
to poor record-keeping and failures in communication between prosecutors, police, and
courts.862 For years preceding New York’s passage of the initial law in 1907, the New
York State Board of Charities advocated for it by drawing on rehabilitative penology.
The 1905 SBC report cited Brockway, who served on the Board, for using the
indeterminate sentence to release reformed offenders and provide “permanent detention”
to “those who by defect of character or constitution” required containment. The SBC
concluded that a habitual offender law was necessary because “incorrigible offenders
should be permanently segregated by the state” and that the indeterminate sentence
“should be relieved of its maximum limit” to contain incorrigibles.863 The SBC’s 1907
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report expressed support for the law, citing Dugdale and Lombroso as proving that
habitual criminals are a “distinct class” requiring restraint, and praised the law for
instituting a “genuinely indeterminate sentence” for incorrigibles.864
That the Baumes laws replicated the 1907 statute underscores its connections to
rehabilitation. This was noticeable in the first case prosecuted under the law. After being
arrested for holding up a store, a 21-year old man was sentenced to life imprisonment
under the law in August of 1926. His judge had this to say during his sentencing hearing:
Hanson, you have four other complaints against you in addition to the one older
offense. You had punishment when you were sent to Elmira Reformatory. It did
you no good. You are no good to yourself or society. I sentence you to life
imprisonment and direct that you be kept there for the natural extent of your
life.865
In design and implementation, the Baumes’ laws were tied to evaluations of rehabilitative
potential. Journalist Robert Quillen defended it by writing that some offenders are
“natural-born rebels” who “do not desire the opportunity to reform” and “can not be
reformed.”866 Baumes made comparable claims before the New York State Bankers’
Association, stating that the laws that bore his name were designed “not so much for the
punishment of the criminal as the protection of society. They are not retributive nor
vindictive…These laws may provide the last and only chance for the redemption of
hardened criminals, because if these men go to prison for life they must go to church.”867
In response to public uproar after the laws’ passage, New York reinstituted early
New York State Board of Public Charities, Annual Report of the State Board of Charities for the
Year 1907 (Albany: JB Lyon, 1908), 643–68.
“Gets Life Sentence Under Baumes Law for a $51 Hold-Up: Youth Who Robbed Brooklyn Store
the First to Draw the Maximum Penalty,” New York Times, August 21, 1926.
Robert Quillen, “Habitual Criminals,” Washington Post, November 29, 1927.
“Baumes Talks to Bankers: New Criminal Law Are for Society’s Protection, He Says,” New York
Times, January 18, 1928.
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release incentives and replaced the life sentence with a fifteen-year minimum in 1931.868
But the damage had been done. Over the next two decades, forty-three states passed
legislation based on the Baumes laws. Twenty-nine authorized judges to issue life
sentences for third or fourth time offenders.869 Five states attempted to pass versions of
the Baumes laws only one year after New York.870 These proposals were similarly
justified through rehabilitative ideology. For example, in 1927 the county prosecutor in
Minneapolis said that the state’s proposed version of the Baumes laws “gives prosecuting
attorneys the power to deal severely with the man who will not reform.”871 Prosecutors
and judges in Pennsylvania fought for a Baumes law in the late 1920s, going “on the
record in favor of a new law fixing punishment for crime on the principle that confirmed
criminals should be ‘permanently removed as a menace to society.’”872
As of 1950, forty-two states had statutes that increased sentences for recidivists.
Thirty-two authorized life sentences in varying circumstances with different degrees of
judicial discretion. Table 6.4 below outlines these variations. As Professor George Brown
of St. Lawrence University observed in 1945, the laws were typically, “regarded as a
reformatory measure” that “contemplates an enhanced punishment for a party who…does
not reform, but persists in committing other offenses of a like character.”873
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FIGURE 6.4: State Habitual Offender Laws (1949)
Type of Law

No. of States

States

Life sentence, 2 felonies
(Discretionary)

3

AZ, ME, OK

Life sentence, 3 felonies
(Discretionary)

7

CA, ID, IL,
KS, LA, UT, VA

Life sentence, 3 felonies
(Mandatory)

6

IN, KY, MI, TX, WA, WV

Life sentence, 4 felonies
(Discretionary)

5

MN, ND, OR, PA, SD

Life sentence, 4 felonies
(Mandatory)

10

CO, FL, MO, NJ, NM,
NY, OH, TN, VT, WY

Life sentence, 5 felonies
(Mandatory)

1

NV

Increased terms of
confinement

11

AL, CT, DE, DC, GA,
IA, MA, NE, NH, RI, WI

*Compiled by tracing statutory citations from the following three sources: “Court
Treatment” (1948); Tappan (1949); and Brown (1945).
At the conclusion of his analysis, Brown noted that habitual offender laws can be severe,
but tied them to the logic of rehabilitation:
…the indeterminate sentence affords the best opportunity for the treatment of the
recidivist at this time. For those recidivists who are reformable, the parole
techniques…become increasingly important… For those lacking reformable
characteristics, it seems quite possible that the indeterminate sentence can restrain
them for a period long enough to prevent active danger on their release... If their
attitudinal distortions or other mental anomalies can be acceptably changed, they
too would be given consideration for release. If not, they would be restrained for
life.874
Brown went on to directly attribute the spread of these habitual offenders’ laws to the
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ideas of Lombroso. He argued that precursors to habitual offender laws could be traced to
1817 but noted that these laws only punished the re-commission of the same crime(s). By
1900, “No doubt as a result of the work of Lombroso, the rising popularity of the
‘habitual criminal’ caused a change in this situation.” Lombrosian theory encouraged
lawmakers to apply the label “habitual” to any recidivist, regardless of the crimes he
committed, shaping the political construction of the “habitual offender” in America.875
Despite numerous proposals, few states initially succeeded in passing their own
versions of the Baumes laws in the 1920s. Figure 6.5 below shows that states generally
did not succeed in passing such proposals until the mid 1930s and 1940s.
FIGURE 6.5: US States with Habitual Offenders Laws, 1926-1947
45
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No. of
Laws
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*Chart tabulated from three sources: Tappan, Brown, and “Court Treatment.”876
Brown, 644.
Tappan, “Habitual Offender Laws in the United States”; Brown, “The Treatment of the Recidivist in
the United States”; “Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes.” There were some discrepancies
between the three, and I only included statutes I traced down and confirmed in the data presented here.
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Even though many states immediately praised the laws after their passage, the rapid
spread of habitual offender laws coincided with discursive shifts towards individualism in
the latter stages of the New Deal. Habitual offender laws manifested as the punitive
prong of rehabilitative ideology in the 1940s during a renewed push towards
individualized treatment and indeterminate sentencing.
Two states led the way in penal reform in mid-century. New York, which had
been recognized as a leader in corrections since Brockway’s term at Elmira, regained
national attention for the passage of the Baumes laws. California’s Youth and Adult
Authorities made the state a leader in penal reform, and while the Authorities were
ostensibly progressive and geared towards rehabilitative programming through
sentencing individualization, California saw its prison population spike after their
creation from 5,700 in 1944 to 19,202 in 1958.877 As a result, close analyses of the
habitual offender laws in New York and California offer insight into the rationale behind
the laws and their connection to rehabilitative ideology. Judicial rulings from the two
state court systems are particularly useful, since state legislative records from this period
are not consistently available and SBCs were no longer in operation.878 Given
developments in procedural justice in the 1940s, courts were hearing more cases
regarding criminal justice than ever before. As leaders of penal reform, the California and
New York court systems thus provide meaningful insight into how habitual offender laws
See Walker, Popular Justice, 208–15 on the important role California played as a leader in criminal
justice reform from the 1940s through 1960s.
I could not find SBC reports from this era. They may have been in operation, but at the very least
they declined in prominence to such an extent that I could not find their reports. This suggests that
their reports would not have been meaningful metrics for state-level political decision-making at this
time.
335
877

878

fit into broader currents in crime politics in mid-century.
When the New York Court of Appeals first upheld the Baumes laws, it did so by
linking them to rehabilitative purposes. In the ruling, the Court wrote that rehabilitation is
one of the primary goals of incarceration, stating that early release incentives for good
behavior often “works for the rescue and reformation of the individual.” But the court
qualified this by stating that, “the laws enacted for the reformation of the criminal should
be administered with caution and circumspection” to ensure that punishment is meted out
when necessary. The court stated that in determining a sentence, the defendant’s past
convictions and behavior “have much to do with the way he should be treated.” The
Court presented the Baumes laws as a necessary complement to New York’s
rehabilitative programming for individuals who did not deserve another chance.879
Only three year later, the Supreme Court of New York struck down a sentence
under the Baumes statutes in a ruling that tied the laws to rehabilitative logic. In People v.
Spellman, a judge sentenced a defendant who had committed three felonies at the same
time to a life sentence under the Baumes laws. The individual had no priors, but the judge
determined the three offenses constituted the three strikes necessary for a life sentence.
The state Supreme Court reversed, stating that the law “humanely and justly required a
mandatory life sentence only after three or more fully completed, legal, prior judgments
of conviction, separated sufficiently to offer opportunity for the felon to reform.”880 The
striking down of Spellman’s conviction underscored that the justification for a life
sentence under the Baumes laws was premised on having multiple opportunities to
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rehabilitate. The habitual offenders law was not seen as in conflict with rehabilitation, but
as an integral part of the state’s rehabilitative programming. In the 1950s, the Supreme
Court of New York again recognized that the Baumes laws were grounded on
rehabilitative theory, noting that the “theory of…the so-called Baumes Laws…is that
they [repeat offenders] have not reformed since their first offense but have persisted in
breaking the law.”881
The California courts upheld the state’s habitual offender law on similar grounds.
In the 1946 case People v. Richardson, a state Court of Appeals upheld the law in the
face of challenges that it violated double jeopardy. Dismissing arguments that being
punished more severely for previous behavior constituted double punishment for the
same crime, the Court ruled that habitual criminality was not an offense but a status.
Allegations of previous convictions, and that an accused is an habitual criminal,
are not allegations of a substantive crime, but are a status which, in the eyes of the
law, aggravates the position of the perpetrator of the primary offense alleged in
the indictment in the sense that he comes within the classification of those who
probably may never be reformed. He has evidenced a predilection to commit
certain offenses which has become a settled custom, indicating a tendency toward
repetition. Such an offender, so the Legislature has decreed, is subject to the
infliction of a longer term of imprisonment.882
Despite the fact that People v. Richardson came from a lower appellate court, it still had
significant sway. It was cited 58 times between 1946 and 2013, and 43 of those instances
occurred before 1970 during the proliferation of habitual offender laws. California courts
have long since ruled against claims that habitual offender laws violate double jeopardy,
deciding that the laws do not create an offense but a status for those “who have proved
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immune to lesser punishment” and require more severe sanction.883 State courts in
Washington, Minnesota, Nebraska, and New Jersey rejected double jeopardy challenges
on grounds similar to those deployed by the New York and California court systems.884
In 1967, the California Court of Appeals rendered a ruling that was almost a
replica of the New York Supreme Court’s 1930 ruling in People v. Spellman in which a
defendant was sentenced to life after committing three offenses simultaneously. Noting
that the label of habitual criminality could only be earned through “separate trials,” the
court ruled that for the habitual offender law to apply, a defendant’s convictions must be
separated to provide “two chances of rehabilitation.” The court ruled that the purpose of
“any” habitual offender law “is not obscure.” Such a law serves two purposes: “(1) to act
as a deterrent to repeated criminal acts while affording the criminal two…opportunities to
rehabilitation, and (2) to protect society against the incorrigible recidivist.” The court
concluded that concurrent crimes should not count as proof of habitual criminality, ruling
that the label only applies to those who have experienced, “separate terms…for separate
offenses separately sentenced,” that “have been followed by separate chances at
rehabilitation.” But the court recognized that, “the third time around defendant, to adopt
the vernacular, ‘has had it.’”885 The California Supreme Court ruled little differently,
stating one year earlier that the primary purpose of the law was “to protect society from

In re McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 264 (1946); In re Harincar, 29 Cal. 2d 403 (1946); In re Bramble, 31
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Washington v. Edelstein, 146 Wash 221 (1927); Washington v. Hensley, 20 Wn. 2d 495 (1944);
Hansen v. Rigg, 258 Minn. 388 (1960); Davis v. O’Grady, 137 Neb. 708 (1940); Goodman v. Kunkle,
72 F.2d 334 (1934); New Jersey v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565 (1962); New Jersey v. Van Buren, 29 N.J.
548 (1959).
People v. Reed, 249 Cal. App. 2d 468 (1967).
338
883

884

885

incorrigible criminals.”886 These statutory precursors to three strikes laws defined strikes
not as three crimes, but as three opportunities to rehabilitate.
Habitual offender laws are odd and underappreciated features of the U.S. criminal
justice system. To this day, the American justice system’s emphasis on an individual’s
background and criminal history as sentencing considerations is attributable to the
influence of rehabilitative ideology and the indeterminate model. Contemporary variants
of habitual offender laws, including career criminal or three-strikes laws, are common in
American states. But they are remarkably unusual in comparison to countries in Europe,
Asia, and Scandinavia, which rarely consider an individual’s background or personal
history in making sentencing decisions. Nonetheless, in American jurisdictions, a prior
record can have a greater impact on an individual’s sentence than the offense committed.
The reliance on criminal history embedded into American sentencing systems is a legacy
of rehabilitative ideology’s emphasis on predictive capacitation and rehabilitative
potential.887 Even after the criminal justice system became untied from biological ideas of
criminality, this is how notions of innate criminality remained embedded in the fabric of
the penal system. The deterministic and individualistic aspects of rehabilitative
ideology’s punitive features have infected how justice is meted out in America even
while biological theory has waxed and waned in influence.
It is unsurprising that habitual offender laws flourished next to state statutes that
also conceptualized criminality in terms of biology. Well into mid-century, at least a
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dozen states continued to authorize sterilization for criminal offenders.888 It is true that
support for criminal sterilization soured in the 1940s after the Supreme Court struck
down an Oklahoma law in 1942 in Oklahoma vs. Skinner that authorized compulsory
sterilization of habitual offenders.889 But this supposed repudiation of the eugenics
tradition was weaker than many observers suggest. Skinner did not overturn or limit Buck
v. Bell but struck down the Oklahoma law for not differentiating crimes of “moral
turpitude” from other offenses in defining the “habitual offender.” Justice Douglas, the
decision’s author, elsewhere stated he thought sterilization statutes were constitutional if
they contained appropriate “careful procedural safeguards.” Extant research shows that
sterilization rates actually rose in the years immediately following Skinner, remained high
through the 1950s, and only noticeably declined in the 1960s.890
Beginning in the 1940s, American penology renewed its push to perfect the
system of individualized treatment. The spread of indeterminate sentencing brought with
it an emphasis on providing sanctions tailored to the individual, stunting the progressive
potential of new social-structural explanations of criminality. Rehabilitative institutions
and practices—including indeterminate sentencing, presentence investigation reports, and
habitual offender laws—served as frameworks through which new ideas were channeled
and modified. Practices and premises associated with rehabilitative ideology and notions
of innate criminality were embedded into these institutions. Given the unity of
individualistic and deterministic assumptions in rehabilitative frameworks, structural
theories of crime lost their progressive bite. While some theoretical criminologists
888
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viewed poverty and structural disadvantage as causes of crime rooted in economic and
class relations, policymakers viewed them as individual level faults requiring microsolutions through rehabilitative reforms rather than broad-based political economic ones.
V. Conclusion
By the onset of the Great Society, every state and the federal system had an
indeterminate system and almost every one experimented with a habitual offender law.
Numerous scholars have thus claimed in the 1960s, the rehabilitative ideal of American
criminal justice reigned supreme. They then conclude that the political repudiation of
rehabilitation in the 1960s and 1970s was a key driver of punitive politics that
precipitated the onset of mass incarceration.891
What this chapter has illustrated is that the rehabilitative ideal played a significant
role in laying institutional and ideological groundwork for mass incarceration. The
politics of the 1960s and 1970s should not be viewed as “rejecting” the rehabilitative
ideal. The punitive politics associated with mass incarceration was in part driven by an
increased emphasis on one part of the ideal’s dual logic. Increased sentences for
recidivists, three-strikes laws, and efforts to preemptively identify criminals based on
criminal histories, socioeconomic backgrounds, and personal traits were not new in the
latter twentieth century. Rather, they were integral to the spread of rehabilitative
programming throughout the twentieth century. The onset of mass incarceration was not
ignited by a rejection of rehabilitation; it was marked by a capitalization on an
underappreciated punitive facet of rehabilitative logic.

Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal; Garland, The Culture of Control; Tonry, Sentencing
Fragments.
341
891

Ira Katznelson has argued that the political economic reforms of the Great Society
should be understood in terms established by the reforms of the postwar era, which he
argues undercut the prospects for a robust social democratic politics in the U.S.892
Katznelson’s argument also applies to crime policy, as the opportunities for the Great
Society to promote structural reform as a solution to crime were limited by the resurgence
of the rehabilitative ideal the 1940s. Any potential to link an understanding of criminality
to social and economic dynamics was compromised by a revival of rehabilitative
ideology that led policymakers to reinterpret macro-level crime theories in light of
individual level dynamics. This laid crucial institutional and ideological groundwork for
the crime politics and policies of the 1960s that directly preceded the onset of mass
incarceration.
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CHAPTER 7: BUSINESS POWER, KEYNESIANISM, AND CORPORATE
CRIMINALITY IN MID-CENTURY
“I suppose there is no agency in the world that can prevent crookedness.”
- Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, 1933893
The relationship between the politics of street crime and corporate crime in midcentury did not illustrate the pattern visible in Gilded Age and Progressive Era politics
because they were not driven by a common set of ideas and ideologies. There is no set of
thinkers or ideational trends that produced divergent constructions of both street and
corporate criminality in the 1930s through 1960s. However, developments in the
punishment of corporate crime during this period were connected to changes in New Deal
politics that were also mirrored in the politics of street crime. Particularly, the politics of
corporate crime during these years reflected the New Deal regime’s shift away from its
social democratic basis in the 1930s to its more moderated version in the 1940s.
The story of corporate crime politics during the New Deal and postwar years is
not one in which evolving ideas and ideologies contributed to policy change, as earlier
chapters outline. Rather, it is one in which political actors operated within an institutional
context that had been built upon certain practices, premises, and ideologies over time.
Coupled with an evolving alignment of political forces, this tied New Deal political
leaders in the executive branch and in Congress to a durable governing class ideology
that was embedded into regulatory arrangements, economic policy, and the corporate
criminal law. This is particularly clear in how policymakers articulated the language of
“respectability” in defense of business leaders in securities, investment banking, and
893
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other industries that caused the Great Depression. This language was nearly identical to
political defenses of business leaders rooted in biological, anthropological, and eugenic
theories of human behavior. This exhibits a degree of continuity in the state’s approach to
monitoring corporate crime. Because this posture took shape earlier in the century and
was embedded into institutions, notions that the “respectability” of individual corporate
actors warranted a different response to their criminal actions became an institutionally
grounded idea that was untied to biological ideologies. These ideas about corporate crime
were institutionally entrenched in ways that kept their ideological power the same even
though they were no longer explicitly rooted in bio-essentialism.
These prevailing institutional and ideological frameworks shaped interest group
politicking and the policy choices of leaders of the New Deal coalition. Even during a
period of substantial change in American politics, this governing class ideology
conditioned how the state responded to the abuses, frauds, and scandals that precipitated
the Great Depression. This was significant; in the wake of the Depression, there was
tangible outrage at the financial industry for facilitating the crisis. The explosive findings
of the Pecora Commission, a congressional inquiry that investigated the causes of the
Depression, provided a political basis for the state to crack down on the abuses of Wall
Street and finance in new ways. But it did not produce those changes given how leading
business interests and New Deal political leaders politicized corporate crime.
Once again, political change related to corporate criminal law and regulatory
policy can only be understood upon acknowledging shifts in the political economy. In the
New Deal period, the financial sector had become a dominating force in the American
economy. As the growth of the investment banking and securities industries took off in
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the 1920s, debates about corporate crime became centralized in these sectors of the
political economy. As a result, business leaders in investment banking, securities, and
exchanges became the primary interest groups that carried ideas about corporate
criminality into mid-century debates.
Investment bankers and leaders of securities exchanges defused the potency of the
Pecora Commission’s findings by articulating a defense of the familiar brand of
regulatory ideology traceable to debates over the Interstate Commerce Act. Defenses of
the character of businessmen, concerns about a vindictive public, and an emphasis on the
complexity of the financial system all justified a regulatory approach to monitoring the
industry in debates over the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts. But bankers,
exchanges, and executives gave regulatory ideology a crucial twist by adapting it to the
political context of the 1930s. They argued that too much criminalization or regulation of
industry would impede progress at a time when the economy was struggling to pull out of
the depression. In this sense, these legislative debates mirrored what David Vogel found
between the 1960s and 1980s—that the political power of big businesses actually
increases during economic downturns, when the public and policymakers are fearful of
impeding economic revitalization through too much intervention.894 By adapting
regulatory ideology to the context of the 1930s, investment bankers and exchange
executives convinced lawmakers to rely on a familiar regulatory ideology to monitor
markets rather than act on the populist impulses inflamed by the Pecora Commission.
Preexisting institutional arrangements not only shaped the politics of industry
leaders, but also of leaders of the New Deal coalition. This is particularly clear in the
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politics of the era’s most prominent trustbuster, Thurman Arnold. Although FDR
appointed him to run the Justice Department’s antitrust division from 1938 to 1943,
Arnold’s personal writings and statements before the Temporary National Economic
Committee in the 1940s belie his image as a fervent trustbuster. He regularly
demonstrated a hesitance to use the prosecutorial powers of the antitrust division in lieu
of civil or administrative interventions. Other members of FDR’s inner circle like James
Landis and William O. Douglas, both of whom served as chair of the Securities Exchange
Commission, were similarly reluctant to challenge the prevailing institutional structures
in which they operated, which separated corporate crime from the criminal justice system
through regulatory institutions.
By the late 1940s, the New Deal regime’s initial emphasis on regulation gave way
to an emphasis on “commercial Keynesianism,” a variety of economic thought articulated
by corporations and conservatives that emphasized the state’s capacity to tax and spend
as the way to promote economic stability rather than robust regulation. In the 1940s and
1950s, this shift away from regulatory politics discouraged state monitoring of exchanges
and investment banking in ways that curbed earlier New Deal reforms.
Even though developments in street and corporate crime were not rooted in shared
wells of political thought during this period, the evolution of both strands of politics bear
similarities rooted in the nature of New Deal political discourse. First, in both cases, there
was an opportunity for a radical change in the New Deal’s earliest stages. Second, in both
cases, appeals to older ideas, ideologies, and institutional dynamics channeled those
impulses for change into directions that reaffirmed older trends. In the case of street
crime, ideas emphasizing structural dynamics were reinterpreted through rehabilitative
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frameworks in ways that emphasized the individual. In the case of corporate crime, the
Pecora Commission’s potential to foster penalization of exchange officials and
investment bankers was checked when bankers, exchange leaders, and executives
channeled those impulses into regulatory ideology, imbuing them with a new political
significance during the economic crisis. Third, by the 1940s, the prospects for radical
change in both domains had been diminished by broader shifts in New Deal political and
economic discourse as the regime’s statist instincts weakened.
The chapter begins by analyzing the place of finance and banking in the New
Deal coalition, reviewing the shifting relationship between the state and core industries in
the political economy from the 1930s through 1950s. Section II then examines changes in
the ideational and political construction of criminality in the New Deal period. Section III
examines how investment bankers and exchanges extinguished the prospects for radical
reform coming out of the Pecora Commission by reframing regulatory ideology within
the context of the Great Depression. This produced changes in the Securities Act and
Securities Exchange Acts that favored financial interests and reflected older varieties of
regulatory ideology. Section IV explores how shifts towards commercial Keynesianism
in the 1940s entailed changes in the way corporate criminality was conceived. This
neutralized any remaining potential for the New Deal coalition to promote robust statist
reform in the realm of regulation or corporate criminal law. The section explores the
findings of the Temporary National Economic Committee, the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), and the Justice Department’s antitrust case against
an investment banking trust in U.S. v. Morgan (1953).
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I. The Place of Business in the New Deal Coalition
Accounts presenting the New Deal as having ushered in an industrially regulated
state often assume that leading business interests of the era were hostile to the regime.
Such scholarship suggests that the New Deal tamed these industries, as the regulatory
logic of New Deal policy was founded on older progressive imperatives to order
business-state relations.895 For instance, Fred Block’s neo-Marxist account suggests that
the Great Depression neutralized conservative forces and created room for liberals and
labor to promote regulatory change. Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal work argues that the
New Deal was simply a vote-getting response to discontent with market failures in the
wake of the collapse.896
For other observers, this narrative is too simple. Many argue that as businesses
mobilized in more coordinated ways in the latter twentieth century, they dismantled the
New Deal’s achievements.897 Power elite theorists, new left historians, and scholars like
Colin Gordon, William Domhoff, and Thomas Ferguson have made the case that capitalintensive industries or financial interests worked with the New Deal coalition to stabilize
the capitalist order.898 Theda Skocpol alternatively suggests that it was not the
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mobilization of any specific business interests that limited the New Deal’s reforms, but
rather the way popular demands were channeled through rigid institutional machinery in
ways that led to “piecemeal reforms and…partially successful efforts” to promote
economic recovery.899
Much of this work highlights how the New Deal coalition accommodated and
acquiesced to sectors of industry over time in ways that explain shifts in the regime’s
political commitments. This chapter is thus contextualized within research identifying the
postwar period as a critical juncture in the political development of New Deal
liberalism.900 Examining the four phases of the New Deal outlined in the previous chapter
illustrates key dynamics in the regime’s evolving relationship to banking and finance.
Regulatory Policy in the Early New Deal, 1933-1937
The early choices of the Roosevelt Administration were largely conservative
ventures to save capitalism through emergency bills to stabilize the economy. The GlassSteagall law, the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts, and the National Industrial
Recovery Act were all written with the assistance of financial interests. With the support
of virtually all non-Morgan investment bankers, Glass-Steagall and the New Deal’s
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securities reforms secured a place for finance in the New Deal coalition while becoming
durable fixtures of American financial law.901
Arguments from Block, Schlesinger, and others that the Depression depleted the
political strength of financial interests and created an opportunity for liberal and labor
militancy to drive reform assume that the public’s perception of corporate power soured
in the 1930s.902 There is certainly reason to believe this was the case. In the wake of the
Depression, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency authorized an inquiry into
the causes of the crash. Called the Pecora Commission for its chief counsel and former
New York Assistant DA Ferdinand Pecora, the commission uncovered a range of abusive
and fraudulent practices in the securities industry. In his sweeping historical analysis of
investment banking in America, Vincent Carosso suggests that investment bankers had
their reputations destroyed by the hearings. But Carosso also notes that many bankers
insisted that some regulatory interventions were necessary.903 This complements
historical accounts that non-Morgan bankers played key roles in the passage of the GlassSteagall Act, since they viewed the separation of commercial and investment banking as
a way to destroy the foundation of Morgan hegemony in American finance.904
The claim that the public was disillusioned with corporate power in the 1930s is
notably qualified by Louis Galambos. In his research, Galambos reveals that there were
five cycles of anti-business opinion from 1880 through 1940, with the Great Depression

Ferguson, “Industrial Conflict,” 14–15, 19–24; Domhoff and Webber, Class and Power in the New
Deal, 24–26; Domhoff, The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy, 24–25.
Block, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule”; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal; Carosso,
Investment Banking, 300 says the reputation of investment bankers was destroyed by the crash.
Carosso, Investment Banking, 322–51.
Ferguson, “Industrial Conflict,” 14–17.
350
901

902

903
904

sparking the final one. In a quantitative analysis of eleven public interest magazines,
Galambos finds that there was a decline in public attitudes towards corporate power after
the collapse, but that across the five cycles of anti-business opinion each successive one
saw less hostility, with the 1930s being the weakest. His work shows that in spite of the
collapse, the public remained generally accepting of the corporate order.905 It would thus
be hasty to view the New Deal’s initial regulatory policies as manifestations of radical
anti-business impulses, as investment bankers were crucial to shaping debates over the
Securities and Securities Exchange Acts.906
Historian Michael Parrish called the New Deal’s securities reforms “a
conservative revolution which nonetheless horrified a great many conservatives.” New
Dealers like Frankfurter, Landis, Cohen, and Corcoran designed the Securities Act to
prop up the economy while minimizing state intervention into markets. Passed within the
first hundred days, there was little time for bankers and securities officials to mobilize
effectively, and the law did not reflect many of their core concerns. But by the passage of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, bankers and exchange leaders were able to mobilize
even more successfully. The New Dealers involved in drafting the law wanted to
empower the Federal Trade Commission to regulate the securities industry, but
investment bankers and exchange officials led by Richard Whitney, head of the New
York Stock Exchange, pushed for a separate commission to regulatory and flexibly work
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with industries. The compromise that emerged with a Securities Exchange Commission
showed that Congress was willing to accommodate entrenched economic interests.907
The second New Deal from 1935-37 witnessed the passage of cornerstones of
American social policy including the National Labor Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards
Act, and Social Security Act.908 But Thomas Ferguson’s work shows how economic
elites from capital-intensive industries where labor was a small expenditure and labor
turbulence a minor concern allied with Roosevelt by supporting this pro-labor legislation
in exchange for free trade policy.909 As a result, even the second New Deal helped to
buttress the capitalist order by evening out competitive disparities resulting from private
experimentation with benefits and garnering support for free trade. Peter Swenson has
also argued that support for New Deal social policy among business can be understood as
“post-facto cross-class alliances.” While some sectors of the economy supported New
Deal social policy from the outset, politicians anticipated a process of policy feedback in
which those in opposition would eventually realize how these reforms promoted healthy
competitive dynamics.910
It was in this context that several major regulatory reforms were passed in which
debates about criminal behavior among firms were a major issue. Section III of this
chapter examines this trend in the passage Securities and Securities Exchange Act. The
post-Depression political context offered some opportunities for a break from past
Michael Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1970), 4, chapters 3 and 5.
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approaches to regulation and criminalization, especially given the findings of the Pecora
Commission. However, investment bankers, brokers, and exchange officials appealed to
persistent ideological constructions of corporate criminality in ways that led to familiar
outcomes—the creation of a regulatory agency with wide discretion to respond to crime
through an assortment of non-criminal sanctions.
Mirroring David Vogel’s analysis of business-state relations from the 1960s
through 1980s, the legislative record reveals that investment bankers, exchange officials,
and securities brokers had significant political power during the Depression because
policymakers were reluctant to over-regulate the economy in ways that might inhibit
recovery.911 In the wake of the Depression, regulatory ideology appealed to policymakers
who were afraid to obstruct economic progress. Demands for criminalization of the
securities industry were checked by an impulse to give regulators discretion to work
cautiously with the industry and get it back on its feet. This serves as a testament to the
institutional and ideological precedents of the regulatory state. The construction of
corporate criminality built into regulatory ideology had political purchase even in the
wake of the nation’s greatest economic crisis.
The Development of Commercial Keynesianism
The New Deal regime found itself in retreat in 1937 as Roosevelt’s new pump
priming approach to economics foreshadowed postwar Keynesian policies of demand
management. Insistent on returning to fiscal orthodoxy, Roosevelt facilitated a recession
by cutting public investment and pursuing a balanced budget. As southern Democrats and
Republicans coalesced with financial moderates in response, a conservative coalition
911
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emerged to challenge the New Deal.912 This coalition was able to dial back some of the
New Deal’s regulatory successes in the late 1930s.913 The Temporary National Economic
Committee (TNEC) was the final gasp of the New Deal’s potential to promote a robust
regulatory politics. When Congress created the committee in 1938 to study economic
concentration, it appeared to mark a revival of anti-monopolism, but the TNEC praised
industrial consolidation as efficient while defending state regulation of markets to
monitor concentration. The TNEC attracted little attention when it published its report in
1941, as anti-monopolist attitudes faded in the 1930s.914
G. William Domhoff’s analysis shows that the liberal-labor coalition at the heart
of the New Deal began losing to a corporate-conservative bloc in the late 1930s. He
illustrates how these coalitions were in conflict from the New Deal’s origins, but that
conservative victories became more frequent after 1937. By drawing on Keynesian
theory, many corporations advocated a moderate conservatism that countered the
orthodox conservatism of major business networks like the Chamber of Commerce.
These corporate moderates aligned with a coalition of Republicans and Democrats from
southern states to block liberal-labor initiatives and secure compromises on business
regulation and taxation.915
There was clearly a spectrum of opinions among corporate interests and business
organizations regarding economic policy in mid-century. However, historian Robert
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Collins has shown how the Committee for Economic Development (CED) emerged in
1942 as a particularly influential and coordinated voice that represented a variety of
businesses and industries and championed business-friendly economic policy. A
business-led public policy organization, the CED was designed to help the state manage
its transition to a peacetime economy. The CED accepted core precepts of Keynesianism,
like occasionally using deficit spending to promote economic recovery, while rejecting
hard left interpretations of Keynes from New Dealers like Alvin Hansen who defended
progressive taxation, public investment, and redistributive policy. The CED was a major
force in cultivating business support for a new economics rooted in a moderated
Keynesianism in the postwar period.916
Scholars have different ways of explaining the subsequent postwar shifts in
economic policy. Most call the corporate-conservative bloc’s version of Keynesianism
that prevailed “commercial Keynesianism.” While the early New Deal was characterized
by a social democratic Keynesianism, this variant was more amenable to private
enterprise and relied on state manipulation of the money supply to promote growth. A
bipartisan persuasion, it encouraged the state to abandon the political commitments
inherent to social democratic Keynesianism, including the pursuit of full employment,
significant public investment, and the use of redistributive policy to bolster the
purchasing power of the poor and middle classes. While commercial Keynesianism
accepted some features of its social democratic counterpart, such as economic
management and occasional deficit spending, it relied on bolstering growth by
encouraging private investment rather than stimulating demand. This meant lowering
916

Collins, The Business Response to Keynes especially first three chapters for a broad overview.
355

taxes on corporations and the wealthy, cutting social spending, and relying on automatic
stabilizers like unemployment insurance to counteract the ups and downs of the business
cycle. The war and postwar years were characterized by a debate between these two
visions of governance—a statist one promoting social welfare and regulation and a
moderated one emphasizing taxing and spending.917
The New Deal’s original social democratic Keynesianism relied on an
administrative politics regulating capital structures. New Dealers like Corcoran, Landis,
and Cohen believed in mature economy theory, which was premised on the assumption
that all the basic industries had developed and the nation would be trapped in stagnation
without statist economic policy. But WWII prompted economic recovery in a single
stroke, robbing mature economy theory of its credibility. Further, the ineffectiveness of
the War Production Board diminished the public’s faith in the administrative state. These
developments re-legitimized the public’s faith in capitalism, and defenders of social
Keynesianism began to lose debates to corporate moderates and conservatives
championing commercial Keynesianism.918
As the political climate shifted, the commercial Keynesianism articulated by the
CED took root. The CED claimed that the state should only act in compensatory ways to
redress imbalances in the private economy without challenging capitalism. It pushed for a
politics aiming to enhance growth through tax cuts to encourage private investment in
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lieu of pursuing stability through state spending on welfare and public projects.919 This
pushed monetary policy into the center of economic debates, deprived regulatory
impulses of their urgency, and fused social policy to a vision of sustained economic
growth driven by private investment. This stripped New Deal liberalism of its regulatory
and collectivist instincts by replacing demands for state-led economic planning and
regulation with compensatory policies to correct for the inequalities of capitalism.920
This variant of Keynesian theory was more individualistic than social democratic
Keynesianism. It turned the “forgotten men” of the New Deal into a mass of atomized
consumers and viewed private investment as the key to spurring growth.921 This politics
was thus directed towards corporate development and the promotion of consumer culture
rather than promoting any sort of communal vision of social welfare.922 Efforts to revive
social Keynesianism were routinely dismissed in the 1940s, as evidenced by
conservatives’ quashing of the NRPB in 1943, which made room for the CED and
Business Advisory Council (BAC) to gain power. The BAC, which also endorsed a
compensatory version of Keynesianism amenable to capital, was created in 1933 in the
hope that it could harmonize the Roosevelt Administration’s relationship with business
and finance.923 As these organizations grew in influence in the 1940s, they hardened the
conservative version of Keynesianism.924 The corporate-conservative coalition was
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consequently able to win major legislative victories on regulation, spending, labor
organizing, and taxation.925
Historian Robert Collins argues that by 1948, “The American business
community had at last domesticated Keynes.”926 The CED had worked with economists
to promote rightward shifts in Keynesianism, leading Collins to conclude that economics
is “partly a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each period as well as partly a method of
scientific investigation.”927 The Justice Department’s attempt to file a high-profile
antitrust suit against seventeen major investment-banking firms in the late 1940s and
early 1950s backfired, and Eisenhower directly followed the recommendations of the
CED in responding to fluctuations in the business cycle.928 The economic vision that
prevailed in the 1940s embraced the revenue rather than spending side of Keynes’ theory
and accepted a modicum of unemployment in exchange for tax reductions and increases
in private spending. This turned the state into a technocratic manager of the economic
order, limiting the capacity for Great Society reforms to promote regulatory reform.929 By
the 1960s, the state could only correct for capitalist structures on the margins without
challenging them, since commercial Keynesianism relied heavily on private
investment.930
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Regulatory reforms in the 1940s and 1950s entailed debates about crime in ways
that mirrored the rise of commercial Keynesianism. In the early New Deal, major sectors
of business supported regulatory reforms to save industries as long as they were not so
strict as to obstruct economic revitalization. But by the 1940s, commercial Keynesianism
became dominant and administrative politics were seen as hostile to progress. The
Administrative Procedures Act was passed in 1946 to make sure that businesses could
protect themselves against an overbearing regulatory state by infusing regulatory
proceedings with the adversarial elements of American legalism. When the Justice
Department filed a suit in 1947 against a combination of investment bankers, the
defendants secured a favorable precedent in the 1953 ruling U.S. v. Morgan, which
discredited the negative images of finance fostered by the Pujo Committee, Pecora
Commission, and TNEC.931
II. Regulatory Discourse and Constructing Corporate Criminality in the New Deal
In 1949, Edwin Sutherland upended orthodox criminology in his book WhiteCollar Crime, which emphasized how business practices that were legally punishable
under criminal law were typically dealt with as civil or regulatory infractions. Sutherland
defined white-collar crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high
social status in the course of his occupation.”932 This constituted the first intellectual
attempt to systematically define the concept. While his definition was problematically
broad, his emphasis on the crimes of powerful economic actors was a definitive turn
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away from criminology’s focus on lower-class crime.933 And although his book was
called White-Collar Crime, it could have more appropriately been titled Corporate Crime
given his emphasis on the crimes committed by corporations.
Studying 980 legal decisions brought against seventy large corporations,
Sutherland argued that at least 779 of the 980 cases in his sample included grounds for
criminal charges. However, he found that only 158 decisions—or 20% of the criminally
punishable cases—were brought in criminal court. The remaining 80% were handled
through regulatory or civil procedures. Sutherland pointed to the Sherman Antitrust Act
as establishing this precedent. The law defined antitrust violations as criminal, but as a
“second thought” authorized non-criminal procedures such as injunctions for handling
antitrust cases. This, Sutherland argued, was mirrored in all subsequent regulatory
legislation.934 He also recognized that corporations were among the worst recidivists, but
that because their behavior was channeled through civil and regulatory channels, most
avoided the repercussions of a single conviction.935
While the roots of the regulatory pattern Sutherland discovered are really in the
Interstate Commerce Act, his book outlined a rough case for the path dependent nature of
the regulatory state. But he downplayed the institutional and ideational implications of
his arguments. He did not discuss the favorable construction of corporate criminality
embedded into the state’s regulatory machinery and left unaddressed the fact that the
The central problem with his definition is that it is so broad that it encompasses a range of behavior
that would normally not be considered white-collar crime. For example, under his definition, an
accountant pickpocketing a client’s wallet during a meeting would technically be considered whitecollar crime.
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regulatory state shaped how policymakers conceptualized corporate criminality. Instead,
he made an individualized psychological argument that politicians handled white-collar
criminals leniently due to the fact that they typically come from similar social strata, have
friends in business, rely on business for money, and hope to secure private sector
employment should they lose election.936 These are not trivial points, but Sutherland
missed important historical, institutional, and ideological aspects of his own research.
White-Collar Crime has been praised in subsequent decades for its path-breaking
approach to examining an understudied type of crime, but at the time it had almost no
impact on the discipline of criminology. Without a clear violation of criminal law, a
finding of guilt, and subsequent punishment, many of Sutherland’s contemporaries felt
that the behavior he studied could not be considered “crime” and were dismissive of his
work.937 It was little different in political venues. While the Wickersham Commission
employed Shaw and McKay to draft reports and state legislators cited the Gluecks,
Sutherland’s research was completely absent in these circles.
Hagan suggests that White-Collar Crime was a reflection of the era’s antibusiness climate, but the limited impact of White-Collar Crime tells us more about its
relationship to American political development than its publication does on its own.938
Unlike many academic disciplines, criminology has been relevant to American politics,
and in mid-century policymakers drafted reports and policies that drew on and modified
prevailing criminological theories. But White-Collar Crime was ignored, despite being
Sutherland, 248–49.
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published by one of the era’s most prominent scholars, indicating that Sutherland’s ideas
did not cleanly fit into mid-century political discourse. While his book marked a
significant moment for criminology, that it had virtually no impact while other leading
criminologists were cited by state reformers and federal crime commissions suggests that
his book should be viewed as an outlier rather than a reflection of the era’s politics.
Examining the texts and speeches of prominent New Dealers reveals that they did
not share the perspective of corporate criminality articulated by Sutherland, because
political change during the New Deal was not influenced by concurrent shifts in
ideational constructions of corporate criminality. Rather, New Deal politicians operated
within institutional networks in which certain ideas associated with regulatory ideology
had been embedded. This shaped the politics of these individuals assumed to be fervent
trustbusters, as they spoke in terms defending the “respectability” of powerful corporate
actors while suggesting that prosecution was an inappropriate way to monitor their
behavior. Reluctant to challenge capital structures or the basic design of state
administrative agencies, the supposed trustbusters of the New Deal exhibited a reluctance
to prosecute corporate crimes because the institutions they operated within kept them tied
to the tenets of regulatory ideology.
William O. Douglas is a good case in point. A key member of Roosevelt’s inner
circle, Douglas was the SEC’s chair from 1937 to 1939. His tenure is often depicted as
characterized by fights against Wall Street speculators.939 But his words belie his political
posturing as an anti-business crusader. In a speech he delivered in 1938, Douglas
described the SEC as a “mechanism of democratic government whereby capitalism can
939
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discipline and preserve itself,” and one that was designed “to meet business on business
terms.”940 He repeatedly insisted that exchanges were capable of self-regulation, and that
businessmen had “sufficient brains, courage, and integrity” to monitor themselves. The
government and the SEC, Douglas concluded, should only play a supervisory or “residual
role.”941
One can look to the work of Douglas’s predecessor as SEC Chair, James Landis,
for similar arguments. Landis viewed the creation of the administrative state as the
answer to an institutional problem. He argued that agencies were designed to handle
issues that courts and Congress were ill equipped to address. But he explicitly
differentiated agencies from criminal justice venues. He claimed that commissions take
on “less the appearance of a tribunal and more that of a committee charged with the task
of achieving the best possible operation” of industry. He argued that agencies like the
ICC should conceive their purposes “in terms of management rather than of police.”942
He described the Securities Exchange Commission similarly, arguing that the 1933
Securities Act was ineffective because it gave insufficient discretion to the FTC to
enforce the law. The SEC, however, was given “powers to exempt securities from the
operation of the 1934 Act” among other broad discretionary controls, making it a more
flexible institution responsive to the demands and needs of the securities industry.943
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Perhaps the most telling statements come from Thurman Arnold, who ran the
antitrust division of the Department of Justice from 1938 to 1943. Arnold filed and won
more antitrust cases than the Department of Justice initiated in its entire previous
history.944 However, his celebrated 1937 book The Folklore of Capitalism adopted a
perspective that consolidation in industry was beneficial and ironically bemoaned
antitrust laws as meaningless. He described them as “the answer of a society which
unconsciously felt the need of great organizations” but wanted to “deny them a place in
the moral and logical ideology of the social structure.”945 Arnold favored an expansion of
the state’s regulatory powers, but specifically cautioned against prosecution. He wrote
that an antitrust violation “is not an ordinary crime” because antitrust laws are “violated
by respectable people.” Such a violation is thus “an economic offense, the seriousness of
which is not related to the moral turpitude of the offender” which is why antitrust law “is
different from ordinary criminal law” in its use of civil, regulatory, and criminal
proceedings.946 For Arnold, only activities that artificially inflated consumer prices were
appropriate targets for prosecution. In this sense, he viewed antitrust laws as vehicles to
expand the state’s regulatory capacity only with an eye towards enhancing consumer
purchasing power, not as tools to challenge the structure of the economy.947
Even the era’s leading trustbuster adopted a politics antithetical to Sutherland’s
claims. Arnold’s emphasis on using regulatory power rather than prosecution completely
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accepted the existing institutional structures Sutherland was so intent on challenging. The
statements of Arnold, Landis, and Douglas illustrate how New Deal reformers were more
likely to uncritically accept the regulatory ideology embedded within the institutions they
ran rather than challenge those institutional structures. This institutional context kept
them wedded to the basic assumptions of regulatory ideology.
In the wake of the war, leaders of business and finance endorsed commercial
Keynesianism in ways that quelled demands for federal regulation in order to allow
business to lead the economic conversion. Essential to this political campaign was a
justificatory rhetoric that rationalized businessmen as natural leaders that should not be
impeded by the state. For instance, BAC members Henry Dennison, Lincoln Filene,
Ralph Flanders, and Morris Leeds enlisted John Kenneth Galbraith to help them publish
their 1938 book, Toward Full Employment. The authors argued that stronger use of
monetary controls would enable the state to reduce its regulatory role. Although
admitting that some businesses required monitoring, the authors wrote that those few
businesses “can be controlled only because the mass of business remains relatively free.”
They went on to claim that, “were more direct and detailed controls to be applied to the
majority of business,” economic growth would become “impossible.” Thus, loosening the
state’s regulatory reins in favor of an emphasis on monetary policy would effectively
promote growth.948 The CED made similar arguments in Markets After War (1943),
which stated that business “must assume a large share of the responsibility” for getting
the economy back on its feet after the war. To do so would require “the best brains” to
focus on these problems, and they wrote that the “courage, imagination and ingenuity” of
948
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businessmen would promote growth more than statist regulation.949 The CED emphasized
that it was “essential for the government, in cooperation with business” to “provide an
economic environment favorable both to the expansion of production and the
maintenance of profitable markets.”950
These trends in discourse about regulation did not reflect concurrent
developments in criminology, but rather a continuity with older varieties of regulatory
ideology. Sutherland’s lack of impact during a period in which criminology and politics
were closely connected illustrates that his work was an outlier. Douglas, Landis, and
Arnold could not hear his arguments given that Sutherland’s book was published after
these men were in positions of power, but their words illustrate crucial dynamics about
New Deal discourse as related to corporate criminality. While they adopted a
comparatively more aggressive posture in relation to business than their predecessors,
they also accepted the institutional structures in which they operated and the separation of
regulation from criminal justice. It was these institutional designs that shaped their
politics and perceptions of corporate criminality, keeping them committed to the basic
facets of regulatory ideology.
III. Securities Reform During the New Deal
In the wake of the stock market collapse in 1929, President Herbert Hoover
warned the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that it would have to adopt its own
measures to curb fraud, thrift, and abuse, or his administration would push for legislation.
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The exchange did not budge, and President of the NYSE Richard Whitney insisted that
the industry had no major problems. What followed was a congressional inquiry
exploring the causes of the Depression. Led by chief counsel Ferdinand Pecora, the
“Pecora Commission” shed light on the fraud and exploitative practices so pervasive on
Wall Street. The revelations of the hearings provided crucial insights leading to the
Glass-Steagall Banking Act, Securities Act, and Securities Exchange Act.951
Three things are clear in the Pecora hearings, debates over the Securities Act of
1933, and debates over the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. First, disagreements
emerged across and within sectors of industry in how they politicized corporate
criminality. While some industry leaders insisted they were innocent, others endorsed
securities reform as necessary for reining in their most ruthless competitors. Second, and
related, legislators, investment bankers, securities brokers, and exchange officials
perceived the law primarily as a way to protect business, viewing investor protection as a
secondary concern. The laws were built to revive business and protect industries from
uninformed investors that might push frivolous suits on good honest businessmen. Thus,
familiar dynamics associated with regulatory ideology characterized debates over
securities reforms. But a third critical current, particularly present in legislative debates,
was a concern shared by financial industry leaders and legislators that excessive
regulation would impede economic recovery following the Depression. Just as David
Vogel has found during other economic downturns in American history, the public and
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policymakers were desperate to encourage growth and job creation, apt to listen to
business’s demands, and hesitant to overregulate the economy during the Depression.952
By reframing regulatory ideology within the context of crisis, leaders of finance
derailed attempts to articulate new framings of corporate criminality. While much
research on the New Deal suggests that populist outrage led to crackdowns on Wall
Street, lawmakers’ concerns with restoring prosperity trumped populist impulses to
penalize business. The Pecora hearings revealed truly explosive findings, but bankers,
brokers, and exchange officials were able to extinguish their political potency with
appeals to older facets of regulatory ideology during legislative debate.
The Pecora Commission
The Pecora Commission opened its inquiry March 4, 1932, and hearings began
little more than one month later on April 11. It was initially meant to be an investigation
into short selling, a practice that is criminalized in many countries, but not the U.S. One
of the Commission’s most frequent visitors was Richard Whitney. President of the
NYSE, Whitney testified regularly on a range of issues, including short selling. He
defended it as both a moral activity and “a necessary part of the security market.”953 To
ban it, Whitney suggested, would force the American economy “100 years”
backwards.954
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The Commission did not maintain a focus on short selling for long, broadening its
scope during its two years of operation to explore a variety of fraudulent and abusive
practices on Wall Street. Only a few months into its inquiry, the Committee revealed
serious sins among members of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). A hot
technology stock in the 1920s, RCA saw its share prices skyrocket in a few months
preceding the 1929 crash. The Pecora Commission uncovered that its values were falsely
inflated by a group of investors dubbed the “Radio Pool,” who bought and sold RCA
shares among themselves to create an appearance of activity that drove up their value.
Once they pumped up the shares’ value, the pool’s operators pushed the stocks onto
unsuspecting investors and paid newspapers and radio announcers to recommend the
stock to the public.955
Shining a light on the Radio Pool’s abuses pushed the Commission’s hearings into
the public spotlight. Thomas Bragg, one of the managers of the pool, insisted that the
pool’s activities should not be construed as “manipulation,” stating that they simply
intended “to go out and buy stock in the open market, and to sell it at a higher price to
make a profit.”956 Similarly, after the Commission’s legal counsel William Gray called
the activities of RCA “purely manipulation,” George Breen, a securities dealer involved
with RCA, insisted they were no more than “buying and selling.”957 Whitney even
reappeared before the Committee to defend pooling as an appropriate practice “for the
purpose of making a profit.” He insisted that even if pools resort to fictitious transactions
United States Senate, vol. 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), 729 for similar
testimony from John Rakob, Director of General Motors, who said “there is no crime in short selling.”
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to drive up share prices, it is no use to regulate them, since Whitney concluded “there is
no agency in the world that can prevent crookedness.”958
The defenses offered up by those in the RCA pool did not hold up to the public. A
front-page Chicago Tribune piece lambasted the arguments of Bragg, Breen, and other
members of the RCA pool shortly after their testimony. Critical of the pool’s scheme, the
piece highlighted that in one week in March of 1929, the pool orchestrated enough deals
to net over $5.5 million in profits. The article noted that Bragg, Breen, and James
McConnachie (another one of the pool’s members) all were compelled during their
testimonies into admitting that Gray’s allegations were “probably right” that their
activities constituted manipulation rather than honest buying and selling.959
With the public’s support, the Pecora Commission challenged additional activities
common on Wall Street, including the practice of officers and executives of a company
investing in their own stock. Interrogating Henry Warner, the President of Warner
Brothers Inc., Senator James Couzens (R-MI) discussed the practice of officers buying
and selling their own company’s stock in rapid succession to inflate share value in a way
that did not reflect market conditions. Warner insisted that such a practice was both
“ethical and helpful” to the industry, even if unsuspecting investors were left paying the
cost when the activity ceased and the value dropped.960 William Fox of the Fox Film
Corporation stated that he “manipulated,” his own stocks, that he was “proud of it,” and
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would “continue to do it” as long as “the stock exchange permits him to.”961 Other
brokers and executives insisted that the practice was not unethical, even when designed to
create the false appearance of activity to excite the public.962
Perhaps the most explosive findings of the Commission came in regard to
National City Company, a security affiliate of the National City Bank of New York. The
Commission uncovered that National City routinely led investors into purchasing
securities while providing little information as regards to their quality. National City
regularly gave out large loans to questionable borrowers, including $8 million to Minas
Geraes (a state in the Brazilian Republic known as a negligent borrower), $90 million in
loans to Peru (which National City executives recognized as “an adverse moral and
political risk”), and another $50 million to companies in Cuba and Chile without
informing their investors.963 As the nation’s largest investment banking house, National
City speculated on exchanges, participated in copper pool operations, and traded in its
own stock up to 30 to 40 thousand times per day to inflate its value.964
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National City executives routinely unloaded millions of dollars of securities
backed by bad loans onto the public, and Charles Mitchell, the President of National City,
saw no reason to change the company’s ways. When confronted with arguments from the
Commission that publicizing the company’s spreads and information about its securities
would stabilize the market, Mitchell insisted it would not. He said, “I can not yet
conceive myself that the American practice has been wrong” in not publicizing the details
of a company’s finances to investors.965 He argued that it was his “duty” to sell shares as
long as customers viewed them as worthy investments, even when National City did not
reveal it was unsound stock.966 Mitchell stated that letting executives share in the net
earnings of a company’s financial maneuverings while insulating them from its losses
encouraged an “esprit de corps” among officers, although he admitted it may have had
“some influence” on the fact that 20% of the company’s securities were in default.967
Ultimately, sharing information with the public would have served no purpose according
to Mitchell. He concluded that, “there is no investor that I know of who would have had
the slightest interest, or whose judgment would have been in the least affected” had the
company publicized information about its questionable loans.968
Not everyone in the financial sector proffered up blanket defenses of the industry.
In opposition to many of his colleagues, President of Chase National Bank Winthrop
Aldrich took a different tack with the Commission and demanded greater federal
regulation of the investment banking industry. He particularly directed his ire against the
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tendency to combine investment and commercial banking in single entities, which had
been essential to the consolidation of power by the Morgan Empire. Winthrop’s hostility
was largely directed towards Morgan. When he was called to testify, Winthrop stated that
he regulated his own business according to “a code of professional ethics and customs”
that differentiated him from those he criticized.969
While he insisted on regulation and separation of the two forms of banking,
Winthrop also informed the commission that investment banking should be regulated
with “as little restriction” as possible. 970 He walked a careful line, telling the commission
that prohibiting clearly harmful business practices was “sound” and “wise,” but qualified
that “business enterprise, initiative and courage flourish in an atmosphere of the utmost
freedom compatible with protection of the public interest.” He said the public is too eager
to “blame all financial evils upon bankers,” but that regulation was necessary within
limitations.971 His final recommendations for regulating investment and commercial
banking were so severe that Senator Glass, who put his name on the bill that ultimately
separated the two, described Aldrich’s proposals as “a straight-jacket” built on the
assumption that bankers “are addicted to those excesses…of immoral greed.”
Nonetheless, both Aldrich and Glass agreed that it was unfair to assume that all bankers
were immoral but that regulation was necessary to some extent nevertheless.972 While his
colleagues lashed out against any political calls for regulation of industry—a strategy that
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would prove futile—Aldrich foreshadowed the industry’s eventual embrace of regulatory
ideology as an alternative to criminalization.
The Pecora Commission inflicted serious damage on the reputation of stock
exchanges, investment bankers, and Wall Street. But the hearings revealed splits among
Wall Street leaders, with some offering strong defenses of their actions and others
supportive of a moderate level of regulation. In debates over the Securities and Securities
Exchange Acts, corporate interests either opposed the laws or viewed them as necessary
to regulate a small handful of individuals and businesses. But both sides agreed on two
things. First, they concurred that the state’s response to the crisis should be designed to
protect business, not the consumer. Second, both camps agreed that legislation should not
damage the already weakened economy. However, leaders of finance who made these
arguments by drawing on regulatory ideology were more successful than their colleagues
who opposed the laws entirely. By defending the character of bankers and exchanges
officials while voicing concerns about an uninformed public armed with the power of
prosecution, politically savvy bankers, brokers, and exchange leaders adapted regulatory
ideology to the political context of the 1930s. This convinced lawmakers to rely on
familiar concepts of regulation rather than try something new during the crisis. Again,
this illustrates that business has to work within prevailing discourses to achieve its goals.
Strict opponents of the New Deal’s securities reforms failed to achieve their goals, but
leaders of finance who favored regulatory ideology secured laws designed to support
industry, restore investor confidence, and promote growth while extinguishing the
potency of the Pecora Commission’s findings.
The Securities Act of 1933
374

Passed within the first hundred days of Roosevelt taking office, the Securities Act
was designed to ensure that buyers of securities received accurate information before
investing in a security. The law required companies to write up a registration statement
and a prospectus outlining relevant information about a given security and the
corporation itself, including its financial statements, before issuing a security on the
market. By providing transparency, the theory behind the law was that it would inhibit
firms from engaging in fraud and help potential investors make informed decisions.
With prominent New Dealers from Roosevelt’s inner circle leading the push for
reform (including Corcoran, Cohen, Landis, and Frankfurter), the Securities Act was
proposed to comprehensively monitor securities markets. The bill they drafted
empowered the Federal Trade Commission to regulate the securities industry by
monitoring corporations’ registration statements and prospectuses. Their bill quickly
moved through Congress and Roosevelt signed it on May 27. It included civil and
criminal provisions for the making of false or misleading statements, and it held the
company, underwriter, and any individuals who signed the registration statement liable
for falsehoods. Viewing the law as laying an even competitive floor under American
business, Frankfurter, Landis, and the other New Dealers involved thought it would get
the securities market back on its feet.973
In the wake of the Pecora hearings, there was a push in Congress for criminal
justice reform in securities markets. Testimonies before the House Committee on
Commerce from members of the FTC asked for the law to “have teeth in it,” claiming
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that the law should give the commission more than investigatory powers.974 There was
even support for criminal justice reform from others within the financial community
beyond Winthrop Aldrich. Representing the Investment Bankers Association of America
(IBA), a prominent network of the nation’s largest investment banking firms, attorney
William Breed told the committee that “the penalties for fraud should be broadened,” and
supported giving the FTC powers to investigate fraud and enjoin securities sales.975
That the IBA came out in support of the Securities Act, even in part, is significant.
It shows that there were meaningful splits among businesses. The IBA was one of the
most unified voices for the investment banking industry at the time, and it statements
reveal the deep support for reining in industry through regulatory reforms that included
penalization.976 But the IBA’s support for the law was qualified by its other demands.
Breed criticized the law’s strict liability provisions, contending that the law should only
punish willful false statements and not accidental negligence. And while he endorsed
penalties for fraud, he argued against subjecting violations of FTC rules to criminal
sanction.977 Breed concluded by stating that the law should be written so as to “not cover
the honest issuer or the honest director.”978
Opponents of the law advanced similar arguments that the law was going to hurt
people who ran their businesses honestly. Concerns about interfering with honest
business focused on the strict liability provisions punishing negligence and willful fraud
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equally. Senator Thomas Gore (D-OK), one of the most outspoken critics of Wall Street
during the Pecora hearings, even mentioned this. Justice Department attorney Alexander
Holtzoff tried to argue that the law should not just monitor dishonesty, “but also
negligence and carelessness.” 979 Gore was unconvinced, replying that the law “bristled a
little too much with punishments and penalties,” and would,” frighten everybody out of
business.” He said the law should be fashioned so as “to deal with the dishonest minority
and…not to frighten the honest” out of the market.980 Arthur Dean, counsel for a group of
investment bankers, argued that the law should mirror the English Companies Act by
allowing executives to prove that their behavior was an honest mistake or else the law
would impede business among “responsible houses” and “encourage irresponsible
houses.”981
Ollie Butler, legal counsel in the Department of Commerce, also stated that
criminal penalties should only apply in the case of willful fraud. By imposing strict
liability, “honest well-intentioned men” would be tepid in their business transactions for
“fear of unintentional violation.” Meanwhile, “the clever crook or weakly dishonest
person” would dominate the market. He warned the Senate Banking Committee that,
“The popular dislike of investment bankers” should not lead them to the “hasty adoption
of legislation which may superficially appear to be punishing the investment bankers but
which upon analysis is in fact injuring the country as a whole.”982 Butler did not disagree
with the bill’s inclusion of criminal penalties or its basic goal but feared that it could
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injure the country by impeding business among honest bankers. His logic was built on
certain facets of regulatory ideology—including a character defense of bankers to
rationalize his opposition to criminal punishment—but like Gore, Dean, and others, he
did not couple his critique of the law with clear proposals for regulatory policy.
Wound up in arguments about impeding economic recovery were familiar claims
that executives’ actions should not be viewed as criminal by virtue of their character.
Testimony from Penn Harvey, Vice President of Chase Harris Forbes in New York,
illustrates this dynamic. He claimed that, “there are a great many honest men in the
investment banking business” and that if legislators could “mingle” with the “financial
men in New York,” they would conclude that they are “ordinary, good, [and] honest.” He
did admit that there was a dishonest element that needed to be regulated “out of the
business” to have “business restored to the confidence of the country.” However, he
stated that this element “is a minority” and that Congress should not punish the whole
industry “because of some one act that some person may have committed.” He said the
law should promote “greater confidence” among the public in bankers but not be so
stringent that good men “cannot do business and make an honest living.” 983
Members of key House and Senate Committees heard business’s demands and
presented the law less as a way to protect consumers and more to restore business
confidence. In an April report, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated
that the bill had several aims, one of which was to “prevent further exploitation of the
public,” from unsound securities by providing them “adequate and true information.” But
all other listed aims were geared towards protecting business. They included “to protect
983
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honest enterprise,” “to restore the confidence of the prospective investor,” and encourage
business investment since they have “grown timid to the point of hoarding.”984
Deliberations took a turn when the bill reached the floor of Congress, where
debate was animated by outrage at big business and an insistence that criminalization was
necessary. Democratic Majority Whip Arthur Greenwood (D-IN) argued that the average
banker “no longer has a strict sense of ethics.”985 Ernest Gibson (R-VT) called executives
of banking houses “criminal,” saying that their crimes of “burglary, robbery, larceny, and
fraud” cost the public $10 million annually.986 James Beck (R-PA) claimed that the
corporate form “dissipates moral responsibility.” He stated that presidents of major
corporations “will at times do things of an immoral character” because they viewed
themselves as “the trustee for the stockholders,” even if it meant acting in financial
irresponsible ways. His demands to put “predatory millionaires in jail” were met with
applause on the House floor.987
Other legislators took a different approach. For instance, James Parker (R-NY), a
member of the House Interstate Commerce Commission, presented the bill’s primary aim
as promoting economic recovery, leading him to conclude that it should not be too
severe. He claimed that the bill does “two things.” One was “to protect the gullible
investor,” but that, “more important is the protection of the honest business man upon the
success of whose business depends the success of the country.” He stated that lawmakers
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have been too “apt to think only of the man who has lost his money” and not “the men
who are trying to do business and do business honestly.”988 Parker’s claims explicitly
suggested that promoting economic recovery, not investor protection, was the law’s
central purpose.
Parker’s statements underscore a dynamic that has long distinguished the politics
of corporate crime from the politics of street crime. While crime politics in America has
often been victim-centered, debates about corporate criminality have instead painted
industry leaders as the real victims of an ignorant public, a state too eager to meddle in
their affairs, or the few bad men in business. In the New Deal era, this logic took on a
special meaning. The protection of honest business from unscrupulous competitors and
excessive state intervention became paramount to getting out of the Depression. For
instance, much like Parker, Virgil Chapman (D) of Kentucky said the two purposes of the
law were to protect the investing public and “at the same time to protect honest corporate
business,” and the law should be written so businessmen had “no fear” of the law.989
Clyde Kelly (R-PA) similarly stated that the bill protects “honest and legitimate industry”
which has too often been “the victim of greedy and ruthless investment bankers.”990 In
the Senate, Burton Wheeler (D-MT) outlined the law’s “general purpose” as “to protect
the investing public and honest business.” He stated that by protecting enterprise, the law
would ignite recovery by promoting business confidence, spurring employment, and
restoring the public’s faith in securities markets. The notion that the law should protect
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the investing public mattered, but Wheeler stated that protecting investors only mattered
if it was tied to “restoring buying and consuming power” among the public. 991
Representative James Mott of Oregon (R) pointed out how putting business
before the investor mattered. He noted the Securities Act’s information provision
requirements required corporations to give public investors detailed statements that
rendered the seller only liable for actual fraud by making the buyer responsible for their
purchase. Mott emphasized that this overlooked the fact “the average investor cannot
read and interpret a balance sheet” and is largely unfamiliar with the financial structures
of big business. A balance sheet can be technically accurate, but still “convey to the
untutored investor the idea that an unsound company is sound.”992 In this way, the
Securities Act differed from state “blue-sky” laws that protected investors against
securities fraud by requiring sellers to register their securities, publish relevant financial
details, and go through a merit review in which state agents determined if the security
was of reasonable enough quality to be deemed a fair offering.993 The Securities Act gave
firms protection by not including a merit review and instead applying the standard of
caveat emptor, making the buyer responsible for understanding all relevant information.
As a result, a firm could issue low-quality securities, but as long as it provided adequate
information in its statements, they were legal to sell on the open market.
Mott’s insistence to write the law to be more like a blue-sky law was dismissed by
his colleagues. As member of the House Interstate Commerce Committee Charles
Wolverton (R-NJ) stated, “the theory that underlies this proposed legislation is
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different…from that which forms the basis of many of the so-called ‘blue-sky’ laws.”
Wolverton stated that merit reviews would end up “hampering developments” in
industry. He said such reviews would discourage innovation and investment, which is
why the law placed responsibility with the buyer.994
The final law included criminal provisions in addition to civil and regulatory
ones—including a $5,000 fine or five years in prison for false statements—but was
written with an eye towards minimizing state intervention into markets, as Congress
chose not to model it after state blue-sky laws. Thus, neither opponents nor supporters of
the law were entirely happy. Representative Carroll Breedy (R-ME) bemoaned that the
administration “has listened to the representatives of big business” while Mott fruitlessly
insisted on including stronger liability sections and blue-sky provisions.995 Investment
bankers and exchanges secured some concessions and thought the Act was workable to
an extent, but many believed its civil and criminal provisions amounted to strict
prohibitions on necessary business practices. As a result, large sectors of the financial
community perceived it as a sensationalistic reaction to the Pecora hearings.996
The Securities Act was pushed through Congress in the first hundred days, giving
business little time to mount a coordinated response. Alternatively, the Securities
Exchange Act gave the financial community adequate time to mobilize and advocate. By
framing their goals more clearly within the parameters of regulatory ideology—defending
the character of businessmen and expressing concerns about frivolous prosecutions while
advocating for regulatory commission—leaders of industry were more successful in
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debates about the Securities Exchange Act. Investment bankers and exchange officials
argued that a regulatory approach would protect industries first and foremost while not
impeding economic recovery during the Depression. By arguing that regulatory
discretion be vested in a separation commission, leaders of finance were able to secure
the creation of a regulatory body to work with the industry in its interests.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Michael Parrish’s account of the New Deal’s securities reforms illustrates how the
Securities Act was written and passed within the span of a couple of months. The
legislative record was characterized by diverse responses from various sectors of finance
and industry. However, one demand voiced by several leaders of industry—the creation
of a separate commission to monitor exchanges rather than the FTC—was not met.
Further removed from the first hundred days and with more time to mobilize, the
exchange officials and investment bankers who favored a commission mounted a more
successful political campaign in 1934, championing regulatory ideology to pursue their
goals.997
The initial Securities Exchange bill written by the team of Landis, Cohen, and
Corcoran empowered the FTC even more than the Securities Act did. Their bill banned
the use of wash sales, matched orders, and joint trading accounts to create the appearance
of market activity. It separated the functions of brokers, dealers, and underwriters while
restricting the availability of credit for exchange trading, defining the permissible
activities of exchange members, scrutinizing trading by directors, and making various
financial affairs of listed corporations a matter of public record.
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Thomas Corcoran, legal counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation at
the time, was the administration’s chief advocate of the law. He defended the law’s strict
liability provisions that upset many in the financial community, arguing that like
manslaughter, the behaviors targeted by the law should be criminal regardless of whether
intent was present or not. He told the Senate Banking Committee that he believed it was
no longer a “norm of the criminal law” to require proof intent, given the number of things
that can be considered crimes “which are sheer matters of negligence.” He suggested that
the reforms favored by Wall Street would limit regulators so much that it would amount
to putting “a baby into a cage with a tiger to regulate the tiger.”998 His proposal included
a $25,000 fine and 10 years of imprisonment as punishment not just for any violation of
the statute, but also for any violation of FTC created rules.
Representative Sam Rayburn (D-TX) in the House was the legislative advocate
for the New Dealers’ proposal. But in conference negotiations, Rayburn eventually
accepted the creation of a five-person commission in exchange for other concessions on
the law’s specifics. As the first major confrontation Roosevelt had with big business
separated from the chaos of his first hundred days, the law was significant, but it also
represented a reluctance to offend entrenched economic interests. By giving a new
commission rulemaking authority, Congress avoided difficult statutory decisions
regarding floor trading, short sales, over the counter markets, and other issues that it left
to the newly minted Securities Exchange Commission.
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The first draft put forward by the New Deal team was broadly met with disdain
from the securities industry, investment banks, and exchanges. For months, leaders of
American finance appeared before the Senate Committee on Banking and House
Committee on Commerce to attack the law, with Richard Whitney leading the bill’s
staunchest opponents. He told the Senate Committee that regulating the exchanges
through a “new board of seven members” drawn from the exchanges and including the
secretaries of treasury and commerce would enable regulation of exchanges to be more
“flexible and mobile.” He similarly told the House Committee that a separate commission
could write rules that they “can immediately change” if necessary.999
Leaders of banks and exchanges put forward arguments that corporations had
long deployed in defense of regulatory ideology. For instance, many argued that the bill
only regulated economics and not morality, rendering criminal provisions inappropriate.
This is why the NYSE’s attorney Roland Redmond objected to criminally punishing
violations of the commission’s rules, stating that such sanction should be restricted only
to “what are really in their nature crimes.”1000 Michael O’Brien, an official of the New
York Stock Exchange, stated that while legislators might believe certain transactions on
the exchange are wrong, “We believe they are necessary to orderly markets.”1001Woodlief
Thomas of the Federal Reserve said that he viewed the law through the lens of “economic
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matters rather than morals,” and that from an “economic standpoint, gambling is not
bad.”1002
The unity among financial interests in giving the initial bill a chilly reception
marked a significant difference from earlier debates over securities reforms. Even Paul
Shields, a prominent New York commission broker who opposed Richard Whitney and
represented Wall Street’s more moderate elements, said that the New Dealers drafting the
bill went “way too far” and failed to “recognize that there are honest, decent people in
this business, and that such people should not be destroyed” through too much
regulation.1003 Legislators who thought the law did regulate morality even agreed that
economic issues should trump moral ones. Edward Kenney (D-NJ) conceded that while
exchange regulation “presents a moral problem,” questions about the financial structure
of the economy “should be prominently brought to the front” of the debate.1004 In front of
the Pecora Commission, Corcoran presented his proposal as “not at all a moral proposal”
but rather “the result of the economic judgment of the community,” revealing that the
depth of agreement regarding the bill’s economic rather than moral aims.1005
In defending regulatory ideology as an alternative to Corcoran’s proposal, agents
of the financial industry built on familiar claims about the character of businessmen,
ignorance of the public, and complexity of markets. But wound up in these arguments
was a unique appeal to lawmakers’ concerns about economic recovery. Bankers,
exchanges, brokers, and other interested parties discouraged lawmakers from appealing to
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populist impulses to crack down on industry by reframing regulatory ideology as a way to
monitor markets without obstructing their revival.
Richard Whitney’s testimony exemplified how this was done. Whitney informed
the Senate Banking Committee that he was “in entire agreement with the proponents of
the bill.” But while he favored some monitoring of exchanges, he feared that excessive
punishment “would seriously disrupt our organized security markets and American
business.” This was a recognizable aspect of regulatory ideology—that too much state
intervention would hurt business. But Whitney went further. He warned the committee
that without a separate commission, the law’s strict provisions would not only “punish
stock exchanges for imaginary offenses,” but also would “throttle industry…and
postpone the return of prosperity.”1006 Whitney thus linked his defense of regulatory
ideology and attacks on the law’s strictest provisions to broader concerns about the state
of the economy as the nation climbed out of depression. The NYSE’s legal counsel
similarly stated that “general regulation” alone could achieve the law’s basic aims
without criminal sanction. He said if Congress empowered a separate commission, they
will “have accomplished all of the same possibilities of regulation without in any way
hampering ordinary and legitimate business transactions.”1007
Major players in the securities industry and other exchanges shared Whitney’s
concerns. Frank Hope, President of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms, informed
the Senate Banking Committee that a separate commission specifically built to monitor
exchanges would have the “elasticity and discretion” necessary to “practicably meet
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situations as they arise.” He condemned Corcoran’s proposal, saying it “unnecessarily
and dangerously” went beyond what was necessary. But Hope’s orthodox case for
regulatory ideology was also tied to the economic climate. He insisted that Corcoran’s
severe proposal would only cause further “confusion, conflict, and disorder” in the
financial system, and that it could ultimately “regulate it out of existence.”1008
Howard Butcher, the Vice President of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, offered
a stinging critique of Corcoran’s proposal before the Pecora Commission. He argued that
Corcoran failed to adhere to Roosevelt’s demands in writing the bill, stating that,
It seems to me that the bill does not take into consideration what President
Roosevelt has repeatedly said, that we must go forward in a united group, that we
must fight the depression, that we must make a united effort towards recovery.
And I do not believe there has been any group of men who have responded more
readily and more thoroughly than stockbrokers to that desire expressed by the
president.1009
Butcher’s statements went on to articulate a character defense of bankers, brokers, and
exchange officials that was explicitly framed within, as he argued, making a “united
effort towards recovery.” He claimed that most members of exchanges “have the highest
standard of ethics there is,” but that in Corcoran’s bill, “we are to be treated as a bunch of
criminals,” because Congress has focused its criticism on “one or two men,” paying no
attention to the “250 of 253 other men who have rendered outstanding service.”1010
Butcher claimed that it is “entirely unfair to take a group of men who have had an
honorable existence” and punish them for actions that have previously been considered a
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 15:6901, 6904, 6907, 6910–13, 6916.
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 15:6964–65.
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, 1934, 16:7459, 7463;
see U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before a
Subcommittee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, vol. 5 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1933), 1615–16 for similar arguments from Harold Stuart of Halsey, Stuart and Co.
388
1008
1009
1010

“routine matter of business…that is not adverse to the public interest…individual
morals…[or] the law of our land.”1011 This led Butcher to insist on the creation of a
regulatory body “conversant with the technical problems” associated with the exchanges,
which could institute “reasonable limitations” on business. Without a commission to
work with rather than against industry, he stated that the law took men “whom have
honorable records” and turned them into “an unholy class,” grouped with people who are
“undeserving of the confidence and respect of the Nation.”1012
Many of the arguments made before House and Senate Committee facially read as
standard cases for regulatory ideology, suggesting that criminal penalties would create
more problems than they would solve. For instance, prominent investment banker G.
Hermann Kinnicutt informed the House Commerce Committee that the bill’s “effort to
cure a lesser evil will create a greater one.”1013 Theodore Gould of the Baltimore Stock
Exchange stated that the law would “destroy all that is good in our markets.”1014 Eugene
Thompson, President of the Associated Stock Exchanges, stated that the law attempted to
correct a problem unique to the NYSE but in doing so overlooked the “damage that is
going to occur to local exchanges” due to the law.1015 Frank Altschul, the Chairman of
the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List, contended that Corcoran’s proposal would create
so many “burdens and hazards” that it would force “the more responsible persons” to quit
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because the law would “hamper the conduct of honest business.”1016 John Hancock of
Lehman Brothers wanted to narrow the law’s penalties so that it only regulated the vices
of industry without “touching the good” while the Secretary of the L.A. Stock Exchange
said the law should not “unduly” penalize the whole industry “for the acts of the
minority.1017 While these arguments read as orthodox defenses of regulatory ideology, it
is important to understand the unique political meaning they had in 1934. By highlighting
the instability of the early 1930s U.S. economy, major players in banking and securities
convinced lawmakers to rely on regulatory ideology rather than try something different
for fear of hampering economic recovery.
The legislative record indicates that members of Congress internalized these
concerns. In its initial report on the bill, the House Committee on Commerce stated that
the law represented “the pleas of the representatives of the stock exchanges for the
vesting of broad discretionary powers” in an agency. The committee stated that
representatives of exchanges had “insisted that the complicated nature of the problems
justified leaving much greater latitude of discretion with the administrative agencies than
would otherwise be the case.” The report stated that “for that reason,” the law “leaves to
the administrative agencies the determination of the most appropriate form of rule or
regulation to be enforced.”1018
On the floor of Congress, legislators argued that the bill should be moderate and
reflect the interests of finance given their ongoing efforts to restart the economy.

U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, 1934, 15:6678, 6698.
U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Stock Exchange Regulation, 464–66.
U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Securities Exchange Bill of 1934,
Report No. 1383 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), 5–6.
390
1016
1017
1018

Representative John Cooper (R-OH), a member of the House Commerce Committee,
utilized this line of argument. He said that most businessmen were “honest and sincere
men” who “suffered tremendous losses during the last 3 years of economic depression.”
Cooper stated that,
Industry and business today want to be let alone for a little while. They want to
try to get on their feet. They are trying to recover. They are doing everything that
is humanly possible to try to bring our country back to a sound economic situation
again; but they are afraid that the restrictions placed upon them in this bill will
retard economic recovery and not assist it.1019
Cooper claimed that the businessmen who managed to keep the economy afloat during
the crisis were now “afraid of this bill” and the way it empowered the FTC. He suggested
that the law should not target the honest businessman and “destroy his standing and
reputation,” saying that the “mere indictment of a prominent citizen is a sad thing” that
hurts both him and his community.1020
Representative Elmer Studley (D-NY) warned that empowering the FTC to
monitor securities markets would reignite the depression. Saying that the men operating
on exchanges were not “just a lot of bad boys” but “the most resolute and resourceful
element of our people,” Studley claimed that “Wall Street will go to Canada” if
Corcoran’s proposal became law. He concluded that should the bill succeed, “again we
shall find ourselves the victims of our own folly.” He painted a bleak picture drawing on
dark imagery, suggesting that the nation’s “most prolific source of revenue will be dried
up and our business structure reduced to ashes.”1021
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Things were little different in the Senate, where the interpretation of the law was
widely pro-finance. Frederic Walcott (R-CT) of the Senate’s Banking Committee
informed his colleagues that the law must be carefully written so that it promoted “a
recovery in our business institutions.” Without a separate commission to moderate the
law’s provisions, Walcott called the proposal “a black eye to business” that would do “a
great injury” to the economy. He concluded that a moderate law including a separate
exchange commission was “important and vital to the recovery of business.”1022 Another
committee member Hamilton Kean (R-NJ) advanced similar claims, calling Corcoran’s
proposal “a hindrance to business” that would be “detrimental” to the economy.1023
Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) was convinced by these arguments, arguing that the
Corcoran proposal would contribute to an “atmosphere of insecurity” that was “stopping
the revival of many businesses.”1024
The Chair of the House Commerce Committee Sam Rayburn (D-TX) stated on
the floor that Congress heard the concerns of business and responded by taking “much of
this so-called ‘fright’ out of the bill” by reducing the criminal penalties from 10 years and
a $25,000 fine to 2 years and a $10,000 fine. He said that, “the vast majority of business
in this country is high-minded and honest.” To design the law with the interests of
reputable businesses in mind, Rayburn framed the law as a protection for “the man who
wants to conduct a straightforward and honest business” from the “desperadoes” in the
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industry.1025 To Rayburn, the main point of the law was to protect honest businessmen
from “desperadoes” making it impossible for them to succeed while abiding by the law.
When the House and Senate passed their versions of the bill and it went into
conference, Rayburn endorsed the Corcoran proposal. However, he gave into the Senate’s
demands to create a separate exchange commission. When the conference committee
submitted its final bill, it included a separate 5-person Securities Exchange
Commission.1026 The final law made a violation of any of the law’s provisions susceptible
to 5 years imprisonment and/or a $25,000 fine, but the Senate successfully ensured that
violations of rules and regulations created by the Commission (and any false or
misleading statements filed under a rule or regulation) could only be punished with a
$10,000 fine and no prison time. And like previous regulatory laws, it granted the
Commission to respond to behavior legally defined as criminal through a variety of
administrative and civil sanctions.1027
The securities industry secured major concessions in the Securities Exchange Act,
not the least of which was the creation of a separate commission. The SEC became a
technical way of handling economic problems somewhat insulated from politics and,
more importantly, of resolving industry problems on business terms. Jerome Frank, SEC
Commissioner from 1937-1939 and its chair from 1939-1941, said that the SEC existed
“primarily to preserve the capitalist form.”1028 William O. Douglas, SEC chair from 1937
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to 1939, stated that the SEC should “meet business on business terms” and leave it to
exchanges to primarily self-regulate.1029
In the wake of the SEC’s creation, radical Keynesians were disappointed with the
agency’s hesitance to intervene in the economy directly. Meanwhile, conservative critics
mounted publicity campaigns panning the commission for slowing recovery by impeding
private investment. As the recession of 1937 began, the financial community attacked the
SEC by suggesting that it was responsible for obstructing growth. Congress responded
with the Maloney Act of 1938. Heeding the considerations of over-the-counter market
brokers and dealers, the law gave the SEC the authority to register voluntary national
securities associations that worked to prevent fraudulent and manipulative practices in
OTC markets. While subject to SEC review, the commission essentially handed
exchanges discretion to self-regulate and write their own codes of conduct.1030
By the end of Roosevelt’s second term, securities regulation had been modified in
the interest of core financial interests and was enthusiastically supported by large
segments of the financial industry. Despite some commonalities in their arguments, the
bankers and financial leaders who fought the Securities Act were not as successful as
those who lobbied for a regulatory commission in the Securities Exchange Act debate.
Those who opposed criminal intervention into markets without offering an alternative
during the Securities Act debates failed to situate their goals within discourses and
ideological frameworks that were widely accepted and amenable to policymakers. By
positioning their arguments within the parameters of regulatory ideology and framing the
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regulatory model to have particular appeal during the Great Depression, the industry
leaders who fought for the creation of the SEC appealed to prevailing political and
economic discourses in ways that enabled them to achieve favorable policy outcomes.
IV. Commercial Keynesianism and Regulatory Development
While the early New Deal was animated by debates over regulatory policy, the
1940s were driven by a shift towards commercial Keynesianism. Economics became
more about monetary policy and less about regulation. How this affected the state’s
perception of corporate criminality and regulation can be seen in the trajectory of three
developments—the Temporary National Economic Committee, the Administrative
Procedures Act, and the antitrust suit US v. Morgan (1953).
The Temporary National Economic Committee
In 1938, Congress created the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC)
as an investigatory body to study the causes and effects of economic concentration.
Prominent members of Roosevelt’s inner circle including Arnold and Douglass led the
TNEC’s investigation. They defended a robust statist vision of regulatory Keynesianism,
so the committee seemed to be a strong revival of anti-monopolism. But by the time its
final reports were published in 1941, popular anti-monopolist attitudes had faded and the
committee’s final reports garnered little attention.1031 Even if they had, the men leading
the investigation were not the staunch anti-monopolists they were feared to be. The
committee’s final report defended concentration as inevitable while revealing a hesitance
to prosecute corporate violations in lieu of opting for regulatory approaches.
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In statements during the TNEC’s hearings, the FTC was often praised. Because it
had a limited capacity to pursue prosecution, it was commended for working with
businesses without penalizing them. William O. Douglass, who was just finishing his
term as the SEC Chairman, lauded the FTC for its tendency to “cooperate with business
by not making the corrective activity too severe.”1032 Erwin Douglas, one of the FTC’s
commissioners, said he and his colleagues “are glad we don’t” have the authority to
impose penalties or pursue imprisonment. He insisted, “we don’t want it,” and argued
that the matters the FTC monitors “generally do not pertain to criminal matters in the
ordinary acceptation of that term.”1033 Members of the TNEC were content with the fact
that they lacked powers to prosecute anti-competitive practices because they did not think
they were “ordinary” criminal actions.
William Douglas emphasized that the state’s regulatory powers had become
generally overgrown. He lamented that the principle in criminal justice that it is better to
“allow nine guilty persons to escape than to punish one innocent person” was abandoned
in the regulatory system. He argued that regulatory expansion empowered the state to
“take every violator by the back of his neck and rub his nose in the sand, regardless of the
effect upon the innocent.” He said that, “because the innocent have been compelled to
suffer along with those have violated” the law, there is “fear among many businessmen of
what they call Government regulation.”1034
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Jerome Frank, also serving on the SEC, had similar anxieties. Instead of
bemoaning the growth of the regulatory state, he made a plea for more procedural
reforms to administrative law. He informed the committee that, “we need to safeguard
against the abuse of the innocent” who have been victimized by the regulatory state. He
argued that the regulatory process required “more safeguards…to prevent the abuse of
criminal enforcing powers in the hands of prosecutors.”1035 His plea foreshadowed
reforms that would take shape in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946.
Thurman Arnold, at the time running the Justice Department’s antitrust division,
advocated for greater use of civil proceedings in administrative cases. He said they
provided “a speedier and more equitable method” than criminal charges while avoiding
the difficulties of prosecution through criminal courts.1036 Arnold concluded that in
antitrust cases, the state is generally “not dealing…with the criminal class” but with
“ordinary law-abiding citizens.” Antitrust enforcement, according to Arnold, was
designed to gives “assurance” to men in business “that they will not be forced into illegal
practices” by their competitors.1037
The TNEC’s preliminary report, written in 1939, criticized the DOJ for making
criminal proceedings a “normal procedure” for enforcing antitrust laws. The report stated
that criminal remedies made it “extremely difficult to keep clearly before the public, the
business community, and the courts the all-important fact that the antitrust laws must be
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regarded primarily as an economic instrument and not as a moral tract.” The TNEC
argued that the “connection between the idea of criminality and the idea of some sort of
moral obloquy is deeply rooted both in the law and the national psychology.” As a result,
it was misguided to pursue convictions for actions that “have a pernicious economic
effect” but are committed “by responsible and reasonably well-intentioned men.”1038 This
again illustrates the deep ways regulatory ideology was intertwined into regulatory
mechanisms. What was reputed as a fervently anti-monopolist investigatory commission
led by prominent trustbusters ultimately defended regulation over prosecution for
corporate crime by suggesting that the character of the individuals involved excused their
actions as legal, but not moral, wrongs.
The TNEC made the case that criminal antitrust charges were fundamentally
unfair because of the “stigma of indictment” they carried. The committee emphasized
that news of an indictment could ruin a business’s reputation, but that later acquittals are
rarely treated as newsworthy. This was “extremely unfair,” especially to those facing
charges only because they were forced into anticompetitive practices “by the necessity of
survival in a complex business structure.” The TNEC’s preliminary report suggested that
criminal penalties should be left unchanged, but that civil remedies should be made more
available so that criminal charges can be pursued more selectively. The commission
concluded that even in cases where criminal charges might be warranted, the lower
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standards of proof in civil law and the absence of any stigma associated with being
indicted made civil actions preferable.1039
The TNEC’s final report and recommendations had only slight differences. It did
recommend an increase in the maximum fine for a criminal antitrust violation from
$5,000 to $50,000. Nonetheless, the committee endorsed its earlier recommendations to
include more civil penalties as options given the “inappropriateness of the criminal
remedies in many cases.”1040 Included in the report was a statement from Thurman
Arnold promising corporate executives that the DOJ would not bring them to Washington
“with a gun at their heads.” He said that the antitrust division is not “trying to regulate the
industry,” because “we are so meticulous and so sensitive to those charges that we never
even suggest what business ought to do.” He concluded that, “courts are properly
reluctant” to pursue imprisonment, promising that the Justice Department had no
intention to aggressively use the criminal features of antitrust law.1041
The TNEC was a final gasp of regulatory Keynesianism. Meant to revive antimonopolist sentiment, it only reaffirmed the idea that economic concentration was
necessary, beneficial, and inevitable. Most importantly, New Dealers on the TNEC
defended moderate regulatory responses to industrial combination because they feared
that antitrust prosecutions made a moral statement they did not wish to make. This was a
legacy of regulatory ideology embedded into the state’s regulatory framework, one which
drove New Deal reformers to defend regulatory over criminal sanctions in antitrust cases
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by promoting the assumption that industry leaders’ virtuous characters gave their
arguably criminal actions non-criminal meanings. Although relatively unnoticed at the
time, the TNEC’s case to limit the reach of the criminal provisions of antitrust law
reveals important and underappreciated dynamics of New Deal era politics.
The Administrative Procedure Act (1946)
Passed in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) reformed the way
regulatory and administrative agencies propose, write, and enforce rules. One of the core
pieces of American administrative law, it applies to federal executive departments and to
independent agencies in four ways: it requires agencies to inform the public as to their
organization and procedures; provides means for public participation in rulemaking
through public commenting; articulates uniform standards for rulemaking and
adjudication; and subjects agency decisions and actions to judicial review. The law
concentrated the Executive’s authority to coordinate the administrative state, opened up
the rulemaking process to the public, and established uniform standards for rulemaking
and adjudication.1042 As a result, the law reshaped the relationship between the state and
corporations by outlining procedural protections in regulatory proceedings.
The APA had its roots in 1939 when Roosevelt asked his Attorney General Frank
Murphy to form a committee to study the operation of administrative law. The
committee’s final report detailed its conclusions and recommendations, which served as
the basis for several reforms to U.S. administrative law. Among its conclusions was an
emphasis on the need for uniformity in administrative procedures given the vast
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differences across executive departments and regulatory agencies in how they made rules,
adjudicated disputes, and rendered decisions.1043 The report particularly noted that some
agencies had effectively adopted the “adversary characteristics” of a courtroom. The
committee praised this practice because it afforded the accused rights similar to those
they would receive in a legal setting, such as apprising them of charges and evidence so
they have adequate time and information to prepare a defense. When the committee
argued that “there is need for procedural reform” in the administrative process, their aim
was to protect those being charged through standardizing proceedings.1044
By standardizing the administrative process, the APA outlined specific rights for
anyone subjected to regulatory oversight. On the floor of the Senate, Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee Pat McCarran (D-NV) described the APA as “a bill of rights for the
hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way
or another by agencies of the Federal Government.” He stated that it was “designed to
provide guaranties of due process in administrative procedure.”1045 Similarly,
Representative John Gwynne (R-IA) said the law was designed to make regulatory
hearings look more like legal ones by “bring[ing] into the practice of these bureaus and
tribunals those principles of due process that we understand and that have been enforced
in the courts.”1046 ICC Commissioner Clyde Atchinson even informed the House
Committee on the Judiciary that administrative procedures would be greatly improved if
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they were made more comparable to “an adversary proceeding,” with all the rights,
procedures, and protections that come with it.1047
Reports from the House and Senate Judiciary Committees both described the law
as a bill of rights in regulatory proceedings. The Senate Committee took the position that
“the bill must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of some incidental or
possible inconvenience to or changes in present administrative operations.”1048 The bill, it
wrote, “is designed to afford parties affected by administrative powers a means of
knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected.”1049 The House Committee
described the bill as “an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures” that
“affords private parties a means of knowing what their rights are and how they may
protect them.”1050
Standardizing regulatory and administrative procedures for the sake of those
being monitored was a worthy reform, especially given the vast disparities in how
agencies operated. But by infusing regulatory processes with the dynamics of adversarial
legalism, the APA made litigation a prominent way of shaping the relationship between
the regulatory state and industries. By importing elements of legal culture into regulatory
operations, adversarial argument between opposing parties became a mechanism for
determining administrative outcomes and establishing precedent for regulatory
enforcement.1051 This uniquely American system of regulation, reliant on legalistic rules,
U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the Committee
on the Judiciary House of Representatives (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), 54–55.
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act: Report of the Committee of
the Judiciary on S. 7, Report No. 752 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), 5.
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 7.
U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure: Hearings, 16–17.
Moran, “The Rise of the Regulatory State,” 388–89.
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complicated regulatory proceedings and fostered a hostile relationship between business
and the state. Well-resourced corporations have as many benefits in adversarial settings
as they do in legislative ones, so while the APA constituted a noble attempt to standardize
regulatory procedures, it also gave industry the opportunity to use litigation to secure
favorable precedent and victories that were unattainable in other contexts.
By the late 1940s, state regulation was viewed as a threat to business-led progress
rather than an effective way of managing the economy. In this context, any remaining
hostilities to corporate concentration that flourished in the 1930s were quieted. This
dynamic is particularly clear in the Justice Department’s failed suit against a group of
investment banking firms in the case U.S. v. Morgan.
The Decision in U.S. v. Morgan (1953)
In October of 1947, the Justice Department filed a civil complaint against
seventeen of the nation’s top banking firms and the Investment Bankers Association
(IBA). The suit, billed by Attorney General Tom Clark as one of the most important
cases ever initiated under the Sherman Antitrust Act, was brought in the Southern District
of New York and dragged on for six years.1052 The outcome highlights how by the 1950s,
the power of antitrust law had been remarkably weakened and the negative image of
bankers created by the Pecora hearings was largely discredited.

See Carosso, Investment Banking, chapter 21 for a detailed historical review of the case. The
seventeen firms included: Morgan Stanley & Co.; Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; Smith, Barney & Co.; Lehman
Brothers; Glore, Forgan & Co.; Kidder, Peabody & Co.; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; White, Weld & Co.;
Eastman, Dillon & Co.; Drexel & Co.; The First Boston Corporation; Dillon, Read & Co. Inc.; Blyth
& Co. Inc.; Harriman Ripley & Co. Inc.; Stone & Webster Securities Corporation; Harris Hall & Co.
Inc.; and Union Securities Corporation.
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The trial ran from 1950 to 1953. The state repeated the allegations of the Pujo
Investigation, the Pecora Commission, and the TNEC in arguing that the seventeen firms
named had combined and conspired to monopolize America’s financial markets. To those
who were convinced of Wall Street’s corruption by these preceding investigations, the
suit promised to deliver the final blow to one of the greatest monopolies in American
business. The government alleged that the seventeen firms in the suit and the IBA
monopolized underwriting and impeded competition in securities markets.1053
Wall Street accepted the suit with a telling response. John Hancock of Lehman
Brothers declared that the charges were “based on ignorance of how business is done”
and was initiated for reasons, “that will not stand the light of day” in court. Hancock
insisted that Wall Street was already so well regulated that the securities industry
essentially operates “in a goldfish bowl.” A spokesman for Glore, Forgan & Co.
hearkened back to arguments advanced in the wake of the Great Depression, arguing that
the state’s stringent monitoring of the securities industry was creating a climate similar to
“the dark days of the Early Thirties.” 1054 What was most noteworthy is that investment
bankers felt that courts would serve as a good venue in which to prove their innocence. A
spokesperson for Kuhn, Loeb & Co. asserted that the suit was driven by “political
reasons,” and concluded that it would be “constructive to have the issues in this case
decided by our courts” so that the case could “end the long-continued efforts to harass a

Carosso, 458–61, 466.
“Investment Bankers Lash Back At Charges in Government Action: Underwriting Business Most
Competitive and Regulated in U.S., They Say--Some See Political Aim--War Service Recalled,” New
York Times, October 31, 1947.
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business which plays so vital a part in our entire economy.”1055 Murray Hanson, counsel
to the IBA, framed his response in legalistic terms, stating that the charges constituted an
“attack upon the members of the association for having individually and collectively
exercised their constitutional rights of petition and free speech.”1056
During the opening statements of the trial, it became clear that the defendants’ use
of legalistic language was not just a rhetorical weapon. Arthur Dean, attorney for the
defendants, clarified how the case differed from the Pujo, Pecora, and TNEC
investigations. He stated that those committees were always able to “select their own
documents and their own witnesses to support their own theory.” In these instances, Dean
said, “counsel for those under investigation…have been limited,” while the bankers were
“denied the right to object or question other witnesses.” Dean emphasized that this was
the first case in which investment bankers were able to tell their side of the story.1057
Well-resourced and well-financed, the defendants successfully dismantled the
government’s case, providing statistical evidence of market competition and attacking the
government’s evidence for being incomplete.1058 On February 5, 1954, Judge Harold
Medina ruled in favor of the firms and IBA, writing that he saw no evidence of
combinations or conspiracies. He stated that the concentration in the investment banking
industry was a “gradual, natural and normal” development. He wrote that it was produced
by the, “Securities and Banking Acts…State Blue Sky laws…[and] SEC, ICC, FPC and

“Investment Bankers Lash Back.”
“Investment Banking Firms Deny Monopoly Charges; Suit Called ‘Utter Nonsense’ and
‘Fantastic,’” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1947.
“Core of Trust Suit Put Under Attack: Bankers’ Lawyers Cite Cases to Disprove Argument That
They Refused to Compete,” New York Times, December 12, 1950.
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various state commissioners.” Medina concluded that the economic system that led to this
concentration among banks was “the product of legislation by the Congress and
administrative rulings by those functioning under the authority of Congress.”1059
The case gave investment bankers an opportunity to defend themselves and
decimate the state’s case in court. Investment banking historian Vincent Carosso’s
detailed account of the case concludes that the “image of the investment banker that
emerged” after the ruling “was entirely different one the one that had existed before the
trial started.” The trial gave bankers the chance to convince the public that the reports of
the Pujo, Pecora, and TNEC commissions were built on misconceptions. What began as
one of the most important suits ever filed under the Sherman Antitrust Act ended in an
outcome that “shattered the old myth of a Wall Street money monopoly.”1060
V. Conclusion
By the 1950s, regulation was the state’s main response to corporate wrongdoing.
Any potential in the earlier stages of the New Deal to create a new way of overseeing
corporate crime was extinguished by bankers, exchange officials, industry executives,
and legislators who appealed to older regulatory ideologies. By the 1940s and 1950s,
shifts towards commercial Keynesianism ensured that the state not only viewed the
prosecution of corporations as rarely appropriate, but also saw too much regulation as
hostile to economic progress.

United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y 1953); Medina’s decision was praised as as
“‘must’ supplementary reading” for anyone interested in the history of U.S. investment banking. See
“The Medina Opinion,” New York Times, October 15, 1953.
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The political development of the regulatory state during the New Deal and midcentury mirrors the story David Vogel tells about the latter twentieth century. During a
period of economic crisis, legislators and the public were keen to listen to the demands of
industry. At a moment where there was tremendous fear of over-burdening the businesses
trying recover from the Depression, the voices of the primary sectors the economy were
amplified in the political arena. Industry leaders used this opportunity to good effect,
reframing regulatory ideology to have a specific appeal in the political and economic
climate of the Great Depression.
Most importantly, the story of the New Deal illustrates how deeply entrenched
regulatory ideology was in political institutions. Policymakers intent on pushing back on
the status quo who had reputations for cracking down on corporate power—like Thurman
Arnold, William O. Douglas, and Thomas Corcoran—were in positions of power in the
1930s and 1940s. Still, they remained wedded to the basic precepts of regulatory
ideology that shaped the institutions they operated within. By the time political actors
seeking real change secured real power, the regulatory approach to monitoring corporate
wrongdoing had firmly established itself as a common-sense approach.
The regulatory state was designed within a specific set of ideological parameters
that hardened over time. The regulatory state sends an ideological message that the
corporate actor who commits a crime is tangibly different from the “common criminal,”
and his or her actions therefore take on a unique and more favorable meaning. This
system exists next to a criminal justice system that expresses the ideological message that
the poor are pathologically dangerous. Beginning in the 1960s, these two institutional
arrangements worked in tandem to promote the class-based brand of punitive politics that
407

drove mass incarceration by channeling street criminality into criminal justice institutions
and corporate criminality into regulatory arrangements separated from the dynamics of
carceral growth.
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CHAPTER 8: THE MUTUAL CONSTITUTION OF CLASS AND CRIME IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
“We are the good guys…We are on the side of the angels.”
- Jeffrey Skilling, former Enron CEO, in
the wake of Enron’s collapse (2002)1061
When Jeffrey Skilling told a Senate Committee shortly after Enron’s collapse that
the company’s leadership consisted of “the good guys,” he made a familiar appeal. He
defended his arguably criminal actions through reference to the good character and
intentions of business leaders. But his statement also made an assumption—the
assumption that everyone knew who the “bad guys” were.
It is thoroughly documented that the U.S. is the world’s leader in incarceration
and has also historically struggled to prosecute corporate crime. This project has
illustrated how these phenomena are related. Distinctive ideational constructions of street
and corporate criminality have been entrenched into U.S. regulatory and carceral
apparatuses, but both reflect and reinforce a common set of ideas about who the “bad
guys,” or the real “criminals,” are.
The state’s approaches to monitoring street and corporate criminality are products
of a shared set of political and ideological forces. In the late nineteenth century,
regulatory and rehabilitative ideologies were built around a common conception of
criminality that poor, low-income, and socially marginalized populations fit and
corporate leaders did not. These ideologies have travelled over time and been embedded
into carceral and regulatory institutions that have hardened in ways that legitimize this
politically constructed idea of criminality. This dissertation has shown how this idea
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originated and, at formative junctures, was embedded into the state’s criminal justice and
regulatory machinery.
This project makes several contributions to diverse academic literatures that are
reviewed in section I. Section II explores how this leads to reinterpretations of several
literatures in these fields. This is followed in section III with a review of directions for
future research before finishing in section IV with an account of its policy implications.
I. Overview of Primary Contributions
The findings presented in this dissertation make contributions to several
literatures in political science and criminology. Particularly, the project speaks to
research regarding ideas and institutions in American political development, the carceral
state, corporate crime, the regulatory state, and business-government relations.
Ideas and Institutions
The rise of rehabilitative penology reoriented American criminal justice. An
emphasis on the criminal rather than their crime, as well as assumptions about who the
likely criminal was, were rooted into the criminal justice system and the regulatory state.
Rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies embedded practices and premises into
institutions that have kept policymakers tied to a durable governing class ideology of
punishment. This was clear in the mid-twentieth century. New Deal era structural theories
of crime lost their emphasis on class and social relations as they were channeled through
rehabilitative frameworks, defusing the potential for the ideas of Robert Merton, Clifford
Shaw, and Henry McKay to link criminal justice reform to social and economic reform.
While ideas can shape political development, politics can also modify ideas as they are
repurposed and channeled through preexisting institutional and ideological settings.
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At the same time, political power cannot operate in isolation of prevailing
ideational patterns. Chapters three, five, and seven illustrate how historically, business
interests have strategically framed their goals within predominant discourses about
criminality. Politically savvy business leaders have remained aware of how the public
perceived corporate power and regularly relied on prevailing discourses related to crime
and economics to articulate their goals. This underscores how dominant ideational and
ideological currents of a political climate can delimit and condition the range of policy
outcomes that can be pursued, even for powerful political actors.
These conclusions comport with the spiral model of political development
outlined by Rogers Smith. Conceptualizing political actors as operating within a context
of preexisting institutions and ideas which they modify and use to form coalitions and
pursue policy change, the model conceives of development as a cyclical process in which
each cycle of development begins with a modified institutional and ideational context. In
this framework, ideas, interests, and institutions are mutually constitutive forces that
shape and are shaped by one another.
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This project shows the spiral in operation,

stressing how varied interests have used ideas about crime to drive political change and
how institutional contexts have modified and altered ideas at different times.
The Carceral State and American Political Development
Political science research often emphasizes how law-and-order campaigns
through U.S. history have stigmatized the poor and people of color as dangerous
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criminals while building up the carceral state.1063 With leading scholars suggesting that
the rejection of rehabilitation in the 1960s was a trigger for mass incarceration, this
research has overlooked the influence of rehabilitative ideology on political development.
Chapter two demonstrated how the rehabilitative ideal reoriented the focus of
American criminal justice from punishing the crime to punishing the criminal. The
degree of rehabilitative treatment or punishment meted out to an individual hinged on a
subjective judgment of his or her rehabilitative potential. Individualizing punishment in
this way meant that whether an individual personally fit prevailing constructs of
criminality became more important than their actions in determining how the state should
respond to their behavior. Reforms to indeterminate sentencing statutes, vagrancy laws,
the southern Black Codes, and crackdowns on labor mobilization hinged on the classskewed ideational construction of criminality attached to rehabilitative ideology.
Notions of natural criminality carried into schools of cultural, psychological, and
eugenic crime theory in the early twentieth century. By the New Deal, social structural
explanations of criminality were unable to dismantle rigid institutional frameworks and
established practices that had been shaped by rehabilitative ideology and ideas of innate
criminality. The deterministic understandings of crime articulated by Lombroso and
Brockway had long been abandoned by penologists, policymakers, and scholars. But the
policy innovations those men created, like the indeterminate sentence, were built around
those ideas and had become firmly entrenched into America’s system of criminal justice.
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Long before incarceration rates skyrocketed in the 1960s, the institutional and
ideological scaffolding for mass incarceration had been laid. Rehabilitative ideology was
essential to this process. Rehabilitative thought facilitated the passage of habitual
offender laws, the institutional precursors to contemporary three-strikes laws. Modern
guidelines schemes and mandatory sentencing statutes are often written to increase terms
of incarceration for repeat offenders. While punishing recidivism seems to be common
sense to Americans, the U.S. is unusual in how heavily it considers a person’s criminal
history in sentencing. This is a legacy America’s emphasis on the rehabilitative ideal and
individualization of punishment. Defenses of contemporary banishment laws even bear
resemblances to late nineteenth and early twentieth century justifications for vagrancy
law reform—the poor are prone to crime and their socioeconomic status is an indicator
that they will likely commit serious crime even if they have not yet.
Assumptions about who can and cannot be rehabilitated and who is or is not likely
to commit crime still color the way punishment is meted out in America. Ideas about
innate criminality and predictive containment are central to the politics that have driven
and maintained mass incarceration just as they drove brands of punitive politics earlier in
the century. Even in the absence of the biological ideas that initially fueled rehabilitative
ideology, key features of American criminal justice reflect the premises of rehabilitative
ideology and carry class-skewed ideas about criminality into the twenty-first century.
The Regulatory State and American Crime Politics
The development of indeterminate sentencing, vagrancy laws and their
contemporary variants, and other legal structures shaped by rehabilitative ideology show
how people who fit prevailing ideational constructs of criminality have historically been
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punished because of who they were in fear of what they might do. But in debates over
regulatory law since the late nineteenth century, industry leaders who did not fit this idea
have gone unpunished because of who they were in spite of what they actually did.
Literature on mass incarceration has drawn attention to the politics of street crime
at the expense of ignoring varieties of crime not punished harshly by the state. While
criminologists recognize that regulatory bodies rather than traditional law enforcement
agencies monitor corporate crime, political scientists describe this network of agencies as
the “regulatory state” without any discussion of its relation to crime politics.1064 But the
regulatory state is a relative of the criminal justice system and the political development
of both institutions have been related processes. The regulatory state must be analyzed as
a product of crime politics to fully appreciate its institutional design, purpose, and impact.
Even though it is under-addressed in political science scholarship, it is
underwhelming to claim that the state channels street criminals into the criminal justice
system and corporate criminals away from the prison. What is more important to
understand is how and why a common politically constructed understanding of
criminality has shaped both criminal justice and regulatory institutions. Chapters two and
three illustrate how this common idea was sewn into rehabilitative and regulatory
ideologies, which guided reforms to the criminal justice system and the initial political
choices in the regulatory state’s design. Chapters four through seven demonstrate how
carceral and regulatory frameworks have hardened over time in ways that legitimize the
shared understanding of criminality embedded into both sets of institutions.
Skowronek, Building a New American State; Berk, Alternative Tracks; Bensel, The Political
Economy of American Industrialization; Berk, Louis D. Brandeis; DeCanio, Democracy and the
Origins of the American Regulatory State.
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Opportunities to adopt new political approaches to monitoring corporate crime
have been constrained by these institutional and ideological factors. Chapter seven details
how reforms to regulatory policy and the corporate criminal law in the New Deal were
not driven by a new ideational pool, as was the case in the Gilded Age and Progressive
Era. Rather, major interests from the financial sector reframed regulatory ideology to
have particular appeal to policymakers during the Great Depression, convincing them that
a familiar regulatory approach would be the safest way to monitor the economy during
the crisis. Further, policymakers who would be likely advocates of criminal sanction for
executives, including Thurman Arnold and William O. Douglas, operated within an
institutional environment built on practices shaped by regulatory ideology that kept them
committed to a regulatory rather than criminal approach.
Carceral and regulatory institutions operate together in ways that reinforce a
message that only certain people count as criminal and deserve punishment. The poor and
people of color can commit three property crimes and get locked up for life, whereas
executives can perpetrate multiple frauds without sanction. This is a testament to the class
biases inherent to the political construction of criminality. To reform the carceral state,
the regulatory state, and the inequalities of U.S. crime policy, it is necessary to recognize
how these institutions relate to one another and produce and legitimate those inequalities.
Corporate Crime and Deterrence
Politicians repeatedly rediscover the problem of corporate crime in the wake of
financial crises, prompting them to reinvent the wheel and seek new solutions to the
problem. But despite these recurrent cycles and political campaigns to combat corporate
wrongdoing, the state has never cultivated the consistent power to deter corporate crime.
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Existing research demonstrates that regulators have historically been inconsistent
in how they exercise discretion in responding to corporate crime. Agencies have tended
to rely on regulatory responses over criminal ones to monitor business. Sutherland first
found this in in 1949, when he discovered that only 20% of prosecutable actions by
corporations were charged criminally.1065 It is little different today. A 2011 New York
Times piece found that while the SEC discovered 51 cases of securities fraud committed
by 19 prominent firms between 1996 and 2011, the agency initiated zero prosecutions.1066
Contemporary studies of corporate crime deterrence concur that the state’s
inconsistent enforcement of the corporate criminal law has rendered both regulation and
prosecution weak deterrents, but this is not to suggest that corporate offenders should be
subjected to the dynamics driving mass incarceration. Scholars in this literature generally
endorse the responsive regulation model as a framework for guiding the state’s response
to corporate crime.
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Braithwaite and Ayres’s responsive regulation model suggests

that the state should monitor corporations through regulatory tools before escalating to
punitive sanctions for serious or repeated infractions.1068 This project complements their
proposal. Braithwaite, Ayres, and contemporary analysts of corporate crime deterrence
agree that regulation only has deterrent force if the criminal law constitutes a credible
threat that firms will face should they fail to follow the law or modify their behavior.1069
Overreliance on regulatory sanctions not only masks corporate criminality and reinforces
Sutherland, White-Collar Crime, 6–9, 22–35, 40–43.
Edward Wyatt, “Promises Made, and Remade, in S.E.C. Fraud Cuases,” The New York Times,
November 7, 2011, sec. Business Day.
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a class-biased conception of crime, but also it weakens the deterrent force of the criminal
law and regulatory interventions.
This indicates that pursuing harsh sentences for every executive in every case of
wrongdoing is not necessary for regulators to achieve deterrence. As Schell-Busey et al.’s
2016 research found, too much emphasis on any one type of sanction—regulatory, civil,
or criminal—had poor deterrent power. A mix of sanctions applied consistently, as the
responsive regulation model suggests, was the only enforcement pattern with any
statistically significant deterrent value.1070 What is necessary is not severe sentencing for
corporate crimes, but clearer standards for when agencies plan to escalate to punitive
sanctions accompanied by a willingness to follow through and adequate funding for
agencies to pursue difficult cases. Specific guidelines on when to deploy regulatory
sanctions or refer cases to the Justice Department and consistent enforcement of existing
laws would create more certainty of criminal sanction. Empirical analysis indicates that
making criminal prosecution a credible threat in this way would improve the deterrent
force of both the criminal law and regulatory and administrative sanctions.
Business-Government Relations in America
Scholars of business-government relations in the U.S. have made claims ranging
from sweeping assertions about the almost unchecked capacity of big business to
constrain democratic institutions to nuanced claims about the specific ways in which
businesses have used their political might to secure their policy preferences. Universal in
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this literature is an emphasis on how corporations have regularly exerted enormous
political influence in American politics.1071
Research on the development of business-state relations in the U.S. often points to
conflicting junctures as “the moment” when large corporations organized in a
coordinated fashion. David Vogel emphasizes the 1960s as a period when business
interests mobilized in their own defense while William Domhoff argues that the New
Deal was undone by the late 1930s as corporations coalesced to facilitate a shift to procorporate governance.1072 However, most scholars agree that business was unorganized in
the late nineteenth century and thus mounted an insufficient defense against the Populists.
Unable to counter distaste for free markets through a coordinated response, a common
conclusion is that business lost in the face of a push for an administrative state.1073
This project illustrates that corporations were not on the run in the nineteenth
century and how they managed to secure some of their most significant goals. This
revises accounts from scholars like Steve Fraser who stress the rise of populist aversion
to wealth inequality in the Gilded Age by illuminating how and why populist rhetoric
failed to produce policy change.1074 The idea that businesspeople were staunchly opposed
to the regulation of free markets does not play out in the legislative history. Focusing on
the role of crime politics in regulatory debates clarifies that railroads got what they
wanted. They supported free markets in rhetoric but in practice preferred a minimal
Lindblom, Politics and Markets; Bernstein, Regulating Business; Kolko, Railroads and Regulation;
Carpenter and Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture; Werner and Wilson, “Business Representation
in Washington, DC”; Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change.
Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes; Vogel, “Why Businessmen Distrust Their State”; Domhoff, The Myth
of Liberal Ascendancy; Domhoff and Webber, Class and Power in the New Deal.
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regulatory state as an alternative to statutory criminal prohibitions on industry practices.
Even in the absence of business advocacy groups to coordinate large-scale mobilization
of various corporations, individual businesses and certain prominent sectors of the
economy were able to effectively take political action in their own interests.
As the political economy evolved, various industries become more or less
dominant. Consequently, different coalitions of corporate powers carried and modified
ideas associated with regulatory ideology and corporate criminality across time. While
railroads promoted the regulatory approach in the late nineteenth century, financial
interests carried regulatory ideology into Progressive Era policy debates. And in the New
Deal and postwar years, it was Wall Street financiers and bankers who drew on familiar
elements of the regulatory approach to pursue their policy goals.
Business’s political power has never been absolute. Businesses often secure their
favored policies, but their ability to do so is constrained within a window defined by the
discursive and ideological contours of the political climate. Chapters three and five show
that corporations were aware that they were popularly condemned and accordingly
framed their goals in policy debates within language about crime and economics that had
popular appeal. Chapter seven illustrates how business reframed regulatory ideology to
have a unique significance during the Great Depression. Big businesses do not simply
hold vetoes over public policy. Rather, successful corporate interests have tended to
frame their political goals within prevailing political discourses and ideological currents.
The Mutual Constitution of Class and Crime
The role of ideas about crime in APD and associations between carceral and
regulatory development shed light on the mutual constitution of class and crime in
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America. Inequality, class difference, and crime have long been theorized as phenomena
rooted in a shared set of personal individual pathologies. Exploring the nexus of
criminology, political economy, and political development reveals how class and
criminality have been mutually constitutive constructs in American politics.
The persistent power of rehabilitative ideology has embedded a naturalized
understanding of criminality into class relations. Rehabilitative and regulatory ideologies
both treat an individual’s social or economic condition as a determinative factor in
shaping the state’s response to his or her behavior. Behaviors common among the urban
poor have been criminalized to preemptively detain individuals deemed prone to crime,
while executives have been viewed as inherently good in ways that imbue their arguably
unethical actions with positive meanings. These distinctions have been presented as
natural rather than socially and politically constructed, turning a class ideology of
punishment into a common-sense approach to governance and social control.
Naturalizing class and crime produced a cycle that drove twentieth century
political development. Chapters two and three show how rehabilitative and regulatory
ideologies were embedded into institutions and chapters four through seven show this
cycle at work. As carceral and regulatory frameworks expanded and complexified, the
ideological constructions of criminality embedded into them were reproduced and
legitimated by governing institutions. This project thus builds on critical criminological
scholarship by showing how carceral and regulatory institutions are instilled with classskewed understandings of criminality that they have reinforced over time.
The label of criminality has had broad political purchase beyond class. Terms like
“incorrigible,” “born criminal,” “habitual offender,” and similar variants have historically
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been used as receptacles into which any undesirable population can be placed. The unity
of individualism and determinism in rehabilitative ideology has legitimated multiple
prejudices. The project thus highlights how varying ideologies of oppression, including
racism, nativism, and classism, cannot be wholly understood in isolation in the context of
American crime politics. Discourses that naturalize and link inequality and crime have
legitimized a range of ascriptive ideologies. The class skew of the prison population can
only be understood if we recognize how political constructions of class and criminality
have been interrelated in American political development and how the carceral and
regulatory states have internalized and reproduced these constructions.
II. Implications for Existing Literatures
This project prompts a rereading of extant research on a number of topics in law
and American politics. First, it promotes a reinterpretation of literature on the carceral
state’s development. Second, it alters understandings of regulatory reform in the second
half of the twentieth century. Third, the project challenges arguments that the rise of mass
incarceration has been characterized by a full rejection of the rehabilitative ideal.
The Political Development of the Carceral State
Leading scholars often identify the 1960s as a trigger for the onset of mass
incarceration, emphasizing conservatives’ backlash to civil rights and the Great Society
as a spark for carceral growth. They conclude that this led to a rejection of rehabilitation
and the proliferation of punitive reforms.1075 This project adds to the work of scholars

Flamm, Law and Order; Weaver, “Frontlash”; Tonry, Sentencing Fragments; Tonry, Punishing
Race; Garland, The Culture of Control; Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal; Ruth and Reitz,
The Challenge of Crime.
421
1075

who challenge this narrative by pointing to developments in earlier periods that shaped
the institutional and ideological context out of which the carceral state developed.1076
Three-strikes laws, harsh sentencing for career criminals, and the promulgation of
strict guidelines designed to predict a defendant’s criminal tendencies and calculate their
sentence were not entirely new in the second half of the twentieth century.1077 These
policies were connected to older ideas associated with rehabilitation. Risk assessments
were fundamental to the rehabilitative ideal, as indeterminate sentences were designed to
match an evaluation of a defendant’s criminal tendencies and rehabilitative potential to an
individualized sentence. Indeterminate sentencing was built on a dual logic to reform and
release some inmates while indefinitely containing incorrigibles, and laws resembling
three-strikes statutes were rationalized as extensions of rehabilitative logic as early as
1907. In the 1950s, California even experimented with a system resembling a riskassessment guidelines model that predicted defendants’ criminal tendencies through a
multi-factor schematic based on an individual’s personal traits and history. The state
explicitly presented it as part of its commitment to the rehabilitative ideal.
This sheds new light on current crime politics. Contemporary risk assessment
measures, such as guideline calculations of defendants’ criminal history scores, reflect a
punishment calculus that estimates an individual’s criminal predilections. Harsh
sentences for three-strikes offenders reflect the notion that recidivists are incurably
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criminal and the only solution is incarceration. It is easy to take these policies for granted
as common sense, but in global perspective, America is highly unusual in how heavily
state and federal jurisdictions rely on criminal history as a factor in criminal
sentencing.1078 The popularity of such policies is a legacy of the rehabilitative ideal and
its emphasis on tailoring punishment to the rehabilitative potential of each individual.
Evaluations of rehabilitative potential are subjective and often rest on
considerations of an individual’s socioeconomic background, behavioral history, and
personal traits. With poverty, class inequality, and criminality all treated as linked
phenomena, the poor and low-income classes have been disproportionately subjected to
the rehabilitative ideal’s punitive aspects geared towards predictive incapacitation. While
vagrancy laws were used to punish the poor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
modern banishment laws reflect the same premise that punishing the poor for minor
crimes will incapacitate the “incorrigible” before more they commit more serious crime.
This reveals how class-skewed ideologies about inherent criminality that
undergirded punishment in the late nineteenth century still infect the justice system with
naturalized understandings of criminality. Because white-collar offenders are seen as
neither requiring rehabilitation nor carrying traits warranting enhanced sentences, they
remain insulated from the punitive prong of rehabilitative ideology. The punishment
calculus of rehabilitative ideology shapes the class profile of the prison population by
reserving the labels of habitual criminal and three-strikes offender for lower class and
low-income individuals. Although the criminal justice system today does not reflect biodeterminist understandings of crime to the extent that it did in the nineteenth century,
1078
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central features of American criminal justice are relics of the rehabilitative ideal and have
transmitted notions of innate criminality into the twenty-first century.
It is important to realize that these policies are not entirely new innovations of the
carceral state, but rest on core facets of rehabilitative ideology. We can only make sense
of the rise of mass incarceration if we recognize that the politics for this brand of
punitiveness has been around for a long time. Late nineteenth century shifts towards
rehabilitation pushed policy in both benevolent and punitive directions in ways that have
had a durable impact on the development of American crime politics. The onset of mass
incarceration was not marked by a rejection of rehabilitative logic, but a reframing of it
emphasizing the ideal’s punitive prong at the expense of downplaying its reformative
aspects. Pushing rehabilitation as a way to check carceral growth is likely to exacerbate
punitive aspects of contemporary crime policy shaped by rehabilitative ideology.
Reassessing Consumerism and Regulatory Reform in the 1960s
Scholars often argue that the 1960s were a critical period for consumer protection.
Criminologists suggest that Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring, and the fallout Ford suffered after the Pinto recall provided impetuses for
reforming the corporate criminal code.1079 Political scientists view these developments as
reshaping the federal bureaucracy without any recognition of their relationship to crime
politics. While some scholars argue that these constituted meaningful consumer reforms,
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others suggest that corporate interests effectively ensured that agencies like OSHA and
the EPA were vested with vague mandates leaving them vulnerable to capture.1080
The failure of these literatures to contextualize these developments within a broad
understanding of American crime politics is a significant flaw. This project’s historical
scope provides new insights into how these developments were related to and distinct
from general currents in crime politics. Various coalitions have modified regulatory
ideology in debates about crime depending on historical and economic circumstance, but
by depicting corporate criminals as sympathetic figures, regulatory ideology limits the
capacity to label those hurt by corporate actions as victims. In the 1960s, the nation’s
network of criminal justice institutions ensured that voices demanding criminal justice
reform, including otherwise liberal groups like the victims’ rights movement, were
channeled into promoting harsh justice.1081 Literature on regulatory reform during the
1960s shows how the institutional structures constituting the regulatory state channeled
voices demanding shackles on corporate crime into regulatory directions.
In the context of this project, these literatures take on a new significance. An
institutional context designed to promote a class-skewed brand of punitive politics had
begun to take shape well before the 1960s, with roots dating back to the regulatory state’s
origins and the rise of the large corporation in the nineteenth century. But public attitudes
hostile to corporate power in the 1960s were separated from the punitive impulses driving

Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, especially chapters 3-5; Terry Moe, “The Politics of Bureaucratic
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mass incarceration not only because those voices were channeled through institutions
separated from the justice system. They were also separated from the victims’ movement.
The public has historically been labeled consumers rather than victims in
instances of corporate wrongdoing. Regulatory ideology has actually depicted
corporations as the real victims of an ignorant public that frivolously demands
prosecutions. Assumptions that consumers’ policy preferences about the economy are
based on uninformed beliefs and would unfairly hurt business have been central to
regulatory ideology and have helped to limit the state’s power to prosecute corporate
crime. This project illustrates how and why demands to restrain corporate power in the
1960s were disconnected from the era’s victims’ movement that was directed towards
criminal justice reform, leaving these voices directed into regulatory reform.
Rehabilitation, Political Discourse, and Criminology
Existing literature on mass incarceration mischaracterizes the role rehabilitative
ideology has played in advancing the prison boom and driving punitive politics, but the
rehabilitative ideal has also shaped the development of the discipline of criminology. As
the Wickersham Commission noted, perhaps the single greatest contribution Lombroso
made to criminology was “centering attention on the criminal rather than the crime
committed.”1082 The rehabilitative ideal brought two new analytic foci to the study of
crime—an individualistic framework and deterministic assumptions about human
behavior. The rehabilitative ideal served a project of individuation and was built on the
assumption that certain people were innately predetermined to commit crime.
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These assumptions about individualism and determinism shaped alternative
variants of crime theory in the Progressive Era, including eugenic science and cultural
theory. Even into the New Deal, emphases on the individual faults of offenders were
difficult for crime theorists to dislodge in their attempts to focus on social and economic
contributors to criminal behavior. Scholars have addressed how prevailing governing
ideologies are related to simultaneous patterns in criminological research, but this project
shows nuances in how these relationships operate.1083 There is a connection between
political discourse and crime theory, but criminology is in some sense its own path
dependent phenomenon. There are moments where new ideas mark larger or smaller
breaks from prevailing trends, but rehabilitative ideology and its focus on personal traits,
determinism, and risk assessment has conditioned the development of criminological
theory. The positivist bent to contemporary criminology, specifically its emphasis on
identifying the causes of individual-level behavior, is partially a legacy of how Cesare
Lombroso, Zebulon Brockway, and other architects of the rehabilitative ideal redirected
criminology to focus on studying the individual criminal rather than the crime.
III. Future Research
There are several avenues for extensions of the project, including analyses of the
ideational and ideological currents of latter twentieth century politics and the politics of
street and corporate crime from the 1960s to today.
Ideas and Ideologies
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Three ideologies have shaped political debates about inequality in the second half
of the twentieth century—human capital theory (HCT), culture of poverty theory, and
neoliberalism. HCT is the oldest, as it began to take shape in the 1930s and became
prominent ideology in the 1960s.1084 HCT posits that human resources, including skillsets
and personality traits, are forms of capital that dictate the worth of labor one brings to the
marketplace. Chicago school economists, notably Gary Becker, popularized HCT by
using it to justify the inequalities of liberal capitalism.1085 Culture of poverty theory’s
clearest basis was in Oscar Lewis’s work, in which he described the lifestyles adopted in
historically marginalized communities. While his initial theory mirrored a Marxist
anomie theory, sociologists and policymakers warped his theory in the 1960s to mesh
with delinquent subculture theory and focus on individual-level dynamics.
Ideological commitments to human capital and culture of poverty theories primed
American politics for a transition to neoliberal governance. Neoliberalism is an
ideological framework in which market schemas are used to rationalize all aspects of
human life. Logics of market choice and competition become organizing principles for all
public policy. Although neoliberalism is philosophically committed to less government,
this does not always manifest in neoliberal policy, which often repurposes the state to
impose market dynamics into areas of life in which markets do not exist. Neoliberalism
became particularly dominant in the 1980s after the collapse of the New Deal order.1086
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Prevailing governing ideologies are linked to patterns in criminological research,
so the current revival of bio-criminology should be considered in conjunction with the
consolidation of neoliberalism.1087 Research over the past twenty years has focused on
psychophysiology, neurology, and genetics in explaining crime while endorsing policies
similar to the eugenic ones advocated by nineteenth century scholars.1088 The
implications this project has for the revival bio-criminology will be discussed in a latter
section.
Neoliberal politics has been especially favorable to aspects of regulatory
ideology.1089 Many scholars point to the post-1980s financialization of the economy as a
trigger for an uptick in corporate criminality.1090 These scholars agree that
financialization has glorified the pursuit of profits to the extent that illicit tactics,
corporate rapacity, and market manipulation are viewed as laudable actions done in the
name of growth.1091 It seems counterintuitive that neoliberalism would accept any aspect
of regulatory ideology given its promotion of regulatory rollback. But while the idea that
corporate lawbreakers are properly understood as upright and enterprising as opposed to
“criminal” has been at the heart of regulatory ideology for a century, the neoliberal
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moment and celebration of market ideologies has amplified these biases as part of the
process of financialization.
Rehabilitative ideology also reinforces neoliberal political imperatives by locating
the causes of behavior and inequality in individuals. This masks the social and economic
factors that drive inequality and emphasizes personal responsibility as the solution. Along
with biological explanations of crime and inequality, rehabilitative ideology legitimizes
the neoliberal notion that social assistance is a misguided attempt to aid people who are
irredeemable. Together, bio-criminology and rehabilitative ideology justify the neoliberal
agenda of welfare retrenchment and carceral expansion, which produces disadvantaged
neighborhood loaded with obstacles to upward social and economic mobility.
A sizable literature explores how mass incarceration is linked to neoliberalism.1092
However, future extensions of this project can illustrate how regulatory reform,
rehabilitative ideology, and bio-criminology are connected to these shifts and how
durable class ideologies of punishment have carried into twenty-first century politics.
Trends in Street Crime
There are many ways in which culture of poverty, human capital, and neoliberal
ideologies related to rehabilitative ideology and developments in the politics of street
crime from the 1960s to today. Liberal discourse revived the rehabilitative ideal in the
1960s.1093 Then in 1974, Robert Martinson published his famous article concluding that
rehabilitative interventions had little to no effects on recidivism reduction, which
Gottschalk, Caught; Soss, Fording, and Schram, Disciplining the Poor; Wacquant, Punishing the
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conservatives interpreted as proof that “nothing works” to rehabilitate inmates.1094
Conventional narratives often end here, concluding that this constituted an abandonment
of rehabilitation in favor of a harsh ethic of punishment. Ostensibly this seems true, as
scholars of the 1970s defended deterrence and retributivist penologies while rejecting the
utility of rehabilitation, pushing scholars and politicians on the left like Marvin Frankel
and Ted Kennedy to join the chorus rejecting the rehabilitative ideal.1095 The bipartisan
breadth of this alliance made being anti-rehabilitation the only viable political position.
While this moment constituted a reframing of criminality, this reactionary politics
did not wholly reject the rehabilitative ideal. Many of the reforms associated with the
carceral state’s rise drew on logic only found in rehabilitative ideology. Rehabilitation
was not necessarily the foremost cause of mass incarceration, but it has been overlooked
as a contributor to it. In spite of policymakers’ rejections of rehabilitation, sentencing
guidelines and three-strikes laws were built on core aspects of rehabilitative ideology.
The federal guidelines, published in 1987, quantified offense seriousness and
criminal history into scores which were used to calculate ranges within which judges
could sentence defendants.1096 The House and Senate insisted that rehabilitation was an
inappropriate rationale for incarceration, but that rehabilitation should still be a goal of

Robert Martinson, “What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform,” The Public
Interest 35 (1974): 22–54; Ruth and Reitz, The Challenge of Crime, 83–84.
James Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Von Hirsch and Committee
for the Study of Incarceration, Doing Justice, 6; Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without
Order (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973); Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice
(New York: Random House, 1978).
States constructed similar systems as they abolished parole and cut early release incentives. See
Ruth and Reitz, The Challenge of Crime, 474–75.
431
1094

1095

1096

the justice system under the guidelines.1097 As a result, “Rehabilitating the offender” was
listed among the primary goals of the justice system in the 1987 guidelines manual
published by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which Congress charged with writing the
guidelines.1098 The logical reciprocal to rehabilitation—the predictive incapacitation of
incorrigibles—thus manifested in the guidelines regime. The Commission defended
scoring criminal histories by arguing that, “Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of
a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation.”1099 Judges were also allowed to consider
non-carceral sentences issued for rehabilitative purposes as well as uncharged, dismissed,
or acquitted conduct in determining a defendant’s rehabilitative potential.1100
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1982 similarly used behavioral histories to
judge a defendant’s rehabilitative potential. The law instituted extended sentences for
those convicted of multiple firearm offenses. The Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed
the law by stating that the armed career criminal was “effectively beyond rehabilitation,”
rendering it “necessary to terminate his career by lengthy incarceration.”1101
States witnessed similar developments. For instance, California was a national
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leader in promoting three-strikes laws in the 1990s.1102 Two years after the state passed
its three-strikes law in 1994, the state Department of Corrections did a retrospective
analysis of the law and linked it to rehabilitative ideology. The report quoted Los Angeles
Deputy DA Matt Hardy as saying that the law targeted individuals “who are never going
to change.” DA Bill Gravin even defended the sentencing of Jerry Williams, who stole a
slice of pizza and got 25-to-life due to his previous convictions, by arguing that he “has
been given numerous opportunities by the court to change his criminal behavior.”1103
Another example of the dual prongs of the rehabilitative ideal at work was in the
treatment of juveniles in the 1990s. While the super-predator scare drove harsh justice for
youths deemed irredeemable, these reforms were coupled with increases in communitybased services to reform juveniles. These practices were seen as complementary,
highlighting how the contradictory logic of the rehabilitative ideal persisted over time.1104
The history of the eugenics movement indicates that the current renaissance of
bio-criminology could augment the punitive aspects of rehabilitative ideology. This is
especially clear in Adrian Raine’s 2013 book The Anatomy of Violence. Raine is perhaps
the leading scholar of bio-criminology today. His book was so well-received that it was
adapted into a pilot for a CBS series about tracking criminals through biological analysis,
highlighting how biological constructs of criminality can seep into popular discourse.1105
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In the book, Raine claims to uncover connections between violent crime and
neurological factors.1106 He endorses mandatory treatment and incarceration for at-risk
adults and juveniles, thus mirroring the duality of rehabilitative ideology, while
describing crime as a “biosocial” phenomenon driven by biological and social forces.
While some of the social factors he discusses warrant attention, like lead exposure, others
disregard how crime is tied to economic relations. For example, he emphasizes how
unstable homes and low parental supervision are correlated with juvenile delinquency,
leading him to defend the eugenic proposal of requiring people to apply for state licenses
to have children.1107 This evades an analysis of what causes parental absenteeism,
neglecting that the poor often work multiple jobs, suffer from higher death rates, and
disproportionately face incarceration. By neglecting these details, Raine overlooks how
social disadvantage is produced and how his solutions would exacerbate those problems
by ostracizing people from their families and communities.1108
Bio-criminology and eugenics are not isolated to academia. At least nine states
have legislation permitting the use of chemical or surgical castrations for sex
offenders.1109 Since 2015, state authorities in California and Tennessee were found to
have been illegally coercing inmates and defendants into sterilizations.1110 Non-profits
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like the MacArthur Foundation also keep bio-deterministic understandings of criminality
alive in seemingly progressive circles by utilizing research about brain development to
promote juvenile justice reform. While seeking to minimize sanctions for juveniles, this
strategy inadvertently reinforces deterministic understandings of juvenile criminality.1111
Analyses of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1982, Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, state three-strikes laws, and the revival of eugenic politics are potential routes for
assessing how the rise of mass incarceration has been linked to rehabilitative ideology.
Exploration of how organizations like the MacArthur and Heritage Foundations rely on
bio-criminology could provide insights into the networks that keep these ideas politically
relevant in progressive and conservative circles. Additional research could also study
how courts are increasingly relying on risk assessment scores calculated by private
companies to make parole, probation, and sentencing decisions in individual cases.1112
Trends in Corporate Crime
There are numerous directions for future analysis of corporate crime politics from
the 1960s to today. A good starting point would be David Vogel’s research, which shows
how the wave of regulatory laws passed in the 1960s constituted a form of
entrepreneurial politics driven by savvy lawmakers who realized that the public would
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support them once mobilized. He concludes that this spate of reforms were passed
because of the economy’s health, which made it hard for corporations to oppose
regulations on the grounds that they could not afford them.1113 Future research could
examine the passage of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, which
expanded the enforcement powers of federal banking agencies, to see if and how
lawmakers politicized regulatory ideology during these debates.
Future analysis would also have to examine the 1980s, when both the left and
right accepted financialization as a business unto itself rather than a catalyst for other
businesses to grow. Rana Foroohar has shown how Reagan-era reforms led businesses to
prioritize risky financial ventures over investments in product quality and job creation.
For instance, she discusses the SEC’s 1982 legalization of share buybacks, through which
companies can repurchase shares of their own stock, which were previously considered
an illegal form of market manipulation since they gave firms a way to inflate their share
prices.1114 This is just one way in which financialization prompted firms to focus on
increasing share value over growing their companies by decriminalizing market activities
in the name of the neoliberal “bigger is better” and “markets know best” ethos.
There are numerous examples of how the political shifts of the 1980s through
2000s unleashed America’s financial institutions and resulted in crises. The Savings and
Loan Crisis of the 1980s was precipitated by the passage of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which allowed operators of thrift institutions to

1113
1114

Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes, 38–42, chapter three.
Foroohar, Makers and Takers, 52, 125–28.
436

profit while shielding themselves from detection for undercapitalizing bad loans.1115 The
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act was passed in 1989 as an
attempt to correct this problem.1116 The story of energy-trading company Enron in the
2000s followed a different trajectory. After accounting firm Arthur Andersen helped
Enron perpetrate a massive accounting fraud, Andersen was criminally convicted and
received 5 years of probation, a $500,000 fine, stripped of its licenses, and forbidden
from doing accounting for public companies. The conviction was reversed on appeal, but
the prosecution destroyed Andersen and the reversal hurt the DOJ’s reputation. After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 to monitor corporate accounting and disclosure,
federal prosecutors were reluctant to pursue corporate prosecutions out of fear that they
could face backlashes for destroying firms and then having those convictions
reversed.1117
Brandon Garrett has shown how after Andersen, prosecutors began using deferred
prosecution agreements in cases of corporate wrongdoing. DPAs, which were designed
for juveniles in the 1930s, have been adapted for corporations in the modern era. They
allow firms to avoid convictions by mandating reforms to internal compliance systems
and instituting fines far smaller than the damage caused without requiring admissions of
guilt. They enable prosecutors to score public relations victories by imposing fines that
appear massive without alienating corporate interests and are issued regularly to repeat
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offending corporations.1118 A close look at DPAs, which are essentially rehabilitative
opportunities for corporate bodies, would be a promising direction for future research.
The familiar story of the S&L and Enron scandals also played out in the lead up to
the Great Recession. Many experts agree that the repeal of Glass-Stegall laid crucial
groundwork for the 2008 collapse.1119 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did not
shy from condemnatory language in studying the collapse, using the word “fraud” over
150 times in its final report to describe what caused the crisis. But in John Hagan’s
words, the Commission’s influence was “uninspiring.”1120 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 it helped create left the “tough work” of
writing regulations to the Federal Reserve and Securities and Exchange Commission,
where the bill was kept in a crippled state. As of 2013 less than half of the two hundred
regulations necessary to enforce it were in place. Firms hired armies of lobbyists and
regulatory lawyers to delay its implementation and “defang” the law of its bite.1121
How these debates about regulatory reform from the 1960s through today
reflected tenets of regulatory ideology would be the focus of future analysis. An analysis
of Justice Department policy would also be promising, particularly exploring the rise of
“too big to fail” politics as exemplified in Eric Holder’s 1999 Justice Department memo
declaring that prosecutors should consider the collateral consequences of corporate
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convictions. Realistically only a small sample of these topics could be subjected to
meaningful scrutiny, but all are promising avenues for analysis.
IV. Policy Implications
A number of policy implications follow from this work. They regard the revival
of the rehabilitative ideal, the resurgence of bio-criminology, how to reform the
regulatory state, and ways to reform the criminal justice system.
The Rehabilitative Ideal and American Crime Politics
In recent years, numerous policymakers have expressed support for a return to the
rehabilitative ideal. Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders have all spoken
of rehabilitation as an alternative to mass incarceration.1122 This is a perspective shared
by those on the right, including conservative operative Grover Norquist.1123 Georgia’s
Republican Governor Nathan Deal has even received praise as a national leader in
criminal justice reform for investing $17 million into measures partially designed to
rehabilitate low-risk non-violent offenders.1124 And public opinion research indicates that
the public in deep-red Texas supports rehabilitative measures for those behind bars.1125
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There is good reason to be cautious about a revival of the rehabilitative ideal. The
resurgence of rehabilitation has historically been coupled to bursts of punitive policies
framed as necessary complements to rehabilitative measures. It is thus unsurprising to
hear President Trump state that “We will be very tough on crime, but we will provide a
ladder of opportunity to the future,” in the same breath while endorsing policies to
rehabilitate federal inmates.1126 Research has expressed surprise that public support for
rehabilitation coexists alongside public support for punitiveness, but these are not
mutually exclusive positions.1127 The theoretical structure of rehabilitative ideology
entails support for both. Rehabilitative measures have been implemented next to harsh
justice practices in the past and there is no reason to think they would not now.
Social and economic inequalities have long shaped criminal justice outcomes in
the U.S., but scholars have not recognized how the rehabilitative ideal has naturalized
rather than combatted those inequalities. It has promoted a project of class control by
rationalizing the economic condition and criminal behavior of the poor as natural
phenomena rooted in unfixable individual defects. By conceptualizing criminality as a
function of personal faults among the poor that can only be treated through microinterventions, rehabilitative ideology has hardened class distinctions and legitimized
punishment over social assistance as the optimal way to address inequality and crime.
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This is not to say that rehabilitative interventions have no value. In-prison
educational opportunities, vocational training, and good behavior incentives have
intrinsic worth. To promote reentry, it is reasonable to make incarceration as much like
life in society as possible. But reformers must recognize the dangers inherent in
rehabilitative ideology. Now as in years past, rehabilitative discourse obscures the
structural, social, and economic forces that contribute to what gets labeled and punished
as crime by promoting an emphasis on personal responsibility and self-improvement.
This masks how the state’s abandonment of low-income communities contributes to
crime. A focus on correcting individuals can lead to complacency in demanding
structural reform and ultimately feed the politics of law-and-order advocates.
It is problematic when the effectiveness of rehabilitative measures is measured by
their impact on recidivism reduction. A serious commitment to lowering crime rates must
recognize that criminality is not just a function of personal agency that can be corrected
by reforming individuals, but a product of social and economic forces. Meaningful crime
reduction also requires political economic reform, like adequately funding public
education so that inmates do not need to receive their GED during a prison term. Public
investment in neglected communities should be used to create jobs so that inmates
reentering society can actually use the educational or vocational training they receive
behind bars. Bulking up public housing and guaranteeing ex-felons access to it would
guarantee that reentering offenders would not sleep on the street while looking for work.
Rehabilitation is a political form of punishment that allows the state to grant
certain individuals social and political equality over others while limiting the weapons in
the state’s crime reduction toolkit to micro-interventions. It absolves the state of any
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responsibility for pursuing comprehensive reforms that could make a deep and tangible
difference in former inmates’ lives. Rehabilitative discourse today is likely to generate
the same dual tracks of policy we have seen in the past. Whatever rehabilitative measures
may be implemented will be reserved for inmates only “if they deserve it.”1128 Those who
do not will be subjected to severe sanctions that will be presented as complementary to
rehabilitative programs. Without a politics aiming to reform the deeper social and
economic inequities that shape U.S. crime policy, the rehabilitative ideal will again
promote a project of individuation designed as both remedial and repressive.
The Resurgence of Bio-Criminology
Advocates of rehabilitative reform should be cautious at a moment when genetics
research is growing in influence. A growing body of bio-criminology linking crime to
congenital biological and genetic factors presents its policy implications as both punitive
and therapeutic and thus reinforces the abusive facets of rehabilitative ideology.
Rehabilitation’s relationship to eugenics suggests that a joint revival of bio-criminology
and rehabilitative ideology could lead to more support for the eugenic practices that have
already been implemented in many states.
Rehabilitative ideology’s class-skewed philosophy has long been disguised by
scientific clothing. Repeatedly, theoreticians of crime have explained the “rehabilitative
ideal” and its reciprocal punitive aspects as parts of the same whole by relying on
disputable empirics infected with a class ideology. From Brockway through Raine,
biological research has provided “proof” that the Anglo-Saxon upper class is different,
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and largely superior, to others. This has provided an empirical basis for rationalizing the
criminality and economic condition of undesirables as natural while turning the label of
criminality into a catchall category into which any population deemed offensive to
bourgeois sensibilities can be contained. These accounts have hardened the link between
a facially progressive rehabilitative discourse and the criminal justice system’s class
biases by masquerading long-standing prejudices as facts.
This underscores connections between race and the development of American
criminal justice. Much like nineteenth race scientists sought to hierarchically organize
humanity based on racial traits, contemporary bio-criminologists argue that criminality is
a naturally occurring trait in certain people. But labels of natural criminality have evolved
and been populated with different “inferior” racial categories over time. Blacks, Italians,
Irish, and other immigrants were treated as natural criminals in the nineteenth century,
and scholars like Raine populate the category with undesirables today by hiding their
ideological commitments underneath technical language. The science of race and science
of crime have long worked in tandem to justify control of marginalized populations, and
racial categories have served to distinguish gradations of inferiority and criminality.
The rehabilitative ideal is built on these brands of scientific theory reflecting a
class-biased and racially skewed understanding of who counts as a “criminal.” This has
had counterintuitive implications for offenders who do not require rehabilitation,
including corporate defendants. Since executives do not fit the image of the criminal type
requiring rehabilitation or control, they cannot be labeled incorrigible. They do not
require compulsion to work, sterilization to prevent future criminality, or enhanced
punishments for repeat offending to learn. This is because their behavior has consistently
443

been attributed to structural forces rather than personal traits.
Corporate criminals are hard to prosecute for many reasons, but their exclusion
from rehabilitative discourse and bio-criminological research has worked to their
advantage by insulating them from labels of incorrigibility. The few modern biocriminological projects that do study white-collar criminals reinforce favorable
perceptions. While not intended to present white-collar criminals in a flattering light, a
2011 study comparing the brain functionality of white-collar to street criminals
concluded that “white-collar criminals have better executive functioning, enhanced
information processing, and structural brain superiorities” than street offenders, creating a
sharp contrast from the notion of pathological deviance associated with crime.1129
It is a testament to the class biases of our prevailing political understanding of
criminality that poor offenders can commit three minor offenses and get incarcerated for
life, whereas wealthy ones can commit multiple far more damaging offenses without ever
being sanctioned. The class ideology of the rehabilitative ideal has ensured that labels
like “habitual criminal” and “three-strikes” offender have been reserved for lower class
offenders. The biological study of crime has ensured that the state’s most severe
sanctions are only directed at the poor and low-income classes.
What the Regulatory State Can Learn from the Criminal Justice System:
How to Punish Corporate Crime Without Contributing to Mass Incarceration
There are two trends in criminological research within which this project’s
implications about regulatory ideology should be assessed. First is the literature on
corporate crime deterrence. Academics have long debated whether the corporate criminal
Adrian Raine et al., “Increased Executive Functioning, Attention, and Cortical Thickness in WhiteCollar Criminals,” Human Brain Mapping 33, no. 12 (2012): 2932–40.
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law is such a weak deterrent that regulation should be prioritized over prosecution or
whether the criminal law, when used effectively, can deter corporate law breaking.1130
Those who endorse Braithwaite and Ayres’s model of responsive regulation contend that
the consistent use of criminal sanction could deter corporate crime and enhance the
efficacy of regulatory measures by backing them with credible threats of prosecution.1131
Again, this project complements the responsive regulation model by emphasizing
the need for consistency and clarity in agency responses to corporate crime. It also notes
that empirical deterrence studies suggest that a consistent mix of responses based on the
sanctions pyramid is the best way to promote deterrence.1132 These analyses indicate that
optimal deterrent effects follow the use of a healthy mix of sanctions, including the
consistent and regular use of prosecution by regulators, rather than an overreliance on
prosecution or the meting out of a few wildly severe sentences.
This connects to a different literature consisting of accounts from academics,
journalists, and other observers who offer stinging critiques of Wall Street and demand to
subject white-collar criminals to lengthy prison terms.1133 But visceral outrage at the likes
of Martin Shkreli and Bernie Madoff fuels a rhetoric that can, if unchecked, be
counterproductive. It is true that deploying more criminal sanctions in response to
For various perspectives in this debate, see Stone, Where the Law Ends; Hawkins, “Compliance
Strategy”; Croall, Understanding White Collar Crime, 133; William Chambliss, “Types of Deviance
and the Effectiveness and Legal Sanctions,” Wisconsin Law Review 43, no. 4 (Summer 1967): 703–
14; John Braithwaite and Gilbert Geis, “On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control,” Crime
and Delinquency 28, no. 2 (1982): 292–314.
Braithwaite and Ayres, Responsive Regulation chapter 2; Schell-Busey et al., “What Works?”;
Braithwaite, “In Search of Donald Campbell”; Paternoster, “Deterring Corporate Crime”; Yeager,
“The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime.”
Schell-Busey et al., “What Works?”
Ferguson, Predator Nation; Morgenson and Story, “In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top
Figures”; Rakoff, “The Financial Crisis”; Taibbi, The Divide; Tillman, Pontell, and Black, Financial
Crime and Crises.
445
1130

1131

1132
1133

corporate frauds that inflict magnitudes more damage than street crime could help the
economy by encouraging healthy market conditions, despite the pleas of business that it
would obstruct the engines of growth.1134 But those who evaluate corporate crime in
isolation from the broader character of American crime politics often endorse a “lock ‘em
up” mentality. Punishing every executive for every crime with savagely long terms just to
satiate our outrage is an impulsive and dangerous position to take.
When the state gives in to punitive instincts in corporate cases, it produces a few
high-profile convictions in which defendants get sentences so severe they defy
sensibility. The 845-year sentence meted out to Sholam Weiss and Bernie Madoff’s 150year sentence are two examples of this dynamic at work.1135 This satiates the public’s
demands for punishment while obscuring structural problems with the regulatory state,
corporate criminal law, and political economy. For example, Madoff’s sentence
distracted the public from the fact that the SEC failed to uncover his Ponzi scheme after
initiating five inquiries into his operations over sixteen years. Punitive responses
discourage public conversations about more difficult topics, like how the underfunding of
agencies like the SEC encourages regulators to focus on easy cases rather than more
serious and challenging ones so their statistics look good when they submit funding
requests to Congress. 1136 And ratcheting up every corporate case to the level of Madoff or
Weiss would be a reckless answer, as subjecting every corporate criminal to such extreme
sentences would only exacerbate the problems of mass incarceration. This is why the
See Mokhiber, “20 Things You Should Know About Corporate Crime”, for information on the
damage inflicted by corporate and white-collar crime generally.
Henning, “Sentences Get Harsher in White-Collar Cases”; Rakoff, “The Financial Crisis”; Garrett,
Too Big to Jail, 271.
Goldfarb, “The Madoff Files.”
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responsive regulation model—which emphasizes consistency in prosecution rather than
severity and has received support from empirical analysis—is a better model for deterring
corporate crime than ruthless sentencing.
While consistency in criminal sanction would encourage deterrence, reactive
responses are also not a complete solution to reducing corporate crime. Much like with
rehabilitative interventions, reforms to regulatory policy and the corporate criminal law
will only work in conjunction with changes to the political economy. Some prosecutions
could help the economy if they are used as complements to regulatory tools, but only
relying on these types of reactive interventions overlooks how financialization has
heightened the criminogenic tendencies of industries. Rana Foroohar has argued that
America should “put finance back in service to business and society.” She suggests that
simplifying banks, reducing their debt, structuring corporations to act in the public
interest, and incentivizing companies to seek growth strategies outside of finance would
promote such change.1137 These types of reform, however, are unlikely in the near future.
A more immediate way to address these problems is to recognize that clarity and
consistency in criminal sanction are the keys to deterrence over severity. Changes to the
economy and reformation of a business culture that glorifies fraud are fundamental ways
to reduce corporate criminality, but an increased focus on clarity and certainty in
prosecution could have immediate deterrent effects right now.1138 This would require
more federal funding for agencies; clearer agency guidelines on when to escalate
sanctions; a dedication among regulators to follow those guidelines; and an increased
Foroohar, Makers and Takers, chapter 11.
Tillman, Pontell, and Black, Financial Crime and Crises, chapter six particularly highlights how
financialization has created an organizational culture prone to criminality in major corporations.
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allocation of resources to the Justice Department’s white-collar crime division to enable
prosecutors to pursue prosecution rather than DPAs.
What the Criminal Justice System Can Learn from the Regulatory State:
Contextualizing and Decriminalizing Poverty and Homelessness
It is true that social and economic reform would help check carceral growth, but
this has unrealistic short-term prospects as a reform strategy given how out of step it is
with basic facets of American political culture and its emphasis on individual
responsibility. However, there are two ways in which the criminal justice system can
learn from the regulatory state to make immediate progress in scaling back the carceral
state. This includes directing attention to correcting structural conditions conducive to
crime and decriminalizing behaviors that do not deserve punishment.
First, it is not impossible to imagine policy responses to crime that reflect a
structurally contextualized understanding of criminal behavior. This is clear in the
regulatory approach to punishment, which conceptualizes criminality as a function of
market structures and industry dynamics that agencies are designed to monitor more than
the people operating businesses. By locating the causes of crime in market conditions,
agencies are built to encourage healthy behavior among firms through regulatory
interventions. The FTC’s design is a clear example of this. As Brandeis said, the FTC
was built to focus on “preventing the conditions which lead to the criminal tendency.”1139
If one were to read his comments out of context they would seem spectacularly out of
step with the typical currents of American crime politics. That is because his philosophy

U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on Interstate Trade
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reflects a distinctive approach to monitoring crime unique to regulatory ideology—as
something rooted in structural factors and economic conditions rather than individuals.
It is not unprecedented to adopt this kind of approach to street crime. A case in
point is deferred prosecution agreements. The DPA model theoretically escalates
sanctions dependent on severity and recurrence, but in its original form, it recognized the
deeper structural factors that contributed to crime. DPAs constituted an attempt to
channel disadvantaged juveniles away from the justice system, aware that exposure to the
prison could encourage future offending. DPAs today have been divorced from their
socially attentive basis and are primarily used for corporations, but the early form DPA
model reveals that it is possible to implement policy responses to street crime that are
cognizant of how structural dynamics outside of the individual contribute to criminality.
Still, a revival of DPAs as a response to street crime would only be a small step forward.
It is admirable to advocate reforms recognizing that crime is linked to social and
economic forces, but this is unlikely to lead to short-term solutions for those currently
ensnared in the carceral state. Treating structural inequalities as the cause of carceral
growth promotes long-term commitments that are unlikely to garner much political
support or reduce prison growth now. Marie Gottschalk has highlighted how this
progressive “root cause” discourse obscures other problems with the prison crisis by
overshadowing America’s tendency to mete out ruthlessly long sentences for behavior
that goes unpunished in many other countries. She defends direct reforms to penal policy
as more effective solutions, include slashing sentences for minor crimes and for violent
and sex offenders who cease to pose threats to public safety over time; a constitutional
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amendment to protect human dignity and improve the conditions of U.S. prisons; and the
elimination of barriers to public services, voting, and employment for ex-felons.1140
This highlights a second lesson the criminal justice system can learn from the
regulatory state. Focusing on political economic reform as the way to reform mass
incarceration overshadows America’s penchant for criminalizing an overwhelming array
of behaviors common among the poor that are simply not criminalized elsewhere.
Whereas regulatory ideology dictates that behaviors not deemed inherently wrong should
not be criminalized, victimless crimes unavoidable for poor and low-income populations
are criminalized with cruel severity in America. From the age of anti-tramp acts to their
contemporary banishment law variants, states and localities have long punished the poor
for behaviors that are inescapable parts of their daily lives. America should treat crimes
associated with poverty the way it treats crimes associated with markets—as behavior
driven by structural forces that do not reflect the personal depravity of individuals.
A good place to start would be the repeal of banishment laws. Politically justified
by the notion that neighborhood deterioration is a precursor to serious crime, banishment
laws are modernized versions of vagrancy laws designed to criminalize behaviors
common among the poor.1141 Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert have detailed a variety
of legal tools used by cities that blend criminal, civil, and administrative law to keep the
poor out of certain public and private spaces in cities after they commit minor offenses
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like sleeping in public or panhandling.1142 This is not just a trend present in a few cities.
As of 2014, over 400 cities had various criminal restrictions and bans on sleeping in
public, begging, and loitering.1143 The spread of these laws has been connected to brokenwindows policing and the criminalization of “quality-of-life” offenses while causing
public defenders’ misdemeanor caseloads to skyrocket.1144
Banishment laws share affinities with the anti-tramp acts of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth-centuries. Both subject the urban poor to increased police monitoring
for victimless behavior that are unavoidable parts of their daily lives. Both also depict
poverty and homelessness as precursors to serious criminal behavior that warrant
preemptive criminal responses. While political economic reform would improve the lives
of those in disadvantaged communities, we should not divert attention away from the
hyper-criminalization of victimless behaviors among the poor. Misdemeanor convictions
often carry the same collateral consequences as felony convictions, and overburdening
public defense systems deprives many offenders, including those facing serious prison
time, of a meaningful defense by directing public resources into defending minor crimes.
There must be a tremendous scaling back of laws criminalizing homelessness and
poverty. In this sense, the regulatory approach provides a useful model. Sleeping in

Beckett and Herbert, Banished, 4–7, 49–55, 74–75, 96–97; Beckett and Herbert, Steve, “Penal
Boundaries,” 7–9. For example, 43 businesses form Seattle’s Rainer Beach Trespass Program, and
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from parts of cities for other crimes, including drug offenses or prostitution.
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, “No Safe Place: The Criminalization of
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public or begging for money are inexorable parts of being homeless. Under the regulatory
approach, these behaviors would never be criminalized in the first place. Resources
would instead be directed towards monitoring the economic conditions that cause
poverty, homelessness, and these attendant behaviors so as to prevent their occurrence.
This is a more useful model for how street criminality should be monitored.
Structural reform is a noble goal but requires long-term commitments that are unlikely to
provide immediate relief for populations subjected to carceral scrutiny. An emphasis on
correcting the social and economic factors that produce homelessness should not cause us
to overlook the callous way the criminal justice system punishes poverty. Large-scale
decriminalization of loitering, panhandling, sleeping in public, and similar offenses
would reduce the state’s abusive over-criminalization of poverty in the short-term.
V. Conclusion
It is crucial for scholars to understand how rehabilitative ideology, regulatory
ideology, and the class biases of American criminal justice are related. It is also necessary
for policymakers to understand that while long-term commitments to political economic
reform would help to ameliorate problems of street and corporate criminality, these
solutions overlook immediate and pressing problems. Clarity and consistency in
enforcement of the corporate criminal law by regulators and radical decriminalization of
behaviors among the poor are necessary steps to helping people currently trapped in the
carceral state while deterring crime in corporate boardrooms.
Most fundamentally, there needs to be a recognition that carceral and regulatory
institutions work together to reinforce a message that only certain people count as
“criminal” and deserve punishment. It is a testament to the class biases inherent in the
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American political understanding of criminality that a California man can get sentenced
to 25-to-life for stealing a pizza but major corporations can commit devastatingly harmful
frauds again and again without consequence. To meaningfully reform the carceral state,
the regulatory state, and the deep inequalities of American crime policy, we must
recognize how these institutions have internalized, reproduced, and legitimized a
common politically constructed understanding of criminality.
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